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1.1 The Research Problem 
In this study I am interested in investigating or assessing the performance of the 
daily press in an African country during a period of fundamental change in its 
political culture . The investigation will take the form of exploration and analysis of 
changes in the way two daily newspapers differentially performed in their 
coverage of (reporting) and commentary on the political transition in Kenya from 
a single party to a multi·party system. The decision for this study was influenced 
by two major reasons . Firstly, the strong prompting to argue and test the study's 
major hypothesis that in Kenya, the country's political culture and praxis, more 
than any other single variable, has contributed most to the pressures and 
influences that have constrained or enabled the performance of the press in the 
realm of politics. The opportunity to do this was afforded by the second reason ; 
the socio-political process that led to the constitutional change in 1992, which 
established a multi-party political system in Kenya. 
The above proposition is important because since the time of the struggle for 
political independence, most media critics, politicians and government 
functionaries have explained the performance of the daily press mainly by 
reference to their ownership status. The details of these debates will be given 
below, especially in Chapter Three. I have not come across a single study that 
has attempted empirically to explain the political performance of the Kenyan daily 
press by reference to her political culture. Most of the arguments in the debates 
on the performance of the media in Kenya have been informed, directly and/or 
indirectly, by the normative theory of development communication . In a critical 
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review of this normative perspective, I will show below its inadequacy to address 
issues related to the role of the press in the democratic process. I will therefore 
go on to recommend and develop the theory of the public sphere as a pertinent 
normative theory against which one can judge the Kenyan political media and 
make recommendations for their improvement. 
Throughout 1990 and 1991 , there was a determined spirit on the part of critics 
and opponents of the KANU (Kenya African National Union) government to defy 
attempts by the state to suppress their efforts at breaking KANU's monopoly of 
Kenya's national politics. While the KANU government had little, if any, leverage 
to muzzle completely voices of dissent from institutions such as the organised 
Church and the Law Society of Kenya , it had the political will and constitutional 
power to defeat any attempts at the formation of organised political opposition. It 
would seem that the daily press took their cue from this reality so that organised 
or attempts at organised party opposition were covered or reported on very 
sparingly, if at all. For example, when Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, a seasoned 
opposition figure, first announced in October 1990 that he would form an 
opposition party, none of the three daily newspapers carried the story (Weekly 
Review, 22 March 1991 : 5). 
The above observations beg the question as to what was the nature and ex1ent 
of the influence of the one-party political culture on the political performance of 
the daily press. But before addressing this question, one needs to give a 
description of the emergence and nature of this political culture and how it 
affected various human freedoms in Kenya. It becomes pertinent also to review 
the history of the daily press in Kenya in order to better understand its nature 
and those influences that have most affected its composition and performance in 
the political sphere. From these reviews, I will provide the reasons that underpin 
my major hypothesis. It is my argument that it is necessary to have some 
understanding of the histories of party politics and of the daily press in order to 
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fully appreciate the empirical study, its results and their interpretation. Simply 
put, one needs to appreciate the dynamics of the influences between political 
culture and press performance as they were before the political change in order 
to investigate and understand how this change impacted on the political 
performance of the daily press. Gallagher (1982: 171) captures the dynamic 
relationship between the mass media and societal structures and processes 
thus: 
... the general conclusion must be that the mass communication is 
indeed bound with, and bounded by, the interests of the dominant 
institutions of society, but that these interests are continually redefined 
through a process to which the media themselves contribute. 
1,1,1 Democratic Political Culture and Legitimacy 
The Dictionary of Political Analysis defines political culture as "The aggregate of 
learned, socially transmitted behaviour patterns characterising government and 
politics within a society. Political culture frequently connotes the psychological 
dimension of political behaviour- beliefs, feelings, and evaluative onentations. A 
political culture is the product of the historical experience ofthe whole society as 
well as the personal experiences that contribute to the socialisation of each 
individual." According to Pye (1993: 712), "Involving both the ideals and the 
operating norms of a political system, political culture includes subjective 
attitudes and sentiments as well as objective symbols and creeds that together 
govern political behaviour and give structure and order to the political process". 
Birch (1993: 32) defines political authority as "a combination of political power 
and legitimacy, where power is the ability to get things done and legitimacy is the 
quality of ascribed entitlement to exercise that power" . In Baynes (1993) words 
"the concept of legitimacy refers to a political order's worthiness to be 
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recognised". Held (1993: 150-1) discusses legitimacy, together with territoriality 
and coercion, as the third key term in Weber's definition of the modern state. In 
this definition "the state is based on a monopoly of physical coercion which is 
legitimised ... by a belief in the justifiability andlor legality of this monopoly". In 
Weber's concept of legitimacy, people no longer comply with authority claimed 
by the powers that be merely on the grounds, as were once common, of habit 
and tradition or the charisma and personal appeal of individual leaders. "Officials 
of the modern state can claim obedience, not because of any particular appeal 
they might possess , although this might sometimes be very significant indeed , 
but because of the authority they hold temporarily as a result of their off/Cewhich 
people endorse or at least generally accept" (ibid.). 
The Dictionary of Political Analysis defines legitimacy as : 
The quality of being justified or willingly accepted by subordinates that 
converts the exercise of political power into "rightful" authority. 
Legitimacy reflects an underlying consensus that endows the leadership 
and the state with authority , and that offers respect and acceptance for 
individual leaders, institutions and behaviour norms. Although law 
serves a legitimating function, the technicality of law alone without 
widespread social acceptance may provide little support for the power of 
the lawmakers and enforcers. The consensus that provide the 
legitimating factor in the exercise of power may be cultivated through 
the sanctity of tradition , by the devotion of people to a charismatic 
leader, or by the acceptance of the supremacy of "legal authority" 
through a general belief in the supremacy of law. 
On the basis of the above definitions and pertinent literature (Atieno Odhiambo, 
1988; Anyang Nyong'o, 1988; Birch, 1993; Goulbourne, 1987; Gitonga, 1988; 
Habermas, 1992; Held, 1987), one can say that a liberal democratic political 
4 
culture obtains where the "pattern of orientations toward government and 
politics" is characterised by an open, free and informed participation by the 
citizens in the political process. This culture is enabled by the fact that the 
various groupings, and/or individuals, of society articulate their interests in tenms 
of demands on societal resources, the formulation of collectively significant goals 
and participation in policy formulation for the achievement of these demands. 
One of the preconditions to this democratic politico-cultural process is the 
existence and efficient functioning of various political institutions, mainly, 
universal suffrage, free electoral competition, political parties, free press and 
parliamentary democracy. The successful working of these institutions is seen as 
the source of political legitimacy. This type of legitimacy implies that power lies 
with the led, a power exercised through the ballot box. Birch (1993: 35) explains 
this by observing that one of the functions of political representation "is to ensure 
that political leaders are held accountable to the electorate for their actions in 
elections that are spaced in time, but not too widely spaced. These help 
legitimise the system and the powers of those who direct the government." There 
are indeed those like Schumpeter (1976) , for whom the only defining 
characteristic of a democratic process is the legitimacy conferred to those in 
authority by a competitive (free and fair) electoral system. For such people, 
"democracy should be understood (merely) as a political method in which people 
as electors periodically choose between possible teams of leaders ... a 
mechanism to select 'the men who are able to do the deciding" (Held 1993: 165). 
A democratic political process whose legitimacy is based solely on the institution 
of electoral competition among political elites has received widespread criticism 
from radical Africanist and other scholars (Ajulu, 1992; Alien, Baylies and Szeflel , 
1992; Anyang Nyong'o 1967; 1966; 1969; Atieno Odhiambo, 1966; Beckman, 
1969; 1991 ; Chomsky, 1991 ; Cliffe and Seddon, 1991; Decalo, 1992; Frank, 
1991 ; Gitonga, 1966; Gouldbourne, 1967; Gutto, 1966; Imam, 1992; Shivji, 
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1991) . In this regard Gitonga's comments about a democratic political culture 
will be helpful . He argues that since "The superstructural foundations of 
democracy are ... to be found in the values, beliefs and attitudes of the people ... 
the amount or degree of democracy in any given society is directly proportional 
to the degree of acculturation of the people in democratic values, attitudes and 
beliefs. For democracy to exist, survive and prosper, it requires that the people 
be bathed in and drenched with the democratic ethos'" That is, the people must 
be imbued with "the gospel of equality, freedom and human dignity". (Gitonga, 
1988:22) . 
In a critique of Schumpeter's classic Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Held 
(1993) takes issue with the belief that "acquiescence to a competitive electoral 
system entails a belief in the legitimacy oflhe system". He argues that in such an 
understanding of legitimacy: 
Far from democracy being a form of life marked by the promise of 
equality and the best conditions for human development in a rich 
context of participation , the democratic citizen's lot was, quite 
straightforward, the right periodically to choose and authorise 
governments to act on their behalf (ibid.: 165) 
The inadequacies of institutional means of political legitimation necessitate 
another precondition to the democratic process. That is, a political public sphere 
which , ideally, "operates as a neutral zone where access to relevant information 
affecting the public good is widely available, where discussion is free from 
domination by the state and where all those participating in public debate do so 
on an equal basis" (Curran 1991 b: 83). In this political public sphere, the citizens 
collectively determine through the process of rational and free discourse the way 
in which they want their society develop. This directly implies that a democratic 
political process requires "the supportive spirit of cultural traditions and patterns 
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of socialisation , of a political culture, of a populace accustomed to freedom" 
(Habermas 1992: 453) . 
Such a political culture is characterised and facilitated by the media "by providing 
an arena of public debate". In this regard, a basic requirement would be the 
institutionalisation of 'freedom of speech' and the articulation of public opinion in 
the press. This ensures that in the democratic process, the citizens as political 
actors are enabled and guided by their willing acceptance of and trust in the 
functioning of the democratic institutions, including the media. Atieno-Odhiambo 
(988: 119) explains that in this understanding , 'democracy thrives ... within a 
political culture which asserts that "no government is legitimate which does not 
derive its powers and functions from the consent of the governed."' Political 
culture, Hallowell (1954: 49) states, must underwrite the civil liberties because: 
There can be no real consent where there is no freedom of speech, of 
press, and of assembly. Individuals must be protected from arbitrary 
arrest and imprisonment.. . Individuals must be free to present petitions 
to the government and to enumerate publicly their grievances. 
Individuals must feel secure in their persons, homes, papers and effects 
against unreasonable and arbitrary searches and seizures ... . There 
must be an impartial judicial system to settle dispute in terms ofthe rule 
of law (Quoted in Atieno-Odhiambo 1988: 119). 
1.1.2 The Party-State's Suppressive Political Culture 
The Party-State and the Monopoly of Politics 
Writing about developing countries and African states in particular, Anyang 
Nyong'o (1988: 84-85) describes the development of a political culture whereby 
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states ' have preferred to be occupied with the politics of control rather than the 
promotion of political participation ... Thus any form of popular participation in 
the process of government is usually in the form of approval of government 
decisions rather than an expression of diverse interests expecting govemmental 
decisions and actions". This political culture ' of preferring control over 
participation becomes prevalent" not "because governing elites want to satisfy 
certain developmental goals" but because they ' have chosen to privatise the 
state and personalise political power so as to meet their very narrow and private 
needs over and above any public good" 
The development of the non-democratic political culture of control, in Frantz 
Fanon's (1963) view, started soon after independence when African governments 
started to sideline democracy. This sidelining of democracy was achieved 
primarily by use the state as "a means for private accumulation of both wealth and 
power, and this was quite often done irrespective of how much it hurt the public 
good". State institutions 'including the monolithic political parties" were in turn 
used to keep ' the people away from the political arena" (Anyang Nyong'o 1988: 
75) . The sidelining of democracy easily led 'many African civilian governments to 
be commandist, i.e. to prefer issuing commands so as to be obeyed rather than 
engaging in discussions so as to convince. Very soon a culture of fear becomes 
prevalent in the political system such that, even when things are going wrong , 
nobody dares point it out since only the commander has the right and knowledge 
to know what is wrong . In this regard the commander is usually the Head of State. 
The lack of a participatory political culture, rather than nurture political stability, is 
here argued to be the source of political instability" (ibid.). 
Shivji links the development of a non-participatory political culture to the 
adoption by African countries of the one-party state. He argues that with this 
adoption: 
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... the Party ceased to be an organ and institution of the civil society and 
became part of the state . It became a state-party. It derived its authority 
from law as opposed to a political party which derives its legitimacy from, 
and is part of, civil society . Hence, increasingly and frequently, it began 
to depend on the use of coercion, which is a characteristic par excellence 
of the state, rather than persuasion, which is characteristic of an 
organisation of civil society (Shivji, 1991 : 84). 
Another pertinent explanation given by Shivji is that: 
... the Party ceased to be a regularruling party let alone a political party. 
The self-perception of a state party, which it propagates and even 
enforces on others, members and non-members, is not simply that of a 
ruling party bent on staying on power but that of a supreme political 
existence which holds the last word on the social good and political truth. 
This means that one of the main objects of a political party - to get into 
government and monopolize political power - is transformed into a 
singular object of monopolising politics. And this object is pursued single-
mindedly with a far-reaching impact on the constitution and future of civil 
society itself (Shivji, 1991: 84-5) . 
The Consequences of Party-State Monopoly of Politics 
Shivji goes on to argue that the emergent monopoly of politics had four 
fundamental consequences for the polity. "First, it meant that no organised 
politics or political activity could be permitted outside the state-party". 
Consequently, all "mass organisations" were "brought under the control of the 
state-party". He describes this "profound effect of the monopoly of politics by the 
state-party" as the "destruction of autonomous organised expression of the 
differences in civil society". This destruction led to the second effect: "If 
organised interests cannot be permitted then any autonomous articulation and 
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expression of those interests cannot be permitted either." This meant that the 
"various media of expression, newspapers, magazines, radio and institutions or 
propagating ideas, schools and such also come under the hegemony of the 
state". Shivji argues that though it is true that "different interests and the 
expression of those interests cannot be obliterated altogether but they can 
certainly be suppressed and discouraged" (Shivji 1991 : 85) . 
The cumulative resu It of the above two effects was "the development of a closed 
society" . This third effect "develops almost imperceptibly behind the backs ofthe 
people, so to speak" . The development and manifestation of the closed society 
takes place on both the institutional as well as ideological levels. The institutional 
manifestation happens in such a way that: 
The public affairs are conducted most secretly, where members of the 
public are spectators and rumour-mongers rather than actors and 
commentators ... The right of expression is circumscribed - monopoly of 
the press, severe laws on edition - while the right to know is almost non-
existent. Severe limits on the rights of the citizens are prescribed in law, 
which the people themselves may not know, but feel in their bones. 
Drawing lessons from experience and leading examples, which become 
part of popular sub-conscious, people set their own limits through self-
censorship. Prudence dictates that these be even more restrictive than 
the legal limits (Shivji 1991 : 86). 
The consequence ofthe above institutional development is that "openness, one 
of the most important characteristics of a democratic society, suffers . With it 
suffer the prestige and social place of institutions given to openness, by 
definition, such as the judicature, the parliament, the press or the university". The 
closed society provides fertile ground for the flourishing of "arbitrariness, 
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intrigues, nepotism, favouritism and political sycophancy. At the leadership level , 
individual merit, sincerity of purpose, personal honesty or commitment count for 
little. What matters is the ability to appease your leader and the agility to chorus 
into a dominant song, even if it is exactly opposite to the one sung on just the 
previous day" (ibid.). 
In Shivji 's analysis , "the fourth effect of monopoly of politics is ideological". This 
ideological effect is the "most subtle yet profoundly prejudicial to democracy" 
since by it the monopoly of politics "generates a political culture of intolerance 
which expects and actively solicits an unanimity of views". The political culture of 
intolerance is best exemplified by "what has always been put forward as the 
strongest argument in favour ofthe system of state-party ... This is the argument 
that the one-party system has generated and helps ensure national unity" . This 
argument is ideological because it "may not necessarily mean what it says or 
may say what it does not necessarily imply". One of the implied meanings of 
national unity "may be a nation (country) without diversity and divergent 
interests; that is to say, the one-party system has helped us to attain national 
unity by obliterating all important differences and different interests. This is 
certainly not true" (Shivji 1991: 86) . 
Shivji concludes by contending that there is only one real meaning of 'national 
unity' and: 
that is that the single-party has managed successful to suppress any 
organised expression of diversity and differences in our society. If so, 
then what is really meant is not 'national unity' but (imposed) unanimity 
.... In that case, therefore, 'national unity' is an ideological euphemism for 
imposed unanimity" .... Unanimity is not identical with unity, for unity can 
flourish in adversity just as unanimity can disguise forces of disunity. 
National unity based on diversity would dictate different political attitudes 
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and culture, a politics of consensus rather than a politics of coercion -
whether physical or psychological. 
A politics of consensus has a positive attitude towards diversity while a 
politics of unanimity aims at obliterating all diversity . A politics of 
consensus however can still maintain national unity by a continuous 
process of dialogue, debate and discussion in which there is 'give and 
take', and there are compromises so as to attain a consensus on major 
issues. Under the politics of unanimity, views of one side have to prevail, 
more often by the logic of force rather than the force of logic (Shivji 
1991 : 87) . 
1.1.3 Presidential Authoritarianism 
There is another feature that characterised the emergent political culture that 
Shivji did not address: the "phenomenon of presidential ism" (Goulbourne 1987) 
or "presidential authoritarianism (Anyang Nyong'o 1989). Goulbourne (1987: 30) 
argues that the tirst generation of post-colonial leaders in Africa "had a unique 
opportunity to set in motion the further development of democratic institutions, 
practices and conventions". This unique opportunity was characterised on the 
one hand by the fact that "there was the tremendous enthusiasm of the people 
for building a new social order, an enthusiasm borne out of the struggle for 
political independence and which was still buoyant in the years immediately after 
independence". On the other hand, "tirst generation of leaders throughout the 
continent enjoyed an authority which went beyond that derived from popular 
elections, etc.; they nearly all enjoyed something of what Weber called 
charismatic authority by virtue of being the leader who had challenged the 
colonial power and forged the path to political independence". 
12 
These leaders however failed to use the unique opportunity that they had and 
instead did the direct opposite, "the destruction of the birth of democracy". They 
"threw their weight behind the construction of a variety of repressive systems and 
used their authority to justify these new forms of repression" mainly by use of "a 
number of spurious arguments". One of their arguments was that "being new 
states engaged in the process of nation-building , the unity achieved during the 
nationalist struggle for polilical independence should be maintained at all cost". 
In this argument, "national unity was pitched against open politics; it was seen as 
a choice between the one of the other. The declared search for consensus which 
formed the basis of national unity , was short-circuited and a 'unity' imposed from 
above through the repressive state institutions" (Goulbourne 1967: 35) . 
The first-generation leaders also used the ideological argument that "the 
institutions and beliefs which are generally accepted as being the essential 
elements of democracy" such as a plurality of political parties, a free press "are 
colonial in character, or in any case, come from the former imperialist countries 
and are, therefore, if only presumably by association, unacceptable". Yet another 
argument "was that to effect rapid development it was necessary first to put 
controls in place. This argument maintained that much political disputation was 
bound to result in distraction from the main national effort, namely development". 
The reasoning here is premised on the "view that democracy and development 
are in any event contradictory elements": 
The argument seems to run something like this: a poor country cannot 
afford to dissipate its energies in the niceties, luxuries, of allowing all and 
sundry to put Iheir views about national matters when the task of 
prosecuting development is the national project over which 
independence was fought. A second aspect of this argument is that in 
any event democracy is not a necessary condition for development 
(Goulbourne 1967: 36). 
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The above actions and ideological arguments on the part of "the first generation 
of post-colonial leaders in Africa" was coupled with , and also contributed to, the 
birth and development of "presidential ism". According to Goulboume (1987: 31), 
this phenomenon "involves the centralisation of state power in the hands of 
president and/or his office. The incumbent is supposed to represent the people 
as a whole in nearly all matters relating to the country" . The development of this 
phenomenon has seen "many presidents derive their authority not from any 
popular electoral mandate but through sheer incumbency." A process, such as 
obtained in Kenya (see Widner, 1992), whereby "the sole political party puts 
forward one candidate for election to the presidency" achieves because the 
candidate is returned and is deemed to have been unopposed. This is then 
projected as a demonstration of the president's popularity in the country, "and 
the newspapers usually hail his election as a great victory" . The result is that 
"presidents have never actually gone to the country for popular election because 
candidates have never been opposed, it being illegal to put forward a candidate 
from outside the de facto single party which becomes the de jure sole political 
party" (Goulbourne 1987: 31). 
For Anyang Nyong'o (1989: 231): 
Presidential authoritarianism is born when political power is so 
concentrated in the office of the president that no major decision is taken 
within the bureaucratic or political process without reference to this 
office, or when the legitimacy of bureaucratic decisions is derived from 
their claim to have the blessing or backing of the president. The 
presidency becomes the biggest bureau in terms of administration and 
policy-making; all other organs of government gradually begin to bend to 
it and politicians stand in awe of the power of the president 
It is his contention that "the rise of the strong preSidents in post-colonial Africa is 
really the result of the fragmentation of the petty bourgeoisie; struggling among 
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themselves for political power, and who, not being able to produce any dominant 
tendency among them, are finally compelled to settle for the mediation of one 
man; the leader, who eventually grows into a strong presidenr (ibid.). The result is 
that "factions of the bourgeoisie, especially the dominant and ruling faction, could 
not see their political and economic fortunes outside the halo of the presidential 
power". This is because they had abdicated from political organisation by 
dismantling their nationalist coalition, and now they could only ensure their class 
rule by perpetuating the authoritarian presidency. Anyang Nyong'o argues that 
though at first the "authoritarian presidency" was seen "as a stabilising factor for 
bourgeois rule , increasingly became a snare to the rule, and finally stood as a 
wall between the bourgeoisie and the popular masses" (ibid. 232). 
1.1.4 The Ideology of Order 
In a study of the development of a suppressive political culture in African 
countries and Kenya in particular, Atieno Odhiambo (1988) deploys the concept 
of "ideology of order." In this study , he "explores how the state, as an institution, 
has evolved and attained its hegemonic function in the Kenyan society, while 
simultaneously eroding the process of democracy, and therefore freedom". He 
argues that, "the pursuit of power as an end in itself has attained its 
Machiavellian charm in Kenya" . The source of this development is located in the 
fact that "the decolonisation process was an ambiguous adventure" which "left 
Kenya with two legacies that have sat and continue to sit uneasily with each 
other. On the one hand there is the legacy of freedom, while on the other there is 
state power" (Atieno Odhiambo, 1988: 111). 
Atieno Odhiambo's (1988: 112) main thesis is that "the colonial and post-colonial 
regimes have sought to control the direction and content of politics in Kenya, 
using state power as the instrument of control. The state has created a justifying 
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ideology ... the Ideology of Order, in order to legitimise these efforts at control. 
The goal of the ruling regimes has been to assert political hegemony over the 
rest of society". Two of the essential characteristics of the ideology of order are 
that it "spells out the need for obedience among the governed rather than any 
profound acceptance of the rulers" and "the necessity for lowering the newly-
acquired expectations and levels of activity of the ruled". In this ideology, the 
people or the ruled are seen as the greatest danger to democracy. "The people 
are perceived as a danger to order because they do insist that there ought to be 
accountability in society" (ibid.: 122) . 
In the development of and justification for the ideology of order, "the emergent 
wisdom was that the strong state was a pre-requisite for law, order, good 
government and nation-building". Atieno-Odhiambo (1988: 124) observes, for 
example, that "the quest for hegemony in the Kenyan context has involved the 
sponsorship of the high visibility of the General Service Unit (for beating up 
recalcitrant crowds), the continuous centralization of power around the 
presidency, and the usage of legal lawlessness - detention and murder - to 
muzzle society". And for justification: 
The argument runs that one of the foremost concerns for any newly 
independent state is creating political order. The struggle for 
independence has a way of throwing up a whole host of political 
opinions, an array of political movements, and a gamut of flamboyant 
leaders. It is the duty of the in-coming governments to create political 
order in society by incorporating, excluding or liquidating all the 
discordant political noises in society .. .. The victorious party at Uhuru 
(independence) must assert its political hegemony before it can hope to 
rule effectively. It must insist at all times that sovereignty, "national unity" 
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and "national security" are sacred and inviolate. He rules best, and lasts 
longest, who can ensure that Law and Order, in other words internal 
security , is paramount. Out of this wisdom emerged "regime-building" and 
the quest for the hegemony by the state in all spheres of national life . 
(Atieno Odhiambo 123). 
One of the manifestations of the ideology of order is the high regard given in the 
Kenyan polity to constitutionalism. Anyang Nyong 'o (1 989: 250) observes that 
"there has been so much concern for the law in post-colonial Kenya . Even when 
it is obvious that the faction of the bourgeoisie which dominates the political 
process simply wants to get things done in its own interest, it must somehow 
reduce it to law, or act arbitrarily and then retroactively legalise such action." In 
the case of Kenya , the suppressive political culture was epitomised in the way 
the Constitution was used or changed in order to criminalize organised 
opposition politics , place the President above the law, strip the Attorney General 
of tenure protection, detain government critics without trial , muzzle the press, 
curtail freedom of expression and assembly etc. For this reason, any significant 
change in the political culture would have to begin with a change in the 
constitution . According to Anyang Nyong 'o: 
Part of the explanation is to be found in the colonial inheritance that 
dominates state action and processes of state legitimation. Things have 
been done legally from colonial times and they are only accepted or 
tolerated as legitimate ifthey pass through legal channels . ... Further, the 
process of law-making is believed to be carried out by the elected 
representatives of the people. Once certain interests pass through 
parliamentary validation as legitimate laws, they are expected to acquire 
a universal appeal and legitimacy beyond the particularistic social forces 
behind them. In this way, even when the interests of the bourgeoisie were 
being pursued much more directly through executive action, the need to 
17 
stick to the law for purposes of legitimation was always there (Ibid.). 
From the above review one can argue that there emerged a suppressive political 
culture in most African countries with their adoption and establishment of the 
party-state . I will deal with the case of Kenya in more detail below. I will show 
that what emerged in Kenya under President Daniel arap Moi was a political 
culture whereby the ruling elite preferred the politics of control rather than 
political participation. Popular participation was accepted only in the form of 
approval of government decisions rather than expression of diverse interests. 
The difference between the state and the ruling party became blurred, effectively 
sidelining democracy. The party became part ofthe state deriving authority from 
law and making use of coercion as opposed to deriving legitimacy from 
persuasion. In effect, the party assumed a "supreme political existence which 
holds the last word on the social good and political truth" with the "singular object 
of monopolising power" . Organised politics or political activity outside the state-
party was criminalized by the Constitutional amendment of June 1982. This 
effectively prohibited organised and public articulation and expression of 
alternative views and interests. 
The emergent political culture in Kenya as will be seen below, and indeed in 
most post-colonial Africa, was therefore a culture of fear among the citizenry, 
where there was little room to criticise the ruling party or its president. Political 
sycophancy flourished. One sees in this the development of a closed society. 
This resulted also from the fact that there were put in place legal limits on the 
rights of the citizens. Members of the public ended up being "spectators and 
rumour-mongers rather than actors and commentators". The effect was that a 
culture of silence set in on the part of the populace. Ideological support for the 
state-party or party-state was achieved by the main argument that it fosters and 
ensures "national unity". This in reality was an "ideological euphemism for 
imposed unanimity". What was being advanced was a political culture of 
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unanimity where "views of one side have to prevail ... by the logic of force rather 
than the force of logic·. The ideology of order and respect for the law of the land 
was used to accord "legal legitimacy· to authoritarian rule. 
1.1.5 Political change and Press Perfonmance 
One of the main concerns in this study is to investigate the proposition that a 
major change or process of change in the Kenyan political culture as described 
above would impact significantly on the performance of the country's political 
press; press performance here referring to both their coverage and their 
commentary on central issues pertinent to that transition (change) . This 
proposition is based on the premise that in the above political culture, the 
freedom of the press to report and comment on the political process in a way that 
would be construed as openly challenging the legitimacy of the KANU 
government was curtailed both directly or indirectly. A situation then obtained in 
Kenya where there was media censorship, both overt censorship and self-
censorship . 
The Dictionary of Political Analysis defines political change as the 
Transformation of structures, processes, or goals affecting the 
distribution and exercise of governing power in society. Political change 
may occur as a system adapts to new demands and a changing 
environment, or as one system - unable to maintain itself - is replaced 
by another. .. Peaceful political change may be called reform or simply be 
identified with constitutional change in leadership or the restructuring of 
political influence within society. 
A momentous political change took place in Kenya when in December 1991, the 
ruling KANU government repealed the constitutional amendment that had made 
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Kenya a de jure one-party system, thereby ushering in a multi-party political 
system. This constitutional change resulted partly from a long politico-ideological 
struggle between the local opposition political elite and the ruling KANU 
government; a struggle that was fuelled by powerful and vested diplomatic 
interests from the West. This struggle was in itself the cradle of a process of 
change in the political culture, informed as it was by a determination among the 
opposition political elite to break KANU government's monopoly of politics in 
Kenya . The political elite got popular support from a populace that had grown 
weary of the suppressive Moi regime . I will discuss this in more detail below. 
As already stated above, I am interested in finding out whether and how the 
political change to multi-partyism impacted on the proportion and nature of the 
daily newspape~s coverage of party-political news. It is my proposition that with 
the repeal of the single-party legislation that legalised opposition politics, the 
press could now freely report news and on issues and personalities that would 
have been taboo in the former political conjuncture. This proposition can be 
gauged firstly by finding out if there was any increase, and the extent of this, in 
party news as a proportion of all the political news carried by each of the two 
dailies, Kenya Times and the Nation. Secondly, it can be gauged by finding out if 
there were any changes in the proportion of publicity (coverage) accorded by 
each of the political groups by the two newspapers. From here I will then look at 
the nature of publicity accorded, whether positive or negative. This will help 
establish the party sympathy for each daily because positive or negative publicity 
for this study would imply giving or not giving a particular party public legitimacy. 
It is in the above light that this study may be regarded as a "media performance 
assessmenf study. According to McQuail (1992: 12), the expression 'media 
assessment' may refer to, among other things, 'critical evaluation of many 
possible aspects or cases of the work of media.' He goes on (1992: 17) to give 
the definition of media performance analysis as: 
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The independent assessment of media provision according to alternative 
'public interest' criteria , by way of objective and systematic methods of 
research , taking account of other relevant evidence and the normal 
operating conditions and requirements of the media concerned . 
Such performance analysis should be grounded in normative and historical 
perspectives. This would facilitate a systematic evaluation of what the media are 
doing according to some independent criteria of achievement. It is in this regard 
that McQuail (ibid.) suggests the way to go as follows : 
The first aim is to develop as comprehensive a framework of normative 
principle as possible, consistent both with the historical record of social 
concern with public communication and with the requirements of 
coherence and economy of presentation ... The need to specify some 
observable outward sign of supposed merit or public benefits from 
communication is a powerful incentive to clearer thinking . 
1.1 .6 Ownership Status and Press Perfonnance 
The press cannot be studied as a single entity as if the different institutions that 
comprise it have uniform characteristics and interests. This study is particularly 
interested in the daily newspapers. To a limited but important degree, this study 
will discuss issues pertaining to ownership. During the period under 
investigation, there were three daily newspapers in Kenya; one owned by the 
ruling party KANU and the other two privately owned. While the KANU paper, 
Kenya Times, is comparatively a more recent publication, the private ones, the 
Nation and the Standard, have a long history going back to pre-independence 
Kenya. They are sometimes referred to as the 'independent' press; 
independence here simply meaning freedom from direct state, political or 
ruling-party control. 
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On another level , this study will be comparative. I will investigate how the ruling 
party newspaper, Kenya Times, compares with a private one, the Nation, in 
covering the same political issues and the two political groups to be investigated. 
I consider the comparison between the two types of newspaper ownership to be 
significant because of the historical discussion in Kenya about press ownership. 
The discussion has centred on the question: What is the most desirable form of 
ownership , foreign or indigenous, that will serve the nation's interests? For my 
purposes, during the period under investigation, Kenya Times qualifies as being 
indigenously owned while the Nation qualifies as both privately and 
foreign-owned. This study will be comparative in a second way. I will investigate 
how the press coverage of the pol itical transition before the constitutional change 
compares with the coverage after. The temporal comparison will be concerned 
with the influence of the change in the political culture on press performance. 
Still on the question of ownerShip, there is the problem of private ownership 
versus political party-ownership of the press. It was argued in some Circles, as 
will shortly be seen below, that a ruling party newspaper would of necessity give 
access only to party propaganda and monopolise news from the state thereby 
defeating freedom of the press . This argument implies that private ownership of 
the press is to be preferred to party ownerShip. If one considers also the 
above-mentioned preference for indigenous as opposed to foreign-owned press, 
the preferred press, it would seem, would be indigenous and privately owned. 
This study aims at finding out firstly, by way of literature review and by reference 
to case examples and secondly, by empirical research , whether these 
propositions are valid. I will do all this with the aim of recommending and 
developing the theory of the public sphere as a viable normative theory against 
which one can judge the Kenyan and African media systems and make 
recommendations for their improvement. 
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1.2 The Importance of News 
The newspaper is chosen for this study because of some very important and 
apparent reasons. Newspapers report news in a format that is easily accessible 
and enduring. Historically, this is the medium that is strongly identified with news. 
As McQuail (1987: 203) puts it, 'It is arguable that the newspaper is the 
archetype as well as the prototype of all modern mass media and ... that the 
central ingredient of the newspaper and those media modelled on it, radio and 
television , is what we call news.' In Kenya where the broadcasting media has for 
a long time been in the hands of the state , politicians , especially opposition 
politicians, and other politically motivated persons rely on print media for 
alternative and relatively more balanced news (see Chapter 3 below). 
It is generally agreed that people can get information in the news about events 
that they cannot experience first hand and it can therefore be argued that news 
is for them a mirror or window on reality . The importance of news is further 
enhanced by the journalists' ideological belief 'that their role is to supply 
information that will enable their audience to come to its own conclusions' (Gans, 
1980: 186). This belief is at the very heart of claims to objectivity, imparti.ality and 
independence by newsmen. However, although these may be major sources of 
legitimacy for the press organisations, other aspects of news warn against taking 
the assumption at face value. 
It is Waiter Uppman's (1922) observation that 'News is not a mirror of social 
conditions, but the report of an aspect that has obtruded itself (quoted in 
McQuail 1987: 204). An elaboration on this observation is provided by 
Schlesinger (1987: 164), who has this to say: 
News does not select itself, but is rather the product of judgements 
concerning the social relevance of given events and situations 
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based on assumptions concerning their interest and importance. 
The 'reality' it portrays is always in at least one sense 
fundamentally biased, simply by virtue of the inescapable decision 
to designate an issue or event newsworthy, and then to construct 
an account of it in a specific framework of interpretation. News 
must be assessed as a cultural product that embodies journalistic, 
social , and political values. It cannot be, and certainly is not, a 
neutral, impartial , or totally objective perception of the real world . 
From a practical point of view, therefore, 'National media cannot report all stories 
that affect the nation or the national audience they serve; consequently, they 
need an exclusionary consideration that limits the number of suitable stories' 
(Gans, 1980: 147). It is my argument that the metaphor of news being a mirror 
does not imply capturing most aspects, let alone the whole picture, of the 
nation's political configuration or development mainly because, 'the (news) media 
are institutionally under-equipped for this overwhelming responsibility' (Tiffen, 
1989: 178). 
The fact that the media have a limited capacity to carry national news has grave 
consequences for the political process. This is so because politicians rely on the 
press for publicity and legitimacy in the eyes of the public. However, as it will be 
argued presently, the media, in their news processing , employ selective and 
exclusionary considerations on events that have 'obtruded' themselves and in 
deciding on the perspective{s) in which to present them as news. This study aims 
also at establishing and illustrating some of the selective and exclusionary 
considerations employed by the Kenyan press in its news processing, and the 
perspectives in which they are presented. 
Politicians are perennially preoccupied with publicity being mainly concerned 
with whether the media publicity that they are accorded is negative or positive. 
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The struggle for publicity on the part of political actors can be likened to a battle. 
In Kenya, the struggle for party-political change was in its seminal stage heavily 
dependent on , and waged through the media. I would like to make the argument 
that opposition politicians depended on the media to legitimise their agitation for 
change whilst the KANU government, through the media, resisted this by trying 
to ensure that the Opposition was not accorded any media publicity or/and that 
they were on the average accorded mostly negative media publicity. 
One can therefore argue that 'Battles for favourable news coverage are a major 
arena in political conflicts, and the news provides a common reference point to 
which the different sides relate in their subsequent actions' (Tiffen, 1989: 178). 
Gans aptly captures the importance of the quest for good publicity when he says 
that, ' ... news organisations are surrounded by individuals and groups wanting to 
get their messages into the arena w;th a maximum of helpful and a minimum of 
harmful public;ty' (1980: 249 my italics). The implication of these arguments is 
that preference and search for positive public;ty gives birth to a litany of 
struggles; for access to the news media, for legitimacy in the news and for 
control of access to and performance of the news media, among other things . It 
is my proposition that whatever the nature of the publicity struggle in the realm of 
politics, power lies at the heart of it. This is mainly because, 'The centrality of the 
news media in political communication makes them a strategic arena in the 
struggle for power' (Tiffen, 1989: 7). It is my argument that opposition politicians 
in Kenya were in the main seeking after political power and recognition. They 
could achieve this only by being legitimate players in the political arena. Before 
the 1992 constitutional change, this legitimacy was denied them because 
opposition party-politics was proscribed. It can be argued, therefore, that the 
seminal stage of their fight for legitimacy was carried out through press publicity. 
The metaphor of the news media as an arena captures the element of the 
inequality that is inherent in political news coverage; there is no equality or 
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equity in the news arena. Furthermore. being featured in this arena does not 
guarantee having 'helpful' publicity. Tiffen (1989: 7) expounds on this as follows: 
An arena is not necessarily a neutral or inert venue in 
participants' battles. The advantages and disadvantages of 
newsworthiness and access are not bestowed equally. The 
factors that produce publicity are rarely within the control of 
anyone group. The publicising efforts of rival participants. 
the intrusion of unplanned newsworthy events. independent 
information-gathering by reporters all conspire to make the 
process of news coverage one of the less predictable 
elements in the political equation. Similarly. publicity cannot 
be simply equated with success. Its political impact is far 
from uniform - being apparently vital at some times and 
seemingly irrelevant or marginal at others. (my italics) . 
I think that one of the major considerations to bear in mind when discussing the 
import of news in the political process is the ideological nature of the impartiality 
problematic inherent in news-gathering and news reporting. According to 
McQuail (1987: 208). it is hard to ·resist Gerbner's (1964) conclusion that there is 
no fundamentally non-ideologically . apolitically. non-partisan. news-gathering 
and reporting system. Hoggart suggests that it is erroneous to claim that news 
presentation can be ·objective·. or a mirror of reality. or neutral channels for 
representing the ·facts· . Referring to television news workers in Britain . he 
asserts that 'Of course. what they call 'the news' is biased .. .' (Glasgow Media 
GrouP. 1976: x) . 
In Hoggart's view. there are four 'filtering processes' by which 'the news select 
itself . Of the four. he opines that •. .. the most important filter - since it partly 
contains the others - is the cultural air we breathe. the whole ideological 
26 
atmosphere of our society, which tells us that some things can be said and others 
had best not be said' (ibid. my italics) . The implication of Hoggart's argument, 
and I agree with this, is that we should remember when looking at the content of 
news, as aptly put by Gans (1980: 60) , that 'News, like other kinds of symbolic 
fare, consists of explicit and implicit content, and no single content analysis can 
grasp them all. ' 
I intend to demonstrate presently that the political-ideological cultural 'air' or 
'atmosphere' during KANU's power monopoly was a major 'filtering process' that 
determined the selective and exclusionary considerations of the Kenyan press in 
their political performance. I will demonstrate that KANU's political ideology and 
performance was averse to opposition and criticism and that Kenya's daily press 
performance was greatly constrained by this reality. The change to multi-party 
politics, for the purposes of this study , suggested that the daily press would now 
operate in a new 'atmosphere' and breathe new 'air'. This study will investigate 
how this changed atmosphere affected the way the two daily newspapers 
performed as a political public sphere. 
On another level of precision, in this study I am interested in both political events 
and political issues. It is my proposition that a daily press covering a political 
process that is changing in the direction of greater political diversity would cover 
both the political events and the political issues with equal importance. In fact, if 
the role of the press is to contribute in the direction of effecting greater 
democracy, the definition and/or discussion of pertinent political issues as 
opposed to that of events should be given precedence. The determination of 
which of the two, events or issues, is accorded overriding coverage in the press 
is not made easier by the fact that, usually, issues emerge via events. In his 
study of News and Power in Australia, Tiffen (1989: 178) says that, 'The 
definition of issues in the news is a by-product from its primary orientation of 
reporting recent developments. Coverage of issues depends on how their 
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abstract principles, amorphous conflicts or continuing conditions become 
crystallised into newsworthy events.' 
One can therefore argue that news coverage is skewed in preference of dramatic 
events having an element of novelty. This brings to mind the 'man bites dog' 
news characteristic. Tiffen (1989: 178) illustrates the dialectic of preference for 
events over issues when he observes that; 'the press thrives on people robbing 
banks, not banks robbing people.' He goes on to explain that: 
News responds primarily to two main influences: the development 
of politically consequential controversies and the occurrence of 
'spot' news (accidents, crimes, disasters, etc.). Whatever their 
commitment to diversity, no news organisation functions by 
promoting debate in the abstract Their priorities are shaped by 
perceptions of the exercise of power, the imminence of decisive 
developments, the intensity of conflict and their sense of what is 
important to their audience. (my italics) . 
The political change in Kenya during the period that I am investigating had 
everything to do with fundamental political issues. The crusade for multi-partyism 
was one of the most important politically consequential controversies in the 
history of Kenya . However, the pertinent issues were mooted in dramatic fashion 
during dramatic political events (mainly during public rallies). It can be argued 
that the press highlighted the political issues in the process of reporting on these 
events. Tiffen on his part argues that, 'Issues ... emerge publicly not as 
autonomous topics for debate but embedded in, and secondary to the reporting 
of conflicts and power plays.' He also subscribes to the belief that 'avoidance of 
issues is institutionalised into the work patters and norms of the press gallery. He 
goes on to say that, 'The intrinsic properties of issues are less important in 
determining news coverage than the developing direction of the political conflicts 
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and the balance of contending voices' (1989: 178). 
The peculiarity of news, and its primary political significance, is that it is an 
institution devoted to disclosure. Disclosure is important because it puts events 
and issues on the public agenda. This journalistic importance of disclosure was 
expressed by The Times as long ago as the 1850s thus, The press lives by 
disclosure - it is daily and forever appealing to the enlightened force of public 
opinion, anticipating if possible the march of events, standing upon the breach 
between the present and the future' (quoted in Tiffen , 1989: 186). The emphasis 
in the news on disclosure and publicity as against the substantive issues does 
not, however, guarantee that what gets prominence will be of most significance 
or that options will emerge in a manner which aids democratic choice. 
In the realms of politics, depending on other factors such as, in this study, a 
major political change, publicity may crucially enhance the salience of issues. 
This is because publicity can determine and transform the priority accorded an 
issue in a positive direction. However, this mechanism may work in the reverse 
direction too. Frequent and intense coverage of some issue and the intermittent 
coverage or neglect of others helps to shape public agendas. News presentation 
involves a hierarchy of importance between stories and information within 
stories. Some aspects of the political issues may gain prominence in the news to 
the implied subordination of others. News coverage is thus implicated not only in 
the priority of issues, but in their definition. 
In summary, I can say that the basic import of the news media in politics is that 
they are an institution in the business of disclosure and commentary; being an 
institution of mass dissemination, they communicate to a large audience of mixed 
social classes and political persuasion. Having a relative degree of 
communicator autonomy, they do occasionally impose their own priorities and 
conventions upon what is presented. As a result, they are the targets of political 
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players who are interested in positive publicity. This is more so because their 
presence and activities affect the timing , the manner, and, most important, the 
extent of revelations about powerful groups and personalities . 
1.3 Editorial Commentaries 
From the above discussion on news, I wish to argue that the way a newspaper 
reports or covers political events and political actors, when analysed may give 
some but not all of the clues as to where that newspaper's sympathies lie 
ideologically and/or politically. I propose therefore that when it comes to gauging 
a newspaper's expressed or implied ideological and, therefore political 
preferences, editorial columns and editorial commentary pages are the places to 
study. It is my observation that it is in the editorial pages that the Kenyan daily 
newspapers openly comment or give their opinions on political issues and 
political personalities. It is here too that they respond to any accusations and 
complaints against their performance. Generally speaking , editorials are of 
particular concern to politicians and politically motivated persons. According to 
Gans (1980: 291): 
Editorials provide overnight approximations of public opinion; 
public officials also analyse the news for implicit opinions, 
believing the value implications of the news to reflect the 
journalists' opinions. When normally objective reporters express an 
explicit opinion, public officials become even readier to treat them 
as agents of the vox populi. 
Hays (1969) mentions a sequence of editorials as examples of a typical stream 
of linguistic data that may be a subject of scientific analysis. He opines that: 
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The staff of a newspaper, experiencing an epoch , produces a 
series of essays, recapitulating some of the day's events, placing 
them with respect to historical trends, theory, and dogma. It 
expresses opinions about the true nature of situations that are 
necessarily not fully comprehended , and opinions about the 
responses called for (quoted in Krippendorff, 1980: 42; my italics). 
It is in this regard that in the qualitative section of this study I will investigate the 
two selected newspapers to find out their editorial position with regard to the 
issues raised in the political-ideological debate which I will presently detail 
below. 
From a careful study of the data, I have observed that in most cases editorials 
are prompted by news as reported by the newspaper. The commentaries may be 
carried on the same day as the news stories to which they are attributed, or later. 
As already indicated above, the editorials attempt to put or contextualise these 
news stories into historical or dogmatic perspectives. All this is done with the 
reader in mind, partly with a view to influence opinion and belief. However, as 
will be seen below, the history of the daily press in Kenya has a few examples of 
how the editorial pages can be used by editors as a weapon against political 
enemies. In short, the editorial section of the daily newspaper is the most easily 
politicised and potentially most sensitive and controversial . The relevance of 
studying daily newspaper editorials is enhanced by my belief that the results can 
also provide a backdrop against which to review findings from the investigation of 
the main news stories. 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
In the section above, I have discussed the different aspects of the research 
problem: the relationship between political culture and press performance; and 
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secondarily, between ownership status and press performance. This comprises 
the first part of Chapter One: The Introduction. In the second section of the 
chapter, I give a brief history of party politics in Kenya since the 
pre-independence period until 1991 when the single-party legislation, which 
turned Kenya into a de jure one-party state, was repealed . I will document and 
illustrate here the development, under the KANU government, of a political 
culture that progressively became intolerant of dissenting political views. The 
whole thesis consists of eight chapters . 
Chapter Two deals with theoretical argumentation. Firstly , I will develop here an 
argument to underpin my decision to treat a society's political and ideological 
culture as a major determinant of the political performance of the press. 
Secondly, I will discuss and develop the normative theory of the public sphere 
and recommend its application to African media situations. In chapter Three I will 
give the history of the daily press in Kenya , reviewing the main issues that have 
dominated discussions on media politics and, the major socio-structural factors 
that have impacted on the performance of the press in the political process since 
the pre-independence era. I will go on to make and illustrate the argument that 
political considerations, emanating from the political culture discussed in Chapter 
One, have been the major sources of constraint on the press. In the end, I will 
illustrate how this pressure was used to deny the nascent Opposition press 
publicity. This will form part of the basis on which to review the findings in 
Chapters Six and Seven. 
In Chapter Four, I will explain why I have decided to use both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches to content analyses. Chapter Five will deal with the 
research design; giving the operational definitions and then delineating the 
period for the empirical study. I will present and discuss the quantitative and 
qualitative research findings in Chapters Six and Seven respectively . The 
conclusion will be presented in Chapter Eight. 
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1.5 The Colonial and Pre-Independence Period 
It is important for the purposes of this study to give a concise review of the 
historical development of party politics in Kenya . This is intended to show how 
the birth and development of a party-state gave birth to a suppressive and 
non-democratic political culture . The consequences of this development for 
the press will be the subject of Chapter Three below. The focus at this stage. 
however, is to show how organised political opposition to the ruling KANU 
government during both the Kenyatta and Moi eras was strongly suppressed. 
Though there are some differences in the way the two leaders actually 
effected this suppression, they shared major attributes which included 
disapproval of multi-partyism, aversion to and harsh dealing with government 
critics, use of legal instruments to achieve their ends, amending of the 
constitution to their political convenience when need arose. All these 
contributed , with time, to a marked erosion of various fundamental and human 
freedoms, especially the freedom of association and expression. As I have 
already said above, I will argue in Chapter Three that the curtailment of the 
freedom of political expression described here, meant that the daily press was 
likewise under immense pressure not to play the role of the political public 
sphere. 
The Moi era however, gives this study its temporal positioning or time frame. It 
is during Moi's regime that the KANU government's monopoly of Kenyan 
politics was brought to an end in December 1991 . It is also during this era that 
Kenya was made a de jure one party state with an all-powerful Presidency. I 
will show that during this period , Parliament lost most of its functions and 
became an arm of KANU and the executive's rubber-stamp; amending the 
constitution at the executive's whim to entrench the KANU government's hold 
on power. The limited political space that existed during Kenyatta's era was 
now effectively circumscribed and political views criminalised . The early years 
of the 90's saw a world-wide hue and cry for democratic governance and for 
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the end of one-party and military states . This coincided with an unprecedented 
show of daring by a number of prominent political activists and others in 
positions of leadership in their criticism of Moi's regime. The demands of donor 
countries and international financial institutions for political transparency, 
accountability and good governance and their eventual tying of aid to the 
satisfaction of these conditionalities added the last straw that humbled the 
KANU government. 
By illustrating the developments mentioned above, I intend to show and argue 
that the debate about multi-partyism was waged from two different ideological 
grounds. I will show that the major issue was whether or not multi-partyism as 
opposed to a single-party system was the desirable political system for Kenya. 
This will form part of the background for the analysis in Chapter Six. 
Kenya became a British 'protectorate' in 1886, when the East African Treaty 
was signed between Britain and Germany over the colonisation of East Africa. 
The Imperial British East Company (lBEAC), which was formed in 1888, was 
entrusted with the administration of Kenya ; being given in the same year a 
royal charter to develop the territory, officially known as British East Africa 
Protectorate. The imposition of British rule was widely resisted by African 
peoples, provoking military retaliation from the imperial power (Ochieng, 1985: 
87). 
Effective administration of Kenya by the British began in 1907 with the transfer 
of Kenya's capital from Mombasa to the European railway town of Nairobi. 
With time, a situation obtained where a white minority imposed and maintained 
its privileged position of domination through the manipulation of government 
machinery. Despite their small number, the British government gave in to 
settler demands in 1906 and introduced a legislative council in Kenya . It was 
not until 1944 that the Legislative Council was opened to the first African, Eliud 
Mathu, who was in actual fact a government appOintee. Mathu's appointment 
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was an effort to channel the budd ing African nationalism toward the support of 
the colonial administration. 
The Kenya African Union, KAU, was formed in 1944 with the immediate aim of 
giving African support to Eliud Mathu but it also had as one of its aims the 
unity of Africans and advocacy of their social and economic progress. Its 
leadership was composed of educated Africans who strove to advance a 
constitutional and legal nationalism (Maloba, 1989: 185). Kenyatta became 
leader of KAU in 1947. In 1952, Sir Evelyn Baring declared a state of 
emergency in Kenya. During the Emergency period , the British government 
and some of the European settlers in Kenya made a determined effort to 
mould African political thought and to develop the confidence of the budding 
African intelligentsia, who had positions of relative importance within the 
colonial structure. They wanted to help constitute a small but rich African 
landed middle class that would promote Western values. 
In the period 1952 to 1960, a multi-racial society, the Capricorn African Society 
was formed to harmonise and promote the relationship between the races . It 
provided a multi-racial approach to political, economic, educational and land 
problems of the country. The society, elitist in outlook, aimed to create a new 
African patriotism to which all people would give allegiance, setting aside their 
loyalty to the conflicting aspirations and nationalism of the different races 
which threatened the country. 
Following the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954, the first direct elections for African 
members of the Legislative Council were held in March 1957. By this process, 
the elected African leaders got the legitimacy not previously enjoyed and a 
platform from which to voice African grievances. For the next three years, 
these leaders persistently agitated for 'one man, one vote' (Ochieng, 1985: 
139). Following the Lancaster House conference of 1960, the British 
government decided in February of that year to grant independence to Kenya 
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with a Westminster model constitution. In March 1960, the majority of the 
African members of the Legislative Council formed the Kenya African National 
Union, KANU, with James Gichuru as president, Oginga Odinga as 
vice-president and Tom Mboya as general secretary. 
1.6 A Multi-Party Beginning at Independence 
Vested European interests, through their organised groups, began to appeal 
to the smaller African groups to join the whites against the Kikuyu and Luo 
politicians. On the threshold of independence, elected members from other 
ethnic groups saw KANU as urban-centred, dominated by Kikuyu and Luo 
influence and too radical. After seeking assent from leaders of other minority 
groups, Muliro and Ngala launched the Kenya African Democratic Union, 
KADU . Whilst KANU's objective was to work for a predominantly African 
government, KADU hoped to form a multi-racial government together with the 
smaller political groupings of settlers and Asians. One of KADU's major aims 
was to resist a Kikuyu and Luo dominance in Kenya by pressing for a majimbo 
(federal) constitution (Ochieng, 1985: 151; Widner, 1992: 134). 
KANU emerged victorious in the 1961 elections but refused to form a 
government until Jomo Kenyatta was released from detention. Ronald Ngala 
was persuaded to form a minority government in coalition with European and 
Asian members of the Council. The last Lancaster Conference of 1961 was 
primarily preoccupied with KADU's demand for a federal constitution (see 
Widner, 1992: 51; Matheson, 1992: 69). KANU once more emerged victorious 
in the May 1963 independence elections and in June 1963, the now free Jomo 
Kenyatta, who had replaced Gichuru as President of KANU, became the first 
Prime Minister of Kenya. Because the colonial government for its part had all 
along favoured a majimbo constitution, this was initially introduced on 1 June 
1963 when self-rule was first accorded to Kenya (Tostensen and Scott, 1987: 
96). 
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On December 12, 1963, Kenya became an independent African State. At this 
time, Kenya had three major parties, the third one being the African Peoples 
Party, APP. While KANU and KADU claimed support throughout the country , 
the APP led by Paul Ngei, had support mainly from the Akamba ethnic group. 
The major political divide between the two major parties, KANU and KADU, as 
explained above, originated in the fear of ethnic domination on the part of 
minority tribes. This concern found support also from the Colonial government 
and white settlers . However, within KANU itself, there were two contending 
groups separated on political-ideological grounds. According to William 
Ochieng (1985: 147), by early 1960's it was obvious that there were two 
schools of thought in Kenya with regard to her future development. One group 
lead by Kenyatta and Mboya and the other led by Oginga Odinga. The former 
was pro-West (Capitalism) and the latter pro-East (Socialism) . 
It was not surpriSing then that on Independence Day Jomo Kenyatta stated his 
commitment to a democratic African socialist state . In this new dispensation, 
the benefits of economic and social development were to be distributed 
equitably. Differential treatment based on tribe, race, belief or class would be 
abandoned , and every national whether black, white or brown, would be given 
equal opportunity to improve his lot (see Widner, 1992: 51 , 54) . By the end of 
1965, all the members of the Opposition, after persuasion from KANU, had 
voluntarily crossed the floor of Parliament and joined the ruling party, making , 
Kenya a one-party state (Tostensen and Scott, 1987; also see Widner, 1992). 
Beneath this apparent success in the direction of national unity, there emerged 
a glaring discrepancy between the rhetorical promises before independence 
and the performance of KANU later. Instead of the equity promised in the run 
up to independence, there evolved an exploitative relationship in the wake of 
independence between the haves and have-nots (Ochieng, 1985: 148). 
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The radical pro-socialist wing in KANU made demands for the above situation 
to be redressed . As a response to these demands, the pro-West and 
conservative in KANU came up with the Sessional Paper number Ten of 1965, 
African socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya. 'Apart from its 
rhetorical character, this blueprint clearly had no intention of altering the 
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inherited colonial economic and social structures, and especially their law and 
order aspects.' The 'Left' in KANU vehemently opposed the Paper and this 
earned them the following response from President Kenyatta: 'It is a sad 
mistake to think that you can get more food , more hospitals or schools by 
simply crying communism ... There is no room for those who wait for things to 
be given for nothing. There is no room for leaders who hope to build a nation 
on slogans' (Ochieng, WR, 1985: 149). However, the pro-socialist wing 
believed that the government had failed to make a concerted effort to put the 
country's social and economic institutions in the hands of the African people . 
In 1966, some of the more radical members of KANU led by Oginga Odinga, 
the vice-president, broke away and formed the Kenya People's Union, KPU , 
demanding more socialist measures and policies . They were deeply 
disillusioned with the way in which , as they perceived it, the Kenyatta 
government had betrayed the people after independence (Ochieng WR, 1985: 
153; Widner, 1992: 58-59). KPU had a populist orientation and Luo ethnic 
predominance, albeit also including prominent Kikuyu leaders such as Bildad 
Kaggia, who became its vice-president. The defectors to KPU were compelled , 
as a result of a series of legislative moves on the part of the incumbent KANU 
government, to stand for re-election in their respective constituencies. In this 
'Little General Election', a majority of the KPU group lost their parliamentary 
seats largely as a result of administrative harassment by the state apparatus 
which , in effect, intervened in favour of KANU (Tostensen and Scott, 1987: 96; 
Widner, 1992: 69-70). 
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KPU's frustration by Kenyatta's KANU government was selective and 
strategically effected. Widner (1992: 69) observes that only in Western Kenya 
and especially Luo areas did the government at first restrain from using 
intimidation and harassment against the opposition , 'with the consequence 
that the "radicals" appeared, wrongly, to have a particular ethnic base and to 
have acted on narrow, sectarian interests ... The rigging of opposition in this 
way destroyed the KPU's national electoral appeal and provided the 
government with the pretext necessary to further curtail its actions.' For the 
next three years KANU and KPU called each other names until 1969 when 
KPU was banned following a disturbance in a Kisumu political rally at which 
President Kenyatta was pelted with stones. KPU leaders were detained 
without trial and once again Kenya reverted to being a one-party state 
(Ochieng , 1985: 154). 
1.7 The Kenyatta Legacy and the Nyayo Era: The Rise of a Party-State 
From the time the KPU was proscribed until June 1982, when legislation was 
passed to make it a de jure one-party state, Kenya remained a de facto 
one-party state. The 1982 legislation was passed mainly to forestall the 
registration by Oginga Odinga and George Anyona of an opposition political 
party which was to be called the Kenya African Socialist Alliance, KASA, and 
which was intended to have a socialist orientation (Widner, 1992: 145). 
Anyona was subsequently detained and Odinga placed under house arrest 
after the August 1, 1982 coup attempt at toppling President Moi. Though the 
1982 amendment arguably only sanctified what already existed, a de facto 
one-party system, it nevertheless radically changed Kenyan politics in 
'legitimising' the ban on all political parties other than KANU. It effectively 
licensed the persecution of opposition groups by criminalising them and 
creating an 'underground' context (see HRW, 1991: 10-11). 
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Between 1969 and the June 1982 constitutional amendment, KANU had 
become moribund, ceasing to function as a party between elections, and 
overly sensitive to criticism. A telling example can be found 'in the mid 1970's, 
(when) Martin Shikuku claimed in Parliament that KANU was dead. When 
asked by other members of the House to substantiate his claim, the Deputy 
Speaker, Jean-Marie Seroney, ruled that it was not necessary to substantiate 
the obvious. Shortly afterwards, they were both detained' (T ostensen and 
Scoll, 1987: 97; Widner, 1992: 1; Weekly Review 12.01 .1990: 11). According 
to Mazrui (1983: 288) : 
In reality, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), was at its most 
vigorous when it faced competition from another party ... But when, 
after 1969, KANU successfully eliminated all party competitors, KANU 
itself began to experience a progressive process of atrophy. The 
dilution of elite competition through intimidation and the elimination of 
other parties resulted in the dilution of the vigour of the ruling party. 
This was particularly so since the Kenya African national Union did not 
even experiment with mass mobilisation as an alternative dynamo to 
multi-party elite competition. 
During the 1970's, one of the few politicians who dared to lock horns with the 
Kenyalla government was Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, popularly known as 'J M'. 
This is what he had to say about the socio-economic situation obtaining at that 
time in the country: 
A small but powerful greedy, self-seeking elite in the form of politicians, 
civil servants and businessmen, has steadily but surely monopolised 
the fruits of independence to the exclusion of the majority of people. 
We do not want a Kenya of ten millionaires and ten million beggars. 
(Talking about his political predicament, he had said) My concern 
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about the owners of property has been misconstrued as rebellion 
against the government, and I have been accused of being 
controversial in matters affecting my brothers and sisters who happen 
to be less endowed with the material wealth of the world . If this is what 
controversy means, I do not regret the accusation (Ochieng WR, 
1985: 145). 
Kariuki was found murdered on Ngong Hills in March 1975. (see Widner, 
1992: 76) . This assassination of a popular leader further compounded in the 
public mind the fear of dissidence and more deeply engraved in it the culture 
of silence. 
Observing that KANU during the Kenyatta era existed only as a loosely-knit 
group of politicians, Widner (1992: 3) argues, however, that 'the party had 
tolerated some internal criticism and debate over its platform, albeit to a 
gradually diminishing degree' . It is the provincial administration , not the party , 
she notes, that Kenyatta used as a vehicle to secure compliance with 
government policies and stances. According to Widner (ibid), in fact, there was 
a shift in government-party relations brought about by the move from a 
single-party system in which KANU remained a loosely organised 'debating 
system' with little policy system, toward a Kenya 'party-State', during Moi's 
tenure, in which KANU increasingly became a vehicle for the Office of the 
President to control political opposition . 
While acknowledging the above observed difference between the two regimes, 
my aim at this stage is to stress that Kenyatta , like Moi later, eschewed 
multi-party competition and believed firmly that Kenya would thrive only if there 
were a single political party (Widner, 1992: 31). The Kenyatta government 
introduced and used various 'techniques of political intimidation, including 
detention laws and violence.' During the KADU opposition days, according to 
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Widner (1992: 55) , 'Kenyatta said that those who were slow in recognising the 
virtues of the single-party system were often the same people who had been 
"warming their bellies under imperialist wings" ... What mattered, he argued, 
was whether the party or parties established were mass parties. A one-party 
state with a mass base was as democratic, in his view, as a state with two 
mass based parties' Those who opposed Kenyatta 's one-party system were 
as a result usually put in jailor subjected to various forms of police intimidation 
and general human and political rights deprivation. 
When Daniel T oroitich arap Moi took over the Presidency, following Kenyatta's 
death in 1978, he vowed to follow in the nyayo (footsteps) of his predecessor. 
Soon after, however, measures were taken to revamp the ruling party KANU 
with recruitment campaigns being held frequently throughout the country. In 
order to nip the opposition in the bud, a clearance system was effectively 
employed to bar candidates who did not follow nyayo (meaning did not follow 
Moi) from contesting for parliamentary seats. The methods used to recruit 
members into KANU sometime bordered on coercion (Tostensen and Scot!, 
1987: 97; Widner, 1992: 1-3, 92) . 
Compulsory membership was introduced for all government/public employees 
and there were cases in which civil servants would be barred from entering 
their offices when they failed to produce KANU membership cards. At this time 
it was customary for people looking for employment to buy or carry KAN U 
cards in case possession of one was used as criteria for employment. State 
and party organs seem indeed to have merged into a one-party regime. 
'KANU membership became necessary as a protection against intimidation by 
unruly KANU youth wingers and the police ... KANU was increasingly 
promoted as a mass movement and periodically restructured to increase party 
power' (HRW, 1991 : 13-14; also see Widner, 1992: 162). 
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Silencing Opposition: Legal Instruments of Suppression 
Throughout both Kenyatta's rule and during Moi's tenure, good use was made 
of a host of legal instruments of control and repression inherited from the 
colonial era. Detention without trial of politicians critical of the regime has 
remained legal under the preservation of Public Security Act. Widner (1992: 
68) observes that 'in the immediate post-independence period , the Office of 
the President (Kenyatta's) moved rapidly to amend the constitution in ways 
that would ... limit the chances that an official opposition party would secure a 
significant foothold in parliament.' One such instrument was the 1966 Sixth 
Amendment to the constitution, which empowered Kenyatta to detain political 
opponents without trial. 
The Preservation of Public Security Act empowered the president to detain 
any person who is considered a threat to public security. Such acts of 
preventive detention have been exempted from legal action under other 
constitutional provisions. The detention laws were suspended between 1978 
and 1982 but Moi's parliament voted on June 4, 1982 to reinstate them. The 
practice of preventive detention without trial has been rarely questioned in 
public debate on grounds of principle. One exception was in 1982, when the 
former editor-in-chief of the Standard, George Githii , spoke in an editorial 
against preventive detention as a method of silencing political opponents of 
the government (Tostensen and Scott, 1987: 116-7). 
People opposed to the ruling oligarchy have for a long time been denied the 
freedom of association through the Public Order Act which empowered the 
Provincial Administration to issue or deny licences for holding public meetings. 
A licence is meant to be issued on the basis of an application stating the 
purpose of the meeting, time and venue, and a list of speakers. The 
commonest pretext for refusal is that a meeting is adjudged likely to cause a 
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breach of the peace. Legal existence for associations critical of KANU has 
been denied mainly through the Societies Act, which requires all societies and 
associations to be registered . These measures of suppression resulted in the 
congestion of channels of expression and legitimate dissent giving rise to the 
formation of clandestine movements and publication of so-called 'seditious 
publications such as Pambana published by the December Twelve Movement 
before 1982, and Mpatanishi published by Mwakenya in early 1986 (ibid.: 99). 
There was a coup attempt to overthrow Moi in August 1982, which was 
successfully resisted . This was later used as a pretext for a general 
clampdown on all forms of political opposition, which involved, inter alia, 
imprisonment and detention without trial. The Moi regime was determined to 
wipe out opposition elements before they were able to mobilise popular 
support. In August 1986, the KANU Annual Delegates Meeting unanimously 
adopted a new procedure for preliminary election of candidates for 
parliamentary seats . This system, dubbed 'queue-voting', meant that voters 
would queue or line up, in the open, behind the candidate of their choice. The 
KANU government argued that this would obviate election rigging because it 
would be done in the open air for all to see. However, the system was 
criticised because of the concern that it would antagonise people and also that 
it would render the filing of petitions of complaint meaningless, as ex post facto 
verification of results would no longer be possible (see Widner, 1992: 
191-192). 
In December 1986, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment, the most 
debated provisions of which were the removal of security of tenure of the 
Attorney General, and that of the office of Comptroller and Auditor-General. 
These removals were seen as a political design meant to erode the system of 
checks and balances within the constitution . In respect of the latter office, 
there would be a weakening of public accountability because it is meant to 
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function as a watchdog over the government's conduct of the nation's financial 
affairs. There was also grave concern about the ease with which the President 
could change the Constitution , which was the very foundation of the country's 
political , social and economic structures (Tostensen and Scott, 1987: 114). 
A Political and Ideological Culture Intolerant of Criticism 
On the basis of the above concerns, the National Council of Churches of 
Kenya, NCCK, called for a referendum on the constitutional amendment. The 
Catholic Bishops for their part called for a dialogue between the government 
and Wananchi (the citizens) and voiced sharp criticism of the KANU party to 
the effect that 'discussion is precluded by the allegations of party officials, so 
that any questioning of the system is tantamount to disloyalty. Already the 
party is assuming a totalitarian role. It claims to speak for the people, and yet it 
does not allow the people to give their views' (ibid.: 115 my italics) . The church 
organisations, because they criticised the KANU government's political 
performance, were frequently accused of attempting to play the role of an 
opposition party, and of engaging in subversive activities. 
During this heyday of the KANU party-state's monopoly of politics, Parliament 
lost both its independence and its role as a forum for debate. There was 
frequent lack of quorums in Parliament making it a farce and members 
wouldn't voice criticism against the government for they feared falling foul of 
the party because of the disciplinary measures it meted out. President Moi had 
by now established the practice of enlarging the 'government' side of the 
House so that Ministers, Assistant Ministers, and presidential nominees to 
Parliament formed a majority in the House (Widner, 1992: 329) . The result 
was that it made ineffectual the constitutional provision that Parliament may 
cause the government to resign if a vote of no confidence is carried in the 
National Assembly. 
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Because of the government majority in the House, it became very easy for the 
wishes of both KANU and President Moi to pass through the House. 
Parliament was then used as a mere rubber-stamp. As already mentioned 
above, vital constitutional amendments were passed through Parliament 
without any debate. For example, the 1982 June amendment that made Kenya 
a de jure one-party state was rushed through Parliament in a matter of twenty 
minutes and without a single MP speaking out, let alone objecting . The above-
mentioned removal of security of tenure for the Attorney General and 
Auditor-General were also passed without debate (HRW, 1991 : 19; also see 
Widner, 1992: 145). This was a result of the fact that the political space 
available to members was severely limited. There was deep erosion of 
parliamentary immunity, which insulated members of parliament and enabled 
them to obtain information from the executive and therefore hold the 
government responsible for the actions of its officers. 
With time, a political culture had developed in which the authority of the 
President was formally unquestionable - constitutionally and politically. 
Criticism of the President and his Government (as distinct from individual 
Ministers and civil servants), however constructive and well grounded in facts, 
tended to be dismissed out of hand, and branded as anti-nyayo (Tostensen 
and Scott, 1987: 94). Even the sharpest critics of the government preferred to 
criticise the president by implication only; very often done by quoting the 
'wisdom' of the president's words and then the way in which they are 'abused' 
thereby contrasting the reality with the rhetoric (HRW, 1991 : 25) . Whatever 
genuine debate previously existed in Parliament had been replaced by a 
personalised style of rule by virtue of which Presidential directives and orders 
were issued whose constitutional basis may not always have been fully 
evident (Tostensen and Scott, 1987: 94; also see Widner, 1992: 136, 163, 
198). 
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According to the human rights publication , Human Rights watch President Moi 
had developed a personality cult: 
Schools sing in praise of him wherever he goes; mass choirs exalt him 
on national holidays; the national radio plays music in his honour after 
every newscast; the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation TV news always 
begin with the activities of 'His Excellency the President, Mr Daniel 
arap Moi. .. ' The result of this cultivated reverence is that President 
Moi's powers were considered supreme and his exercise of them wise; 
yet at the same time, he was distanced from all the abuses of the 
state . This was done by attributing all excesses to his bad 'advisers' 
(HRW, 1991: 25) . 
Moi used the concept of nyayo to signify his intention to perpetuate Kenyatta's 
style and principles in governing . He later tried to develop it into a philosophy 
(Moi , 1986). However, to most Kenyans, following nyayo came to mean 
accepting Moi's leadership without question or criticism (Widner, 1992: 150, 
161). This has been a political fact in Kenya even though the grounding of 
freedom of expression in the constitution means that criticism of the President 
is not a criminal offence in itself, and can only legally be seditious if 
deliberately used to agitate others into rebellion against the state. One of the 
ways of following nyayo, according to its architect, is to demonstrate blind 
loyalty. Moi said the following on September 13, 1984: 
I call on all ministers, assistant ministers and every other person to 
sing li~e parrots. During Mzee Kenyatta's period I persistently sang the 
Kenyatta tune until people said : This fellow has nothing to sing except 
to sing for Kenyatta . I say: I didn't have ideas of my own? I was in 
Kenyatta's shoes and therefore, I had to sing whatever Kenyatta 
wanted . If I had sung another song, do you think that Kenyatta would 
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have left me alone? Therefore you ought to sing the song I sing . If I put 
a full stop, you should also put a full stop. This is how this country will 
move forward (HRW, 1991 : 27) . 
1.8 The Concerted Struggle for a Multi-Party System 
In December 1989, there was a major political stand off between Professor 
Wangari Maathai , leader of the Kenyan environmental group, the Green Belt 
Movement and the KANU-government led by President Moi. The issue at 
stake was a plan to construct a new sixty-eight-office tower to house the 
headquarters of KANU and the partY's media centre. "Foreign funds 
committed to the construction in Nairobi of Africa's highest tower-building ... 
were withdrawn when vocal publicity drew attention to the fact that the project 
entailed ruining one of the city's few public parks." (Decalo 1992: 17; Widner, 
1992: 1). This is just one example of the ways in which members of the 
opposition political elite had become bold in the face political suppression. 
Wangari 's persistence in her opposition to Moi received wide local and 
international press coverage because she persisted when the intimidation and 
persecution from the KANU government was overwhelming. 
The year 1990 saw an unprecedented show of daring by government critics 
dissatisfied with the political performance of the KANU government. In 
January, Rev. Timothy Njoya, a vocal cleric, argued that one-partY systems in 
Africa had completely failed to be democratic and should therefore be 
replaced with multi-partY systems, which are more consistent with democracy. 
The condemnation he got from the ruling political establishment was true to 
form, with one cabinet minister arguing that those who make such statements, 
even from the pulpit, should be detained without trial. One lawyer, supporting 
the cleric, had said that the one-partY system adopted in Kenya had created 'a 
class of citizens with no political rights and others with parallel absolute rights.' 
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(Weekly Review, 12 January 1990). As a result of increasing criticism, the 
President was constrained to devote most of his time defending the one-party 
system arguing that pluralism would breed tribal alliances in which political 
parties would express tribal sentiments instead of genuine public opinion. 
Whilst an argument can be made that both systems can work in Africa: 
The failure of both multi-party and one-party systems in Africa stems 
from the concentration of both political and economic power in the 
hands of a few individuals who then devise methods and systems for 
perpetuating their dominance ad infinitum (Weekly Review, 
20.01 .1990). 
In April , another cleric, Rev. Okullu , called for the repeal of Section 2A, the 
1982 Constitutional amendment that made Kenya a one-party system. This 
call was later in May taken up by two prominent politicians and former cabinet 
ministers , Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia , who had been expelled from 
KANU. The two called a press conference where they made a case for the 
legalisation of opposition parties . They strongly denounced the KANU 
government and accused it of inability to curb corrupt practices, poor civil 
service performance, ' ... "tribal patronage" that supplanted merit as a criterion 
for advancement, inflexibility and indifference to demands for public 
accountability. However, the main theme of their platform was interference 
with freedom of association outside the political realm' (Widner, 1992: 175). 
The Moi government denounced the conference and the politicians as 
foreign-inspired . 
The political events that were unfolding had an educative and sensitising effect 
on the urban populace whose involvement in opposition politics had been 
hitherto almost non-existent. The political assassination early in 1990 of 
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Foreign Minister Robert Ouko was such an event. There was widespread 
belief that the KANU government was responsible for his death because he 
had become too popular for president Moi's liking and that he opposed cabinet 
colleagues who practised corruption . The rumours that circulated incriminating 
the KANU government provoked substantial grass-roots outrage and urban 
riots that lasted for several days. During these riots, the people openly showed 
their support for the agitation for a multi-party political system. Then in June 
1990, government bulldozers moved in and brutally demolished the shanty 
village of Muoroto in Nairobi . A few people were killed and others injured and 
many were left homeless in this inhuman government action. 
When the MP for the area, Maina Wanjigi expressed outrage and sought 
restitution , his colleagues in Parliament denounced his actions as divisive and 
"tribalist". He eventually lost his seat and his position in KANU (Weekly Review 
8 June 1990). According to Widner (1992: 194): 
Although the members of the informal sector could not provide an 
organized forum for discussion, at least some of their number began to 
lend economic and social weight to the demands for greater openness. 
Coincidentally, even as the two politicians, Matiba and Rubia, were making 
their call for freedom of expression and association, the American ambassador 
to Kenya, Smith Hempstone disclosed in May that the US Congress was 
thinking of linking economic aid to the practice of multi-party democracy. In 
June of the same year, after touring the whole country defending the one-party 
system, President Moi ordered a stop to the 'debate' saying that it was time to 
turn to other matters. His main argument was that the public rallies that he had 
addressed during his tour of the country had convinced him that Kenyans were 
solid in their support of the single-party system. Bishop Okullu aptly responded 
to this by saying that the debate could not have ended as it had not even 
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began . He observed that what had taken place so far was more of a 
monologue on the part of Moi than a debate (Weekly Review 22 June 1990). 
In an attempt to comply with the law of the land, Matiba and Rubia applied in 
early June to the Provincial authorities in Nairobi for a licence to hold a political 
rally on 7 July, to further argue their case and also gauge public opinion on 
this. As expected, the request was denied and a strong warning came from the 
Moi's KANU-government to the effect that it had not licensed any meeting on 
multi-partyism. On Wednesday, July 4 , Matiba and Rubia were arrested and 
detained . This was soon followed by a spate of arrests of other multi-party 
advocates. The crackdown provoked widespread riots in Nairobi and other 
towns , beginning on July 7, or 'Saba Saba Day', as it was later popularly 
called . It was on this day that the two detained politicians were to have 
sponsored their public rally for multi-party democracy at Nairobi's Kamukunji 
meeting ground. Widner (1992: 176) correctly observes that though largely 
unorganised, the riots caught world attention and brought the plight of Kenyan 
advocates of political pluralism under scrutiny. 
It is against this backdrop that President Moi mandated the Saitoti (his 
vice-president) committee to gauge the public's view and come up with 
recommendations for the reform of the electoral system. This was a colossal 
novelty in Kenyan politics , as the Weekly Review observed: 
... for the first time since the debate on political options started, the 
public is being treated to the spectacle of the ruling party's top brass 
having to listen to a litany of complaints and criticism without the party 
trying to silence those appearing before it (3 August 1990). 
In August, veteran politicians Masinde Muliro and Martin Shikuku plus George 
Nthenge, Ahmed Bamahriz and Philip Gachoha joined Odinga in forming the 
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pressure group Forum for the Restoration of Democracy, FORD. Later in the 
month, the President declared FORD an illegal political organisation . This was 
followed by a crackdown on FORD leaders and supporters by the state 
machinery bent on carrying out the presidential directive to suppress the 
pressure group. FORD met these moves with defiance and went ahead, in the 
middle of November, to plan for a public rally without government permission . 
The government responded with a hard crackdown on, and arrest of, 
opposition activists. They were all charged with contravening the Public Order 
Act but were soon released in the wake of strong grass-roots show of support 
when their cases came up for mention in the law courts, and protests by 
Western governments led by the US (Weekly Review 30 August 1990). 
All these events are believed to have earned Kenya very poor international 
publicity . Towards the end of November 1990, a consultative meeting of aid 
donors in Paris, France announced the suspension of further aid to Kenya for 
six months during which they expected fundamental reforms of Kenya's 
political economy. This came at a time when the Nordic countries, partly as a 
result of the diplomatic fallout between Kenya and Norway, and the US had 
substantially reduced their bi-Iateral aid to the country. These developments 
were in line with the 1989 World Bank Report (reviewed in Beckman, 1991) 
that called for, among other things, good governance as a condition for donor 
aid to Africa. The new policy of "the new superstate: the World Bank, the IMF" 
(Hellinger, 1992: 85) , strongly spoke against the failure in African countries of 
public institutions, lack of accountability in governance, massive corruption, 
oppression and nepotism, and the breakdown in the judicial system. 
The Report called for the rolling back of the state . It argued that what was 
needed was less state involvement in the political economy with the state 
playing a facilitation role rather that a controlling one. It went further and called 
for "not just less but better government." It argued that a better balance is 
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needed between the government and the governed. The people should be 
empowered to take charge of their lives. This means that "a more pluralistic 
institutional structure including non-governmental organisations and stronger 
local government should be fostered ." Good governance requires " a public 
service that is efficient, a judicial system that is reliable, and an administration 
that it accountable to its public. This calls for, among other things, a concerted 
attack on corruption. The condition was spelled out clearly, ' unless 
governance improves, economic reforms will not go far , nor will much 
economic aid be forthcoming" (Beckman, 1991 : 45-52) . 
On 3 December, the KANU government bowed to increased internal and 
external pressure and through its Annual General Conference instructed 
Parliament to repeal the single-party legislation (Weekly Review 6.12.1990) . 
The legalisation of a multi-party political system came into effect in December 
1991 . One can argue therefore that the internal pressures and agitation for 
political change away from the authoritarian and undemocratic single-party 
system became bolder and more frequent in the wake of the wind of change 
that swept through the former Soviet Bloc. This coupled with Western donor 
pressure, unilaterally and through the Paris Club, which pegged the 
disbursement of further aid to Kenya on tangible and demonstrable political 
change, forced the KANU government to legalise multi-party politics (Ajulu, 
1992; Beckman, 1992; Decalo, 1992; Hellinger, 1992). 
1.9 Two Ideological Positions with regard to Political Change 
It is important at this stage to give in summary the ideological arguments 
posited by the two political groups that were involved in the public discourse 
about the desirability or not of the change to a multi-party system in Kenya. 
These arguments are ideological for the reason that they attempt to make a 
case for the political supremacy of one group's portrayal of reality about 
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Kenya's democratic situation. During this time of change, KANU was the 
super-ordinate group trying to cling to power, and retain its attendant 
privileges, which it monopolised for the greater part of post-independence 
Kenya. The subordinate group comprised all those opposition politicians 
advocating for a stop to this monopoly . Most of those comprising this group 
actually fell foul of the KANU government and were now fighting for a come 
back to professional politics . 
The first ideological position argued that the status quo is democratic enough 
and should be maintained. This was the position of the KANU government 
supporters who argued that a multi-party system is unsuitable and undesirable 
for Kenya. Politicians in this group insisted that multi-partyism by its very 
nature, was a recipe for ethnic tensions and chaos mainly because Kenyans 
were not yet cohesive enough for such a system. They saw a multi-party 
system as a luxury, which had to wait until Kenya was more 'cohesive' . They 
made reference to the early multi-party period that involved KANU and the 
KADU, highlighting the fact that both parties relied on tribal alliances which 
polarised the country. 
Most poignant were references to the era of KPU, which drew the bulk of its 
support from Luoland. Because its support base was among the Luo ethnic 
group, the KPU was easily branded a tribal party. The violence associated with 
the party's proscription in 1969 was greatly highlighted by the opponents of the 
multi-party system. It was also argued by the KANU government supporters 
that accountability and democracy that were being mooted could very well 
thrive in a one-party environment, and that a multi-party system would not 
necessarily guarantee democracy or cure Kenya's political and economic 
problems. 
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KANU also argued that the concept of multi-partyism was not indigenous to 
Africa and that Kenyans would face problems if they absorbed wholesale 
fashionable political prescriptions without adapting them to local realities 
(Weekly Review 30.03.1990). It was said that the traditional African approach 
to government was through consensus and participation, as opposed to the 
competition of a multi-party system. A historical argument was made that the 
one-party tradition in Africa arose out of the experiences of colonialism and as 
such, ruling parties were not merely factions but nationalist movements 
representing the interests and aspirations of entire nations (Weekly Review 
22.06.1990). One of KANU's pet accusations against the opposition was that 
the advocates of multi-partyism were 'puppets of colonialists'. This argument 
formed the basis of the accusation that Western countries were trying to 
dismember African countries, including Kenya, along ethnic lines (Weekly 
Review 30 .03.1990) . 
The second ideological position argued that the status quo was undemocratic 
and begged for change. The major aim of those who agitated for political 
change was for the introduction of a more accommodating , and to them 
therefore, a more democratic political system. It was their opinion that the 
KANU government's performance had shown that a single-party system 
worked against democratic ideals. They argued that there was lack of 
openness and accountability in the one-party system. The proponents of 
multi-partyism complained that tribalism was being used as an excuse by the 
ruling single parties to entrench themselves undemocratically. They argued 
that tribalism is neither created by a multi-party system nor cured simply by 
maintaining a single-party system. To some of them, tribalism existed even 
under the one-party KANU government and it is not therefore bred by the kind 
of political system that a country adopts. 
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Among the decisions that multi-party advocates slated KANU for were: the 
adoption, even in the wake of strong criticism, of the election system of 
queue-voting; alleged rigging of elections, especially of the 1988 General 
Elections; frequent expulsions from the party; the constitutional amendments 
making Kenya a de jure one-party state; and, removal of the security of tenure 
of the Attorney-General, Comptroller and Auditor General and of High Court 
judges. The position taken by this group was based on their conviction that the 
one-party arrangement had stifled political debate in the country and 
undermined the democratic process. 
The advocates of change argued, therefore, that a multi-party system would 
allow freedom of expression which, they insisted, KANU had denied Kenyans 
by victimising those who held views different from their own. It was argued that 
Kenya could not isolate itself from the changes that were taking place 
elsewhere in the world at the time, especially in the former Soviet Bloc and in 
Africa; 'Kenya must stand up to the challenges of the winds of change that is 
blowing across the world.' The only solution, they argued, was to introduce a 
multi-party system in which political opposition would be institutionalised. This 
would be achieved only by the repeal of the constitutional amendment 
(Section 2A) of 1982 that made Kenya a de jure one-party state (Weekly 
Review 11.01 .1991). 
1.10 Summary 
This chapter has dealt with the research problem. The main focus of the study 
is to investigate the performance of two major Kenyan daily newspapers 
during a period of fundamental political change. The background to this 
political change has also been provided. For most of its post-independence 
existence, Kenya has had a political system that progressively, until 1992, 
became intolerant of political opposition and criticism. This chapter has 
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enumerated ways and means by which this political culture came into being. 
culminating in the adoption of a one-party political establishment. The effects 
of this culture on the human and political rights of the citizenry have been 
established. The reasoning behind this historical review is that it is necessary 
as a variable or backdrop against which to analyse the performance of the 
daily press during a period when the dominance of this culture was legally 
brought to an end. 
The major assumption of this study has been shown to be that the 
performance of the daily press as a public sphere was directly and indirectly 
hamstrung by the existing undemocratic political culture. However. there have 
been in the media debate in Kenya other reasons and propositions to explain 
the performance of the press. These propositions. centred mainly on modes of 
ownership . have been given in this chapter as part of the major problem. The 
goal here is to argue that the political culture had the overriding determination. 
The next chapter will therefore make a review of theoretical formulations that 
explain different determinants of press performance. Arguments in this review 
will provide a connecting link between elements of the research problem and 
the history of the press to be given in Chapter Three below. The main aim in 
Chapter Two will be to argue that media performance analysis should be 





My main objective in this chapter is to develop a theoretical grounding for the 
argument that the political practice, ideology and culture of a particular society or 
nation is a major determinant, alongside and at times independent of the 
economic practice, of the performance of the press in the political process. I 
intend to argue that a society's stage of historical development and extent of 
democratisation directly determines the freedom with which its press will perform 
in the realm of politics , both as a political public sphere and as a crucial 
participant in this sphere. In a situation of heightened political activity, especially 
at a time when, as it was in Kenya during the period of empirical investigation, 
the hegemony of the ruling social group is seriously contested and undermined , 
the resultant change, or process of changing , in the political process will be 
reflected in the changed way in which the political press will perform. 
A significant volume of the literature that informs the discussion in this chapter 
comes from Western media scholarship. This literature is relevant to this study in 
a number of ways. The issues and concerns that are debated in Western media 
studies are very similar to some of those that have occupied African scholars and 
politicians. In fact, most of the African media scholarship is deeply rooted in the 
academic traditions of the West. The democratic political process which the 
media is expected and believed to facilitate likewise has its cradle in the West. 
For this reason, Western theoretical traditions and perspectives are importantfor 
any reasonable discussion of the role of the media in the democratic process of 
African countries . They are important for historical and comparative reasons. As 
will be seen below, media professionals, academics, politicians and govemment 
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functionaries in Africa have formed their ideas on the role of the media in politics 
either in support or in opposition to the Western tradition . 
But the special conditions obtaining in Africa, being part of the so-called 
Developing , Third or Less Developed World , has with time necessitated the birth 
and growth of literature dealing mainly with the role and performance ofthe mass 
media in these countries. The peculiar conditions of African countries , it would 
seem, must give rise to pertinent theoretical formulations or perspectives. These 
theoretical formulations , being especially of a normative nature, reflect the body 
of knowledge from within and without Africa with regard to the role and the 
experiences of the mass media in Africa countries. A review will be made 
therefore of this literature generally as it relates to Africa and specifically as it 
has informed the debate around the general theoretical perspective on the media 
in developing countries . This discussion will be important in that it establishes 
the framework by which to analyse the performance of Kenya's daily press during 
a time of fundamental political change . 
2.2 The Import of the Media in the Political Process 
Most, if not all , of the literature cited below take it as a given that the media of 
mass communication are very important in the constitution of modern societies, 
both developed and developing, because of a number of reasons. They are 
strategic if important information is to reach a widely dispersed mass population 
within a limited time-span . While fulfilling this transmission function, the media 
operate concurrently as interpreters or translators of social phenomena. This 
double function is related to the conceptualisation of the media as message 
carriers: a conceptualisation that constitutes the media as symbolic systems. 
The media are also economic institutions; they need to be heavily funded in 
order that they may start and continue to operate. They may be owned privately 
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by organisations or individuals or by the state as public corporations. For them to 
be viable economically, they must make a profit from advertisements and sales 
or be subsidised privately by people or organisations, which own them, or 
publicly by means of licence fees andlor state subsidy . Another possibility is a 
combination, in varying degrees, of these modes of funding . This economic or 
commercial dimension constitute media organisations as material systems (see 
especially Murdock, 1991). 
The problem of the nature and influences of the relationship between the 
symbolic and the economic aspects of the media and the implications ofthis for 
the performance of the media especially in the democratic process has occupied 
and still occupy mass communication theorists and researchers (Bennett, 1982; 
Boyce, 1987; Curran, 1977; 1982; 1991 a; 1991 b; 1991 c; Curran and Gurevitch, 
1991 ; Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott, 1982; Curran and Seaton, 1991 ; 
Gallagher, 1982; Garnham, 1986; Golding and Murdock, 1991 ; McQuail , 1987; 
1991 ; 1992; 1994; Murdock, 1982; 1990; 1991 ; 1992; Murdock and Golding, 
1977; Negrine, 1989; Naero, 1988; Schudson, 1991). This concern emanates 
from some basic and central socio-theoretical assumptions about media and 
about politics and the relationship between the two . The concern is also based 
on particular assumptions about the larger society within which the mass 
communication media operate. 
The literature cited above reveal that the mass media have become an integral 
part of a complex network of institutions in society and they contribute and give 
meaning to the relationships between institutions and groups in the political 
system. As a result of specific historical reasons and because of their operational 
nature, the media of mass communication have become embedded in the 
political system so that it is hard to imagine that political activity in its 
contemporary form could be possible without them. Of particular importance is 
the fact that the media are able to reach a vast and differentially composed and 
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dispersed citizenry at one point in time. This has critical implications for the 
notion of opinion formation , the propagation of dominant ideologies, and political 
legitimacy. 
The importance of the media derives partly from the fact that as symbolic 
systems, they are characterised by the fact that a few organised communicators 
can reach a vast mass of people with a particular set of information. Here it is 
believed, lies the power of the media in that, independently or in concert with 
other institutions, they are regarded as a source of power for those who control 
them. This belief rests on the premise that whoever has access to the media has 
access to the citizenry and can therefore use the media as a means of controlling 
their political beliefs and actions. This understanding is a result of the realisation 
that, for all its strong aspects, the media cannot carry all the information in all the 
perspectives at the same time. It therefore seems to follow that in the realm of 
politics , it becomes very crucial who owns the media. 
The above literature also indicates that the political process itself is laden with 
struggles for power and dominance. At the symbolic level , most Marxist 
perspectives argue that a superordinate or ruling class will always ensure that 
information dissemination and ideological imagery favour and legitimise their 
hold on power. In liberal democratic theories, however, this power is believed to 
lie with the electorate through the secret ballot box. Throughout modem Western 
society, the media of mass communication have been seen to offer the most 
strategic means for politicians to woo votes during elections and to argue for 
legitimacy when they are in power. 
For the citizenry to fully participate in the electoral , and therefore, the democratic 
process, they must of necessity depend on the media for information and 
commentary. Conversely, for politicians it is by means of the media that they can 
have their divergent views disseminated to the wider community . As a result, the 
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media are a potential carrier of conflict and an arena for political struggle. Those 
who have power over andlor overriding access to the media may want to have 
their views given positive treatment and those of their opponents muffled. A more 
subtle approach would be to present ideologically slanted messages as if they 
were common sense or the objective reality. This raises the concern for the 
necessity of the presentation in the media of views that reflect the diversity of 
opinion and political inclinations in any given society. 
In order to study the role of the media in any social process, one will have to 
review first what is believed that the media can do, or have done before, and 
consider them against the expectations people have for the media to fulfil. I will 
here consider first the normative perspectives on, and then the socio-scientific 
theories about, the performance of mass communication media. 
2.3 Four Theories of the Press and Normative Media Analysis 
There is considerable literature on the media and democracy in Africa, especially 
after the so-called second liberation or revolution that is believed to have come 
in the wake of the wind of change. that started in the former soviet-bloc and spilt 
over into Africa (Ansah, 1988; 1992; Boafo, 1992; Mak'Ochieng, 1993; Ochieng, 
1992; Ochilo, 1993; Odhiambo, 1991 ; Omwanda, 1991; Ronning , 1993; Ziegler 
and Asante, 1992). 
However, some ofthe above literature, especially that on Kenya , up and till very 
recently, borrows too heavily from Siebert et al . (1956) and McQuail (1987) . It is 
my argument that this should not be the case especially after the criticisms that 
have been levelled at these theoretical formulations and the accompanying 
suggestions for their rejection or reformulation . It is aimed therefore to discuss 
some of the reasons that have been given for such suggestions and to 
recommend the theory of the public sphere (Habermas, 1989) as a viable 
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alternative for Kenya and other African countries. The critiques of these 
normative formulations are presented below to underpin their relative 
unrealizability in existing societies and as arguments for their adoption as ideal 
types instead. 
I will begin by discussing two important aspects that are shared by the 
formulations by Siebert et al. and McQuail on the one hand and Habermas on 
the other. Firstly, as will be seen presently, both have been heavily criticised, 
with accompanying suggestions for their reformulation , for historical and 
empirical misrepresentations and gross generalisations and omissions. 
Secondly, both have as their strength , in media studies, their normative thrust. 
This is to be expected since normative evaluation of the media as political 
institutions constitutes a theme that has a long and strong tradition in 
communications studies . 
It was Siebert et al.'s (1956) project to argue that in the last analysis the 
difference between press systems is one of philosophy and they therefore set out 
to concretise the philosophical and political rationales or theories which lie 
behind the different kinds of press existing in the world at their time. According to 
them, since the beginning of mass communication, there have been only two or 
four basic theories of the press - two or four, that is, according to how one counts 
them. They argue that the Soviet Communist theory is only a development of the 
much older Authoritarian theory and the Social Responsibility theory is only a 
modification of the Libertarian theory. The authors treat the two theoretical 
derivations separately because, they argue, the Soviets had produced a system 
so spectacularly different from older authoritarianism and so important to the 
world, and also because they consider the social responsibility theory to chart 
the apparent direction of development which the Angle-American press was seen 
to be taking (1956:1-6). 
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Siebert et al .'s work received wide international attention when McQuail (19B?) 
categorised them among six normative media theories. According to McQuail (p. 
111 ): 
The first attempt at a comparative statement of major theories of the 
press dates from 1956 (Siebert et al.) and it remains the major source 
and point of reference for work of this kind. The four-fold division by 
Siebert et al has been retained, although supplemented by two further 
types, in recognition of more recent developments in thinking , if not in 
practice. It may be that the original 'four theories' are still adequate for 
classifying national systems, but as the original authors were aware , it 
can be often be that actual media systems exhibit alternative, even 
inconsistent, philosophical principles. It is thus appropriate to add further 
theories to the original set. 
Since 1956, various media scholars (Curran , 1991a; 1991b; Gurevitch and 
Blumer, 1990; McQuail , 1991 ; Negrine, 19B9; Skogerbo, 1991 ; Syvertsen and 
Knapskog, 19B?) have subjected Siebert et al.'s Four Theories to criticism. Most 
of the criticism is based on observation that Four Theories can be placed solidly 
within a liberal pluralist approach. It is accused of ethnocentrism for using the 
American system as the model for democracy. The underlying idolisation of the 
American political system is seen to gloss over the fundamental biases within 
that society. From a neo-Marxist position , the libertarian premise that potential 
political interests will organise and take part in the bargaining process is seen to 
be wanting, as only some among the large number of potential interest groups 
will be powerful enough to organise successfully and gain political influence. 
Another major weakness that comes to the fore is the apparent main criterion 
applied by Siebert et al. for their classification ofthe various press systems; thus, 
the continuum of state control- freedom from state control. This classification is 
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made on the basis of the state's control over the content of the media, as 
opposed to press freedom per se. An apparent exception, however, is the "social 
responsibility" theory, which is not distinguished along this dimension. It is 
singled out as a separate category that came into being as a consequence of 
what the authors perceived as an internal development inside the pressroom. 
This theory, however, is still solidly placed within a liberal tradition , but modified 
according to the extensive criticism with which the libertarian theories and 
practices have been faced . The emphasis placed on freedom in the libertarian 
context is merely extended to include obligations as well in the 
social-responsibility framework (Skogerbo, 1991 ;143). 
As indicated above, Denis McQuail (1987:109-134; 1994:127-133), in his 
account of media theories , revisited the typology by Siebert et a!. under the 
heading of normative theories . To the original four, he added two more theories; 
development media theory and democratic-participant theory. As a basis for 
concern with the African situation, I will here expound on the first of these two 
theories . This is mainly because of the extent to which it has been embraced in 
African perspectives both in practice and in theory. Among other sources and 
basic postulates, McQuail stresses particularly Unesco's McBride Commission 
(1980) as advocating for a development media theory. The major reason for this 
theory is given as the general inapplicability of the four theories and the great 
attention on matters to do with Third World communication. 
In development media theory as formulated by McQuail , one notices thatthere is 
a clear statement that the special conditions, values and aspirations of 
developing countries call for a particular normative orientation for the press 
prescribing roles that will serve their development goals . However, the contents 
of the theory shows, on the other hand, that most of these roles have already 
been prescribed in some of the other theories by Siebert et al .. But more 
importantly, as aptly argued by Skogerbo (1991 :144-146), in this "theory", the 
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development support role is given overriding importance to the extent that its 
achievement is seen to justify the abridgement of other human and institutional 
rights and freedoms, especially press freedom. This is a major source of 
weakness in the theory because it contradicts what McQuail says is the theory's 
other concern; namely, respect for democratic communication as expressed and 
inhered in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
More recently, McQuail (1991 ; see also 1994) has argued for abandoning 
Theories of the Press because: 
The confusion over the status of and possible application of normative 
theory has been made worse by their: high level generality; their lack of 
direct connection with actual media systems and often the lack of 
correspondence between normative pretensions and reality of 
performance... In many, if not most countries, the media do not 
constitute any single 'system', but are composed of many separate, 
overlapping, often theoretically inconsistent elements. For instance, 
values of independence and impartiality can be pursued with equal 
chance of success (or lack of it) by systems based either on principles of 
the free market or under strict public control. .. (p .69) . 
In spite of its weaknesses, I find Siebert et al.'s typology important for, modified 
to accommodate the above criticisms levelled against it, it provides a good 
starting point for the development of arguments for normative media analysis as 
a prescriptive and analytical tool. I wish to argue that normative theories and 
analyses can be used to chart out roles for media performance and give 
yardsticks for evaluating that performance. Such theories and analyses can be 
used also to suggest how a particular society's media system should be 
organised. 
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As for the applicability of normative theories to specific/particular societal 
contexts, including those of Africa, I hope to demonstrate the importance of 
taking them as ideal types . This will make them useful and applicable universally, 
leaving the latitude for the consideration of pertinent and overriding conditions in 
the society of interest. The central normative ideals found in Siebert et al .'s 
typology can be refined and reconsidered in the context of changed political and 
socio-economic conditions. I believe that most normative communication values 
are relevant to most societies at all times, though differentially. This means that 
there is no reason why norms and values to do with unity and order should not, 
for example, be pursued together and concurrently with those to do with the 
democratic ideals of equality and freedom. Furthermore, critical normative 
analysis can be used to uncover power structures, relations of subjugation and 
systems of oppression . 
2,4 The African Experience: A Suppressed Press for Planned Development 
In the first three or so decades since independence, most African governments 
embraced a developmental philosophy in their approach to political and 
economic issues. Free at last from the yoke of colonialism, they had good and 
legitimate reasons then to make efforts to formulate and put into effect the best 
possible institutional structures and systems in politics, economics and social 
arrangements to address the peoples' educational , social and material needs. 
(see Ansah , 1988, 1992; Mak'Ochieng, 1993; Ziegler and Asante, 1992). But 
there was another important aspect to the struggle for independence: The 
obvious and taken-for-granted promise of greater human freedom and respect for 
human rights that had been so grossly violated under colonialism. It must be 
remembered that in most African countries, the fight for independence was and 
has been a fight for the right to greater or full participation in the political 
process. 
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However, with time, most African rulers cultivated politics of suppression and 
intolerance as their economies also failed to register meaningful improvement. 
The peoples of Africa have seen a tendency toward the creation of monolithic 
political institutions in most of their countries. This development can partly be 
attributed to the propensity by their rulers to deprive their subjects ofthe right to 
contribute to discussions concerning their well being and, more important, to 
question how their governments went about achieving the national well being. 
There has been a systematic suppression of organised opposition, and the 
elimination of all forms of dissent saw the establishment of one-party states or 
military regimes . These are some of the reasons that led Ansah (1992: 53) to 
state that: 
The wind of change that has been blowing over the continent and other 
parts of the world , assuming the dimensions of a hurricane in certain 
countries and cutting dictators to size , is a manifestation of a yearning 
for human dignity and respect for human rights. An objective assessment 
of the human rights situation in Africa leads to the conclusion that 
contrary to expectation, independence has not brought about greater 
individual freedom; on the contrary, human rights have suffered 
considerable diminution as a result of undemocratic laws enacted 
ostensibly to protect fragile national institutions, forge national 
consensus and promote accelerated development. 
These observations lead us to ask why things came to be the way they have 
been. What reasons, if any did the political leaders give to justify their style of 
governance? From the literature cited above, we can cull out a number of 
reasons. It was argued that in the face of the enormous problems facing many 
African and other developing countries, it was necessary to abridge civil and 
political rights in order to accelerate development. What was implied by this 
position was that human and political rights had to come secondary to the 
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imperatives of economic development because the two could not be pursued 
simultaneously . Therefore, the argument goes, it was collective development and 
not individual rights and freedoms that needed to be emphasised. Some of the 
features of collective development were seen to be national identity and national 
unity. It was argued that during this initial period of growth, stability and unity had 
to be sought, criticism minimised and the public faith in government institutions 
and policies had to be encouraged. The result of this can only be seen to have 
been enforced or imposed consensus in the name of national development, and 
this was clearly at variance with the more enlightened view of development which 
sees free and active participation as an essential ingredient. 
The reasons given above to justify the abridgement of human rights and 
establishment of undemocratic governments in the name of development were 
likewise used to chart and prescribe a particular role and philosophy for the 
media in Africa and other developing countries. The specifics of this role and 
philosophy gave rise to, and have found expression, in the development media 
theory (McQuail, 1987;1994), which is sometimes referred to as developmental 
theory, developmental theory of the press (Ansah 1988; 1992), or development 
communication (Melkote, 1991 ; Moemeka 1989; Servaes, 1995). However, as is 
illustrated presently, a closer look at the above sources reveals that this media 
perspective has three distinct orientations. The orientation that has received the 
most attention is that which looks at the various ways in which communication 
media can best be used to meet the development needs of Third World 
countries. This tradition has its birth during the development decade of the fifties 
and sixties whose philosophy was to assist in the alleviation of the perceived 
abject poverty and general backwardness of Third World countries. 
2.4.1 Development Support Communication 
There has occurred a development within this first version of development media 
theory from narrow concerns with the diffusion of innovations, persuasion of 
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developing peoples to abandon their anti-development values and mores, to the 
realisation that there are also external socio-economic constraints on 
development and that there is the need to search for 'factors which could 
presumably make development projects more relevant to the needs of the 
disadvantaged groups.' These realisations gave birth to what has come to be 
known as development support communication (DSC) (Melkote, 1991 ; Servaes, 
1995). This particular tradition has a materialist, mechanistic and instrumental 
approach to the role of the media in development, its emphasis being to enable 
the DSC specialist bridge 'the communication gap between the technical 
specialists with expertise in specialist areas of knowledge - health matters, 
agriculture, etc. - and the users who are in need of such knowledge and its 
specific applications to improve their performance, increase their productivity, 
improve their health, etc.' (Melkote, 1991 :29) . One can say, therefore, that this 
version of development media theory has a practical and instrumental, and not 
normative, thrust. 
2.4.2 Controlled Media for Development 
The second orientation or version of development media theory is somewhat 
related to the one above to the extent that its point of departure emphaSises 
socio-economic development. However, its main emphasis is different, and 
therefore important to this study, because it has normative implications for the 
role of the media in the political public sphere of African countries. It brings us to 
an understanding of how the media was expected, and made, to serve the same 
interests that worked against democratic practices and abridged fundamental 
human rights, all in the name of development. The point of departure for this 
perspective is the acknowledgement that African countries have poor 
communication infrastructures, few professional skills, and a paucity of 
production and cultural resources, among other things. They are also heavily 
dependent on the developed world for technology, some specialised skills and 
cheap , but expensive to produce cultural products (McQuail 1987: 119-121). 
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These reasons are then used to support the argument that, as a result, the 
media in Africa are ill equipped to support a free press and serve the ends of 
democracy. This type of argument easily degenerates into a prescription that 
because they are ill equipped, the media should not be used for the promotion of 
democracy and human rights. 
In this second orientation of development media theory, collective ends as 
opposed to individual ends have been given overriding priority. The implications 
of this orientation are that the mass media must cooperate by stressing positive, 
development-inspired news, by ignoring negative societal or oppositionist 
characteristics and by supporting governmental ideologies and plans. 
Government ownership and suppression of the media are then justified for the 
reason that it needs to inform the people about its plans and programmes and to 
mobilise them for development, using all channels available. African 
governments have considered it their duty to provide information to their people 
as a service in much the same way as they provide other social amenities and 
services . It is also argued that given widespread illiteracy and inadequate 
political consciousness, a diversity of the sources of information or a multiplicity 
of voices in the media can only create confusion in the minds of the people and 
thus render the task of nation-building and development more difficult (see 
specially Hachten 1971 ; Mytton 1983; Ochieng 1992; Wilcox 1975; Ziegler & 
Asante 1992). 
It can be said further that in the propagation ofthis undemocratic political culture, 
an active pOlitical press is eschewed for the perceived risk that opposing views 
and dissent may be irresponsible and calculated to undermine stability. It is felt 
that opposition elements and critical press may take advantage ofthe illiteracy of 
the masses and exploit their ignorance to destabilise the state. An argument is 
made to the effect that since political institutions in developing countries are 
fragile and any criticism of the government may be interpreted as a challenge to 
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its legitimacy, the media should refrain from scrutinising the affairs of the 
government too closely . It is obvious from these observations that African 
political leaders have found the control , and subservience, of the press as well 
as other media, to be necessary to their exercise of political power, and the use 
of this media, therefore, has been closely controlled so that they are not used to 
propagate views and promote interests that are at variance with those defined by 
the national leadership. 
As has been differently put by various writers, in African countries, the press was 
expected to forego , by way of being open to restrictions , some of its freedoms in 
order to serve the society's collective interests (Ansah, 1988; 1992; Boyd-Barrett, 
1982; Golding, 1977; Mak'Ochieng 1993; McQuail , 1987; 1994; Mytton, 1983; 
Omwanda, 1991; Ziegler and Asante, 1992). This is the point made by McQuail 
(1987: 121) when he mentions the argument that, 'in the interest of development 
ends, the state has a right to intervene in, or restrict, media operations, and 
devices of censorship, subsidy and direct control can be justified' . These 
arguments and their normative implications have been used to justify the 
adoption of an authoritarian system of political governance, and the concomitant 
abuse of various human rights and freedoms in general and the freedom of 
expression in particular. As Ansah (1988:9) put it: 'the virtual monopolisation of 
the mass media has been explained in terms of the need to ensure that people 
are not distracted by 'false propaganda', and that all media resources will be 
harnessed and directed towards national development.' 
2.4.3 Reasons for a Democratic and Participant Press in Africa 
The third orientation of development media theory is more in keeping with that 
supported by this study. This orientation is close to the public sphere theory with 
its emphasis on freedom of expression and discussion as a means of reaching 
the best strategies, alternatives and results for and in development. Popular and 
grassroots participation for socio-economic development is emphasised. But 
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more important, there is an increasing emphasis on freedom of political 
expression to stimulate constructive debate and to enable the press to act as a 
check and watch-dog on abuse of power and violation of human rights (Ansah, 
1988, 1992; James, 1990; Omwanda, 1991). There is perceived here the need to 
develop and nurture democratic ideals as human development objectives. 
An argument is being made in this orientation for the consideration of 
socio-economic development and democratisation as two sides of the same coin 
of human development. According to Rogers (1976) development should be a 
widely participatory process of social change in a society, intended to bring 
about both social and material advancement including greater equality, freedom 
and other valued qualities for the majority of the people through their gaining 
greater control over their environment. This third version of development media 
theory can therefore be seen as a counter to the second orientation that 
sanctions authoritarianism for the sake of socio-economic development. The 
second version of development media theory made it too easy to claim that a 
state's interests were at stake at the first sign of legitimate criticism. Indeed , 
anything could be proclaimed as being against state interest. 
As is already evident above, the preferred concept of development also 
recognises the need for material development, but more than the others do, it 
puts the emphasis on human dignity and the active involvement and participation 
of the people in the development process. It puts a premium on the right of 
participation in the decision making process. One can therefore argue, however, 
that full and meaningful partiCipation cannot be achieved or ensured in the 
absence of the right to express oneself freely and frankly. For the purpose of 
national development and self-development, people should be both able and 
enabled to share ideas and discuss freely , exchange views, evaluate altematives 
and criticise where necessary. One of the functions of communication should be 
the provision of avenues for social interaction and participation. The mass media 
of a country wishing to develop, therefore, should provide a forum or platfonn for 
73 
collective discussion and the weighing of various options in order to arrive at well 
considered decisions. In other words, to serve the ends of development, the 
mass media should provide a public sphere for the exchange of comment and 
criticism regarding public affairs. 
The role of the media in a developing country should also be seen in the context 
of participation, meaning the critical examination , evaluation and report of the 
relevance, enactment and impact of development. In order to undertake this 
critical evaluation, it is essential that the media be sufficiently free and 
independent of governmental control and political pressures. The role of the 
journalist inspired by the development theory is to critically examine, evaluate 
and report the relevance of a development project to national and local needs, 
the difference between a planned scheme and its actual implementation, and the 
difference between its impact on people as claimed by government officials and 
as it actually is (Aggarwala, 1979:181). This observation is informed by the belief 
that social and political criticism and public debate are not, and should not be 
seen as, necessarily disruptive. In prescribing such a role as suggested above, 
or engaging in a critique to see whether such a role has been played , I 
recommend the theory of the public sphere. 
2.5 The Theory of the Public Sphere 
From the discussion above, one can argue that there are two major ways in 
which media functions can be conceptualised . First, media functions may 
emanate from an objective and empirical observation of media activity (see 
Curran, 1991a, 1991b; McQuail, 1987, 1991; Skogerbo, 1991). These observed 
functions are then used to describe what function the media plays in terms of 
what it does or accomplishes. From this functionalist perspective, the recurrent 
and institutionalised activities ofthe media may be seen as serving the needs of 
the particular society in which it belongs. The media are also believed to achieve 
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a number of unintended benefits for the society as a whole by responding to its 
demands in a consistent way . 
Secondly , media functions expressed mainly as normative ideal-types can be 
seen as a particular society's expectations, prescriptions and conditions for 
media performance. These ideal-types are variously conceptualised by theorists 
in their formulations of normative functions for the media (see Ansah, 1988; 
Curran, 1991 , Siebert et al. 1956; Mak'Qchieng, 1996; McQuail 1987, 1991; 
Skogerbo, 1991). These normative functions may also form the evaluative ideas 
and principles against which to appraise media performance. According to 
McQuail (1991 : 70) , a normative framework is important because it is 
underpinned by a 'fundamental assumption that the media do serve the 'public 
interest' or 'general welfare'. This means that the mass media are not the same 
as any other business or service industry, but carry out some essential tasks for 
the benefit of a wider society, especially in the cultural and political life .' 
It is in the first sense above that Habermas came to describe the role of the 
press as a public sphere. In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 
Habermas (1989) argues that it was the development of competitive market 
capitalism that provided the conditions in eighteenth century Britain for the 
development of both the theory and practice of liberal democracy. This it did by 
making available to a new political class , the bourgeoisie, both the time and the 
material resources to create a network of institutions within civil society such as 
newspapers, learned and debating societies, publishing enterprises, libraries, 
universities and polytechnics and museums, within which a new political force, 
public opinion, could come into existence. As a result of the dynamics of market 
capitalism, access to the public sphere, hitherto restricted , was open to all since 
the cost of entry for each individual was dramatically lowered by the growth in 
scale of the market. As a result, the public sphere took on a universalistic aspect. 
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An important argument developed by Habermas in Structural Transformation is 
that the public sphere came to obey the rules of rational discourse. Political 
views and decisions in the sphere were open nollo the play of power, bullo that 
of argument based upon evidence, and its concern was not private interest but 
the public good. It was thus constituted as the space for rational and 
universalistic politics distinct from both the economy and the State. However, 
Habermas went on to argue that the public sphere was destroyed by the very 
sources that had brought it into existence. The development of the capitalist 
economy in the direction of monopoly capitalism, among other things, led to an 
uneven distribution of wealth, to rising entry costs to the public sphere. These 
trends represented the development and rise of direct control by private and 
State interests of the flow of public information in the interest, not of rational 
discourse, but of manipulation. 
Structural Transformation has recently been widely criticised and reformulated 
(Calhoun, 1992; Curran, 1991a; 1991 b; Dahlgren, 1991; Fraser, 1992; Gamham, 
1992; Habermas, 1992; Keane, 1991a; 1991b; Schudson, 1992). Curran (1991a) 
argues that the newspapers celebrated by Habermas were engines of 
propaganda for the bourgeoisie rather than the embodiment of disinterested 
rationality and that their version of reason was challenged by radical papers 
whose other project was developing a set of ideas that generalised the interests 
of a class excluded from the political system. Curran also makes reference to the 
fact that the 'independent' eighteenth century press was caught up in an 
elaborate web of faction fighting, financial corruption and ideological 
management - a far cry, in his opinion, from Habermas's idealised portrayal of 
the eighteenth-century press as the embodiment of reasoned discourse of 
private individuals. 
A more important observation by Curran (1991a) is that a significant part of the 
press was subject to some form of political control by organised interests from 
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the eighteenth century through to the twentieth century . For him, this refutes the 
contrast made by Habermas between the early press as an extension of the 
rational-critical debate among private citizens, and the later press as the 
manipulative agency of collectivised politics. He continues that Herbamas's 
characterisation of the modern media is positively misleading because his 
implicit contrast between the demotic manipulation of the modern media and the 
ratiocination of the eighteenth century press is difficult to reconcile with historical 
reality. 
Craig Calhoun (1992) takes issue with Habermas's neglect of social movements 
by his conforming too closely to the liberal bourgeois ideal in imagining the 
public sphere simply as a realm into which individuals bring their ideas and 
critiques. He argues that social movements are crucial to reorienting the agenda 
of public discourse, bringing new issues to the fore. Moreover, social movements 
are occasions for the structuring not just of issues but of identities. Nancy Fraser 
(1992) brings into focus the exclusion of women from the official public sphere 
and the privatisation of gender politics. For her, Habermas's account reveals 
mostly a bourgeois, masculinist conception of the public sphere, which also 
subordinated workers, peoples of colour, and gays and lesbians. 
2.5.1 The Press as the Political Public Sphere 
All the above criticism granted, most, if not all, of the above writers have 
subscribed to the import of the theory of the public sphere. According to 
Garnham (1992), criticism levelled at Habermas's model of the public sphere are 
all cogent and serve as a necessary basis for the development and refinement of 
Habermas's original approach. However, they do not detract from the continuing 
virtues of the central thrust of that approach. Elsewhere, Garnham (1990) 
observes that the concept of the public sphere and the principles it embodies 
represent an Ideal Type against which we can judge existing social 
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arrangements, and which we can attempt to embody in concrete institutions in 
the light of the reigning historical circumstances. 
Habermas himself has come to argue that the public sphere could only be 
realised today on an altered basis as a rational reorganisation of social and 
political power under the mutual control of rival organisations committed to the 
public sphere in their internal structure as well as in their relations with the state 
and each other (see Garnham, 1990). Schudson (1992: 147) prefers a concern 
with Habermas's model of the public sphere not so much as a "paradigm for 
analysing historical change, but more as 'a normative category for political 
critique'. According to Curran (1991b: 83), Habermas's work, ' ... offers 
nevertheless a powerful and arresting vision of the role of the media in a 
democratic society, and in this sense its historical status is irrelevant.' According 
to Dahlgren (1991 : 2) : 
The concept of the public sphere can be used in a very general and 
common sense manner, as, for example, a synonym for the processes of 
public opinion or for the news media themselves . In its more ambitious 
guise, as it was developed by Jurgen Habermas, the public sphere 
should be understood as an analytical category, a conceptual device 
which, while pointing to a specific social phenomenon can also aid us in 
analysing and researching the phenomenon. . .. As an analytical 
category, the bourgeois public sphere consists of a dynamic nexus 
which links a variety of actors , factors and contexts together in a 
cohesive theoretical framework. It is this configurational quality, with its 
emphasis on institutional and discursive contigencies which gives the 
concept its analytical power. 
In fact, in one of his latest contributions, in which he addresses some of the 
criticism levelled at Structural Transformation , Habermas (1992: 451) stresses 
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the importance of what he now calls the political public sphere to democratic 
theory and praxis. This importance is encapsulated in 'the concept of deliberative 
democracy' otherwise called 'the discourse-centred concept of democracy' . The 
expectation deriving from a discourse-centred theoretical approach, which 
obtains rational results, is based on the inter-play between a constitutionally 
instituted formation of the political will and the spontaneous flow of 
communication unsubverted by power, within a public sphere that is not geared 
toward decision making but toward discovery and problem resolution. 
In this later formulation by Habermas, he puts emphasis on 'the conduciveness 
of specific processes for the democratic formation of opinion and will'. It is his 
submission that the political public sphere is appropriate as the quintessential 
concept denoting all those conditions of communication under which there can 
come into being a discursive formation of opinion and will on the part of a public 
composed of the citizens of a state. This is why it is suitable as the fundamental 
concept of a theory of democracy whose intent is normative. As already stated 
above, a public sphere that functions politically requires the institutional 
guarantees of the constitutional state. But it requires more: 'it also needs the 
supportive spirit of cultural traditions and patterns of socialisation , ofthe political 
culture , of a populace accustomed to freedom' (Habermas, 1992: 453). 
In summary, the central characteristics of the theory of the public sphere, and the 
role of the media in it, have been captured well by Curran (1991 b: 83) when he 
suggests that: 
From (Habermas's) work can be ex1rapolated a model of a public sphere 
as a neutral zone where access to relevant information affecting the 
public good is widely available, where discussion is free from domination 
by the state and where all those partiCipating in public debate do so on 
an equal basis. Within this public sphere, people collectively determine 
through the process of rational argument the way in which they want to 
79 
see society develop, and this shapes in turn the conduct of government 
policy . The media facilitates this process by providing an arena of public 
debate, and by reconstructing private citizens as a public body in the 
form of public opinion . 
2.6 Liberal-Democratic Tradition and the Role of the Press 
In its original formulation by Habermas, the public sphere theory is strongly 
grounded in liberal-democratic theory though striving to go beyond it. This 
observation is captured by Dahlgren (1991: 3) thus: •... one could see that with 
its emphasis on democracy and the role of the media, Habermas's notion of the 
public sphere actually has a good deal in common with prevailing liberal thought 
in Anglo-American traditions. At the same time. the concept has ambition beyond 
those developed within the traditions of liberal democratic theory, of which his 
analysis also in part presents itself as a critique." 
Liberal democratic theory prescribes a political process whereby the various 
groupings, and/or individuals, of society articulate their interests in terms of 
demands on societal resources, the formulation of collectively Significant goals 
and participation in policy formulation for the achievement of these demands and 
goals. A precondition to this process is the presence of Western-style political 
institutions; mainly, universal suffrage, free electoral competition, political parties 
and parliamentary democracy. The successful working of these institutions is 
seen as the source of political legitimacy. This type of legitimacy implies that 
power lies with the led, a power exercised through the ballot box. 
For a government to be considered democratic, therefore, it must be a national 
government legitimised by a democratic polity; that is one where consensus in 
execution of leadership is mediated through the secret ballot-box by a fully 
enfranchised citizenry, and where the articulation of political interests occur 
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through a multi-party system which reflects the plural character of the social 
order. In this regard , a basic requirement of a democratic political system would 
be the institutionalisation of 'freedom of speech' and the articulation of public 
opin ion in the press. In the realm of politics , therefore, the democratic process is 
one in which political actors are enabled and guided by the functioning of the 
democratic institutions, including the media. 
It is clearly evident that the notion of a press that is actively involved in the 
democratic process has roots in the liberal democratic theory. From a 
communication perspective, liberal democratic theory (see Keane 1991, 
McQuail , 1987, 1991 ; Negrine, 1987; Siebertetal. , 1956; Skogerbo, 1991) puts 
at centre-stage the supremacy of the individual, the belief in reason, truth and 
progress and the sovereignty of the popular will. This theory prescribes freedom 
for the individual in both the symbolic and the material forms; the freedom to hold 
and express opinion through the press without risk or persecution and to own 
and use means of publication without restraint or interference from government. 
In fact, the normative aspect of liberal-democratic theory prescribes a central role 
for the press in the democratic political process. It proposes that mass media 
should play a pivotal role in making the relevant information publicly available 
and in providing the spaces in which the full range of argument and policy 
proposals can be debated, so people can make informed choices in their 
capacity as citizens (McQuail, 1987; 1992; Murdock 1991; Curran, 1991a; 
1991 c) . 
In its material meaning, press freedom in the liberal democratic tradition 
advocates private ownership and free market principles . Among other functions, 
the free press should : provide a safety valve for dissent or political opposition, be 
a people's defence against misrule, and a means of arriving at the truth . The 
central argument here is that free and public expression of all contending ideas 
is the means to arrive at truth and the only way to expose error. "The nearest 
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approximation to truth will emerge from the competitive exposure of alternative 
viewpoints and progress for society will depend on the choice of 'right' over 
'wrong' solutions" (McQuail, 1987: 113; Siebert at ai , 1956). 
From a historical perspective , the rise of the press in the West as a medium of 
mass communication was met with both implicit and explicit opposition and 
hostility among the ruling elite (Curran, 1991 c; Curran and Seaton, 1 991 ; 
McQuail , 1991 ; Negrine, 1989: 50; Schwebbs and Ostbye, 1988: 38). Censorship 
and regulation of the press was exercised on the grounds that freedom of the 
press was a threat to the stability and security of the state. Also, by reaching and 
sensitising the masses, the media were seen as a potential threat to the 
established order and distribution of power. Arguments for freedom of the press 
were initially arguments against these controls . 
On the political scene, freedom of the press from state control was closely linked 
to the development of parliamentary politics. This was further linked to a general 
and growing opposition to authoritarian rule. Arguments in favour of freeing the 
press emanated from a real and direct experience of oppression. Freedom of 
expression meant freedom from state control, which further meant freedom to 
express a political opinion and make a political choice. The notion of the fourth 
estate was seen to express the need to curb the excesses of the power of the 
state. There was envisaged a press which was a watchdog, taking governments 
to task and representing the public interest. But this role of the press is not 
without limitations. 
2.6.1 Economic Limitations to a Democratic Press 
The strongest theoretical arguments about the limitations of the role ofthe media 
in the democratic process are rooted in Marxism. According to Fiske (1987: 254): 
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(M)arxist assumptions ( ... ) start from the belief that meaning and the 
making of them (which together constitute culture) are indivisibly linked 
to the social structure and can only be explained in terms of that 
structure and its history. Correlatively, the social structure is held in 
place by, among other forces , the meanings that culture produces ... 
On the basis of such assumptions and arguments , Classical or traditional Marxist 
perspectives dwell on ownership of the means of material production by the 
capitalist class and the subsequent unequal distribution of wealth and property. 
The industrial order is seen as having produced a class society dominated by a 
bourgeois minority class. Following Marx, it is argued that the class which 
controlled the means of material production also controlled the means of mental 
and psychological production and distribution, including the media. As a result, 
the ideas of the dominant class are the ruling ideas of the epoch. This is the 
position that was articulated by Marx and Engels (1974: 136-7) in a much quoted 
passage from the Gennan Ideology (quoted in Teer-Tomaselli 1992: 11): 
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e . the 
class, which is the ruling materialforce in society, is at the same time its 
ruling intellectual force . The class which has the means of material 
production at its disposal, has the control at the same time over the 
means of mental production , so that thereby, generally speaking, the 
ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. 
[ .. . ) The individuals composing the ruling class posses among other 
things consciousness, and therefore think [ ... ) hence among other things 
[that they) rule also as producers of ideas, and regulate the production 
and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling 
ideas of the epoch. 
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From this perspective , private owners of the media of mass communication by 
definition belong to the capitalist class . Because of their vested capitalist 
interests, they are believed to use their power and control to ensure that, the 
media they own carried dominant ideological messages and representations that 
supported the interests of the ruling capitalist class. A more refined view of 
economic determinism posits that the communications industries taken together 
bolster the general interests of the capitalist class, or of dominant factions within 
it (Murdock, 1982: 141). Other perspectives such as the Frankfurt school and 
critical theory make a contribution by giving reasons for the failure of 
revolutionary overthrow of capitalism as theorised and predicted by Marx. Market 
forces in collusion with the culture industry , which in the process of processing 
culture for sale defeats its critical and oppositional purpose, is blamed for this 
failure . The media, regarded as a vehicle for culture, ends up being just a 
'powerful mechanism for containment of change', a function which subverted the 
fundamental economic change that was seen as inevitable by Marx. 
As a result of arguments given above, the media is seen as instrumental in 
preserving the status quo in that as the carrier of the dominant class ideology 
(that of capitalism) that celebrated 'technological rationality, consumerism, 
short-term gratification, and the myth of 'classlessness" (McQuail, 1987: 65), it 
has served to perpetuate the economic base by subverting and assimilating the 
underprivileged class. The universal , commercialised, mass culture was the chief 
means by which this success for monopoly capital had been achieved. A closer 
look suggests that this theory rules out any significant chance in the media for 
oppositional politics that question the dominant ideology. Politics, as mediated by 
media content, may be seen by inference as serving and as the preserve of the 
powerful owners of capital. 
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However, in a situation where ownership does not translate un problematically 
into control, nor where control does not always directly determine content, 
structural analysis becomes imperative to latter-day Marxist political economists: 
Analysis at this level is focused not on the interests and activities of 
capitalists, but on the structure of the capitalist economy and its 
underlying dynamics ... it does not matter who the key owners and 
controllers are. What is important is their location in the general 
economic system and the constraints and limits that it imposes on their 
range of feasible options (Murdock, 1982: 127). (Such an approach) 
could ... be used to demonstrate how media institutions could be 
articulated to the production of dominant ideologies, while at the same 
time being 'free' of direct compulsion , and 'independent' of any direct 
attempt by the powerful to nobble it (Hall, 1982: 86) . 
2,7 Pluralist Detenmination of Press Perfonmance 
At another end of the theoretical divide, liberal-pluralists dwell on the declining 
influence of the capitalist class and of ownership as a source of power. In this 
perspective, significant and effective control over production is seen to have 
passed over to those who directly commanded the necessary industrial 
technologies and organisations. Murdock (1982: 128-135) provides a review of 
this perspective. Fom this perspective, it is argued that it was the property-less 
professionals who were seen to emerge as the new key power-group. This 
development was largely attributed to the rise and spread of joint-stock 
companies. Legal ownership was seen as a result, to have dispersed among a 
widening group of shareholders. These new shareholder-proprietors tended to 
be 'absentee owners' leaving the business of supervising production to 
professional managers (Murdock, 1982: 130; also see Murdock and Golding, 
1977: 29; Negrine, 1989). 
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From a historical perspective , the press was very much affected by this shift in 
industrial organisation . Newspaper ownership became more spread and the 
scale of newspaper organization increased. As these changes came into effect, 
more and more owners relinquished their control over the day-to-day operations 
to full time editors. As a result, owners are seen as having been relegated to the 
position of those who merely supply the means whereby the editors may exercise 
their power. With such arguments, managerialists have stressed the relative 
impotence of owners and the autonomy of administrative and professional 
personnel (Murdock 1982: 128). 
Alongside managerial ism is a pluralist conception of power. According to 
Murdock (1982: 129): 
Where Marxists insist that the capitalist class is still the most significant 
power bloc within advanced capitalism, pluralists regard it as one elite 
among a number of others composed of leading personnel from the key 
institutional spheres - parliamentary, the military, the civil service, and so 
on. These elites are seen as engaged in a constant competition to 
extend their influence and advance their interests, and although some 
may have an edge at particular times or in particular situations, none 
has a permanent advantage. Hence, instead of seeing the effective 
owners of the communications corporations as pursuing the interests of 
the dominant capitalist class ... , pluralists see the controllers of the 
various cultural industries as relatively autonomous power blocs 
competing with other significant blocs in society, including the financial 
and industrial elites . 
The pluralist notion of power structure is linked to the laissez-faire or free-market 
model of the economy. As seen in Murdock's review (ibid.), just as there is a 
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competition for power and influence between institutional elites, so media 
corporations are seen as having to compete for the attention and loyalty of the 
consumers in the market. In the final analysis it is the demands and wants of the 
consumers that determine the range and nature of goods corporations will supply 
(consumer sovereignty). Accordingly, the professionals are not free to pursue 
their interests just as they like; their actions and options are limited by the power 
and veto of consumers. 
Because of arguments such as those presented above, liberal theory is opposed 
to government or state ownership of mass communication media. Even state 
support of media institutions is abhorred because it is believed to lead to 
government and official domination. It is opined that private ownership of the 
media is the only true and sure guarantee of freedom of the press and of free 
expression. It follows then that any strongly motivated private citizen who so 
wishes is free to own the media and use it to express whatever political view s/he 
holds. Her/his success or fa ilure would depend on her/his ability to produce a 
profit and this in turn depends on her/his ability to satisfy his consumers. By this 
argument, the citizenry would be the final judges of what type of media existed 
(Siebert et aI., 1956). 
For the liberal-pluralists then , the political scene is seen as a market place of 
ideas. All views should be given the opportunity to compete in it (Curran 1991 b; 
1991c; Habermas, 1989; Negrine, 1989; Siebert et aI., 1956). The citizenry will 
choose and support the right and true ideas. They would express their choice by 
buying the media that carried what to them were the true ideas. The media so 
chosen would attract advertising because advertisers would prefer the media that 
received public acceptance. 
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2.8 Media Ownership, Control and Performance: Empirical Arguments 
Empirical evidence has produced a reality that is not in complete harmony with 
the theory as presented above. With the development of parliamentary and party 
politics in Western Europe, the press aligned itself heavily with the political 
parties. Party partisanship became rampant. The party-press became heavily 
biased against the views of contending political parties. The press is seen to 
have merely moved from state control to control by politicians. Those who owned 
or subsidised the press used it for avowed political ends. With time. the 
ownership and control of the press gradually passed over to individual 
owner-entrepreneurs. This was mainly because the parties could not bear the 
escalating cost of running newspapers. The press had to be self-supporting in 
order to survive (Soyce, 1987; Curran. 1991 b; Curran and Seaton, 1991; 
Murdock, 1982; Murdock and Golding, 1977; Negrine, 1989). The rising 
importance of advertising is seen to have saved the situation; the implication 
being that the press would be run as commercial enterprises and not as tutors of 
the public and defenders of the truth. 
The new owners of the press tried to use it as an independent source of power 
with which to challenge reigning politicians and their policies. This source of 
power was effective in some special circumstances only. The press barons 
believed that they wielded this power because they commanded the opinion of 
million-readers. For a time they gained the reputation as king-makers because 
they successfully brought down a leader and crowned another to leadership. 
Some of the press barons ran their press as commercial enterprises in order that 
they may use them principally for ideological ends (Soyce, 1987; Curra.n and 
Seaton, 1991; Negrine, 1989). 
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However, on the average, and in the normal run of events , it came to pass that 
the press could not function as an independent locus of political power. The 
nature of political circumstances, more than the press, detennined the short-lived 
influence mentioned above. The accusation of power without responsibility was 
also levelled against the press. It transpired that the press depended to a great 
extent on a close and harmonious relationship with the ruling elite both for 
information and legitimacy. Even though the relationship could be said to have 
been symbiotic, with politicians also depending on the press to accomplish their 
goals, the real power rested with the constitutionally elected leaders (Negri ne, 
1989; Boyce, 1987: 109). 
A rapidly changing economic situation further altered the structure of press 
ownership in two major ways. First, as the press became more and more 
expensive to run, advertising emerged as the motor that ran it. The advertisers, 
because they wanted to reach a more differentially constituted audience, 
encouraged the press to eschew the partisan politics of owner-entrepreneurs. 
Secondly, it became more economically sound to run the media as joint stock 
companies with shares being floated to the public. Ownership became dispersed 
and as the organization of these institutions became more complex, control is 
believed to have shifted to the professionals. 
The observations presented above are advanced by liberal-pluralists to counter 
criticism from Marxists who still argue that the capitalist class does control the 
media and that the media serves the interests of the capitalist class. Marxist 
scholars argue that the cost of starting media enterprises, thus, market entry 
costs , are so high that only the rich capitalists can venture into the business. 
Even then, they must in most cases depend on other sources of capital in order 
that the media can get off the ground. This means that it is those with diverse 
connections with other successful sectors of the economy that can start new 
media (Murdock, 1982; Murdock and Golding, 1977; Negrine, 1989). 
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Marxist analysts agree with the liberal-pluralist observation that share ownership 
has indeed been spread. However, they argue that effective ownership in terms 
of controlling shares still remains in the hands of a few capitalists. These are the 
people who have voting rights in the governing boards of media institutions. 
They have the power to map out company objectives and allocate capital for 
expenditure . These capitalists who have controlling shares usually have interests 
in other sectors of the economy. The resulting picture is one where a few 
capitalists control the most important sectors of the economy including the media 
industries (Murdock, 1982). The most important implication for media 
performance being that they wouldn't allow in their media content that threatened 
their overall economic and political interests in society. 
In the media sector, a few examples can be found whereby those who own 
majority shares have directly interfered in, and influenced, editorial work. It has 
also been demonstrated that journalistic interests and ownership/management 
interests collide, it is usually the latter that prevail. As new communication 
technologies emerge and take root, it has become more apparent that media 
professionals can be laid off easily as they become oppositional or redundant. 
Even the advent of new media technology has not held out the promise of 
diversity of ownership and enhanced access to the media for the masses. 
Ironically, however, it is the control by owners that is seen to have been 
strengthened (Boyce, 1987; Curran and Seaton, 1991 ; Murdock, 1982; Negrine, 
1989; Naero, 1988). 
Though advertising is seen from a liberal perspective to have freed the press 
from political control, it introduced its own form of constraint. Radical theorists 
make the observation that advertisers form part of the competitive commercial 
and capital context within which the media operate, and their decisions and 
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relations to the media reflect that context. It can be argued that in the competitive 
market: 
... the voices which survive will largely belong to those least likely to 
challenge the prevailing distribution of wealth and power. Conversely, 
those most likely to challenge these arrangements are unable to 
publicise their dissent or opposition because they cannot command the 
resources needed for effective communication to a broad audience 
(Murdock and Golding, 1977: 37). 
One of the major arguments advanced is that advertisers have clients who wish 
to sell their products and services and their task is to enable clients to reach as 
many potential customers as possible at the lowest cost. In this sense, 
advertisers are not interested in readers or viewers as such, but in those who are 
able to buy their products. They are willing to pay several times more for their 
wealthy readers than they are for the less wealthy or poor. Further, advertising 
has immense ideological implications. It creates a dream world and therefore 
masks and distorts real relationships of power and dominance (Negrine, 1989: 
80) . For Marxist structuralists then, the influence of market forces can be 
expressed thus : 
In general the needs of production, limitations of cost, and concern for 
audiences, produce news in which the world is portrayed as fragmented 
and unchanging, and in which dissent and opposition appear ephemeral , 
peripheral or irrational. News become palliative and comforting , 
intentionally undisturbing and unthreatening, focusing on institutions of 
consensus maintenance and the handling of social order ... In seeking to 
maximise this market, products must draw from the most widely 
legitimated central values while rejecting the dissenting voice or the 
incompatible objection to the ruling myth (Murdock and Golding, 1977: 
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40) . (And also that) ... the expression of dissenting or challenging views 
rooted in interests unable themselves to support media, are also largely 
absent from the spectrum of legitimated views and ideas provided by the 
major media (ibid.: 38) . 
There is no doubt that ownership of media organisations has important 
implications for control. It can also be asserted that this control definitely impacts 
on media performance (content). The contested issue is whether or not 
ownership has the overriding determination. Arguably, it may not be easy at any 
one time to state the unambiguous source of influence for media content. This 
problem is compounded by the fact that the concept of the media is generic and 
does not therefore refer to a single entity. The media may be electronic or print. 
Although there are some suggestive pointers in this direction, it is not easy to 
prove a causal relationship between media ownership and media control , nor 
indeed, between media ownership and media performance. Such relationships 
are generally regarded to be complex and their determinations not linear. 
The above comments notwithstanding, one can hazard a general argument that 
to some extent, private ownership of the media is skewed in support of dominant 
capital interests and ideological preferences. In concert with market forces, 
private ownership has real implications for content. In the event that not all news 
get equal access to, nor fair coverage by, the media, the privately owned media, 
underpinned by purely business principles - making the most profit 
cost-effectively - cannot be seen to foster a truly democratic political process 
(Golding and Murdock, 1991 ; Murdock, 1982; Negrine, 1988; Naero, 1988). 
However, owner influence is mitigated by elements of consumer-sovereignty, 
which partly dictate media performance and success on the market. It is also 
mitigated by the power and relative autonomy of editors and other creative 
personnel, and the general relative autonomy and competitiveness of media 
personnel vis-a-vis other institutional elites . 
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From the theoretical discussion that I have presented so far, it is apparent that 
power and control are differentially located in society. I have demonstrated that 
media personnel are a source of power in their own right but they have to 
contend with, and sometimes be upstaged by other loci of power; especially 
media owners and other socio-economic interests in general , organised interest 
groups that constitute the civil society, and politicians. I would like to go further 
and argue below that the political locus of power may under specific conditions 
determine how the other loci of power, especially the press, operate. In the 
words of Gallagher (1982:170-171): 
The complex of constraints .. . within which communication organisations 
and professionals operate, makes it difficult to sustain a view of the 
media and media practitioners as autonomous 'watch-dogs'. On the 
other hand, to the ex1ent that the media can be observed to negotiate 
the parameters of constraint - exercising at least at times, a policy of 
'brinkmanship' - they cannot be dismissed as subservient 'tools of 
government' . Rather, the general conclusion must be that mass 
communication is indeed bound with , and bounded by, the interests of 
the dominant institutions of society, but that these interests are 
continually redefined through a process to which the media themselves 
contribute . 
2.9 The Importance of the Concepts of Ideology, Class and Hegemony 
For the purposes of this study, I would like to argue for the use of the concept of 
ideology to refer to the ideas and positions of the two political groups that were 
contending during ' the period under investigation. I also argue for the 
consideration of these politico-ideological groups as a function of the political 
practice in the same way that class is a function of the economic practice. It is 
93 
not my intention to mobilise these two concepts for use in an ideological critique 
nor is the short review below intended to be a comprehensive discussion of the 
concepts . I will do the former in Chapter Five. Simply put, they are meant here to 
be a simple basis for the categorisation that was provided at the end of Chapter 
One and to therefore underpin the decision to regard the two political groups as 
social groups and their ideas and arguments as ideological. 
The concept of ideology, according to Larrain (1983) has undergone revision to 
the extent that it has lost most of its original negative and critical meaning. He 
observes that in its original formulation by Marx, ideology is both that process 
and result, by purely mental and discursive means, of providing solutions to life's 
real contradictions . The ideological forms of consciousness conceal or 
misrepresent the existence and character ofthese contradictions, which are seen 
to be inherent in capitalist social formations. These misrepresentations or 
ideological distortions contribute to the reproduction of the same conditions of 
oppression. They are therefore mistaken or false ideas, which when exposed 
and acknowledged, thereby exposing the exploitative nature of capitalism, 
should hold the key to the liberation of the oppressed. Marx used ideology both 
as a criticism of capitalism and as a characterisation of its distorting nature. It is 
arguable, therefore, that ideology is in Mane's formulation a restricted concept in 
that it applies only to those distortions which are connected with the concealment 
of a contradictory or inverted reality . 
With time, ideology as a critical concept in the analysis and exposure of the 
dynamics of capitalist distortions of reality was given secondary importance. It 
came to refer to the whole spectrum of social consciousness, a totality inherent 
in such concepts as 'ideological superstructure' , 'ideological spheres', and 
'ideological domain', giving way to a conception of ideology as the political ideas 
connected to the interests of a class. These neutral renditions of the concept of 
ideology gradually came to replace the original negative connotation. What came 
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to be preferred was an interpretation of ideology as an all encompassing 
superstructural sphere in which men acquire consciousness of their contradictory 
social relations' (Gramsci, 1971 : 138, 164, 377). 
Another development, according to Larrain (1983:222) came from Lenin's 
extension of the concept of ideology. He observes that: 
For Lenin, ideology becomes the political consciousness linked to the 
interests of various classes and, in particular the opposition between 
bourgeois and socialist ideology .... Ideology is no longer a necessary 
distortion which conceals contradictions but becomes a neutral concept 
referring to the political consciousness of classes , including the 
proletarian class (my italics) . 
With Gramsci, the above conceptualisation of ideology was elevated to the realm 
of struggle for hegemonic control. Gramsci (1971: 377) considers ideology as 
being more than a system of ideas, it refers also to a capacity to inspire concrete 
attitudes and provide orientations for action. Ideology becomes 'the terrain in 
which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc: It is in 
and by ideology that a class can exercise hegemony over other classes; that is, 
secure the adhesion and consent of the broad masses. 
Further development by Althusser (see White 1992) brings the above arguments 
to the concrete level of interest to this study. Though recognising the importance 
of economic mode of production, he argues that society is comprised of a variety 
of interrelated social and intellectual practices or activities including the 
economic, the political, and the ideological. Economic practice involves the mode 
of production while the political practice describes social relations and forms of 
social organization. Economic and social analyses are therefore concerned with 
the nature and relations of power expressed in particular economic and social 
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systems. Economic, political and ideological practice are distinct but co-existing 
arenas of human activity. They mutually influence and exert pressure on one 
another, but operate with relative autonomy. The political and ideological 
practice do not function as direct expressions of the class interests defined by 
economic practice but have a life of their own. They have relative autonomy; 
meaning that they are not mere reflections of class interests dictated by the 
economic practice. The political and ideological practice are, along with the 
economic, also arenas of contestation among social groups (White, 1992: 168). 
Althusser argues that 'the reproduction of the submission to the ruling ideology' 
requires the cultural institutions of the Church, the mass media and the political 
apparatuses. He calls these apparatuses, whether or not they are strictly 
organised by the state, 'ideological state apparatuses' . Because the terrain of 
ideologies is not simple but complex and consists not simply of ruling ideas but 
of a field of ideological thematics , he argues that what the ideological state 
apparatuses (ISA's) reproduce must be the ruling ideology precisely in its 
contradictions. Ideological reproduction thus becomes' not only the stake but also 
the site of class struggle .. .' (Hall, 1977: 336 my italics) . 
Having established, by way of the arguments given above, grounds for 
considering the ideological and political practices as potential sources of 
influence and pressure on the media, it must now be argued that actors in these 
practices need not necessarily be categorised by the traditional Marxist concept 
of class. One may begin by looking at a class as a social group. However, the 
very concept of social groups is complex; there are numerous ways of 
conceptualising groups that one set of terms cannot be assumed to sufficiently 
explain social identity. Groups may have conflicting , intersecting, and parallel 
interests. According to White (1992: 169) a given individual may be defined and 
positioned by a variety of categories -including class, nationality, gender, and 
race. etc. Categorisation by class may be a function of economic practice but the 
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other terms may emerge specifically within the contexts of political or ideological 
practice. 
The notion of the struggle for hegemony is used to illustrate how the dominant 
class or dominant group propagates their interests by projecting their ideas as 
the prevailing , common sense view (White, 1992). As used by Lenin, hegemony 
refers to political leadership in the democratic revolution, based on an alliance 
with sections of the peasantry. According to Gramsci, in modern conditions, a 
class or social group maintains its dominance not simply because it uses force 
but because it also exerts a moral and intellectual leadership and makes 
compromises , within certain limits, with a variety of allies who are unified in a 
social bloc (Sassoon, 1983: 201-203). The exercise of hegemony thus depends 
on a combination of force and consent (Hall, 1977: 332) . 
The leading hegemonic class or social group is in Gramsci's definition truly 
political because it goes beyond its immediate economic interests. It follows from 
this that any economistic notion of politics or ideology that looks for immediate 
class interests in politics and culture is incapable of accurate analysis of the 
political situation and the balance of political forces and cannot produce an 
adequate understanding of state power. Accordingly, ideology does not simply 
reflect or mirror economic class interests but is an area of struggle. Hegemony 
cannot be won in productive and economic spheres alone; it must be organised 
at the level of the state, politics and the superstructures, the terrain on which 
hegemony is accomplished (Hall, 1977: 332) . 
2.10 The Political Process and Press Performance 
The brief discussion that has been presented above is meant to argue for the 
necessity oftaking politicallideological consideration as a relatively autonomous 
source of determination of media content. It is important here to stress again the 
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observation that the ideological terrain is complex and full of contradictions and 
continuing struggle. The media as the political public sphere should be 
conceptualised both as carriers of and as the arena for political struggle. With 
these observations, I hope to have established a case for considering political 
struggle as meaning ideological struggle in the realms of politics and 
governance. The notion of hegemony may also feed into this construction when 
one considers that political struggle in the end result is a struggle for leadership 
and dominance. For these reasons therefore, depending on a particular society's 
history and level of political development, the struggle for political hegemony 
may involve force and consent in varying proportions. 
Media content becomes a central and sensitive arena where a double struggle is 
fought. In a situation where there is already a dominant or ruling political 
ideology, one can still expect a contestation from the dominated social groups. 
The status of ruling incumbency may give advantage to the ruling political 
ideology in which case the possibility of a serious erosion or threat to the ruling 
ideology may precipitate a situation of heightened struggle in the ideological 
apparatuses, especially in the media. Because of their importance in the political 
process as the public sphere and thus an arena for political discourse, the media 
have become very crucial for contending political groups. Tiffen (1989: 129) 
gives the advantages of ruling incumbency as follows: 
A party may win the election with promises that store up later problems -
but once in government the party has substantial means to manage the 
timing and appearance of these embarrassments in the least damaging 
way. Governments enact decisions and because action is more 
consequential than criticism they are inherently more newsworthy than 
Oppositions. Governments enjoy more initiative in their media relations; 
by their activity and show of concern they can help focus the news 
agenda into particular areas ... Governments have further publicity 
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advantages as the custodians of the administrative and ceremonial roles 
of the state . They may embody national unity on occasions of both 
national tragedy and triumph ... Publicity through news is more vital but 
less easily attainable for oppositions than governments. 
Because this investigation will dwell partly on the influence on the media of 
party-political hegemony in Kenya , it is pertinent here to consider the observation 
by Hall (1977: 333) that: 'there is no permanent hegemony: it can only be 
established, and analysed, in concrete historical conjunctures ... Even under 
hegemonic conditions , there can be no total incorporation and absorption of the 
subordinate classes'. One can argue, therefore, that a major change in a 
society's political process may give birth to a new political conjuncture which may 
substantially impact on the performance of mass media in the realm of politics. 
Such momentous change took place in Kenya. In a country where the 
constitution had for a long time established a one-party state and criminalised 
opposition politics , a constitutional revision that legitimised multi-party politics 
was a great change indeed. 
2.11 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed theoretical formulations that attempt to explain factors 
or variables that affect media performance. It is generally agreed that the media 
of mass communication have an important role to play in the democratic process 
of any country. The media are conceptualised both as significant participants in 
the democratic process and as constituting the main public forum or sphere 
where this process takes place. The media are therefore expected to be free 
from all sorts of interference and influences. This chapter has reviewed the 
debate about the fact that there are sources of interference and influences that 
limit the media's ability to play both roles. This debate is very similar to the one 
that has occupied media politics in Kenya since independence and can be used 
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to explain and make sense of that debate. The Kenyan debate is the subject of 
Chapter Three below. 
It is my opinion that the theoretical route to follow in order to analyse the 
performance of the daily press in Kenya is to use a normative orientation. This 
chapter has therefore reviewed the normative perspectives on media 
performance preferring to use the theory of the public sphere . The Kenyan daily 
press will therefore be conceptualised both as a political public sphere and as a 
significant actor in the same. The history of party politics given in Chapter One 
and that of the Press given in Chapter Three below will be used to support 
reasons for this conceptualisation and also to provide normative principles 
against which to analyse their performance. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE HISTORY OF THE DAILY PRESS 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will endeavour to give an instructive history of the daily press in 
Kenya . I will highlight the main issues that have dominated media politics in 
Kenya since the end of the last century until just before the 1992 multi-party 
general elections. It is my intention that some of the issues identified should 
provide , on the one hand, some understanding of the expectations of politicians 
and government functionaries about the role of the press and, on the other 
hand, what newspaper editors themselves consider to be the role of the same 
press. Since pre-independence days, the press has been constrained by 
various economic, political and organisational pressures. It is obviously difficult 
to delineate a particular source of influence as the overriding determinant of 
press periormance. However, my intention is to demonstrate that the political 
periormance of the daily press in Kenya has been influenced most by power 
dynamics in the political arena. 
I will show that the above reality has been the case with the two oldest private 
and foreign-owned dailies, The Standard and the Daily Nation; that an 
indigenous private press has faced similar problems; and lastly, that the same 
has held true of a press that is both indigenous and political party-owned. 
Before addressing these historical issues on the daily press, however, a brief 
section will be devoted to the broadcast media. This is intended to establish the 
fact and extent to which the broadcast media was completely controlled by the 
government. This brief section will dwell largely on the period after 
independence. I intend to demonstrate that for all intents and purposes, the 
Kenyan broadcast media was a publicity extension of the ruling KANU 
Government. 
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3.2 Broadcasting and Politics before Independence 
A commercial telecommunications company first inlroduced radio broadcasting 
into Kenya in 1928 for the English speaking community. According to Heath 
(1986:51) , Kenyaradio was primarily intended to entertain its listeners and to 
provide a cultural link between widely scattered European homesteads and 
missions and with Britain . The station, which was opened in Nairobi in August 
1928, was a pioneering effort on the continent. In fact , Kenya was the second 
British colony, after India, to have regular wireless broadcasts . Although there 
must have been a good number of Asians and even a few Africans in Kenya 
who could have afforded radio receivers in 1928, racialist policies in every other 
sector coupled with European cultural arrogance, apparently prevented 
consideration of a multi-racial audience until the 1940's. 
Broadcasts especially for Asians and Africans in their languages were 
introduced by the government information service during, and mainly because 
of, World War 11. These services were intended mainly to apprise listeners of 
the progress of the war in which their kith and kin were involved and to urge 
their co- operation and support for the war effort. Heath (1986: 80) goes on to 
state that: 
In many respects Kenyaradio was like the colonial press. Both 
institutions served to keep Kenyans in touch with the outside world and, 
in particular, the metropolitan country. Both reflected and reinforced 
European Kenyan political opinion and cultural norms. Both were 
commercial media whose contents were guided by market 
considerations and by professional standards borrowed from Britain 
ralher than by citizen advisory committees or official regulation . 
There occurred fundamental developments in the broadcast environment during 
the 1950s especially after the Emergency of 1952. An Information Department 
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In his contribution to the above debate, Tom Mboya said : 
It is not a matter of saying "this is the truth we are telling you ; we are 
the Government." You must give them a chance to decide for 
themselves whether the Government is right or wrong otherwise it is to 
underestimate the intelligence of the people whom I believe all of us 
would like to serve (ibid.) 
In September 1959 the KBS within the Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting, MIB, assumed responsibility for all broadcasting in the country. 
However, on November 14, 1961 the Legislative Council passed the Kenya 
Broadcasting Corporation Ordinance and the new corporation assumed 
responsibility for broadcasting . Just two years later, the National Assembly 
nationalised the KBC and named it the Voice of Kenya (VOK). According to 
Heath (1986: 161): 
Although establishing the KBC as a means to ensure independent, 
impartial broadcasting was given considerable lip service, it seems the 
primary objective in establishing the corporation was to introduce 
television and, in so doing, strengthen the cultural and economic bonds 
between Kenya and the West. The door to multi- racial partnership in 
Kenya's government had been closed at Lancaster House in February 
but the door to multi-racial partnership in the country's economy was 
still wide open .. . Television, which would have to be supported by 
advertising and fed with foreign films, appeared to be an ideal vehicle 
for that manoeuvre. 
3.3 Broadcasting and Politics after Independence 
At independence, the general agreement was that the Kenyan broadcast media 
would be accessible to proponents of diverse political perspectives on an 
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equitable basis. African members of the legislative Council had argued for that 
right. As a result, the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) Ordinance (No.24 
of 1961) had specifically required that the corporation provide an 'independent 
and impartial broadcasting service of information, education and entertainment' 
and 'to keep a fair balance in all respects in the allocation of broadcast hours 
between different political view points'. In compliance with these provisions , the 
KBC adopted an election policy for the May 1963 election designed to give all 
parties access to radio. Fifteen 14-minute segments were allocated to the three 
J parties, KANU (Kenya African National Union) , KADU (Kenya African 
Democratic Union) and APP (African People's Party) , in proportion to the 
number of, candidates slated by nomination day. 
In principle, there was to be no censorship by the KBC but all scripts were to be 
submitted in advance and pre-recorded to enable the corporation to check for 
libel, sedition or anything contrary to the laws of the land. The order in which the 
segments were broadcast was to be determined by the KBC by ballot. The 
Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (Nationalisation) Act (No 12 of 1964) retained 
the above provisions with respect to a fair balance in the allocation of airtime 
between different political viewpoints . Daniel arap Moi , then opposition KADU 
MP and the only member to have clearly dissented, had sounded a warning 
saying that, 'I hope the Government will not use this organisation as a means of 
propaganda to suppress the opposition or other people who would like to say 
what they want to say' (Official Record, Kenya National Assembly, 25 June 
1964). The KBC then became the Voice of Kenya (VOK). 
Tom Mboya, then Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, was one of 
those who clearly articulated the developmental agenda for the broadcast 
media. Contributing to the KBC Nationalisation Bill of 1964, he had answered 
Moi thus: 
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[He] asked whether the take-over means the Government using the 
Voice of Kenya as a propaganda machine for the Government. Now, 
Sir, the answer is yes. What else do you do with a broadcasting service 
or information service of the Government but propagate Government 
policy and teach people to understand and appreciate the meaning of 
Kenya's nationhood according to Government's interpretation of it? 
... The Government intends to use the Voice of Kenya for the purpose of 
building, strengthening, consolidating the new nation of Kenya and 
educating its citizens to understand their duties, their responsibilities, 
their privileges, their opportunities, and the role that they can play in 
making that nation what all of us want it to be. It is not intended to be 
used for the promotion of individual , personal ideas. It is intended to be 
used for the promotion of what is and must be the interest of Kenya 
(House of Representatives Official Report, 24 June 1964). 
It soon became apparent that the government's use of the VOK to popularise its 
programs and perspectives was to take precedence over its obligations to keep 
a fair party-political balance. Members of the opposition, backbenchers, and 
even some ministers found it increasingly difficult to obtain access to the public 
through the broadcast media. Kenya's first Minister in charge of the Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting (MIB), Achieng Oneko, saw the role of 
communication in terms of national building. Under his leadership the VOK was 
purposefully used to consolidate support for KANU and the government in 
power. It was used to advise and guide the government to ensure that the 
government spoke with one voice to the public. This was deemed necessary to 
'avoid conflicting statements from different departments and thus avoid popular 
confusion and potential instability. In his contribution to the above debate, 
Oneko had said that: 
.. . our primary aim is not profit-making but rather that these powerful 
weapons should become instruments for the constructive development 
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of our country .We want to use them to educate our people, to 
popularise our Government's programme and our peoples' initiatives 
and generally to keep the people of this nation adequately informed. It 
is not the intention of our Government to work against anybody or any 
loyal society; any loyal society includes the Opposition (ibid.). 
In his address to the IPI in Paris on 17 May 1962, Mboya suggested that 
'freedom of the press' might have to be redefined in the African context. He 
argued that for all the value the press placed on liberty and self-determination, it 
had, in fact, been hostile to the struggle for self-determination in East and 
Central Africa . As a result Africans were asking what freedom of the press 
means, 'does it include licence to do and say what they please, even if it means 
directly or indirectly wrecking all our efforts at consolidating our dearly won 
independence or our efforts for economic reconstruction' (Mboya, 1970: 140). 
Kenya's second development plan described the VOK as 'an essential 
instrument in Government's programme for building a prosperous and united 
nation' (Kenya, Development Plan, 1966-70). The Ndegwa Commission of 1971 
stated that 'The Ministry of Information has the wider responsibility for the public 
image of the Government as a whole. It projects and presents to the wananchi 
(the citizens) the policies and achievements of the Government. In doing so, it 
must work in harmony with all Ministries and Departments.' 
In 1981, contributing to a motion to start a KANU newspaper, 0100 Aringo, then 
in charge of the MIB, had said that the government had advocated a free press 
not from weakness but in the belief that the 'free flow of ideas enhances a 
healthy society' but added that 'freedom is limited by our national philosophy of 
promoting national unity, national integration, socio-economic development and 
our cultural heritage. We have defined that very precisely and expect 
newspapers to walk within that context of our national commitment' . In general, 
the Kenyan public has regularly been reminded that their constitutionally 
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protected freedoms have 'natural limitations,' that is, one's conduct must not 
'infringe on the right of others or threaten their security' and that 'freedom of the 
individual is better achieved and more greatly enjoyed when , and only when, it 
operates within the boundaries of the common good' (Kenya Times, April 28, 
1984). 
The above policy positions about the role of the media in Kenya have had 
adverse consequences for access on the part of opposition political voices. For 
example, no provisions were made to give Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) leaders 
an opportunity to speak to the nation on radio and television during the mid-
term "Little General Election" of May 1966. Quite the opposite , ex1raordinary 
administrative efforts were used to kill the opposition. In December 1966, Luk 
Obok, KPU MP for Alego introduced a motion in Parliament titled "Unfair 
Treatment of Opposition.'1 He alleged that the VOK was being used to conduct 
anti-KPU propaganda and had refused to publicise any KPU activities only' 
mentioning the party when someone resigned from it. 
As a government department, the VOK received all its funds for recurrent and 
capital expenditures from the national treasury. Cuts in government 
expenditures , which have affected all departments, were obviously ex1ended to 
the VOK. Particularly, shortage of foreign exchange placed severe constraints 
on departments like the VOK, which relied almost entirely on imported 
equipment for capital developments as well as for replacing and upgrading 
production equipment. In this respect, lack of substantial financial support 
derives from very real fiscal constraints. Kenya's economy being a dependent 
and developing one, there has simply not been enough money to meet all the 
developmental and other demands on the nation's purse. 
Kenya News Agency (KNA) journalists, main news suppliers for VOK, have 
seldom had their own transportation . As a result, they have tended to attend 
and cover meetings called by the Provincial and District Commissioners to 
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which official transportation is made available. Politicians who want to be 
assured of press coverage have found it necessary to send vehicles to collect 
journalists . Clearly, with its limited resources the VOK could not possibly attend 
and fairly report on all the nation's political and other activities . On the other 
hand, the VOK was not permitted to become self-supporting , apparently to 
prevent it from becoming an independent and potentially challenging voice . In 
the absence of adequate government subventions for program production , the 
VOK was obliged to make arrangements to obtain programme materials from 
external sources , commercial sponsors, private voluntary agencies, and 
religious establishments (Heath, 1986). 
In 1989, the Kenya Government set up the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation , 
KBC, a semi-autonomous commercial entity, to take over responsibility for the 
running of VOK. This was meant to improve it technically without placing an 
additional financial burden on the government. However, things have not 
changed much with regard to political control and pressures. The KBC is 
governed by a board whose membership comprises ministerial appointees or 
senior bureaucrats and is chaired by a presidential appointee (KBC Act, section 
4). Most of these appointments are political. The KBC radio and television are 
practically KANU-government loudspeakers, access to which almost non-
existent for those with views and messages that are different from the official 
KANU-government views and positions. 
In the run up to the 1982 multi-party general election, the opposition party 
FORD Kenya filed a suit in the High Court seeking to compel the Kenya 
Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) to give equal airtime on radio and television to 
all political parties in the country. The party was also seeking to prevent the 
KBC from campaigning for KANU and its President, who is also the State 
President, by giving them extensive exposure to the detriment of other parties. 
It was looking for constitutional protection against adverse and discriminatory 
publications and pronouncements by and through the KBC against them on 
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behalf of the President of KANU . In its submissions, the party argued that the 
publication of news, comments and music in praise of the president of KANU 
and its officials was discriminatory, unlawful and wasteful (The Standard, 
Oct.15, 1992; see also Andreassen et aI., 1993). 
In the case of broadcasting in Kenya , therefore, it is fair to say that access to 
radio and television for diversity of political opinions and views in hamstrung by 
a monolithic and authoritarian grip of the ruling KANU-government. As 
observed by Heath (1990:3), 'Broadcasters privately complain that political 
interference makes it impossible for them to meet standards of impartial news 
casting as required by professional norms as well as broadcast law' . When 
launching a medium wave radio transmitting station , part of a modernisation 
programme funded by Japan, President Moi said that 'Irresponsible 
broadcasting and journalism can lead to national disintegration and loss of 
national identity ... The use of radio and T.v. in promoting cohesion in ours 
society, economic development and national unity cannot be over emphasised' 
(The Standard, August 19, 1992). Legitimate as these goals are, as we 
observed above, it is argumentation such as this that is invariably used to cow 
critical journalists into toeing the establishment line. 
In their appraisal for the 1992 General Elections in Kenya, Andreassen et aI. , 
(1993) had the following to say about the findings of an evaluation of the 
broadcast media's coverage of the contending political parties : 
It concluded that news coverage, particularly that of KBC, was heavily 
biased in favour of the ruling party KANU. It was found that not only did 
KANU receive disproportionately more air-time that the opposition, but 
also that news items about KANU were invariably positive and those 
about opposition parties always negative (p. 16-19). 
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3.4 The Early Settler and Asian Press 
The printed press has a fairly long history in Kenya . This history has been 
covered variously by Ainslie (1966) . Abuoga and Mutere (1988), Barton (1979) , 
Hachten (1971), Mwaura (1980), Matheson (1992), Mytton (1983), Ochieng 
(1992) and to a lesser extent by Ziegler and Asante (1992) and Wilcox 0 
(1975) . From these sources , we learn that one of the oldest publications to 
appear in Kenya was a quarterly called Taveta Chronicle published by the 
Church Missionary Society from as far back as 1895. However, the first English 
weekly was the Leader of British East Africa published in Mombasa from 
August 1899. The publication carried articles covering news and issues from 
England and the British Empire. In 1908, the Leader of British East Africa 
moved to Nairobi and was then established as a weekly tabloid . It became a 
daily in 1911 . 
Like most of the colonial media in Africa at the time , the Leader of British East 
Africa identified closely with colonial and settler causes. Referring to Kenya , 
Mwaura (1988:60) concludes that, "Indeed the settler press - as it has come to 
be called was used by the settler community as a political and social instrument 
to agitate for their interests and maintain their political domination." According to 
Coppard (1988: 160), "Throughout the colonial period the media were owned 
and, to all intents and purposes, run by Europeans ... their output was directed 
almost exclusively towards the European settlers, traders and administrators ... " 
Ainslie (1966:99) argues that, "Newspapers in East Africa were from the 
beginning vehicles for the culture and concepts of the rulers, with considerable 
resources of White capital at their command." 
The second most significant event in the history of the daily press came on 
1902, when Mr. A M Jeevanjee, an Indian merchant, launched The African 
Standard. This publication catered primarily for civil servants and businessmen 
who inhabited Kenya's coastal town of Mombasa, which was the headquarters 
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of British East Africa . However, it was sold in 1905 to two wealthy Europeans 
who renamed the paper, The East African Standard. According to Ochieng 
(1992: 193) 
W .H. Tiller (was) invited from England to edit the paper. However, 
Tiller's vituperative criticisms against Britain's colonial policy soon 
embarrassed Jeevanjee into selling the paper to Messrs Anderson and 
Mayer, who immediately changed its name to East African Standard 
and set it on the pro-white course it was to follow all the way to 
independence in 1963 and considerably beyond. 
The East African Standard became a daily in 1910 and the largest and the most 
influential publication in East Africa . After years of competition , it took control of 
the Leader of British East Africa in 1923. 
A publication of a somewhat different nature was launched in 1919 when 
another Indian, Mr. Desai, established the East African Chronicle. The 
Chronicle was the mouthpiece of the East African Indian National Congress 
(EAINC) whose president was Desai himself. This publication attacked colonial 
policy in Kenya, accusing the British colonial administration of subjugation, 
repression , and discrimination against Asians and Africans. According to 
Mwaura (1980:60), the Asians started their press to articulate and defend their 
interests, and where it suited those interests, to support the political rights of 
Africans. The Chronicle was edited by Pio Gama Pinto who, according to 
Ainslie (1966: 107), "Turned his paper into a far more than a communal organ, 
for he voiced demands of Africans as well as Asians for social justice and a 
share in government." 
For Gachie (1992:16), Pinto was one of the few radical Asians courageous 
enough to use the media to agitate for multi-racialism and justice. However: 
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Few Asian community leaders or the Asian press sought to identify with 
the aspirations of the African majority, opting to steer clear of any 
confrontation with the Colonial Government as long as their interests 
were protected. 
Kenya's settler press on the other hand was keen to oppose any colonial laws 
that were less accommodating to Europeans. The editorials of such papers as 
the East African Standard and the Leader generally reflected the views of 
leading racist settlers such as Lord Delamere who owned large tracts of land 
that had been unjustly and forcibly expropriated from defenceless Africans . 
Issues that touched on the suffering of Africans , such as the unrest in 
Kikuyu-Iand arising from land shortage, were, if not abhorred, simply ignored by 
the colonial press (Abuoga and Mutere, 1988). According to Barton (1979: 101) , 
the settler press portrayed African leaders as "Objects of scorn and encouraged 
their European readers to regard them as irresponsible agitators". In fact, earlier 
on in his book, Barton (1979: 71) says that: 
Indeed in the case of Kenya, the most important of Britain's East and 
Central African colonies, the fact that independence came late ... was 
due in part to the resistance to African nationalism by the White owned 
press, representing not the Whitehall attitudes but settler's viewpoint. .. 
Up until the morning of independence on 13 December 1963, Kenya's 
biggest daily newspaper, The Standard, carries the British Coat of Arms. 
During this early period, a mere request from an African for permission to start 
his own press brought a reactionary response from officials of the colonial 
administration. Such newspapers were not permitted. Notwithstanding these 
restrictions and limitations, such publications were soon to appear and the 
colonial administration's response to them, cautious at first, soon became 
hostile. We learn from Mwaura (1980) that in the 1920's, 1930's and 1940's, a 
number of African-owned periodicals were started; they included Harry Thuku's 
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Kiswahili news sheet Tangazo, The Nyanza Times, Ramogi, published in the 
Luo language and the Kikuyu Central Association's monthly journal , 
Muigwithania. More about the African press will be said below. 
In summary, it is clear that the early history of the press in Kenya was 
dominated by the settler press whose main reason for existence was the 
promotion of the settlers' vested interests at the expense of those of Africans. 
This press was used to promote and sustain the status quo of African 
subjugation , exploitation of their labour and alienation from their land . The press 
was racist in orientation and heavily biased in their content, policy and approach 
(Mwaura 1980: 11 , 60). The rise of the Asian press saw the birth of 
press-political challenge to white supremacy. Though business oriented, this 
press easily became politicised as it questioned the discriminatory and inhuman 
treatment of Asians and. to a limited degree, of Africans. There arose at this 
time some nascent collaboration between Asians and Africans in their 
endeavour to agitate for common political and land rights, a struggle that to a 
great extent included use of the press. This explains the political orientation of 
such papers as the Chronicle. Access to the press was limited for Africans who 
desperately needed to put their grievances on the political agenda (Ainslie 
1966:107; Hachten 1971). 
3.5 A Press for Africans 
The need to develop a moderate African press that would support official policies 
was recognised early by the colonial government. In 1921 , the Native Africans 
Department began issuing the monthly Habari (Kiswahili word for 'news'). It was 
published to counter the propaganda published by Thuku and Desai and to keep 
anti-government, anti-European and anti-Christian papers from gaining 
readership among literate Africans. According to Abuoga and Mutere (1988: 14), 
however, Habarl1 s influence among Africans was limited because it supported 
even the most objectionable of government policies without question or criticism. 
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In January 1928 Jomo Kenyatta became honorary secretary of the Kikuyu 
Central Association (KCA) and became the first editor of their journal , 
Muigwithania (the Arbiter) . Muigwithania was popular among the Kikuyu largely 
because it challenged colonial authority . According to Abuoga and Mutere 
(1988:16), moreover, it had a much more important role to play. The paper 
helped restore the confidence of Africans in their capacity for political action and 
in their power to influence their history. It carried much information about how 
government worked, reporting on Kenya Legislative Council debates and even 
speeches from the British House of Commons. It tried to convey to Africans 
information about how the outside world operated and suggested that they too 
had a place in that world . 
According to Mytton (1983:44) and Mwaura (1980), Kenyatta halted publication 
of Muigwithania in 1934 when he left for Britain to agitate for African self-
determination. However, Abuoga and Mutere (1988: 16), claim that the paper 
was banned because of what the colonial government regarded as the 
subversive activities of the Kikuyu Central Association (also see Ochieng P 
1992:193; Widner 1992:51) . Hachten (1971 :201 -202) estimated that before the 
Mau Mau rebellion in 1952, there existed over forty .. ... of these violently written 
papers, mainly in Kikuyu, mainly mimeographed, mostly highly seditious and 
taking a bitterly anti-white, 'quit Kenya' line." 
The colonial government, in a bid to win the support of Africans, renewed and 
strengthened its interest in producing newspapers for Africans. It founded the 
Kenya Vernacular Press Company. In September 1939, it began publishing 
Baraza, a Kiswahili weekly. Baraza proved so popular that the East African 
Standard soon took it over completely and turned it into the first successful 
vernacular newspaper in Kenya. It is important to stress here that the colonial 
government's information services were directed at explaining its policies and 
popularising them among Africans. The government newspapers, news sheets 
and broadcasts provided no outlet for Africans except for those Africans of 
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unquestionable loyalty (Abuoga and Mutere 1988:22; Ochieng P 1992:193). 
Popular as they were, the colonial government's newspapers such as Baraza 
did not prevent the emergence immediately after the: Second World War of an 
independent African press (Abuoga and Mutere 1988:21; Mytton 1983: 44; 
Wilcox 1975: 5) . 
With the flood of newspapers and magazines that promoted African interests 
(Mytton 1983: 44; Wilcox 1975:10), came repression from the colonial 
government. Months before the State of Emergency was declared in October 
1952, white settlers , through their representatives in the Legislative Council , 
urged the government to restrain the situation and stamp out the subversive 
elements by banning the more radical newspapers. The State of Emergency 
declaration proscribed all African-owned newssheets and broad-sheets . 
However, an Asian by the name Vidyarthi, who was publishing the Colonial 
Times, seized this opportunity and launched a Kiswahili paper, Jicho (the Eye) . 
This publication filled for the Africans the vacuum that was created by the 
banning of African newspapers during the Emergency. Baraza and Jicho 
became the only two newspapers catering to Africans (Abuoga and Mutere 
1988:22-23; Mwaura 1980:1 1). 
It can be argued that with the rise of a press agitating for the rights of Africans 
and Asians' the colonial government established for Africans a press mainly for 
propaganda and indoctrination purposes. This was an obvious admission by the 
colonial powers that the daily press had a central role to play in the political 
process. The colonial government's media efforts should be seen as an attempt 
by the colonial government to defeat the Africans' struggle for self-liberation. 
Both Habari and Baraza were vehicles used to achieve socio-political control of 
Africans and the colonial government's self-preservation. 
For the Africans, the press was primarily an instrument for liberation, both 
mental and physical. This press was intricately entwined with the political 
activities of freedom movements and liberation politicians. This can be seen in 
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the involvement of both Jomo Kenyatta and Harry Thuku in Muigwithania. The 
press was also seen as a strong forum for cultural expression at a time when 
African cultural expression suffered serious setbacks at the hands of Western 
religious and cultural influences. Mytton (1983:44) says that: 
After the war a series of anti-colonial, anti-settler, Kikuyu language 
newspapers existed that went mainly unchecked because the British 
colonial administrators knew Swahili but not Kikuyu. These papers were 
ruthlessly suppressed during the Mau Mau Emergency of 1952. 
However, the importance of the press in forging links between people 
had now been demonstrated. The establishment of this network proved 
to be a critical factor in African nationalism ... 
In short, the African press was one of protest against the human and land 
exploitative and alienating colonial status quo (Abuoga and Mutere 1988: 16; 
Hachten 1971: 201-202; Wilcox 1975: 3-5, 10-11). However, the African press 
did not survive for long because of financial, technical and human resource 
problems. According to Mwaura (1980: 61) : 
The African press was particularly vulnerable. It was at the mercy of the 
Asian who owned the printing presses .. . it did not receive any real 
advertising support as all advertising was controlled by Europeans and 
Asians . Also, the Africans had no training in journalism and most ... 
were fUll-time politicians and only part-time journalists. 
3.6 The Private Daily Press in Post-independence Kenya 
It is Abuoga and Mutere's (1988) argument, (also see Ochieng W R 1985; 
Widner 1992), that the Emergency compounded the concerns and fears by the 
settler community about their colonial economy and the security of foreign 
investments. As a result of these concerns, some members of the white 
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community found it expedient to seek an alliance with those African leaders 
who were prepared to accept the private enterprise system. This initiative led to 
the formation in 1959 of the New Kenya Party under the leadership of Sir 
Michael Blundell. This collaboration between European and African interests 
facilitated the transition to political independence, without the necessary radical 
changes in the economic and social structures. The post-independence press 
grew and increasingly became a reflection of those interests and the classes 
that had a stake in sustaining them. 
It is in the above spirit of continuity and status quo preservation that Kenyatta is 
seen to have insisted that private property should be respected and that the 
settlers should be accommodated in the new political dispensation. This readily 
became the official line for the emergent African leadership (Widner 1992). 
Whilst it could be argued that the oppressive Europeans masters were on their 
way out, an African leadership with similar interests and ideals with theirs had 
emerged. It began to harness the Press to provide channels through which the 
techniques, life-styles, motivations and attitudes of the modernising sector could 
be diffused to the 'more backward traditional sectors' . Sensing that the press 
would continue to serve the interest of the emergent African elite, as early as 
1963, Kenya's first Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Ramogi Achieng 
Oneko, lamented that: 
It is vital that every new nation should have a government newspaper. 
This is because commercial newspapers aim primarily at making 
profits, so they are not likely to undertake the publication of newspapers 
for small linguistic groups. The government will have to fill the vacuum 
even it means running the newspapers at a loss ... (Barton 1966: 39). 
Oneko argued that the capitalist private press tended to favour socio-economic 
groups that had the highest spending power and therefore attracted the most 
advertising (Abuoga and Mutere 1988: 26-28; Mytton 1983: 68). During this 
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transition period, the emergent African leadership apparently failed to address 
the deep inequalities inhered in, and the need for the overhaul of, the colonial 
legacy. Abuoga and Mutere (1966) argue that the Capricorn Society and later 
on the New Kenya Party successfully co-opted the emergent African political 
and economic elite into the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie. Already at this time , 
there could be seen a budding crop of African leaders interested in cosmetic 
changes and seeing to it that the state machinery inherited from the colonial 
government was retained . The post-independence press became a major 
player in the promotion and preservation of the colonial socio-economic legacy. 
At this time also, the developmental philosophy of the media had taken root. 
The media were seen and expected to play the role of a vehicle whose function 
was the diffusion of modern western values (see Barton 1979). 
An event of great significance in the development of the private daily press in 
post-independence Kenya took place in 1959 when the Aga Khan became 
involved in the Kenyan daily press . In the previous year, a European by the 
name Charles Hayes had established Taifa, a small weekly newspaper 
published in the Swahili vernacular language. According to Ochieng (1992:194), 
in 1959 Michael Curtis set up, on behalf of the Aga Khan , a company called 
East African Newspapers (Nation Series) Limited which proceeded to buy 
ownership interests from Hayes who, however, was retained as editor. It was 
hailed to be the first major newspaper group to identify editorially with the 
aspirations and interests of African people (Abuoga and Mutere 1966:23, 29-30; 
Ochieng 1992:194). In Aga Khan's own words: 
I felt strongly at the time, and still feel , that the printed media are 
profoundly important as instruments of mobilising peoples of the new 
countries of Africa and Asia for the complex and continuing task of 
national building ... In those days, it was something of a revolutionary 
idea to found a newspaper which was intended to be edited and staffed 
by Africans, to contain news of specific interest to Africa and to express 
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an African point of view... (Nation 25th Anniversary Celebrations 
Souvenir Magazine 1985: 1 8) . 
In 1960, the management of the Nation Series launched Taifaleo (Swahili word 
for 'the nation today') , the first Swahili daily . On 20 March of the same year, they 
launched the Sunday Nation and on 3 October, Kenya's second daily, the Daily 
Nation, went into circulation. As indicated above, the entrance of the Nation 
Group of Newspapers on the press scene was an event of great import 
because their publications aimed at reflecting and supporting the interests and 
views of Africans (Mwaura 1980:65). Soon after it was launched' the Daily 
Nation surpassed the East African Standard in circulation while the Sunday 
Nation with a circulation of 70, 076, became the largest selling weekly in East 
Africa (Abuoga and Mutere 1988; Ochieng P 1992). According to Mwaura 
(1980:65), the Nation series newspapers 'posed a serious challenge to the long 
established but rather staid and dull East African Standard.' 
In Ainslie's view (1966: 105), the Nation papers were an entirely new 
experience for East Africa, tried to bring a new professionalism and 
sophistication to local journalism with emphasis on entertainment and glamour. 
Hachten (1971 : 212) concurs that the "tabloid Nation was bright, interesting, 
newsy and intelligently edited". On the day when the Daily Nation hit the streets 
as a daily , it pledged: 
To do our utmost to help Kenya and other East African territories 
perilous transition to African majority rule and full independence as 
peacefully and constructively as possible ... The Daily Nation will also 
be a watch dog, guarding the liberty of the individual against 
bureaucracy and totalitarianism, however they may manifest 
themselves (25th Anniversary Magazine 1985: 18). 
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Barton (1979: 178-179) observed "The Nation has probably more influence on 
the government of the country than any Fleet Street newspaper has over 
political life in Britain". However, Hachten (1971 : 213) came to a similar but 
slightly different conclusion : "Like The Standard, The Nation has followed a 
policy of basic support for the Kenya government, but has criticised certain 
aspects of government. .. " In the sub-section below, I will provide examples of 
case events, which illustrate what for me were the strongest sources of 
constraint on the political performance of the private press in Kenya. 
3.7 Media Politics and the Private Daily Press in Post-Independence Kenya 
A case that would best introduce this section is the following . On one occasion 
in the mid-1960s during the early days of opposition politics of the Kenya 
Peoples Union (KPU) led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, President Kenyatta of 
KANU had gone to Kisumu, a predominantly KPU stronghold, on an official visit. 
During a meeting, an altercation erupted between Kenyatta and Odinga. The 
crown became unruly and in the commotion that later ensued, the heavily 
armed security personnel who formed Kenyatta's security detail shot and killed 
innocent children and adults who had lined the streets to cheer the President. 
Joram Amadi , the editor of Taifa series, because he simply allowed a news 
story about this incident to be published, was immediately sacked (Abuoga and 
Mutere 1988:31; also see Ochieng W 1985). 
Senior civil servants frequently articulated the government's official sentiments 
with regard to the press. On 6 June 1977, the permanent secretary in the 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Darius Mbela, delivered a scathing 
attack on foreign-owned press in Kenya and Africa, charging it with 'self-
censorship' and calling for 'a people's press' as an alternative. Mbela urged 
local journalists to be committed to the interests of the masses and to serving 
as the 'vanguard of the forces needed to neutralise foreign influence and to 
promote our cultural aspirations' (Ochieng 1992:49). He called for a press in 
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Kenya 'genuinely belonging to the masses to avoid some of the grossest 
interference by foreign owners' and criticised the private newspapers for 
'belonging to some tycoons enslaved by borrowed ideologies' . He lamented that 
it was even more tragic that the power barons are foreigners (Ibid. 50). 
Top newspaper managers were not to be left out of this great debate. George 
Githii7 then the editor-in-chief of the Nation, defending the foreign-owned press 
had answered Mbela thus, ' ... we work to assist the Kenyan government and all 
it stands for; we work for the cause of Kenya's progress; we work to defend the 
freedoms .. . ' Joe Rodrigues, an editor with the same paper, is reported to have 
said that' ... the Kenyan press have since independence in 1963 by and large 
given the government every backing in its efforts to develop the country and in 
its quarrel with its neighbours.' In response to Mbela's argument that the press 
in Kenya was 'first and foremost interested in politics', Githii had responded that 
it was true that the Daily Nation was interested in politics, ' ... but not first and 
foremost. And there are other easier and more lucrative areas of operation. The 
newspapers have to satisfy their stockholders while at the same time satisfying 
their readers and serving the national interest...' (see OchiengJ1992: 49-79) . 
About the ownership of the Nation, Githii had said that since 1 970 it had been: 
... our ambition that the newspaper would become not merely edited 
and run by Africans but actually owned by Africans through the widest 
possible share-holding. That process has already started and Nation 
Newspapers' parent company (Nation Printers and Publishers' who are 
also the holding company for Kenya Litho) has numerous indigenous 
shareholders ... (Ochieng P 1992:54-55) . 
Joe Kadhi , then managing editor of the Sunday Nation, was also constrained to 
support the foreign-owned private press. According to him: 
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One does not need to be a qualified journalist to realise that the press 
in Kenya is free .. . It is by looking at the freedom of the press in Kenya 
that one becomes so proud of the democratic society in which we live ... 
Today there is not a single European on the staff of the Sunday Nation 
and 'yours truly' happens to be its editor (ibid.: 63). 
In a different incident during the same year, Githii wrote a vitriolic attack on 
Jaramogi Oginga Odinga when the controversial former vice-president claimed 
that interference from absentee owners was the greatest obstacle to freedom of 
the press in Kenya . Ironically, within just two weeks, in a dramatic twist of 
events, Githii was forced to resign from the Nation accusing the Aga Khan (the 
majority share holder) of constant editorial meddling (Abuoga and Mutere 
1988:31; Ochieng P 1992: 60). 
The debate about the performance of the Kenyan daily press was not limited to 
that press sector that was in the hands of foreigners. Just before Kenya's 
general elections of 1979, Hilary Ng'weno sent out, through the pages of the 
Weekly Review, of which he was owner and editor, a set of questionnaires. He 
was seeking to establish - Gallup style - what kinds of candidates were likely to 
be returned to Parliament and to publish his findings before the elections 
themselves would take place. The government did not take kindly to this plan 
believing that such findings would influence the voters. When the day arrived for 
Ng'weno to publish his findings, he did not but instead he wrote a long 
commentary in the Weekly Review saying that the government had vetoed the 
publication of his findings. He strongly censored the government for 
interference with the 'freedom of the press'. 
A few weeks later Ng'weno wrote a circular to all staff at Stellascope (his 
publishing company) giving them a month's notice to look for jobs elsewhere 
because there was no prospect of the company continuing to exist for longer 
than a month. According to Ochieng P (1992:60), the government had 
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instructed all its departments and parastatals to cancel all advertising contracts 
with Stellascope. These advertisers included the Industrial Development Bank 
and the National Bank of Kenya , to which Stellascope owed considerable 
amounts of money in the form of loan capital. It was only when Ng'weno had 
undertaken to 'behave' that the government's directive was rescinded (also see 
Abuoga and Mutere 1988:95) . 
Another event of significance on the part of Ng'weno took place later on in the 
same year 1979. He wrote a circular, this time to all editorial staff, banning them 
from contributing articles to any publication other than the Weekly Review. This 
action was prompted by an article that appeared in the London-based 
magazine, New Africa, describing the extremely grave political and economic 
situation at the time developing in Kenya . The government was incensed by the 
story and suspecting it to have been penned by a Stellascope employee, had 
been in touch with Ng'weno to warn him. 
Strangely enough, in 1981 Ng'weno told a Nairobi meeting of the International 
Press Institute (IPI) that Kenya was the envy of African countries because of the 
freedoms enjoyed by its citizens. He attributed this to a healthy political 
atmosphere pervading the country. However, in the same year that Ng'weno 
was praising press freedom in Kenya, government interference landed 
Rodriguez, who was now editor-in-chief of the Nation, most of his top editors 
and a couple of senior reporters, in police cells for nearly a week. The Daily 
Nation had carried a story in which it had referred to an unsigned statement 
from the ruling party headquarters as 'anonymous'. This was at a time when 
Kenya faced a crisis during a two-week doctors' strike . President Moi had 
attacked the Nation of misleading people when it reported that the source of the 
party's statement was anonymous. He argued that the 'anonymous' description 
meant that the newspaper regarded leaders of the ruling Kenya African National 
Union (KANU) as 'non-persons' (Abuoga and Mutere 1988:31 -2; Ochieng P 
1992:19). 
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In the meantime, George Githii had been appointed Chairman of the Standard 
Newspapers Limited in 1980, following his departure from Nation newspapers 
on 'matters of principle'. Observers (Abuoga and Mutere 1988; Ochieng P 1992) 
attributed his appointment to the Standard Newspapers Limited to the influence 
of the former Attorney-General , Charles Njonjo who was now Minister for 
Constitutional Affairs. Njonjo was also a good friend of "Tiny Rowlands", the 
Lonrho chief who owned The Standard. After Githii's appointment, The 
Standard appeared to have lost some of its independence and became what 
observers regarded as Njonjo's mouthpiece. Njonjo's political rivals and foes 
were criticised mercilessly through Githii 's editorials. Githii provoked, teased 
and even openly abused the office and person of the then vice-president Mwai 
Kibaki (Abuoga and Mutere 1988:83; also see Ochieng P 1992). 
The following year Njonjo himself was named in a widely reported treason trial, 
which the Daily Nation gave a banner headline. He was reported to have 
complained bitterly that the headline was aimed at smearing his name. 
Consequently, a section of the government identified with Njonjo soon launched 
a series of strong criticisms against the Daily Nation. The editorial team was 
accused of turning the Aga Khan papers into 'an opposition party.' As a result of 
all this, coupled with the need to appease Njonjo, then respected and seen as a 
strategic personality by the business community, Nation Printers and 
Publishers, the holding company for Nation Newspapers and Kenya Litho, 
decided to replace Rodrigues and other senior journalists at the Nation (Abuoga 
and Mutere 1988:34; Ochieng P 1992:67). 
Having been sacked as editor, Rodrigues told the British Broadcasting 
Corporation , BBC, that the press in Kenya though the freest in Africa, was not 
completely free and that the editors had to decide what they could and could 
not print. He noted that there was a tendency to err on the side of caution . 
According to him, a newspaper in the Third World is as free as the government 
wants and that editors do walk a tightrope. He said that a newspaper editor in 
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an African country could find himself in trouble whether the country boasted of 
parliamentary democracy or whether it was a crass dictatorship (Ochieng 
1992:20) . 
On the government policy front, cabinet minister 0100 Aringo mooted in 1981 
the idea of an official 'Press Council' with responsibilities which would include: 
ensuring professional ethics by stopping self-censorship on the part of editors; 
protecting the public from injurious advertisements and by promoting 
professionalism among reporters and sub-editors. The minister warned against 
permissive reporting and witch-hunting , arguing that, 'As a young developing 
country we cannot afford the lUxury of permissive reporting practised by the 
developed countries ... The press must not appear to be inciting the public to 
rise against the popularly elected government' (ibid.: 42). 
After a remarkably rare stint as editor-in-chief of both Nation and The Standard, 
Kenya's leading dailies, things came to a head for George Githii . On 21 July 
1982,. he wrote a very critical editorial entitled 'Preach Water and Drink Wine .' In 
the editorial , he strongly censored the government for detaining people without 
trial simply because they had criticised the practice of detention without trial. He 
lamented the then rapidly worsening economic situation in the country and 
bluntly accused the government of suppression. He called for the release of all 
detainees and the repeal or amendment of the Preventive Detention Act. He 
went on to disclose that, 'There are instances .. . when our national papers have 
been told in no uncertain terms that they publish certain things at their peril and 
there have been instances where they have been humiliated in public' (Ochieng 
1992:57; also see Abuoga and Mutere 1988:34). This time Njonjo, Githii's 
political patron and godfather, joined the political establishment in condemning 
the editor and described the editorial as 'diabolical' . By 2.00 p.m. of the same 
day, there was a special edition of The Standard on the streets of Nairobi , 
brought out to announce the board's decision to fire the editor on the spot and 
. 
to dissociate itself from the editorial (Ochieng P 1992:58, 59) . 
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3.8 The Birth and Perfonnance of KANU's Daily Press 
As the debate discussed above unfolded, there was a concomitant debate 
around the wisdom or not of founding a ruling-party press. On 28 October 1981 , 
Lawrence Sifuna, MP, moved a motion in parliament proposing for KANU to 
establish its own newspaper to counter the habit of foreign owned media of 
slighting certain politicians. Reacting to this initiative, Ng'weno (Weekly Review, 
6.11 .1981) had the following to say about political party-owned press: 
Given a choice between a constant harangue of party 'news' and the 
admittedly flawed menu which relatively independent newspapers can 
offer, readers will quite understandably choose a freer Press. And the 
danger in a party newspaper is that in order to keep from losing readers 
- any ruling party will be tempted to secure a monopoly (of news and 
advertisements) for its newspaper thereby curtailing freedom of the 
press ... 
Later experience by Ng'weno proved the above statement to be most ironic. 
Ng'weno and his wife had founded Stellascope Limited , a publishing company, 
and launched a weekly political magazine, the Weekly Review, in February 
1975. The following year, they launched a children's magazine - Rainbow- and 
in 1977 came a Sunday newspaper, The Nairobi Times (Weekly Review 01 
April 1983). 
In November 1981' the publication of The Nairobi Times was suspended 
because of cash flow problems. However, in May 1982, the first issue of the 
Nairobi Times as a daily newspaper went into circulation. The daily soon found 
itself in a financial quagmire as the national economy became depressed and 
the cash-flow problem became more acute. In Ng'weno's own admission, the 
economic situation as a whole was to blame for his lack of success as an 
indigenous publisher of a daily newspaper (Ibid.) . 
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It was when the Nairobi Times failed as a daily that Ng'weno started to 
negotiate with the ruling party KANU, for the party to acquire Stellascope Ltd ., 
its printing subsidiary (later named Press Trust Printers) and the title of The 
Nairobi Times. It was agreed that KANU take over The Nairobi Times and the 
two companies including their assets and liabilities (Abuoga and Mutere 
1988:95-96; Ochieng 1992: 180). Describing the circumstances at that time , 
Ng'weno had said : 
Advertising in Kenya is dominated by non-Africans. Until this changes, 
the prospects for indigenous independent press in Kenya are bleak. As 
far as the commitment to the concept of freedom of the press is 
concerned, Ng'weno thinks that the government of Kenya is more 
committed to that concept than many others who profess to support 
Press freedom. I have tried to salvage our operations since 1978. I 
have spoken to a dozen American newspaper publishers. I have been 
to Sweden. To Holland. I have talked to Foundations. I have tried 
virtually everything I could think of to keep the Nairobi Times, Weekly 
Review and Rainbow going. When the chips were down, it was two 
Governmental institutions - the National Bank of Kenya and the 
Industrial Development Bank - who kept us alive . Their belief in Press 
freedom showed itself in concrete terms, unlike a lot of 
empty rhetoric which I have heard on this subject only too often .. .' 
(Weekly Review 1 April 1983; also see Abuoga and Mutere 1988: 95) . 
As a result of the economic woes of this indigenous publisher, coupled with the 
KANU government's problems with foreign-owned dailies, the Kenya Times 
Group of Newspapers were founded by KANU in April 1983, when it launched 
its first English daily newspaper, Kenya Times. The Sunday Times was 
launched on 8 May 1983 and the Kiswahili daily Kenya Leo (Swahili word for 
'Kenya Today'), a week later. The launching of these newspapers into the 
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market was not easy, as they had to fight for acceptability against stiff 
competition from existing newspapers. (Abuoga and Mutere, 1 988: 64) . The 
party papers were received with overwhelming cynicism. It was generally feared 
that such papers would be allowed to print only party propaganda from KANU 
leaders. 
Right from the start, the KANU newspapers were bedevilled with financial and 
organisational problems. Faced with stiff competition from the private daily 
newspapers, the ruling party co-opted in 1987 the assistance of Robert 
Maxwell, the late British press magnate of the Mirror group, to help sort out 
problems at the Kenya Times Group (Matheson 1992:124). When the deal was 
finally signed in October 1987, a new venture called the Kenya Times Media 
Trust (KTMT) went into operation on 1 November 1987. For many months later, 
good journalists remained circumspect about joining the party newspapers, 
despite invitations to many of them to do so. Many were apprehensive, among 
other things, of the apparent absence of job security at Kenya Times. 
According to Ochieng (1992:154-155), KANU Investments Limited , which 
represents KANU in KTMT, existed only on paper and has never invested even 
a cent in the venture since it was re-launched in February 1988. The various 
government departments and civic authorities simply refused over the years to 
pay for the advertisements they place in the paper' perhaps assuming that it 
belonged to them and should therefore charge them nothing. He argues that 
KANU and the government owed the publishing group hundreds of millions of 
shillings, with the result that they couldn't begin to make a profit with which to 
expand. In September 1991, 'the company's financial position was extremely 
tenuous as a result of the failure by the owners to invest there and to collect the 
huge debts owed to it for many years' . 
Ochieng, who was appointed editor of the KANU newspapers in September 
1988, claims further that despite the bleak and negative aura with which Kenya 
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Times was received , it: 
... has survived. What is more striking, it has often been much busier in 
its content, more vigorous in its analysis and greatly more courageous 
in its exposition of corruption in government and the private sector than 
have the privately-owned newspapers, including its predecessor, the 
Nairobi Times (Ibid.) . 
This apparent self-analysis by Philip Ochieng of Kenya Times' performance 
under his editorship seems to have been shared by the Weekly Review, for a 
long time Kenya's leading political magazine, when it observed that: 
Ironically , the KANU-owned Kenya Times has never shied away from 
reporting on sensitive political topics, especially under the stewardship 
of Mr Phi lip Ochieng, under whose direction the party paper has come 
to overtake the nearly 1 OO-year old Standard in sales to take second 
place in the market (5 July 1991). 
The above reputation did not augur well for Ochieng's future at Kenya Times. In 
April of 1991, he used the pages of the paper to harshly criticise the poor 
performance and low quality of debate in, the KANU parliament and the 
persistent lack of quorums in the House. He described thO legislators as 
'conmen, layabouts, idlers, thieves and ne'er-do wells' (Weekly Review 12 July 
and 4 October 1991). In fact, by July 1991, Kenya Times was now publishing a 
daily list of Members of parliament who were attending in the House. As a 
result, parliamentarians came out with strong criticisms of Kenya Times, Philip 
Ochieng and journalists in general with one MP calling them 'dangerous fools' . 
The legislators complained that 'the paper was out to discredit them in the eyes 
of their electorate by portraying them as inefficient representatives' (Weekly 
Review 12 July 1991). Many of them called for the paper to be barred from 
covering parliamentary proceedings. 
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If the rank and file of KANU had hoped that the party press would be a friendly 
and supportive alternative to the 'hostile' coverage of the independent' press, 
the performance of the party's Kenya Times under the editorship of Philip 
Ochieng was a big disappointment. Being a strong supporter of the one-party 
political system, he attacked individuals and groups, especially lawyers and 
religious leaders, who agitated for a multi-party system. However, politicians, 
whether or not they belonged to the ruling-party KANU, were not spared 
Ochieng's pen. He exposed corruption both in government and other public 
offices. According to the Weekly Review (4 April 1991), for the time being , he 
seemed to have had the blessing of the President. 
3.9 Factors That Have Affected Press Perfonnance 
From what has been presented above, it can be argued that political 
interference is a major, if not the most important, influence on the performance 
of the press in Kenya. This influence manifests itself in various ways , most of it 
indirectly. Oversensitive to the way they are perceived by the public eye; most 
Kenyan politicians would go to a great length to avoid negative portrayal in the 
press. However, this is usually not very easy and most politicians make do with 
public condemnation of newspapers or media in general. One source of 
interference emanates from political patronage of editors by politicians. The 
example of Githii's support for7 and protection by Njonjo shows that this type of 
symbiotic relationship can make an editor fearless in his criticism of politicians 
so long as his 'godfathe~ is on his side. However, in the Kenyan situation for a 
long time, the daring that Githii was famous for must be seen as exceptional. 
Political pressure in the form of government interference is the most potent in 
this category. Government departments are major sources of revenue in the 
form of advertisement placed in the daily press. A move by the KANU 
government to withdraw this source of revenue would most probably make 
media organisations 'behave' as exemplified by the case of Ng'weno and 
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Stellascope Ltd . There are several examples above in which this type of 
pressure saw the sacking of prominent and able editors . Even though this is 
usually an ex post facto interference, it served as a reminder to editors and 
other journalists of the treacherous nature of their profession. I have also 
observed that it is not uncommon that editors are rounded up by police, 
roughed up or threatened on the instigation of politicians and over-enthusiastic 
functionaries in the government (HRW 1991 185-216; Tostensen and Scott 
1987:118). 
The way in which journalists perceive their freedom from political influence is 
sometimes dictated and clouded by personal expediency. Most Kenyan 
journalists are seen to deny this kind of influence when their professional 
performance is under scrutiny and when they feel secure in their employment 
positions. At such times they laud both press freedom ·and the 'atmosphere of 
freedom pervading the country.' However, when their personal position, or that 
of their organisation, is threatened , they usually lament government interference 
in the freedom of the press. 
In most of the press bashing by politiCians and government functionaries that I 
have given above, foreign ownership is always blamed for the perceived 
'dysfunction'. This type of absentee ownerShip', it is argued, works against the 
interests of Kenya because it dictates the propagation of foreign ideologies and 
interferes with the freedom of local editors in their employment. Some 
politicians see this as 'the greatest obstacle to freedom of the press in Kenya' . 
Editors, most of them Kenyans7 have always hit back at these allegations while 
at the same time asserting that they do not take orders from their employers in 
their editorial work; thereby dismissing the existence of owner-interference. 
Ironically, I have given above a number of cases where editors have been 
relieved of their duties following disagreement with owners or employers. At 
such times, the editors have regrettably acknowledged the existence of, and 
strongly attacked owner-interference. 
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Another strong argument against foreign ownership has been that the main 
interest of the press organisation so owned is to make profit. This profit-motive 
is seen as taking precedence over the national interest. The view of the editors 
is that though it is true that the press may be interested in making profit, this is 
not their major goal. The editors as the prime concerns advance the needs of 
readers and the national interest. It is also argued that newspaper ownership 
has become more spread with the floating of shares to Kenyans. This coupled 
with the fact that only Kenyans are to be found in editorial positions, it is 
claimed, negates or minimises the effects of owner-influence. 
Both politicians and government functionaries accuse editors of self-censorship. 
In their understanding, this is necessitated by the need to please either 
newspaper owners or powerful politicians or both . On their part, editors do not 
dispute self-censorship but would easily allribute it to political interference and 
the concomitant instinct to survive. This instinct is borne out of the 
unpredictable nature of the political climate (See especially HRW 
1991 :185-216; Ochieng P 1992; Tostensen and Sco1l1987: 1 18). 
The nagging concern about the relationship between ownership and the press's 
political performance was at the heart of the suggestions by KANU politicians 
that the ruling party found its own press. An argument was made that because 
the two major daily newspapers at the time, The Standard and The Nation, 
were foreign-owned, foreign influence would perpetually support the press in its 
belilllement of the ruling-party politicians. A press founded by the party, 
because it is indigenous and because it would be answerable to the party, 
would be the answer to the politicians' press-publicity problems. However, it is 
for similar reasons that there was concern by government critics that a party 
press would end up being a mere propaganda machine. It was feared that it 
would hurt 'freedom of the press' should the ruling-party press monopolise 
advertisement and news from the government. It is this realisation that made 
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Ng'weno, an indigenous newspaper publisher, opine that a foreign-owned 
press, though not the best answer to the country's interests, would be preferred 
by readers to the ruling-party press. 
If one then assumes that foreign ownership of the press does not serve Kenya's 
national interest, and that a party press runs the risk of being overly biased in 
the interest of the ruling-party politician , then a private indigenous press would 
be the desirable alternative that would provide objective, non-partisan 
Kenya-friendly news and views. But Ng'weno's experience suggests that this 
may not necessarily, nor practically, be true. He has been subjected to the 
constraints and vicissitudes of both the market and the political climate in ways 
similar to those experienced by the private foreign-owned press. His 
experiences show that even a private indigenous press is susceptible to political 
interference. It is these experiences that made Ng'weno loathe the KANU 
government's interference in the freedom of the press . 
As he himself put it, Ng'weno's later attempt to publish a daily newspaper, the 
Nairobi Times, was jeopardised by market forces. Hard economic times and a 
dearth of advertisement forced this indigenous publisher to sell his short-lived 
daily newspaper to the ruling party. At this time Ng'weno considered economic 
conditions in the form of advertisement rather than ownership to be crucial to 
freedom of the press. Since two state-owned banks came to Ng'weno's rescue 
'when the chips were down', his understanding of the relationship between the 
government and freedom of the press was reversed . He now came to the 
conclusion that because the KANU government, through the banks, had come 
to his help, it was more committed to freedom of the press. 
The ruling party's Kenya Times has been beset with problems not unlike those 
that faced the private commercial daily newspapers. The party found it 
imperative to solicit the financial and organisational assistance of none other 
than Robert Maxwell to save the paper from imminent collapse. In doing this 
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foreign interest became a factor even in the ruling party's press. The 
relationship between the ruling party and the government was to prove 
consequential for the paper's professional and financial position. According to 
Ochieng (1992), public servants found their way into the paper's employment 
bringing with them a bureaucratic ethos in management. The KANU 
Investments Limited, which represents the ruling party in the Kenya Times 
Media Trust, has not made any substantial investment in the joint venture. This , 
plus the failure by government departments to foot their advertisement bills in 
the paper, has not augured well economically for Kenya Times. 
3.10 The Daily Press, Political Pressure and Multi-Party Politics: 1990-1991 
I have demonstrated above that political commentary in the daily newspapers 
had definite limits. It is clear from the examples given that there were, as 
Tostensen and Scot! (1967:1 16) observed, 'limits beyond which political 
commentators (could) not venture lest risking intimidation, victimisation and 
possibly detention.' There were moments when the daily press managed to be 
critical of the powers that be in their news reports and editorials but for the most 
part these criticisms were 'inconsequential and ineffective' . Even the 
exceptional editorial by Githii in 1961 on detention without trial ended with the 
editor's immediate sacking. Describing the self-censorship ethic, and therefore 
the degree of press freedom obtaining at the time, Tostensen and Scot! 
observed that 'sharp criticism is tolerated as long as the addressee is not 
specific, or easily identifiable, as one of the President's proteges or as the 
President himself.' 
The daily press's political performance at the time could be summarised thus: 
For the many who do not master the techniques of writing between the 
lines, self-censorship may represent the only logical response . Articles 
then tend to focus on themes which are unlikely to cause any offence or 
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controversy . If not, the author may be branded, in the name of national 
building and consensual politics, as an anti-nyayo radical , or as a 
purveyor of foreign ideologies, or a disloyal rumour monger (ibid.) . 
This seems to be the situation that still obtained at the time when the agitation 
for multi-party politics was gathering momentum. For example, when Rev. Njoya 
in a church sermon in January 1990 called for an end to KANU's monopoly of 
Kenyan politics, the Daily Nation gave it a banner headline and extensive 
coverage. This infuriated KANU who said that they were "keenly looking at those 
organs of the media, which provide a forum for people with misleading views 
and statements' (Weekly Review 12 January 1990). A study of the press 
coverage at the time suggests that beginning in 1990, the two private dailies had 
already showed an increasing readiness to carry stories about people who 
advocated for an end to KANU's single-party monopoly of political power 
(Mak'Ochieng, 1993). As was to be expected, this was met with intimidating 
pressure from the KANU government machinery. A few examples below will 
illustrate how the verbal and physical attacks on journalists were meted out. 
In March 1990 Minister for Labour Peter Okondo "slapped and indefinite ban on 
newspapers from reporting any of his functions in Busia District because they 
had become 'malicious'" (Kenya Times 12 March 1990). The minister went on 
to take the kind of action that was popular with KANU government politicians, "I 
have already talked to the top management of Kenya Times Media Trust about 
their stringer and I am happy they have promised stern action against him" 
(ibid). On June 21, 1990, the editor of the Daily Nation , George Mbuggus, was 
arrested simply because he had attended a press conference given by lawyer 
Paul Muite on behalf of multi-party advocates Kenneth Matiba and Charles 
Rubia . The press conference was broken up by police, who stormed the 
building where it was being held, confiscated notebooks, film and cassettes and 
ordered journalists to leave. Plainclothes officers told Mbunguss that he was 
being detained for security reasons. 
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Seven days later, police arrested Mitch Odero, deputy managing editor of 
Standard along with three colleagues: Francis M'Thiya, managing editor of the 
Sunday Standard, Francis Githui Muhindi , managing editor-designated, and 
production editor, James Kimondo. They were held overnight and later charged 
in court for publishing reports "likely to cause fear, alarm and despondency" 
(HRW, 1991 : 190). The charges related to the Standard's coverage of the 
violent evictions from Muoroto shanty town, in which it had been alleged that a 
number of people died, including a city employee. On July 9, 1990, Mohamed 
Amin, Vis news bureau chief, and a cameraman, were stopped by police and 
roughly handled. An officer slapped Mohamed Amin over the head, and the 
journalists were forced into a police truck with detainees taken from the scene 
of the July demonstrations and riots . They were taken to separate police 
stations and later released without charge. (HRW, 1991 : 200). 
On March 3, 1991 , two Weekly Review reporters, Gacharia Gaitho and Julius 
Bargorett, were whipped and beaten with sticks by plainclothes police after they 
attempted to attend a public meeting held between Nicholas Biwott, Minister of 
Energy, and the villagers in Kerio valley. The meeting was embarrassing for the 
minister because it concerned a land dispute, in which the villagers were 
seeking compensation for land taken by Kenya Fluorospar Company, which he 
owned. Plainclothes police, believed to include members of Biwotfs own 
security team, ordered the journalists to leave and confiscated their notebooks 
and film. Before they were able to leave, however, one of the four security men 
took them into a room and beat them with sticks (Weekly Review 15. 03.1991). 
During June 1991 member of parliament for Rongai , Mr. Eric Bomett, stood up 
in parliament to accuse local journalists of being the "cause of all evils in the 
country", and of being a highly immoral people "who move with beautiful girls 
during the night" (Weekly Review, July 12, 1991). During the first week in July, 
members of parliament went full-out to blast parliamentary reporters for their 
alleged inaccurate reporting of proceedings in the house, with the member for 
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Msambweni , Mr. Kassim Mwamzandi , calling them "dangerous fools" (Daily 
Nation, July 5,1991) . During the same month, during a fund-raising meeting, Mr 
Mulu Mutisya, nominated MP, is reported to have described local journalists as 
"people born out of wedlock and conceived along river beds and road sides" in 
what the Weekly Review described as "one of the most shameless and 
offensive tirades against local scribes yet" (July 12, 1991) . 
The greatest source of intimidation and censorship , however, came from the 
Office of the President. According to Joe Kadhi , one of Kenya's most prominent 
journalists and formerly a long serving senior editor of Nation Newspapers: 
If the powers of some politicians and indeed that of a number of civil 
servants in one party state appear to be formidable, those of the people 
at the Big House were insurmountable. Any telephone call from that 
area, even if it was only from a mere press officer had to be heard and 
obeyed. Thus when the dreaded telephone calls were received in the 
newsroom, a number of editors were conveniently "not in". Those who 
were in became butchers of important national stories, which were only 
heard on the BBC and never read in the local newspapers. Editors who 
ignored telephone directives to "kill" stories expressing the opposition's 
viewpoint did so at their own peril. They could not expect sympathy 
from proprietors or their board of directors if they found themselves on 
the firing line from the powers that be. (Daily Nation June 17, 1992). 
Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Kenya's first vice-president and erstwhile opposition 
leader, declared the intention to form a political party to rival KANU long before 
the repeal of the single-party constitution. It has been argued that one of the 
KANU government's major press-pUblicity strategies was to put pressure on the 
daily newspapers 'to give Odinga's statements a blackout. When Odinga first 
declared that he was in the process of forming an opposition party in October 
1990, the announcement was considered a bombshell , but it was not carried in 
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the daily media' (Weekly Review, 22 March 1991 :5) . When in February 1991 , 
Odinga announced that he had formed an opposition party to be called the 
National Democratic Party, NDP; the daily press again gave him a news 
blackout. The story was only carried and commented on by the local dailies 
after the local political magazines and the foreign media, especially the BBC, 
had carried it. As one political commentary at the time observed, 'The limited 
press coverage ... reduced the momentum of Odinga's activities and precluded 
the necessity of a major uproar by the government and politicians' (Ibid.) . 
In July 1991, President Moi mooted the idea of enacting le9islation that would bar 
foreign ownership of the media in Kenya . This was in response to the 'often 
defiant editorial policies of ... the Daily Nation and The Standard' (Weekly 
Review, 5 July 1991). Moi lamented that the foreign-controlled papers were party 
to the fuelling of anti-government propaganda. He went as far as threatening to 
ban the two newspapers if they did not mend their ways, claiming that they were 
being used as a forum for highlighting the views of government critics and for 
destabilising the country . The Nation and The Standard had grown bolder and 
bolder as multi-party advocates stepped up their agitation. The KANU leadership 
led by Moi accused the Nation of 'pro-Ford bias giving the impression that KANU 
does not have mass support' mainly because the paper gave government critics 
press coverage (Weekly Review, 20 December 1991). 
I have demonstrated that Kenya Times under Philip Ochieng also carried 
editorials critical of KANU politicians. The Weekly Review described Ochieng's 
editorship as follows: 
... He was a courageous editor rarely willing to defer to any sacred cow 
despite the public's association of the Times with the establishment 
arising from KANU's stake in it. In his own way, Ochieng helped to 
revitalise the newspaper and made it, if not always popular, necessary 
reading all the same. It even began making important gains in 
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readership, which was quite a turn-around for a newspaper that was 
largely unfocussed and bereft of bite ever since KANU took it over in 
1983 (4 October 1991). 
At the same time as he chided the 'independent', private and foreign-owned 
dailies, President Moi asked the Kenya Times to concentrate on party news 
instead of competing with the two foreign-owned daily newspapers. In August 
1991, he censured Kenya Times for having given the impression that the 
recently created political pressure group, the Forum for the Restoration of 
Democracy, FORD, was legally established while the government had said that 
it was not. In September of the same year, it is reported that Ochieng was 
forced to retire as the editor of Kenya Times for suggesting that the arrest of a 
FORD political activist was politically motivated while the government had 
insisted that the arrest was about criminal investigations (Ibid.) . 
3.11 Legal and Administrative Suppression of Political Magazines 
There are a number of legal instruments that the KANU party-state has used to 
control the political press in Kenya. These instruments have been deployed 
mainly against the independent political magazines. These magazines defiantly 
refused to succumb to self-censorship in their open support for multi-partyism 
and its advocates. They consistently published news and views challenging the 
KANU government's politics of control. A discussion of some of the legal 
measures will be helpful in providing an important aspect of the context within 
which the media operated under the suppressive political culture that prevailed 
in Kenya. I will discuss five such legal control measures and how they have 
been used and abused. I will also show that just before the 1992 multi-party 
elections, the state attempted to widen the Defamation Act in order to intimidate 
the political press into silence. 
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The first legal instrument that has been frequently used against political 
magazines is the requirement of registration and execution of a bond under the 
provisions of The Books and Newspapers Act (Chapter Ill , Laws of Kenya) . 
Every publisher of a newspaper is required to send daily returns of the registrar 
and also submit returns of vital information regarding publication and circulation 
annually (Section 8). In addition, it is a requirement of the act that no 
newspaper is to be printed without a bond of Ksh . 10, 000 having been 
executed, registered and delivered to the Registrar of Newspapers by the 
proprietor (Section 11) . The purpose of the bond is security towards the payment 
of any penalty, which may be adjudged against the paper (Okoth-Owiro, 
1990:20) . Printers also have to register by completing a similar form and signing 
a bond. If at any time the magazine is taken to a different printer, then the 
printer must be re-registered . 
According to the Human Rights Watch (1991), a political magazine that has 
been targeted as anti-government initially comes under economic pressure 
through the unwillingness of printers to print at an acceptable charge and the 
withdrawal of advertising. The loss of advertising quickly hurts a small 
publication. Fear of harassment or direct pressure by the government, 
persuades printers to either stop printing the magazine completely, or raises the 
charges to reflect a high-risk assignment. Kenya's most outspoken publication , 
the Nairobi Law Monthly, has had continual problems finding printers willing to 
print at reasonable cost. The so-called failure to submit annual returns is 
commonly used by the authorities to undermine magazines considered critical 
of the government, by simply refusing to accept the annual returns; a magazine 
is left open to criminal charges of fail ing to submit the necessary papers. Some 
editors have confronted this tactically by sending their annual returns by 
registered mail in order to record the submission if a prosecution is brought. 
The second legal instrument against political magazines is the power to prohibit 
a publication. This power is contained in Section 52 of the Penal Code, which 
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defines a publication to include newspapers and periodicals. It provides for the 
banning of "all past and future issues" of a publication when it appears to the 
minister of home affairs that the prohibition is in the interests of defence, public 
safety, public order, public morality and public health. The measure must also 
be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society . It then becomes a criminal 
offence punishable by up to three years imprisonment to print, make, import, 
publish , sell, supply, distribute, reproduce, or possess the prohibited 
publication" (Okoth-Owiro, 1990: 20) . 
Three monthly magazines have been banned since 1988, and a fourth one 
received a banning order, which was a later overturned. Banning orders have 
typically followed a KANU government public campaign against a publication, 
including condemnation by politicians in parliament of the magazine and its 
editor. Announcement of a ban goes to the press first, not to the owner or editor 
of the publication, and is issued without explanation. The editors of Beyond, 
Financial Review and Nairobi Law Monthly all learned of the ban issue against 
their publications after journalists from the daily papers telephoned their offices 
to ask for comment. Banning is the greatest threat that hangs over a critical 
publication. 
Beyond was a monthly magazine published by the National Council of Churches 
of Kenya. It was banned in March 1988 after publishing detailed accounts of 
election rigging during the general elections of that year. When Beyond was 
originally launched under editor Bedan Mbugua, it concentrated on issues 
relevant to social morality and family life. It was perceived as politicised when it 
supported the church in the latter's opposition to the new queue-voting system, 
introduced in 1986. The magazine began to carry long articles by some of the 
most critical clergymen and ran campaigns of its own against all forms of public 
mal-administration. After publication of the March 1988 exclusive election issue, 
circulation figures reached 90, 000 from a low of 15, 000. In that issue, Beyond 
published an editorial condemning the manner in which the KANU government 
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had used force and rigging to manipulate the election results (HRW, 1991 : 197). 
Two weeks after publication of the March issue, Beyond was banned. All past 
issues were proscribed , with an order for their destruction. Bedan Mbugua was 
arrested and charged with the technical offence of failing to submit annual sales 
returns to the Registrar of Books and Newspapers. He was sentenced to six 
months in prison and spent two and a half weeks there before he was released 
on bail, pending appeal. The Court of Appeal acquitted Mbugua in August 1989 
after numerous court appearances and international pressure. 
The third instrument widely used against the political press is the felony of 
sedition . This offence is pegged on the idea of a seditious intention, which is 
defined in Section 56 of the Penal Code. According to this section , a seditious 
intention is an intention: (a) to overthrow by unlawful means the Government of 
Kenya as by law established; or (b) to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite 
disaffection against the person of the President or the Government of Kenya as 
by law established; or (c) to excite the inhabitants of Kenya to attempt to 
procure the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of any matter or thing in 
Kenya as by law established; or (d) to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite 
disaffection against the administration of justice in Kenya; or (e) to rouse 
discontent or disaffection among the inhabitants of Kenya; or (f) to promote 
feelings of ill-will or hostility between different sections or classes of the 
population of Kenya . The section goes on to explain that a seditious publication 
is a publication containing any word, sign or visible presentation expressive of a 
seditious intention (Okoth-Owiro, 1990: 21). 
In March 1990, the Nairobi Law Monthly was denounced by a group of MPs 
after an assistant minister, Noor Abdi Ogle, called the magazine "anti-Kenyan, 
anti-government, anti-progress and subversive: Ogle called on the security 
forces to take action against it and said its contributors were "sworn enemies of 
Kenya and the government." (The Standard, March 22, 1990). The offending 
issue had carried the merits of a multi-party system. Imanyara, the magazine's 
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editor, described this as "a very dangerous accusation - people don 't want to 
be seen with me; we've lost a lot of advertisement revenue ; our printers will not 
print our magazine except at a high cost that we would not normally pay. A 
member of parliament has stood up and said the magazine is subversive - yet it 
is readily available in the streets and people buy il. .. I don't think it's right for an 
MP top call someone anti-government in parliament when that somebody has 
never been tried in a court of law and found guilty, They are making life very 
difficult for people when they brand them anti-government or subversive -
because their families are shunned and they must live in constant fear. (HRW, 
1991 : 210). 
During the height of the multiparty agitation in June and July 1990, Imanyara 
was under surveillance by the Special Branch. He was being watched 24 hours 
a day just before he was detained under preventive detention regulations. After 
three weeks he was charged with publishing a seditious publication. The so-
called seditious edition was titled The Historic Debate - Law, Democracy and 
Multi-Party Politics in Kenya , and included articles for and against a multi-party 
system. The Nairobi Law Monthly was the only magazine to print articles in 
favour of multi-party politics. Imanyara was held incommunicado in a 
windowless, filthy cell and suffered from constant noise of mentally ill inmates in 
adjoining cells. He was released on bail after five days, had his passport 
confiscated, and faced a new criminal charge of failing to submit two copies of 
the "Historic Debate" issue to the authorities before publication. On a third 
count, he was charged for failing to submit financial returns for the magazine in 
1989. These charges were in addition to a previous charge in April 1988 of 
failing to register the magazine and not filling official returns. (HRW, 1991: 210). 
In October 1990, the former attorney general, Mathew Muli, issued an order 
banning all "past, present and future" issues of the magazine. No reason was 
given, but it followed publication of an issue that catalogued anti-government 
submissions to the KANU Review Committee. Given prominent attention were 
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elite opposition to the queuing system, the single party, corruption and land 
grabbing. In his editorial column, Imanyara called for a return to democracy and 
the rule of law, an independent judiciary, multiparty democracy and 
accountability of the occupant of the office of the president (HRW, 1991: 211) . 
Imanyara challenged the ban in court and on October 8, his lawyers won the 
first successful legal challenge to a banning order in Kenya. The ban was found 
to be unconstitutional by Justice Frank Shields. In the week following 
suspension of the ban, some thirty plainclothes police officers seized sidewalk 
news vendors and confiscated copies of the Nairobi Law Monthly. The vendors 
and hawkers who were selling the magazine were told it was an "illegal 
publication" despite the High Court Judgement, and a blanket ban was 
temporarily enforced on all magazines and periodicals sold on the street (The 
Standard, October 10, 1990). 
In February 1991, the Nairobi Law Monthly featured the formation of Oginga 
Odinga's National Democratic Party and printed its political manifesto - despite 
a blackout in the daily papers. Two other monthlies, Society and Finance also 
covered the launch of the new party. Imanyara's accompanying editorial said 
one of the greatest problems facing the country was favouritism on a tribal basis 
in public offices and state-owned and operated organisations, and listed 
positions held by the president's own minority tribe, the Kalenjin . On February 
27, 1991, plainclothes police confiscated thousands of copies of the Nairobi 
Law Monthly from newsvendors. In a sweep of the city, confiscation of the 
Nairobi Law Monthly, Society and Finance magazines was carried out without 
any regard to legality; the officers did not identity themselves or cite 
authorization. Eight plainclothes officers seized Imanyara as he entered his 
office early in the morning of March 1. He was subsequently charged with 
publishing a seditious document with intent to incite tribal hatred and remanded 
at the Kamiti Maximum Prison. However, on May 5, 1991, the new attorney 
general, Amos Wako, dropped all eight charges against the editor and ordered 
his release. (HRW, 1991 : 215-6). 
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The fourth legal instrument of control has to do with the protection of the 
reputation of the individual by the law on libel , which is to be found in the 
Defamation Act (Kenya 1969) and the Penal Code (Kenya 1969). The burden of 
this law is that any person whose reputation has been injured by a published 
statement may seek redress in the courts. If he can satisfy the court that he has 
been defamed, he will be awarded an appropriate sum in money as 
compensation . In addition to this arrangement, the Penal Code criminalizes the 
publication of defamatory matter thus (S. 197) 'Any publication of defamatory 
matter concerning a person is unlawful ... unless (a) the matter is true and it 
was for the public benefit that it should be published; or (b) it is privileged .. .' 
(Okoth-Owiro 1990: 21) . This legislation has not been used much especially by 
politicians and KANU state functionaries. This is because it has not afforded 
them the tough measures that they would love in order to silence the press. It is 
for this reason that in the heat of the multi-party debate, they tried to use 
Parliament to widen the scope of this legislation. 
In late March 1992, Mr Peter Okondo, MP, moved a motion in parliament 
intended to curb what he termed the media's "irresponsibility" in news coverage. 
By this motion, he was seeking the establishment of a watchdog body, the 
"press complaints commission", modelled on the British press arbitration organ 
that bears such a name. He argued that newspapers "often misuse and abuse" 
the freedom of expression enjoyed by the Kenyan press ·with grave 
consequences and risks to national security or damage to society and 
individuals" . He wanted the commission to be given the power to punish errant 
newspapers and other publishing media". He said the motion was intended to 
stem what he called "press tyranny", adding that what he was seeking was 
some kind of control to ensure that the press maintained ethical standards of 
journalism instead of manipulating stories to suit "their profit motive' (Weekly 
Review 3 April 1992). 
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The motion generated a great deal of discussion, with members recounting 
tales of their trials and tribulations at the hands of the press. "They are 
becoming a dangerous weapon that could plunge the country into blood shed : 
charged an assistant minister for information and broadcasting, Mr Shariff 
Nassir. He attacked newspapers for taking sides in the current multi-party 
political set-up, accusing the Standard and the Oaily Nation of being particularly 
hostile to KANU and aligning themselves with the opposition . He challenged the 
two papers to come out and register themselves as political parties if they 
wanted to go into politics. (Weekly Review 3 April 1 992) . Though Mr Okondo's 
efforts did not get too far, they provided fertile ground for the Attorney-General's 
own effort. 
The Attorney-General published early July 1 992, the Statute Law 
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill , 1992 which contained proposals for 
amending the Defamation Act Cap 26. A new section 7A stated that "Any 
person or body of persons shall be entitled to a right of reply to any factual 
inaccuracy affecting them which has been published in a newspaper and which 
is damaging to the character, reputation or good standing of that person or body 
of persons". It went on to provide that where a person is entitled to a right of 
reply, a correction shall be printed in the next possible edition of the newspaper. 
The correction shall be printed free of charge and shall be given similar 
prominence as the item complained of and appear at a similar place in the 
newspaper. The correction must also be of such length as is necessary to 
identify the original item (Sunday Standard, July 19, 1992). 
A new section 16 (A) in part restated the traditional legal provision that in 
actions for libel, the court shall assess the amount of damages payable in such 
amount as it may deem just. However, this clause had a proviso , which seemed 
to be the most important part of the Bill. It was seeking to have newspapers and 
magazines found guilty of defamation or libel to pay no less than KSh. 1 Million 
in damages to the aggrieved party where the libel or defamation is in respect of 
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an offence punishable by death. In instances where the libel is in respect of 
offences punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, the 
Bill said , the sum of money courts can award would not be less than KSh 400, 
000 (Daily Nation July 15, 1992). A prominent Nairobi advocate, Lee Muthoga, 
had the following to say about the above proposed amendment to the 
Defamation Act 
One gets a distinct feeling that this legislation is being amended now so 
that when suits by the Government or those highly placed individuals 
arise damages awarded will be such as to drive the publication out of 
circulation . It also appears that the amendment is brought now so that 
during the forth coming election campaign, people in high places will be 
spared the wrath of the pen and their past misdeeds will be kept away 
from public glare. The provision is singularly destructive of Press 
freedom and comes at a time when we need that freedom most. The 
most effective method of protecting democracy is allowing greater not 
lesser freedom to the Press (Daily Nation , Wednesday, 22 July 1992). 
The fifth legal instrument that has been used against the political press is found 
in that part of the Constitution of Kenya that provides for the regulation of 
procedure in the National Assembly such that the Assembly may make standing 
orders for the orderly conduct of proceedings. This power has been used to 
make Standing Order (Kenya 1983) 170 which provides as follows: 
Any newspaper whose representative infringes these Standing Orders 
or any rules made by the Speaker for the regulation of admittance of 
strangers, or persistently misreports the proceedings of the House or 
refuses on request from the clerk to correct any wrong report thereof to 
the satisfaction of the Speaker, may be excluded from representation in 
the press gallery for such term as the House shall direct. (Okoth-Owiro, 
1990: 24). 
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In June 1989, the Daily Nation was accused in parliament of being disrespectful 
to Kenya's political leadership when it criticised the lack of debate in parliament 
and carried recent reports on corruption in the Custom and Ports Authorities 
and in the awarding and administration of public tenders. Accusing the paper of 
frustrating the work of politicians, and practising tribalism in its employment 
policies, the KANU parliament took the unprecedented step of banning the 
paper and its sister publications from covering parliamentary proceedings. 
Barely a month before the ban, Moi made his disapproval of the paper clear 
when he accused it of promoting subversive activities against his government 
and setting itself up as an "unofficial opposition party" (HRW, 1991 : 192). 
3.12 Summary 
This chapter started with a brief review of the history of broadcasting in Kenya . 
Right from the colonial era, the broadcast media has been in the hands of the 
Government: first, the Colonial and then since independence, the KANU 
government. The Government has used it mainly to inform the public of its 
plans and policies and to secure for itself positive publicity. In the same way 
that the Colonial Government denied African Elected Members access to the 
broadcast media, the KANU-government denied oppositional voices and critics 
similar access. In short, the broadcast media was used as the Government's 
propaganda machine and could not therefore serve as a political public sphere . 
This chapter has attempted to show that the early press in Kenya was mainly 
either settler- or Asian-owned . The settler press was used to advance and 
protect settler interests that were discriminatory, racial , repressive and hostile to 
indigenous Kenyans . To some extent, the Asian press was used to question 
this status quo; a tendency that was to greatly characterise the indigenous 
African press. Even though Africans were lacking in skill and resources to run a 
successful press, they used what they had to agitate for their economic and 
political rights and freedoms. The two dailies, whose existence goes back to 
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pre-independence days, The Standard and the Nation, were both 
foreign-owned . The former was for a long time the voice of settlers' interests but 
it changed gradually because of political expediency. The Daily Nation, 
however, claimed from the beginning to follow an independent and critical 
stance toward the powers that be; beginning by championing African claims 
against the colonial administration. 
I have also demonstrated that since independence the relationship between the 
press and politicians has not always been a smooth one. For most of the time 
the press was seen to be free, but within limits. Whenever the press proved to 
be excessively critical of the political establishment, the blame was put on 
foreign and private ownership. Some of the examples that I have given suggest 
that one cannot rule out organisational and professional factors, 
owner-interference and economic factors as being major constraints on the 
political performance of the daily press in Kenya . However, it can be argued 
that political pressure seems to have been the major constraint. Political 
pressure often translated into police harassment and intimidation, not to 
mention detention. As a result, the editors understandably reverted to 
self-censorship and if the pressure was too immense, they were simply sacked 
to appease the powers that be. 
An indigenous private press was also subjected to pressures similar to those 
suffered by the private foreign-owned daily newspapers. The case of the ruling 
party press wasn't much different either. The review of the performance of 
Kenya Times has given the following important observations. Firstly, because 
market conditions threatened its existence, the party press solicited the 
expertise of press magnate Robert Maxwell, thereby partly perpetuating 
foreign-ownership of the daily press in Kenya, a characteristic that the party had 
abhorred about the other two dailies. Secondly, Kenya Times registered its 
major success under the editorship of the controversial Phi lip Ochieng, 
surpassing The Standard in sales. This is partly because the paper did not shy 
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away from-carrying strong criticisms of the poor performance of KANU 
politicians, public servants and government functionaries . This seems to 
suggest that party ownership does not necessarily make for a subservient 
press. 
I have shown that before October 1991 , Kenya Times had grown to be more 
critical of the KANU government politicians than the other two private daily 
newspapers. At the time, it received the greatest bashing from members of 
parliament, with some suggesting that it be banned from covering parliamentary 
proceedings. However, it can be argued that it was the multi-party advocacy 
that posed the greatest political threat to KANU's monopoly on power. As a 
result, beginning in 1990, there was a heightened effort on the part of the 
government to make sure that the advocates of multi-party politics were not 
given positive press publicity. President Moi who even threatened to ban 
foreign-ownership of the media especially targeted the private press. Though 
Phillip Ochieng was a staunch believer and supporter of single-party 
democracy, he was now considered a liability because of his critical stance and 
daring against corrupt KANU politicians. He was eventually sacked. It is my 
conclusion , therefore, that the freedom of the daily, press, including the party-
owned one, was seriously abridged just as the agitation for multi-party politics 
was gaining ground. 
The above measures of control, including direct State House intimidation, were 
successful in deterring the daily press from supporting multi-party advocacy. 
However, they did not work with the political magazines. In the last section 
above, I have demonstrated how the State used legal instruments and violence 
to control and suppress the independent magazines. This happened mostly in 
1991 and 1992 before opposition politics were legalised. What irked the 
government most was the eagerness and boldness by the magazines to give 
publicity and support to opposition views and politicians. Whilst state violence 
reinforced the wisdom of self-censorship among the daily media, the boldness 
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of the political magazines was a great motivation for their own courage. It is my 
thesis that with the political change legalising opposition politics, the daily press 




CONTENT ANALYSIS: TWO RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES 
4.1. Introduction 
In this study, I will make use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches to 
the analysis of media content. This is because this study is a media performance 
assessment study. Performance is here conceptualised as the coverage (news) 
and commentary (views) by the daily press of the KANU government and of the 
Opposition and also of the issue of multi-party politics. The investigation will 
therefore take the form analysis of the changes in the way the two daily 
newspapers, the Nation and Kenya Times, differentially performed in their 
coverage and commentary on the political transition from a party-state political 
culture to a mUlti-party political system. For the purposes of this part ofthe study, 
therefore, the content of the daily press is the main object of study. I have 
therefore considered content analysis as the appropriate research method. 
Issues to do with relations between the state, political elites, political parties and 
the media are important in the evaluation of media performance (content). These 
issues have been dealt with in Chapter Three above. 
I will analyse newspaper news stories and editorial commentaries and opinions 
as media texts. By way of literature review, this chapter is meant to explain the 
reasons for this decision. This is important because there are different and 
conflicting ways by which media content is conceptualised and about the means 
by which meaning is constituted . These are fundamental epistemological and 
ontological issues without which this study's research design would be difficult to 
defend . I will begin with a discussion and review of the literature on the 
traditional, thus quantitative, content analysis and then proceed to discuss the 
reasons why in this project, I have chosen to make use of both quantitative and 
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qualitative approaches to content analysis. Issues to be addressed will include 
how textual meaning is conceptualised, where meaning is located, how meaning 
is 'produced', how best to study textual meaning and why a methodological 
triangulation is preferred. 
It is quickly evident in the literature cited below that media content is understood 
to be both manifest and latent This content is 'contained ' or 'carried' by the 
media products in the form of texts, messages and meanings. In fact, the term 
'media content' is variously used to mean media texts, messages or meanings. 
According to McQuail (1994: 235) , the most visible and accessible evidence of 
how the media of mass communication performs is the vast and enormously 
varied body of 'messages' and 'meanings', which are continuously being 
transmitted and received by all kinds of different media. He observes that there is 
a clear and significant distinction between message and meaning. It is the 
physical text of the message in print, sound or pictorial image that we can 
directly observe and which is in a sense 'fixed'. The meanings that are 
embedded in the texts or perceived to be present by their producers or eventual 
audiences are largely unobservable and not fixed. Such meanings are therefore 
both diverse and often ambiguous. 
To elaborate further on the term 'text', one can say that it has been used in two 
basic senses. One of them to refers very generally, like McQuail does, to the 
message itself - the printed document, film, television programme etc. The other 
usage, recommended by Fiske (1987:14), is to reserve the term 'text' for the 
meaningful outcome of the encounter between content and reader. For instance, 
a television programme 'becomes a text at the moment of reading, that is, when 
its interaction with one of its many audiences activates some of the 
meanings/pleasures that it is capable of provoking' . This concept of text, 
however, is what McQuail above regards as meaning. In textual analysis, 
Lindkvist (1981 : 26) observes that different textual approaches usually have 
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different concepts of 'text' . He provides three definitions of 'text' as : 
(1) every semiotic structure of meaning (This is a broad definition ofthe 
text concept, common in structuralism and hermeneutics. Such a 
concept includes not only language but music, architecture, picture, 
events, and social actions.); 
(2) every linguistic means of expression (thus , music, for example, is 
excluded for the text concept), 
(3) written language (which would exclude, for example, audiovisual 
language). 
It is quickly evident, then , that the concept of media text and the concomitant 
identification of the meaning of a text is variously understood in the literature. In 
fact, there are those who, rather than focusing on the text, put much emphasis on 
authorship. They argue that one way to identify the meaning of a text is to ask 
the author what he means or to try to reconstruct his intention from the text 
(Lindkvist, 1981 : 23) . According to Hirsch (1967: 5-6), 'If the meaning of a text is 
not the author's, then no interpretation can possibly correspond to the meaning 
of the text, since the text can have no determinate or determinable meaning' . I 
will not be overly concerned with the question of authorship and meaning in this 
thesis. This is an important perspective to which I will come back later, but just 
briefly. But as observed above, when one focuses on the text as the carrier of 
meaning or content, it becomes obvious that the author is not the only 
determinant of content. Most of the literature that I am going to consider shortly 
discusses the problem as to whether the meaning of media products is 
embedded in the text or in the receiver. 
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4.2 The Locus of Textual Meaning 
Any content analysis must grapple with the problem of where meaning is located. 
Interpretive media scholars insist that the meaning of media texts is found not in 
the texts themselves but rather in "audience activity" in relation to them (Barkin 
and Gurevitch, 1987; Fiske, 1986; 1987; Lindolf, 1988; Wren-Lewis, 1983). 
According to Barkin and Gurevitch (1987: 18), the television , is an "empty vessel" 
that can be all things to all people". Wren-Lewis (1983: 196), argues that media 
texts are "meaningless" clusters of narrative forms/devices. An argument has 
even been made which puts a political spin on this perspective thus: "Anyone 
who thinks that the meaning of a text is in the text itself is an elitist" (Wolfe 1992: 
261) . In short, these researchers contend that texts have no meaning in and of 
themselves . Meaning is therefore not inhered in the text and it is rather the 
audience that decides what meaning the text has. As far as the production of 
meaning is concerned , therefore, this perspective is seen to privilege the 
audience. With some exceptions, argues Wolfe, audience-privileging research 
typically slights the role played by texts in the meaning-making process. 
There are a number of objectors, especially Carragee (1990: 87), who argue 
against views of meaning production that privilege audience activity and slight 
the role played by texts properties and structures. According to Carragee: 
Interpretive mass communication research has failed to place media texts and 
media audiences within meaningful historical , social and cultural contexts . 
While properly emphasising the significance of understanding audience 
decodings of media messages, interpretive researchers have neglected the 
contexts and pressures that influence these interpretations. As a result they 
fail to explore troubling questions relating to political and social power. 
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A close examination of interpretive approaches reveals problems in how 
these approaches assess media texts . These problems include failure to 
address media texts as products of organisations, the scant attention 
devoted to the texts ' properties and structures, the often unsupported 
characterisation of media texts as polysemic, and the related failure to 
examine how media content expresses dominant ideological meanings 
(ibid. my italics) . 
Audience privileging research , in Carragee's opinion, ignores the differences in 
cu ltural , social , economic, and "discursive power" that may set apart the 
meanings individual viewers assign to media texts from those meanings 
preferred by such politically, culturally, socially, economically, and discursively 
powerful institutions as television networks and newspaper houses. What is 
more, characterisations of texts or indeed media as empty vessels by Barkin & 
Gurevitch (1987:18), "deny the ways in which texts and media help to constitute 
meanings for their audiences by highlighting certain meanings ... while excluding 
others." If the claim by Wren-Lewis (1983) that texts are meaningless is true , 
then they could hardly "engender" anything in audiences or readers. A full 
account of the meanings of the media texts, suggests Carragee (1990:89) , 
should be matched with close readings of the texts themselves and he therefore 
calls for more detailed analyses of texts. In a similar review of audience-
privileging literature, Gripsrud (1990: 127) contends that if researchers seek to 
"contribute to an improved ... understanding of our societies and cultures as 
historical phenomenon, studies of empirical reception (of texts) must not replace 
the semiotic analysis of the equally empirical text" (see also Curran 1990). 
Another objector is Wolfe (1992: 262) who suggests that "an approach to mass 
media texts derived from certain literary-critical, film theoretical, and 
communication perspectives can account for identifiable textual elements that 
arguably enunciate meanings such texts may be said to convey· (my italics). He 
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argues that texts are incomplete, they are not immaculate completions but rather 
the product of choices , whether message-makers are conscious of having made 
them of not. In his opinion "An analysis of a mass media presentation grasped as 
a text asks not so much "What does this work meanT as "How can the elements 
of the given text be structured so that it can mean what it can mean? The 
meaning so construed may be multiple and even contradictory" (ibid.: 264) . 
These observations sensitise us to the possibility that text structuring can delimit 
textual meaning(s) . 
From semiotics-influenced literary criticism, one learns that communication 
springs from "a context of shared symbolic meanings - i.e., culture. It is this 
shared culture that may be conceptualised as codes (Barthes, 1977:159; Dyer, 
1982: 131 ; Scholes, 1982). A code is understood to be a culturally shared 
arrangement of exchangeable, repeatable, potentially meaningful utterances. 
Within and due to the existence of such codes, each utterance can have the 
same meaning for its consumer that it has for its producer. In Wolfe's opinion , to 
"claim that message-makers can encode meanings that are received and 
understood by message-receivers is to claim that nothing more or less than 
communication takes place in such instances ... " (1992: 264). It is pointed out as 
a major weakness that audience-privileging research gives no account of the 
formal elements of texts (Budd et al" 1990: 170; Carragee, 1990: 87). One can in 
fact argue that the choice of a particular form of text organisation is directly 
meaningful for the entire quantity of transmitted infomnation. What counts most in 
expression is not the thing said but the way of saying it. " Journalism", Carey 
(1983) reminds us, "is a symbolic strategy; journalism sizes up situations, names 
their elements and names or depicts them in a way that contains an attitude 
toward them" (p. 129 quoted in Wolfe, 1992). 
The better approach, suggests Wolfe (1992: 270), is to reposition the concept of 
"text" within the context of semiotics. In his opinion , textual analysts who have 
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found semiotics of use maintain that both text-making and interpretation are 
governed by "norms", or codes that both text-makers and consumers share. He 
argues that, as a matter of fact, the very term "mass communication" implies 
broadly shared meanings: " ... the single most salient and puzzling fact about a ... 
literary text is that it can have a range of meanings but not just any meaning." (my 
italics). Interpretation is a culturally determined practice rooted in codes shared 
by message-makers and -consumers belonging to the same culture. The 
interesting question in all the above arguments has been whether or not the 
meaning of mass media texts is "owned" by the audience or the text. Following 
Budd et al. (1990: 174), Wolfe (1992: 272) argues that "the meaning of media 
texts is not determined by individual audience members interpreting media texts 
in wholly personal or uniquely, id iosyncratic, individual ways." For him, the 
meaning of what could be called artistic text is owned neither by the text nor the 
audience; it is, however, "enabled and constrained by the culture of its 
origination and completed, even if not created , by its audience" (ibid. :273). The 
comprehensive meaning of a text must, therefore, be a blending of meanings 
made by different populations or audiences plus the meanings specified by 
content analysis. 
From the above discussion, one comes to the conclusion that meaning can be 
conceptualised to some degree as being inhered in the text. Media texts have 
formal textual elements. There are ways in which textual elements are structured 
in media texts in such a way that they enunciate the meanings that they convey. 
The fact that producers and consumers of media texts share symbolic meanings 
support the assumption that by means of study, one can identify textual 
meanings that may be shared. This assumption is further supported by the 
observation that media texts are understood better when placed into a historical, 
social and cultural context. Such contextualisation will enable one to see how 
media content expresses dominant ideological meanings. In this sense, the 
media cannot be seen as empty vessels but as greatly determining the meanings 
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that they convey . 
4.3 Berelsonian Content Analysis and the Nature of Textual Meaning 
The focus of my empirical investigation being the content and meaning of news 
stories as texts . a discussion of the nature. location and constitution of content 
and meaning is important. One can probably understand better the meaning of 
content by defining it as that which is the object of content analysis. A quick 
perusal of the pertinent literature reveals that there are major differences as to 
the nature and object of content analysis. It is therefore important to understand 
what content analysis is variously understood to be and whether or not it actually 
accomplishes its goal. In this section , I will introduce the traditional perspective 
whilst the others will follow below. To begin with, I suggest that we first look at 
two dictionary definitions of content analysis . Webster's Encyclopaedic 
Unabridged Dictionary defines content analysis as: 
analysis to determine the meaning, purpose, or effect of any type of 
communication , as literature, newspapers, broadcasts, etc., by studying 
and evaluating the details, innuendoes, and implications of the content, 
recurrent themes, etc. 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines content analysis as: 
a detailed study and analysis of the manifest and latent content of 
various types of communication (as newspapers, radio programs, and 
propaganda films) through a classification, tabulation, and evaluation of 
their key symbols and themes in order to ascertain their meaning and 
probable effect. 
From the above two definitions, one gets the understanding that the object of 
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content analysis is to ascertain or determine the meaning or probable effect of 
content. The content that is analysed can be manifest or latent or both . The 
process or means of analysis is by detailed study and evaluation. However, 
content analysis as a research methodology has obviously meant differentthings 
to different mass communication theorists and researchers (And rEln , 1981; 
Berelson, 1952; Holsti, 1969; Krippendorf, 1977; 1980; Larsen, 1991; Lindkvist, 
1981 ; McCormack, 1982; Rosengren , 1981 ; Sepstrup, 1981). In the social 
sciences and media scholarship in general , content analysis has traditionally 
been defined as a technique for quantitative analysis of extensive media texts. It 
can be said therefore that in its traditional meaning, content analysis is 
synonymous with quantitative analysis of media content (Holsti 1969). In many 
discussions, Berelson's definition of content analysis is regarded as capturing 
the traditional position . 
Berelson (1952: 18) defined content analysis as ' ... a research technique for the 
objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication' (my italics). For Berger (1991 : 25), content analysis is 'a 
research technique that is based on measuring the amount of something ... in a 
representative sampling of some mass-mediated popular art form' (my italics) . 
Whilst several other scholars have provided various definitions of content 
analysis (see Holsti, 1969: 2-3) , they agree with the above definitions to the 
extent that they emphasise the requirements of objectivity, system and 
generality. This is the understanding also adopted by Lindkvist (1981: 27) for 
whom, also, content analysis is exclusively quantitative and just one of the four 
approaches of textual analysis which identify the meaning of a text with the text 
itself. Content analysis is for Lindkvist principally a technique for the quantitative 
analysis of extensive texts within the framework of a communication model. He 
elaborates his understanding as follows: 
Content analysis has in common a fundamental assumption about the 
interest of the text producer and the quantitative profile of the text. The 
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text "hides" the interests of the text producer, but it can be revealed by 
quantitatively measuring the text. The manifest text is coded, but when 
relating the measured result to a general communication model , the 
character of the different textual elements can be explained (lindkvist 
1981 : 28). 
It is clear from the above definitions that traditional content analysis prefers to 
focus on manifest as opposed to latent media content. This seems to be for the 
reason that it is the manifest and not latent content that is objective and can 
systematically be quantified. With regard to this Berelsonian quantification 
requirement, Krippendorff (1980: 14), in a review of early content analysis 
research literature, points out that quantification was a method used to solve the 
'dominant methodological problem' of corroborating 'journalistic arguments by 
scientific facts . Because these facts had to be irrefutable, they had to be 
'quantitative .' Consequently , column inches were measured to determine the 
space newspapers allocated to particular issues or subjects and thereby 
demonstrate, for example, that they favoured trivial matters to 'worthwhile' news 
items (Mathew, 1910). Some researchers, on the basis of such content 
quantification, believed that they had found a way of demonstrating thatthe profit 
motive was the cause of 'cheap yellow journalism' (Wilcox, 1900). Others 
became convinced that quantification had enabled them to establish 'the 
influence of newspaper presentation on the growth of crime and other antisocial 
activity' (Frenton, 1910). 
4.4 Berelsonian Requirements of Validity and Reliability 
The problem identified above that pitted journalistic arguments against the 
results of quantitative measures of the products of journalism is very similar to 
that which compares humanistic tradition in social studies to the positivistic 
tradition . To be more specific, Sepstrup (1981: 135) identifies quantitative 
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analysis with the positivistic research tradition and qualitative analysis with the 
MarxisUcritical tradition. He observes, on the one hand, that the Marxist or critical 
school has a highly developed theory of the social role of mass communication 
and a substantial critical potential, with special emphasis on the social role ofthe 
media. This school, identified with qualitative analysis will always be necessary 
to produce actual understanding, to give detailed descriptions and analyses to 
describe and comprehend overall media content. The problem with it is that its 
research results have not been considered reliable and serious. They have been 
perceived as individual examples, exceptions, subjective interpretations, and 
predetermined results. It is argued further that the MarxisUcritical approach will 
always be unable to cope with large amounts of data, their results may be 
difficult to communicate , and they will always have low general credibility. 
On the other hand, the reliability of the positivistic empirical research has usually 
not been questioned; the findings are considered reliable because the research 
approach corresponds to the commonly accepted notions of research and its 
methods. It is evident in the above reasonings that epistemological and 
ontological issues or problems are at the centre of the discussion. The definitions 
that have been considered above are based on the understanding that to qualify 
as science, content analysis must be empirical, objective and systematic. In 
Evan's (1990: 155) rendition , "To be empirical means to base the knowledge on 
experience or observation. The logical positivist position argues that empirical 
knowledge can be verified and admits only those statements so verified". The 
objectivity requirement stipulates that each step in the research process must be 
carried out on the basis of explicitly formulated rules and procedures: To qualify 
as science " ... empirical observations (must) be ordered, analysed, and 
generalised objectively and systematically." 
The scientific method is further elaborated by Krippendorf (1980: 11) thus: " ... as 
researchers we do our best to avoid biases, distrust a single individual's 
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interpretation, make explicit what we are doing, share our findings so that others 
may examine and replicate them". In Holsti 's construction (1969: 4) , this means 
that decisions about what categories are to be used, how to distinguish between 
categories, how to place content units into the various categories , etc.: 
should be guided by explicit rules that minimise - although probably 
never quite eliminate - the possibility that the findings reflect the 
analyst's subjective predispositions rather than the content of the 
documents under analysis. Thus, one test of objectivity is: can other 
analysts, following identical procedures with the same data, arrive at 
similar conclusions? The investigator who cannot communicate to others 
his procedures and criteria will have failed to fulfil the requirement of 
objectivity. 
The above formulations are merely different ways of saying that if research is to 
satisfy the requirement of objectivity, the measuring instruments must be reliable. 
This means that repeated measures with the same instrument on a given sample 
of data should yield similar results. This traditional position is captured well by 
Berelson (1950) who demands that "regardless of who does the analysis or when 
it is done, the same data should be secured under similar conditions". 
Krippendorf (1980: 21) expounds on this requirement thus: "Any instrument of 
science is expected to be reliable. More specifically, when other researchers, at 
different points in time and perhaps under different circumstances, apply the 
same technique to the same data, the results must be the same. This is the 
requirement of a content analysis to be replicable." 
Reliability assessments or tests are, therefore, very important in quantitative 
content analysis studies. They are seen to serve as important safeguards 
against the "contamination" of scientific data by effects that are extraneous to the 
aims of observation, measurement, and analYSis. In Krippendorffs words (1980: 
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129), "Reliability assesses the extent to which any research design, any part 
thereof, and data resulting from them represent variations in real phenomena 
rather than extraneous circumstances of measurement, the surreptitious biases 
of a procedure." The term reliability refers to at least three distinctive types. The 
first one is variously called stability, consistency or intra-observer reliability. This 
type of reliability is achieved when the same coder codes a set of data twice at 
different points in time and finds no major variations between the two. 
Disagreements or variations would reflect intra-observer inconsistencies or 
noise, the cognitive changes that took place within that observer, or that coder's 
difficulty in interpreting the recording instructions. This type of reliability is 
considered as "the weakest form .. . and should not be trusted as the sole 
indicator of the acceptability of content" (Krippendorf, 1980; 130 my italics) . 
The second type of reliability is variously called intercoder or intersubjective 
reliability, consensus or reproducibility. This type of reliability is in fact a measure 
of the degree to which a process can be recreated under varying circumstances, 
at different locations, using different coders. To establish this type of validity, two 
or more coders apply the same recording instructions independently on the same 
set of data. The coders involved are not supposed to communicate because 
"Communication invariably influences coding toward higher agreement and this 
lack of independence is likely to make data appear more reliable the they are." 
The third type of validity is called accuracy and is defined as the degree to which 
a process functionally conforms to a known standard, or yields what it is 
designed to yield . It is established by comparing the performance of a coder or 
measuring instrument with what is known to be the correct performance or 
measure. Accuracy is considered to be the strongest type of reliability. Arguing 
that in "most situations in which observations, message contents, and texts are 
coded into categories of a data language, the standards against which accuracy 
would be established are rarely available", Krippendorf concludes that in content 
analysis one cannot insist on this type of reliability (1980: 132). He insists, 
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however, "Data should at least be reproducible ... " 
4.5 A Critique of Berelsonian Requirements of Reliability and Validity 
However, not everybody agrees with the stringent requirements of content 
analysis that h"ve been presented above. To me the most notable objector is 
Andr"n (1981) who considers the standard notion of reliability as consensus and 
the idea that something is valid when "it measures what it is intended to 
measure" as unproductive. He instead proposes that reliability be identified with 
truth , and validity with relevancy. His proposal is based on an interesting critique 
of the traditional requirements of content analysis that we have considered 
above. He argues that within the social sciences, discussions about reliability 
and validity usually, in fact, deal with issues to do with scientific trustworthiness 
and productivity. These discussions deal with the determination of what activities 
can justly be called · scientific· and what scientific grounds can be used to assess 
the results of such endeavours. Whether it is necessary that a scientific result be 
true is a difficult and controversial question. Much as it is the agreed opinion that 
the object of science is to give us knowledge, and thus to produce true 
propositions, Andr .. n argues that the history of science is to a large extent a 
narrative about delusions, fallacies, and mistaken or otherwise unsuccessful 
measurements. He contends that: 
The crux is, however, that it is seldom easy to know whether or not a 
result is true or relevant. In order to be certain that the results from a 
particular measurement (for example, a coding procedure) are true, one 
must, if not conduct the analysis oneself, replicate the investigation; and 
in many cases, have an intimate understanding of the theory it is 
assumed to be relevant for, and master the theory as well as the 
scientist who maintains that it is relevant. As these requirements are 
seldom fulfilled, or even possible to fulfil, we must ordinarily trust the 
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scientist and let the future developments tell us whether the results were 
productive and trustworthy (1981 : 45 my italics) . 
In AndrEm's opinion , there are various conceptions of reliability and validity in the 
research literature that it is sometimes difficult to grasp them in detail and to 
understand precisely how they are related to each other. In fact, the conceptions 
used in the discussions of reliability and validity in content analysis seem to be 
taken from the theories and methodologies employed within psychology. For this 
reason it cannot be taken for granted that the concepts constructed in order to 
solve certain problems connected with testing and interviewing are adequate 
instruments, in all respects, for the appraisal ofthe results of a content analysis. 
4.5.1 An Alternative to Berelsonian Reliability Requirement 
In a quotation given above, Holsti argues that measurements must be reliable in 
order to satisfy the requirement for objectivity. An objective result is naturally 
assumed to be that which is independent of the subject who conducted the 
investigation. It is AndrEm's opinion that the traditional endeavour to make the 
results as independent as possible in a population of coders which is maximally 
large, has both good and bad sides. While it has been possible to analyse large 
bodies of material, the cost has been the impossibility of affording the coder the 
more demanding tasks, resulting in a kind of superficiality. He argues that there 
are no fundamental scientific reasons for demanding that the epistemic 
independence should be maximised. For him, it is only ontological independence 
that is required by an adequate concept of objectivity. He finds it absurd to 
demand that a content analysis should be replicable by any person under 
whatever circumstances. 
It has already been made evident above that one major way of ensuring reliability 
is the traditional requirement of intersubjective testability. To this requirement, 
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Andren (1981 : 47) suggests that: 
One way of making these concepts more reasonable is to demand that 
only persons "properly qualified with intelligence and the technical 
devices of observation and experimentation" make measurements that 
yield similar results. Another way of making the concept of 
intersubjectivity less exacting and more feasible is not to prescribe that 
repeated measurements will always, in fact, yield similar results, butthat 
it is possible for one scientist to replicate the findings of the efforts of 
another scientist. 
The above suggestions by Andren are informed by his conviction, and also form 
the basis for his proposal, that an accurate result is one that corresponds to 
reality, meaning that it is true. "As far as I can see, it is the truth, and nothing but 
the truth , that the requirement of reliability should be about" (ibid.: 49) . For him, 
content analysis proper is nothing more than semantic content analysis. He 
elaborates further by explaining that there are, in fact, different kinds of content 
analysis: - pragmatic, semantic, and syntactic. Whether epistemic independence 
is possible and desirable will probably vary depending on which kind of content 
analysis is being undertaken. When a proposition refers to the linguistic vehicle 
used in a text or speech act, it is syntactic. A semantic proposition tells us 
something about which references or meanings the speech act or text has 
according to the linguistic rules. Finally, a pragmatic proposition contains some 
reference to the sender or the receiver of the message. One can then describe a 
content analysis as syntactic if it only results in or presupposes syntactic 
propositions; as semantic if it results in or presupposes at least one semantic 
proposition ; and pragmatic if it results in or presupposes at least one pragmatiC 
proposition (ibid.: 55) . 
It would be odd , argues Andren , to demand indiscriminately that every content 
analysis be epistemically independent. It would be equally odd to claim that the 
168 
results of every investigation within the humanities or social sciences could have 
been accomplished by someone. He notes that scientific progress is sometimes 
contingent upon forms of creativity andlor perseverance that cannot be ascribed 
to every scientist. From a strictly scientific point of view, the important question is 
whether or not a measure is correct and whether the results are true or false; 
"whether the results can be replicated by anyone is a problem with no scientific 
significance." 
In Berelsonian content analysis, one convenient way of assessing the 
trustworthiness of a result appears to be to replicate the measurement and see if 
the results remain the same. There is however a certain uncertainty associated 
with this method. It is certainly true that a high degree of consensus is something 
positive. If two independent measurements give the same results, this is a strong 
indication of the correctness of the measurements and the truth of the results. 
But the converse, argues Andren (ibid.: 57) , does not necessarily hold; lack of 
agreement does not in itself imply that the results are flawed by serious errors. 
When the results from two different measurements of the same objects are not 
identical, it can be inferred that it cannot be the case that both results are true; 
one of the results, or both, must be false. 
For Andren , therefore , there is a possibility that the results of an investigation are 
completely correct or true at the same time as the coefficient of "reliability" is low 
because the control-coder has done a poor job. This means that the conventional 
coefficients are not informative enough. The prevalent belief that scientific 
measurements ought to be intra- and inter-subjectively reproducible is connected 
with the natural science as an ideal for all scientific activity. A distinctive feature 
of modern science is that it makes use of mechanical devices that to a large 
extent make the measurements and observations; and this means that the raw 
data of these sciences in many cases will be epistemically independent of the 
scientist. It is Andren's contention that it is not always possible or productive to 
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try to make content analysis and natural sCience similar in this respect. He 
proposes as an intelligent policy , rather, to make use of the special talents -
accuracy, acumen, discernment, creativity, and tenacity - that the coder might 
possibly possess (ibid.: 58) . 
When it comes to semantic content analysis, analyses in which it is presupposed 
that the observer understands and correctly interprets the material of the 
investigation, it will in many instances be counter-productive to aim at eliminating 
the influences of human skills of the coder. In this context it seems instead wise 
to exploit the linguistic and social competence of human beings. To count heads 
is a comparatively Simple task. It is usually more complicated to infer the 
semantic contents of a text and or picture. A process of this kind necessarily 
involves interpretation. For Andren, to interpret a certain text or picture is to apply 
to its syntactic surface those linguistic rules that define the language of the text 
or picture . It is indeed an intricate procedure. It is a process that involves the 
adoption of intuitively known rules - rules of interpretation and rules of inference 
(Andren 1981 : 59 my italics). He illustrates the problem of coding semantic 
content as follows : 
The coding of semantic contents is thus, as is the proof of a theorem, a 
constructive process. If two coders produce different results - one of 
them records that the proposition p is expressed in the material of the 
investigation and the other does not record the presence of p - this must 
not be due to carelessness or laxity. Assuming that p was in fact 
expressed in the material investigated, we can say instead that the 
disagreement was contingent upon the creativity of the first coder. The 
moral to be drawn from this is that it will not always be feasible to 
prescribe that two independent coders must attain the same data, iftheir 
task is to record semantic contents. 
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There are two different objects of a pragmatic content analysis identified by 
AndrE!n : either to reveal the intentions or mental life of the communicator or to 
make propositions about the reactions of the receivers or the effects or 
consequences of the communication . Analysis of this kind requires that the coder 
possess special forms of knowledge and/or sensitivity to nuances and the like; 
and thus it seems counterproductive to demand that different scientists must 
attain the same results. "Syntactic data are not, however, as relevant as 
semantic data, if the pragmatic object of the investigation is to trace the beliefs 
and attitudes of the communicator. In a context of this kind, the form or surface of 
a message is not as pertinent as its content or deep structure" (Andren 1981: 60 
my italics) . 
Sometimes it will instead be productive to turn our attention on problems 
pertaining to what is not present in a given material and on possible, as opposed 
to actual , effects of a communication . There is no natural language such that one 
interpretation of a given sentence is the true or correct one. There will always be 
a variety of possible interpretations; and quite often more than one of these 
interpretations will be plausible enough. But which of these plausible 
interpretations will be the most adequate? The answer to this question, contends 
Andren, will be contingent on the object of the interpretation. He argues that a 
semantic investigation into the propositional contents of a text/picture always has 
some relation to intents and effects (ibid.: 63) . I believe therefore that the 
purpose of the investigation, to a great extent, determines the most adequate or 
pertinent meaning or interpretation. Semantic content analysis is an activity that 
often demands extensive knowledge and sometimes other rare capacities; in 
some cases the required knowledge can be acquired through a long and 
laborious process of intensive studies. This means that it may be futile to demand 
that the task must be such that "regardless of who does the analysis or when it is 
done, the same data should be secured under similar conditions." 
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At the same time , it is certainly true that one wants to be in a position where one 
can trust the results of a semantic content analysis; it is a strong desideratum 
that there is some kind of check on the results. It is wise not to forget that 
science is a human activity and that it is always somewhat risky to trust a human 
being. Thus, not only can the results of coding procedures be false, figures from 
reliability tests can also be false. There is need therefore to have some kind of 
check on these. According to Andr,," (1981: 65) : 
When we make a conventional reliability test, we get a measure of the 
consensus between different coders; but we do not get any information 
about the source of the disagreements. The consensus coefficient has two 
defects. A poor coefficient can cast doubt upon reliable (that is, true) data. A 
high coefficient in certain cases may insinuate that a set of raw data is 
trustworthy, although it is unreliable (has a high frequency of false data) . If 
we are interested in the truth of the data, we want instead to have a 
measurement of the tendency of the coder who is the source of the data to 
make inadequate interpretations and wrong classifications and hence to 
produce false data. 
First, we should let another person recode a random sample of the 
investigated material. Then we can identify the disagreements and so reach 
the position where we can calculate the ordinary coefficient. Then we will be 
able to analyse each disagreement in order to determine if the disagreement 
is due to an error by the original coder or an error by the test-coder. Thus, we 
can attain a measure of the tendency of the original coder to produce false 
data. The more people we can engage in this process and the larger the 
amount of the material coded, the more we can trust that the data are reliable. 
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It is obvious that this can be a time-consuming and costly procedure; and there is 
room for irrational influences in the discussions that will tell us whose coding is 
the correct one. But, as this seems to be the only feasible way of attaining a 
measurement of the veracity of data concerning semantic contents, we must (at 
least tentatively) try to trust the results of such judgements. Andrlln concludes 
with one fundamental assertion: that interpretation is not, or must not be, a 
subjective process. For him, then , it is an objective fact that a proposition or 
concept is expressed by a certain set of signs: thus, the question concerning 
what is expressed by a texUpicture has true and false answers. This implies that 
semantic data are ontologically independent And that means, contends Andrem, 
that intersubjectivity is not the ultimate arbiter (AndrEm 1981: 66). 
It IS clear from the above discussion by Andren that the requirements of 
traditional content analysis with regard to reliability are not only too restrictive but 
also unrealistic as far as content analysis is concerned . For a study such as the 
one I am carrying out, pragmatic content analysis is the most appropriate. This is 
because the focus is on views , beliefs and attitudes. These require an approach 
that makes use of interpretation. For that matter, as aptly put by Andren, "the 
form or surface of the message is not as pertinent as its content or deep 
structure: One major objection to such an understanding would be that 
interpretation is basically a very subjective process. I agree here to Andren's 
contention that interpretation is not, or must not be, a subjective process. Instead 
of striving for natural-science type of epistemic independence, one should rather 
look for the most adequate interpretation or meaning of a text based on the 
object of the study. When the nature of the study is such that epistemic 
independence should be seen to be there, I agree that the analyst should strive 
to design it in such a way that it is possible to be replicated by another analyst 
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4.5.2 An Alternative to Berelsonian Validity Requirement 
Together with reliability , the other important requirement of Berelsonian content 
analysis is that of validity. Validity is usually defined as the extent to which an 
instrument is measuring what it is intended to measure (Berelson, 1952: 169; 
Holsti, 1969: 142; Janis, 1965: 58). According to Krippendorf (1988: 155), 
"Validity designates that quality of research results which leads one to accept 
them as indisputable facts ... We speak of a measuring instrument as being valid 
if it measures what it is designed to measure, and we consider a content analysis 
valid to the extent that its inferences are upheld in the face of independently 
obtained evidence". He underscores this point by arguing that, the importance of 
validation lies in the assurance that it provides that research findings will be 
taken seriously. It reduces the risk involved in acting on misleading research 
findings as if they were true. 
Instead of the above stated goal of validity, Andren (1981 : 51 -52) suggests rather 
the concept or term "realism" to represent that goal. He observes, however, that 
realism is not the same as truth. A realistic description need not be literally true, 
but it must help us acquire an adequate or realistic picture of the world either by 
telling us straightforward truths or by offering us points of view, concepts, and the 
like which are fruitful in relation to this purpose. He distinguishes three meanings 
of the requirement for validity, thus, three different interpretations of "realism": The 
realism of a certain set of data consists of: 1. Its correspondence to some facts -
i.e., its truth; 2. its connection with some significant problem or with the purpose of 
the study - i.e., its relevancy; 3. its correspondence with precisely those facts that 
are connected with some real problem or the purpose of the study - i.e., both truth 
and relevancy. The problem is that discussions of validity and the relation between 
reliability and validity are often difficult to follow because the meaning ofthe term 
"validity" oscillates between the second and third meanings given above, thus 
between either relevancy only or truth and relevancy together. 
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One can identify several "validation efforts" in content analysis. According to 
Krippendorf (1980), semantic validity assesses the degree to which a method is 
sensitive to the symbolic meanings that are relevant within a given context. In 
content analysis high semantic validity is achieved when the semantics of the 
data language corresponds to that of the source, the receiver, or any other 
context relative to which data are examined." It is AndrEm's (1981) argument that 
this concept of validity is an instance of relevancy and that realism in the 
stronger sense of both truth and relevancy is not claimed. He goes on to 
demonstrate that only relevancy is addressed in the other requirements of 
sampling validity, correlational validity and construct validity. It is only predictive 
validity that Andr"m considers as calling for both relevancy and truth . This is 
evident in Krippendorffs definition: 
Predictive validity is the degree to which findings obtained by one method 
agree with directly observed facts. In content analysis, predictive validity 
requires that the obtained inferences show high agreement with the 
states, attributes, events, or properties in the context of the data to which 
these inferences refer (regardless of whether these are past, concurrent, 
or future phenomena) and high disagreement with the contextual 
characteristics that these inferences logically exclude (1980: 157). 
It is for the reason that all the other definitions of validity, except the one given 
above, require only relevancy that Andren proposes that we take the problem of 
the relevancy of raw data to be the domain of the concept of validity. For a study 
that is focused on the relevance of media content and performance on the 
constitution of a nation's democratic polity, relevance as a criterion of validity 
makes a lot of sense. 
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4.6 Qualitative Content analysis and Criticism of Berelsonian Analysis 
Whilst the traditional view IS that content analysis must deal objectively. 
systematically and quantitatively with manifest content. there are alternative 
views which contend that content analysis can be either quantitative or 
qualitative or both . This is the position taken by Andren (1981) who believes that 
"content analysis proper" is semantic content analysis. For some, the very idea 
of quantifying manifest media content is untenable. Larsen (1991 : 69) discusses 
the work the German sociologist and cultural critic Siefried Kracauer, who argued 
that it is impossible to quantify textual meaning, and that meaning can only be 
grasped by means of interpretation. Kracauer (1953) used the term 'qualitative 
content analysis' to distinguish the interpretative approach from that of the social 
scientists (see Larsen, 1991 : 68) . His understanding of the text and its meaning 
is summarised as follows: 
Documents which are not simply agglomerations of facts, participate in 
the process of living, and every word in them vibrates with the intentions 
in which they originate and simultaneously foreshadow the indefinite 
effects they may produce. Their content is no longer their content if it is 
detached from the texture of intimations and implications to which it 
belongs and taken literally; it exists only with and within this texture - a 
still fragmentary manifestation of life, which depends upon response to 
evolve its properties. Most communications are not so much fixed 
entities as ambivalent challenges . They challenge the reader or the 
analyst to absorb them and react to them. Only in approaching these 
wholes with his whole being will the analyst be able both to discover and 
to determine their meaning - or one of their meanings - and thus help 
them to fulfil themselves (Kracauer 1953: 642 quoted in Larsen, p.70). 
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On the basis of the above statement, one can see Kracauer make a number of 
claims about the text and about textual interpretation. For him, on the one hand, 
the textual object is a meaningful whole and should be analysed as such. It is on 
the other hand. not a closed object but more like a field, an indeterminate 
complex of texture of meaning in which original intentions and several future 
effects intersect. Textual analysis is understood as a specific kind of conscious 
intellectual reaction , or operation, on the texture and its indeterminacies, an 
operation which in a way closes the text in so far as its meanings are, as he puts 
it, "determined" by the analyst. Larsen (1991: 70) concurs with Kracauer in the 
latter's major criticism of quantitative content analysis; that this methodological 
choice, which begins by breaking down a text into quantifiable units (words, 
phrases, etc.), is an inevitable source of inaccuracy because it destroys what it is 
supposed to study. The results of 'frequency counts' and other forms of statistical 
computations are of little use since the atomistic nature of the basic data 
precludes the analyses of internal relations among the units themselves, as well 
as between the units and the textual whole. 'Because quantitative analysis is 
incapable of catching semantic complexities, it always runs the risk of repressing 
what might be important aspects of the textual meaning.' 
In Sepstrup's opinion (1981), Berelsonian positivistic demands are not in 
themselves inferior. He concedes, however, that in their rigorous form and in the 
rigorous tradition in which they are followed, they have developed tyrannically in 
relation to the research process. He also makes similar criticisms to those given 
by Larsen and Kracauer about the atomising nature of Berelsonian analysis: 
Traditional content analysis is further blamed for isolating and atomising 
the text .. . Atomising the text means, for one thing, that the analysis is 
based on isolated observations of individual dimensions of the content, 
and thus it is not realised that an overall understanding cannot be found 
by summarising the various sub-dimensions. Second, atomising 
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suggests that the content is analysed independently of its social context; 
that is, society's existence in the text is not realised . The more 
comprehensive the theories behind the study, the less significant the 
problem, in that such theories ensure a considerable number of ways to 
approach the text and make it possible to incorporate categories which 
include the social context of the content (Sepstrup 1 981: 39 my italics) . 
Some of the above feelings are shared by Krippendorff (1980: 17), who observes 
that it was with the conviction that content analysis should not be inferior in 
explaining human intellect that numerous writers e.g. Kracauer (1947, 1952) and 
George (1959) , challenged the simplistic reliance of content analysis on counting 
qualitative data. Krippendorff notes that Smythe (1954) called simplistic 
quantification an 'immaturity of science' in which objectivity is confused with 
quantification. He argues that Stone et al. offer a definition that may be seen as an 
improvement on Berelson and others in that they recognise the inferential nature 
of coding textual units into conceptual categories. They also illustrate the 
importance of making these inferences by systematically and objectively 
identifying specified characteristics within a text. For them therefore, "Content 
analysis is a research techniques for making inferences by systematically and 
objectively identifying specified characteristics within a text" (Stone et ai., 1966: 5). 
Another modified definition, given by Holsti (1969: 14), is very similarto the one 
given above by Stone et al. For him, "Content analysis is any technique for 
making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified 
characteristics of messages" . Krippendorff (1980) does not, however, see these 
definitions as significant improvements at all because they fail to emphasise "the 
importance of relating the classifications, categorisation, and frequency counts of 
these forms to other phenomena ... Any content analysis must be performed 
relative to, and justified in terms of the context ofthe data". He continues that "A 
communication research may interpret the meaning of a message in relation to a 
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researcher's intentions, to a receiver's cognitive or behavioural effects, to the 
institutions within which it is exchanged, or to the culture within which it plays a 
role' (ibid. 24 my italics) . It can be argued that the most crucial feature of 
messages, for example news, is that they inform vicariously; providing 
knowledge about events that cannot be experienced at first hand. This 'vicarious' 
nature of symbolic communication is what forces a receiver to make specific 
references from sensory data to portions of hislher empirical environment', 
referred 'to as the context of the data' (Krippendorf, 1980: 23). It is therefore 
imperative to make explicit the context relative to which data are analysed for 
'there are no logical limits as to the kind of context an analyst might want to 
conside~ (p. 26). 
It is clear from the discussion above that content analysis can be either 
qualitative or quantitative. The shortcomings of traditional content analysis have 
been amply highlighted . The importance of contextualisation in content analysis 
stud ies has been underscored. It is clear that depending on the goals of a study, 
simplistic quantification that leads to atomisation of texts cannot be trusted to 
reveal pertinent meanings. More about quantification will be said below. By these 
observations I do not suggest that quantification has no place in content analysis 
studies . To the contrary, the point here is to stress that it depends on the nature 
of the study and how the study is carried out. In fact, one of the ardent 
supporters of contextualisation in content analysis studies is Krippendorf for 
whom qualitative content analysis is a contradiction of terms .. 
4.7 A Critique of Berelsonian Quantification Requirement 
The discussion by Holsti (1969: 5-12) with regard to whether content analysis 
must be quantitative is very instructive. According to him, although the issues 
underlying the quality - quantity debate are not trivial ones, one must reject the 
rigid dichotomy, which is sometimes implied in the debate. Especially by those 
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who espouse either the view that "if you can't count it, it doesn't count: or that "if 
you can count it, that ain't it" . He observes that, it is generally agreed by 
measurement theorists that qualitative and quantitative are not dichotomous 
attributes, but fall along a continuum. He goes on to state that: 
Moreover, whether stated explicitly or not, many of the most rigorous 
quantitative studies use nonnumerical procedures at various stages in 
the research . This is likely to be the case in the initial selection of 
categories. Because content analysts are not generally agreed on 
standard categories, even for given classes of problems, the investigator 
often finds himself in the position of having to develop his own for the 
question at hand. Hence, before constructing categories, he may want to 
read over a sample of his data to get a "feel" for the types of relevant 
symbols or themes. Prior to coding , he must also read over the data to 
identify any idiosyncratic attributes which , if not taken into account, 
might adversely affect the results. After coding and data analysis have 
been completed, he may want to check the "face validity" of the 
quantitative results by rereading parts or all of his documents. Or, 
conversely, quantitative results may highlight qualitative aspects of the 
text which might have escaped the analyst's scrutiny ... Thus the content 
analyst should use qualitative and quantitative methods to supplement 
each other (Holsti 1969: 11). 
The above reasoning by Holsti, that the problem of quantity or quality is a 
quasi-problem, is supported by Lindkvist. For the latter, the relevant question is, 
'which is the theoretical relevance of the measure I use?' He argues that isolated 
data are meaningless. Only by linking data together with theoretical questions is 
analysis meaningful (Lindkvist, 1981 : 34; my italics). Holsti is also ofthe opinion 
that " .. . asking the right questions about the data is even more important than the 
system of enumeration used to present the findings .. ." (1969: 12). In his 
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evaluation of the use of content quantification in propaganda analysis , 
Krippendorff (1980: 17) observes that one of the lessons learnt was that 
'quantitative indicators are extremely insensitive and shallow in providing political 
insights. Even if large amounts of data are available as required for statistical 
analyses, they do not lead to the 'most obvious' conclusions that political experts 
are easily able to draw upon and to agree upon by observing qualitative changes 
more in depth'. It is on the basis of the above observations and criticisms that he 
defines content analysis as "a research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences from data to their contexts" and is characterised as a method of 
inquiry into symbolic meanings of messages (Krippendorff 1980: 22) . 
Further to Krippendorffs ' improved' definition which we have seen above, we 
may add that of Watson and Hill (1989: 47) , according to whom 'Research into 
media content identifies, categorises, describes and quantifies short-term and 
long-term trends .. . Content analysis serves an important function by comparing 
the same material as presented in different media within a nation, or between 
different nations; or by comparing media content with some explicit set of 
standards or abstract categories' (my italics) . What we learn therefore is that 
media content can take many formats and also that content analysis can be 
carried out in various ways to accomplish different pertinent objectives. McQuail 
(1987: 175) points out that "We would not pretend to be able to speak of the 
content of (something) except by specifying more precisely which aspects or 
parts of the content we are talking about" . 
A major problem that Krippendorf highlights is that there is no way one can 
establish the indisputable meaning of symbolic data. About this , he makes the 
argument that: 
messages do not have a single meaning that needs to be "unwrapped," 
Data can always be looked at from different perspectives, especially 
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when they are symbolic in nature. In any single written message, one 
can count letters, word or sentences. One can categorise phrases, 
describe the logical structure of expressions, ascertain associations, 
connotations, denotations, elocutionary forces, and can also offer 
psychiatric, sociological, or political interpretations. All of these may be 
simultaneously valid . In short, a message may convey a multitude of 
contents even to a single receiver. Under these circumstances, the claim 
to have analysed THE content of communication reflects an untenable 
position (1980: 22). 
The above argument is used by Krippendorf to conclude that mere inquiry into 
symbolic meaning of messages does not qualify as content analysis. For him, 
"meanings are always relative to the communicator" . He is therefore of the 
opinion that only manifest and not latent content should be the object of content 
analysis. In that case we have a scenario in which, on the one hand, the process 
of quantification is considered not to be a necessary criterion of content analysis. 
This is mainly because they do not lead to the most obvious conclusions. In this 
scenario emphasis is put on research questions and theoretical relevance. The 
conclusion is that it should not matter so much whether the content analysis is 
quantitative or qualitative. The issue is therefore a quasi-problem. However, on 
the other hand, Krippedorffs view is that for the reason that symbolic data can 
convey a multitude of contents even to a single receiver, such 'deeper' meanings 
cannot be analysed objectively. 
The above understanding of the nature of symbolic data given by Krippendorffis 
very similar to that advanced by interpretive media researchers. Interpretive 
studies (see Barkin and Gurevitch, 1987; Fiske, 1987; Liebes, 1988; Lindolf, 
1988; Newcomb, 1984; Newcomb and Hirsch, 1984) view media texts as 
polysemic - that is, as characterised by a multiplicity of meanings. This polysemy 
invites multiple interpretations of a single text. Put in a different way, the 
182 
"polysemic character of media codes" produces texts that permit multiple 
decodings. As already seen above in a quote from Carragee (1990: 87), 
interpretive approaches have certain limitations in the way they assess media 
texts. In short: they fail to address media texts as products of organisations; they 
devote scant attention to the texts' properties and structure; they often 
characterise, without support, media texts as polysemic; and they fail to examine 
how media content expresses dominant ideological meanings. 
It is Carragee's suggestion (1990: 89) that "Interpretive researchers need to 
devote far more attention to the properties and structures of media messages, to 
the symbolic power of texts . Characterisations of texts or indeed media as empty 
vessels ... deny the ways in which texts and media help to constitute meanings 
and realities for their audiences by highlighting certain meanings and values 
while expanding others." In a study of how two people, one strongly opposed to 
and the other strongly supportive of abortion , interpreted an episode of the 
American television detective serial Cagney & Lacey that dramatised the 
abortion controversy, Condit (1989: 106) argues that: 
There were , nonetheless, important elements in their responses which 
lead me to suggest that the term "polyvalence" characterises these 
differences better than does the term "polysemy." Polyvalence occurs 
when audience members share understandings of the denotations of a 
text but disagree about the valuations of those denotations to such a 
degree that they produce notably different interpretations. In this case, it 
is not a multiplicity or instability of textual meanings but rather a 
difference in audience evaluations of shared denotations that best 
account for the two viewers' discrepant interpretations (my italics) . 
In reviewing critical research on audience reception against her findings, Condit 
(1989; 107) provides the following insightful observations on polysemy: 
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The emphasis on the polysemous quality of texts thus may be 
overdrawn. The claim perhaps needs to be scaled back to indicate that 
responses and interpretations are generally polyvalent, and texts 
themselves are occasionally or partially polysemic. It is not that texts 
routinely feature unstable denotation but that instability of connotation 
requires viewers to judge texts from their own value systems. 
It is Kracauer's argument that the risk of "subjective" misinterpretation on the part 
of the qualitative analyst is limited due to the fact that any historical period only 
produces "a limited number of major philosophical doctrines, moral trends and 
aesthetic preferences ... ", and thatthese influences therefore ' can be controlled 
and discerned" (1953 quoted in Larsen, 1991 : 71). On the basis of this 
understanding, Larsen makes the argument that: 
Although media texts are conceived of as complex, "indeterminate" 
entities, they are in the last instance "overdetermined" by various 
contextual , socio-historical factors and can therefore be read as 
"symptoms" or "expressions" of general ideological trends, characteristic 
of the historical period in question' (ibid .. my italics) . 
The above discussion has mainly tried to contradict the notion put forward by 
Krippendorff and interpretive scholars that symbolic or textual data can be so 
indeterminate as to defy measures to identify its common meaning. I suggest that 
it is possible when a number of factors are taken into consideration . One should 
recognise that media texts are products of organisations populated by human 
beings that are, together with the organisations, part of a larger discursive 
societal context. Media texts also have structural elements that make it possible 
for meanings to be shared. Condit's observations sensitises one to see that it is 
possible indeed to have a common understanding of media texts. Larsen and 
184 
Kracauer argue that the risk of subjective misinterpretation is limited by a number 
of factors and can be discerned and controlled . In fact there is then a basic 
understanding that interpretation is not necessarily a subjective process. For 
these reasons , there is no sufficient reason to argue that symbolic meaning 
cannot be analysed as content. If this premise is acceptable, I do not see any 
reason why once identified, such meanings cannot be quantified. 
4.8 Towards More Comprehensive Content Analyses 
It can be argued that the main weaknesses of the two mainstream approaches to 
content analysis and communication research in general , has been total reliance 
on either one or the other of the two principal schools of thought in research 
theory. Obviously, each perspective has strong points, but also very crucial weak 
points which limit their epistemological values. On the one hand, as we have 
already seen, the term qualitative analysis covers a wide range of content 
analysis methods, from more or less impressionistic, intuitive, and interpretative 
to systematic and strict content analyses carried at the nominal level (see 
Rosengren , 1981 : 11). 
On the other hand, as Sepstrup (1981 : 135) observes, traditional quantitative 
content analysis is considered to be suitable for describing many simple forms of 
data, and their results are easily communicated and normally enjoy considerable 
credibility. However, he claims, such research results do not contribute to a 
greater understanding, but merely define and reproduce readily observable 
phenomena. They are considered inadequate when it comes to understanding 
the texts and explaining their content, especially in a broader societal context. As 
a result, observes Rosengren (1981) , this Berelsonian content analysis is 
criticised as exemplifying naive positivism, characterised by fetishism of 
quantitative techniques and lack of theory and therefore, a sterile methodology. 
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It is Sepstrup's argument (1981 : 139) that triangulation, that is, a combination of 
the two methods, bears the promise of considerable possibilities for better 
understanding of media content. The idea being to combine critical/Marxisttheory 
and its comprehension of social relations and the social role of mass media, with 
the ability of quantitative methods to treat substantial amounts of material , to gain 
a more comprehensive view, to create credibility , and to ease the understandings 
of findings. Sepstrup himself made such an attempt and though 'the attempt to 
combine the two approaches has obviously not been fully successful... it does 
seem to illustrate the possibility of combining the advantages of the two 
approaches and of reducing their weaknesses .. .' (ibid.: 155) . 
If Sepstrup recommends Marxist theory, or indeed any theory to be used 
together with the scientific method (positivist empiricism), Gripsrud (1990: 124) 
argues that one must avoid the pitfalls of "empiricism, taken ... to mean a strict 
restriction to, or even fetishization of, concrete data in order to avoid all forms of 
speculation". He suggests that if the object of research is: 
the social meaning of phenomena studied, research along these lines 
must always relate empirical facts to an abstract, theoretical notion of 
the social whole - which, in the research process, comes prior to the 
data collected : .. It does not, of course, mean that the theoretical 
reflection thus privileged is to be elevated above empirical data, whether 
quantitative or qualitative. What it means is that the desired 
multidimensional, critical understanding of the social phenomena studied 
can be attained only through the reflective process known as 
interpretation , a process that attempts to establish the relations between 
highly heterogeneous pieces of information. Interpretation implies a 
distance between the interpreter and that which is being interpreted 
(Grisprud 1990: 124). 
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4.9 Conclusion: The Two Methodologies Applied 
Let me conclude this chapter by saying that this study will use both quantitative 
and qualitative analyses in two different but not mutually exclusive ways . The 
discussion that has been presented above. beginning with a presentation of the 
quantitative approach and the various criticisms levelled against it both from the 
qualitative perspective and from within itself, is meant to demonstrate the 
methodological strong and weak points of both quantitative and qualitative 
content analyses. There are two conclusions to be made: First, there exists now 
some understanding that there is a case for using quantitative and qualitative 
analyses as complementary . Secondly, an argument has been made for the need 
to put emphasis on such things as context, theoretical and other perspectives, 
precisation of the object of study and the exact nature of content, historical and 
cultural variables; and that these, inter alia , are the factors that make content 
analysis not only realistic but also meaningful. 
In short. I hope to have demonstrated the need to combine content analysis data 
with other sets of data: those on media content, intramedia content, and those on 
relevant conditions outside the media, extramedia data. It is Rosengren's opinion 
(1981 : 18) that extramedia data can 'be used in arguments about possible 
causes and effects of various types of media content: He observes that it is futile 
to argue for the overall superiority of a given approach or methodology. The 
different approaches to the study of messages briefly reviewed above are 
important and relevant for each offers its own special contribution to the 
understanding and explanation of textual content. Approaches and 
methodologies are never good per se; they are good for something. A discussion 
of that 'something' can be instructive. 
I intend to use the two methodologies somewhat differently; whilst the 
quantitative part will deal with news stories, the qualitative part will analyse 
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political commentaries, editorials , as texts. However, the quantitative part will 
have a decisive qualitative aspect. In order to classify or categorise a news item 
or story, instead of a highly structured coding book, qualitative judgements are to . 
be employed to determine which actors or activities dominate it and to infer 
inhered values and attitudes (to be found between the lines). The qualitative part 
will have a quantitative aspect for the reason that in a temporal perspective, the 
incidence of argumentation for a preferred or desired ideological position can be 
a fortiori suggestive of the existence of that ideological position. The next chapter 
will give the research design in detail. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.1 Introduction 
A content analysis of the kind that I intend to undertake is not easy to carry 
out. It is my belief that I have laid , in the previous chapter, a good explanatory 
and methodological foundation for the research design that I am about to 
explain . It is evident from the discussion in the above chapter that content 
analysis raises a number of both methodological and "methods" questions. 
The more important methodological issues concerned with the nature and 
location of content or meaning in media texts ; the epistemological and 
ontological issues with regard to the validity and reliability of qualitative and 
quantitative research processes; and the need to use a triangulation of 
methods in content analysis have been addressed. In this chapter I will mainly 
concentrate on the research methods, that is , the techniques or tools that I 
will use to gather and analyse data. 
The unit of analysis in our study will be the individual news item or story. All 
news stories covering the democratic-political change in Kenya will be 
analysed. These news items will come from two daily newspapers, Kenya 
Times and the Nation. The reasons for the choice of these two dailies have 
been explained in Chapter One. Kenya Times is a local party-owned daily 
newspaper while the Nation is a private daily with a foreign majority-share 
ownership. The study will cover a time span of four months, from November 
1991 through February 1992. The two months, November and December 
1991 will represent the period before the democratic-political change whilst 
January and February 1992 will represent the period after the change. The 
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Bill to restore multi-party politics received presidential assent, thereby 
becoming law, on December 19, 1991 . However, the first opposition party was 
registered on January 1, 1992 and only then could it be seen to operate 
legally. For this reason , I will consider this latter date as de jure marking the 
end of KANU's one-party monopoly of Kenyan politics. 
5.2 The Quantitative Stage: Data Collection and Analysis 
In this section of the study, I am interested in finding out the tendencies, if 
any, with which each newspaper differentially covered the KANU government 
and the Opposition. Coverage here simply means news reportage. I will make 
a comparison between the two newspapers to establish differences in their 
reportage. For each daily, and also between them, I will also make a temporal 
comparison between the period before and the period after the constitutional 
(political) change. 
I will first look at a) all the news stories covering the democraiic-po/ftical 
change. For each newspaper, all the stories of a political nature concerned 
with the democratic change to multi-party politics will be included. These will 
be stories covering fndividuals or groups of people, andlor issues andlor 
events or happenings related to the political change. The findings here will be 
used to establish whether the political change had a significant impact on the 
volume of stories directly concerned with multi-party democracy. Because of 
the fundamental nature of the democratic-political change, it is assumed that 
the daily newspapers will give the process substantial publicity. However, 
because of the nature and extent of the KANU government's suppression of 
the press with regard to this issue, it is further hypothesised that it is only after 
the constitutional change that the performance of the dailies will change. 
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From the above summations will be established b) what percentage of all 
stories about the democratic-political change focussed on the activities of a) 
the KANU government and b) of the Opposition. This is intended to establish 
what proportion of all the pertinent democratic-political change stories were 
primarily concerned with reporting about either KANU or the Opposition . This 
statistic will represent the extent of the publicity accorded by each daily to 
each of the contending political groups. I intend to compare between the two 
dailies to find out any possible party-favouritism or leanings for each 
newspaper. The above comparisons should help indicate whether any 
resultant party favouritism or its intensity was generated or influenced by the 
political change. In other words, by use of temporal comparison, I will 
establish whether the political change had any significant effect on the 
proportion of national news coverage accorded by each daily to each of the 
two political groups. 
In the next step, I will then c) categorise the news stories according to the 
nature of the publicity, a) positive or b) negative, that they afford the KANU 
government, or the Opposition. For this purpose, all the news stories on the 
democratic-political change will be analysed so as identify those that have a 
publicity value for the two contending political groups. A decision will be made 
on whether the object of the news story (person(s), issue or event) is reported 
on in such a manner that the story "speaks· approvingly (positive publicity) or 
disapprovingly (negative publicity) of one of the political groups. This is meant 
to help infer the party sympathy, if any, generated by the news selection and 
processing values of the newspaper. Qualitative analytical tools will be 
employed in making these coding decisions (see 5.5 below). This statistic if 
important when one considers the fact that the two political groups each 
supported a different position with regard to the democratic change. A daily 
newspape~s support for a political group may therefore be regarded as its 
support for that group's ideological position . 
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Lastly , d) I will consider a universe of party-political news only . For each daily 
newspaper, I will identify and sum up all those news stories that covered the 
activities of the two contending political groups, the KANU government and 
the Opposition. From these summations will be calculated the percentage 
frequencies of all those stories that: 
1) reported on the Opposition criticising (or challenging) the perfonnance of 
the KANU government. This is meant to establish the effect of the political 
change on the incidence of party-political stories critical of the KANU 
government. This statistic will be taken as a measure of the extent to which 
the pertinent daily newspaper had or developed, with the change, a tendency 
to allow stories that helped build legitimacy for the Opposition thereby 
challenging the ideological position of the KANU government. Support for the 
Opposition at this stage in Kenya's political history will be regarded as a 
measure of support for a multi-party democratic dispensation. 
2) reported on the KANU government defending itself against criticism from 
the Opposition. This is meant to establish whether the particular newspaper's 
overall party-political story content had a tendency to afford the KANU 
government the space within which to redress the negative image created by 
the Opposition's criticism. This may also be taken as a measure of the degree 
of support the newspaper had for the ruling party by helping to protect its 
legitimacy and public image. This statistic will also be taken as a measure of 
the daily's newspapers' support for the status quo. 
A temporal consideration of the above results will highlight the role of the 
democratic-political change in the process. November and December 1991 
will be collapsed to represent the period before the political change while 
January and February 1992 collapsed, will represent the period after the 
political change. The above process will then be repeated for these two 
192 
periods to find out if the political change had any major effect on the press' 
coverage of the two political sides. 
It is not expected to be easy to delineate all the categories listed above. For 
example , a long news item may end up covering both the opposition criticising 
KANU and KANU defending itself against the criticism. This type of problem 
will necessitate continual scrutiny of the news item over a number of times . In 
order to overcome the problem, I intend to begin by firstly determining the 
original object of the news item aside from the other information carried . I will 
do this by way of considering, following Tiffen (1989: 65) , aspects of 'the 
inverted pyramid' style of presentation . This is in the belief that 'the main point 
of the story is encapsulated in a 'strong lead' implying, therefore, that 'a news 
story ... begins with a crisp statement of the most significant or newsworthy 
fact: 
For the publicity and legitimacy categories of the individual news item, I will 
consider also, the ideological preferences in the headline, the lead and the 
subsequent sentences (see Dijk, 1991 : 115; Gans, 1980: 5-7; 39-42) . This will 
help in deciding which values were considered important by the newspaper; 
whether it intended the publicity or legitimacy for KANU or for Opposition. In 
the end, where there is ambiguity, I will decide, by using the above guidelines, 
on which party or any other value dominates the news item. 
5.3 Quantitative Analysis: Indices, Frequencies and Tables 
As I have already indicated above, the content analysis stage of this study will 
use frequencies and percentages as indices of the various categories and 
concepts that are to be analysed. It can be argued that the frequency with 
which a symbol, idea or subject matter occurs in a stream of messages, 
contents or texts, may be interpreted as a measure of importance, attention, 
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or emphasis . While the balance in numbers of favourable and unfavourable 
attributes of a symbol , idea or subject matter tends to be interpreted as a 
measure of the direction of bias. It can further be argued that the kind of 
qualifications made and associations expressed towards a symbol, idea, or 
subject matter tend to be interpreted as a measure of the intensity or strength 
of a belief, conviction , or motivation (see Krippendorff, 1980: 40) . 
I would like to sound a caveat here, however, that the frequency of 
occurrence is not the only guide to salience or to meaning. Much depends on 
aspects of context of a reference, which are hard to capture quantitatively, or 
internal relationships between references in texts, which may be lost in the 
process of abstraction (McQuail , 1987: 184). In some cases, frequency 
measures can be problematic. According to Krippendorf (1980: 41) , it is one 
thing to use frequencies or repetitions to gain certainty about a proposition or 
hypothesis and quite a different matter to use it as an indicator of a 
phenomenon that is to correlate with it. The former pertains to scientific 
procedure, the latter to an empirical property. Frequency measures are likely 
to be successful indicators when the underlying phenomena are likewise 
frequency related. 
In this study, the quantitative dimension of content analysis will have an 
overriding qualitative nature. Frequency of the occurrence of the categories 
explained above will comprise the main quantification. I will not measure 
column inches to quantify space nor will I count words, phrases, references 
etc. The more important empirical process of ascribing categories to the units 
of analysis will be a qualitative one. It has already been indicated at the end 
of the previous Chapter that in order to classify or categorise a news item or 
story, qualitative judgements will be employed to determine, for example, 
which political actors or activities dominate it and to infer inhered values and 
attributes (to be found between the lines) . This qualitative and interpretive 
194 
process will shortly be discussed below. 
Notwithstanding the above observations, the most common form of 
presentation of data, serving primarily the summarising function of analysis , is 
in terms of frequencies: absolute frequencies, such as the number of incidents 
found in the sample, or relative frequencies, such as the percentages of the 
sample size . The next most common form or representing data is in terms of 
relations between variables. Such relations may be seen in a cross-tabulation 
of the frequencies of co-occurrences of the values of one variable and of the 
value of another. In the analysis of the quantitative data, I will use simple 
relative frequency tables mainly to summarise the data and facilitate 
comparisons . I will also employ proportion-calculations for comparison 
purposes. These frequency and proportion comparisons will be presented in 
tables. 
5.4 The Qualitative Stage. 
In this section I intend to explain the nature and mode of the qualitative 
analysis that will be employed in this study. Qualitative analytical decisions 
will be made, firstly, with regard to the quantitative analysis elaborated above. 
This will take place especially at the stage of assigning values to news 
stories . Secondly , here in the qualitative stage, they will be made to find out if 
there is any ideological position with which the individual newspaper identified 
in the discourse about the democratic-political change. The focus of analysis 
here will be on editorial opinions and commentaries. I have two related 
hypotheses in this stage. Firstly, that because it is owned by the ruling party 
KANU, Kenya Times would support the ideological position that the one-party 
status quo be maintained and that this support would be intensified by the 
introduction of multi-party politics. Secondly, that because it is "independent", 
the Nation would support the ideological position that the political change was 
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desirable and that this support would be intensified by the introduction of 
multi-party politics . 
A quick perusal reveals that the views of both newspapers are normally 
penned in the editorial column, which in both Kenya Times and Nation appear 
in the first column of page six. However, the newspapers also carry 
commentaries both by their staff columnists and by guest columnists. These 
commentaries are normally also carried on page six. They touch on various 
topics and issues. While it may be argued that they are personal opinions of 
those who pen them, the analysis is meant to show that they do, as a matter 
of fact, have some consistency in respect to the position taken by the 
particular newspaper on the central issues in the political dispute. 
In relation to finding out the party with which the individual newspaper 
sympathised, I am also interested in finding out how the political change to 
multi-party democracy impacted on the way the individual newspaper 
expressed its ideological preferences. This will be done by finding out what 
the individual newspaper had to say, its position that is, about whether a 
change to a multi-party democratic system in Kenya was desirable. This 
entails finding out its position on the overall performance of KANU during its 
monopoly on political power. Another issue to be investigated is, on the one 
hand, whether the newspaper agrees or disagrees with some of the 
arguments that the KANU leadership gave as underpinning their aversion to 
change. On the other hand, it should be interesting to find out whether the 
newspaper agreed or not with some of the arguments that the Opposition 
gave as making change necessary. 
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5.5 Rhetorical Analyses and Political Discourse. 
The qualitative content analysis dimension of this study will be both rhetorical 
and ideological. The former characteristic is the subject of this section whilst 
the latter will be dealt with below. The overall aim is to establish the 
ideological stance taken by the individual newspaper regarding the political 
change to multi-party democracy. I wish to find out whether the individual 
daily regarded the political change as desirable. In ideological or political 
discourse. good use is made of rhetoric. In this part of the content analysis. I 
will employ rhetoric in its modern usage as a critical perspective and as an 
analytical tool. This is as opposed to its traditional artistic association with 
creative and persuasive oratory. In the usage that I prefer. rhetoric is 
understood as an art, employed in prose, which employs literary techniques. 
including figures of speech and ideological argumentation . for persuasion and 
attitude formation and/or propagation. 
I wish to concur with Carroll (1998: 392) that. "The idea that the locus of 
ideology in mass art resides in the way in which specific works articulate their 
stories and images rhetorically". is a given. Carroll argues that: 
Rhetoric is a matter of attempting to influence thought - a matter of 
persuasion. as a consequence of presenting material in a way 
designed so that its structure operates to facilitate an audience's 
agreement with certain conclusions, or at least, its favourable 
disposition toward those conclusions . Those conclusions may be 
stated outright by the orator, or the listener may be encouraged to 
embrace them in so far as they are strongly implied by, insinuated by, 
or presupposed by the rhetor in question. 
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According to Encyclopaedia Britannica (1986) , modern or new rhetoric is a 
'theory of argumentation that has its object the study of discursive techniques 
and that aims to provoke or to increase the adherence of men's minds to the 
theses that are presented for their consent' . According to Hart (1997: 2-4) , 
rhetoric is the art of using language to help people narrow their choices 
among specifiable, if not specific, policy options. It is often concerned with 
specificity and with drawing conclusions. Hart observes that "each day, in 
each profession, people ... produce rhetoric; much of it trivial, some of it 
important, all of it purporting to help others sort through their choices." 
An information brochure introducing a research project on Rhetoric, 
Know/edge, Mediation: A Project on Theories of Knowledge (University of 
Bergen 1995-1997), which uses a rhetorical perspective, explains that: 
In both classical and recent forms, rhetoric is about how the signifier 
and elements of 'form' influence what we call 'content' or 'message' . 
Second, rhetoric focuses on the persuasive functions of the signifier 
and elements of 'form' , i.e. on how they in different communicative 
situations are geared toward making recipients accept the text in 
question's version of the (part of, kind of) 'world' or 'reality' it deals 
with . Rhetoric is in other words pragmatically oriented, something 
which is evidently important here. Third, rhetoric was originally not 
only about the craft or art of making speeches or texts, but about this 
craft or art as a form of struggle (p. 3) . 
The main objective that recurs in these definitions is that the discursive 
techniques employed in rhetorical argumentation have as their object to 
persuade, convince or win those addressed to the values or attitude of the 
argument-author or 'those of the theses for which (the argumentation) seeks 
assent.' Hart (1997: 5-8) argues that the rhetor always takes special pains to 
be sure that the moral of the story is clear to the audience. "The story rhetoric 
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tells is always a story with a purpose; it is never told for its own sake." He 
emphasises that in the world of rhetoric, a speaker succeeds only when he or 
she can induce the readers to "contribute" their knowledge, feelings, and 
experiences about the matter in question. At its best, rhetoric is ordinary 
language done extra-ordinarily. Rhetoric IS an art: "to be effective in 
persuasion one must have a delicate touch, an ability to use the right 
argument and the deft phrase at precisely the right time." 
5,5,1 The Rhetorical Process 
It is my intention here to discuss the main ways by which rhetoric functions. 
An interesting observation to start with is that by Hart that in a way, rhetoric 
resembles science in that both the scientist and the rhetor want to be taken 
seriously. He argues that like the scientist, the persuader marshals evidence 
and uses this evidence to come to some real or imagined, feature of the 
observable world and then employs this package of arguments to support a 
policy recommendation . However, unlike the scientist, the persuader is willing 
to treat the perceptions of ordinary people as the acid test of 
demonstratedness. Whilst the scientist normally is expected to meet a more 
exacting standard of truth , "the persuader's truth is often fifty-one percent 
truth: the majority judgement of ordinary citizens . For most persuaders on 
most issues, fifty-one percent truth is judged sufficient" (Hart, 1997: 9-10). 
One of the major characteristics of rhetoric is that it distracts the attention of 
the reader or audience from other things to what it is saying . One way by 
which the rhetor attracts our attention is for him to control the premises of a 
discussion. As McCombs and Shaw (1972) demonstrated, the power of the 
mass media derives not so much from their ability to tell us what to think but 
what to think about. By "setting the agenda" in this fashion , by controlling the 
premises pertaining to newsworthiness, the media can thus influence any 
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conclusions drawn from these premises. So the rhetor asks listeners to th ink 
about this topic, not that one, to try out this solution, not that endorsed by the 
speaker's opponent. 
Rhetoric achieves its effectiveness in several other ways . According to Hart 
(1997: 15-23), among other things, rhetoric "tries to narrow our latitudes of 
choice without giving us the feel ing that we are being thereby hemmed in"; 
rhetoric enlarges, thus , it operates by asking us to equate things we had 
never before considered equitable ; rhetoric names - this naming function of 
rhetoric helps listeners become comfortable with new ideas and provide 
listeners with an acceptable vocabulary for talking about theses ideas; and 
most importantly, rhetoric empowers, thus it is the delivery system of power. 
For instance, in an election campaign, "Purity of heart and a spotless record 
of integrity are assets to a political speaker but they are hardly enough to 
sustain a campaign unless those qualities are shared with the voters" (ibid. 
23) . 
Another pertinent argument made by Hart (1997: 38-40) is that " ... since each 
persuasive message is produced in a unique rhetorical situation , thereby 
constituting a unique speech act, the situation itself can make a statement 
apart from the statements contained in the words of the message". Further on , 
he argues that " ... all messages "do" as well as say and .. . all messages bear 
the imprints of the social situations that produced them, thereby making 
rhetoric a situated art that can be understood only when text and context are 
considered simultaneously". That the situation or context contributes to the 
overall meaning in persuasion is a fact also expressed by Hodge and Kress 
(1988: 39) who assert that "context is a crucial part of meaning". They explain 
further "The context, both the physical referents and the social conditions of 
semiosis, is decisive for communication to occur". 
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According to Mader (1973 quoted in Hart 1997: 95) , a narrative must also 
have rhetorical presence, a vividness of detail that brings to life the ideas 
advanced. Hart (1997: 96-97) contends that although narratives do not argue 
explicitly, they do indeed argue. He reasons that although their style of 
argument is devastatingly natural because it uses a realistic time line to tell 
the story , "behind any narrative lie primitive rhetorical decisions for the 
speaker: Which facts should be stressed and which ignored? Which 
characters should be mentioned and which amplified? When should the story 
be started and when stopped? By making each of theses decisions and 
dozens more like them, the persuaderl narrator is also deciding which ideas 
to amplify and which to thrust out into the background ." In this case, an 
interesting question to ask is "What propositional content is the narrative 
designed to mask? This probe encourages the critic to inquire into the 
underlying purpose of the narrative at hand." For these reasons , news as 
narrative can be understood as a rich source of persuasion. Another 
rhetorical characteristic is that the news is fantastic. "Much of what we read in 
the news does not exist. There is no such thing as "public opinion" , for 
example, until a writer labels a particular set of attitudes as popular etc". We 
are reminded yet again that, news is selective and "The essence of rhetoric is 
selectivity. To make a rhetorical decision is to choose this image rather than 
that one, to frame an argument for this audience rather than another" (Hart 
1997: 203-4) . 
From the above discussion, one can now briefly summarise the nature and 
focus of the rhetorical analysis that is preferred in this study. My aim is to 
investigate how the two daily newspapers and the stories that they carried 
articulate their messages and images rhetorically . I am interested in 
identifying and explaining how the news stories and editorial opinions try to 
influence thought. In this case, how they persuade the reader to either 
support or reject the political change to multi-party democracy. The process of 
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persuasion is understood here to be achieved in the way the arguments and 
stories are structured in order to facilitate the reader's agreement with the 
newspaper's ideological position . The ideological position may be stated 
outright by the writers or the readers "encouraged to embrace them in so far 
as they are strongly implied, insinuated by, or presupposed by the rhetor" . 
These objectives on the part of the journalisUeditor as the rhetor are achieved 
by use of discursive techniques . 
It is also apparent from the above discussion that rhetoric is concerned with 
drawing conclusions and recommending policy options. My focus here is to 
explain how this is achieved. To elaborate further on the above paragraph, 
the rhetorical analysis will attempt to explain how the stories use the signifier 
and elements of "form" to influence the "content" or "message". The analysis 
will show how the rhetor takes pain to be sure that the moral of the story is 
clear to the readers. It is assumed here that the news story or editorial opinion 
is always a story with a purpose. I will also attempt to identify the rhetorical 
situation in which some of the stories as messages are produced. It is my 
assumption here that the rhetorical situations during this important historical 
moment in Kenya made important statements aside from the rhetorical 
messages by the newspapers. I will also investigate how "rhetorical presence 
- a vividness of detail that brings to life the ideas advanced" is deployed by 
the editorial opinion and commentary. 
5.5.2 The Rhetorical Process as a Semiological Process 
The terms semiology and semiotics have been used interchangeably. 
Following Tomaselli and Shepperson (1991), I have chosen to use the former 
mainly because I am examining language and rhetoric. I wish to argue here 
for the import of understanding the rhetorical process as a semiological 
process. Semiology (or semiotics) can be understood, in Fiske's (1982) 
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words, as "concerned not with the transmission of meanings but with the 
generation and exchange of meanings ... the focus is on the role of 
communication in establishing and maintaining values and on how theses 
values enable communication to have meaning". Following Peirce (1931-35) 
McQuail (1987: 185) observes that "semiology (or semiotics) is the general 
science of 'signs' (which) encompasses structuralism and other things 
besides, thus all things to do with signification , however loosely structured, 
diverse and fragmentally". He goes on to say that semiology has sought to 
explore the nature of sign-systems which go beyond the rules of grammar and 
syntax and which regulate complex, latent and culturally dependent meanings 
of texts. 
The application of semiological analysis has the advantage of opening the 
possibility of revealing more of the underlying meaning of a text, taken as a 
whole. For McQuail (1987: 187), it: 
is potentially as useful as , perhaps more so than , conventional 
(quantitative) content analysis in predicting or explaining 
effects; it has a special application in certain kinds of 
evaluative research, especially that which is directed at 
uncovering the latent ideology and "bias" of media content C .. ) 
Attention is directed to latent rather than to manifest content 
and latent meaning is regarded as actually more essential. 
It is Fiske's (1982: 153) opinion that such analysis: 
Can help us to make visible the ideological meanings which 
normally lie unacknowledged in communication. Ideological 
meanings are so persuasive because they do not draw 
attention to themselves, they give themselves the status of the 
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taken for granted, the natural. Exposing the arbitrariness of 
that which assumes the mantle of the natural is the work of 
semiotics, and in this sense, semiotic analysis is , must 
necessarily be , a political act. 
The above understanding sensitises one to those semiotic techniques that are 
so basic to rhetorical discourse. These discursive techniques , one can also 
call them rhetorical tools , which include mainly figures of speech, can help us 
infer the conceptualising processes of a write~s mind and anticipate an 
audience's or reader's desired or anticipated response . According to Dyer 
(1982:152), "figurative language is rhetorical language in that it tries to create 
effects by breaking or exploiting language rules". I wish mainly to deploy or 
make use of the following semiotic concepts: symbols, paradigms, syntagms, 
metaphors, metonyms, myths, and connotation . 
The formation and understanding of messages (encoding and decoding) is 
made possible by codes - a set of rules or an interpretive device known to 
both transmitter and receiver, which assigns a certain meaning or content to a 
certain sign. Dyer (1982: 131) explains that "codes are forms of social 
knowledge which are derived from social practices and beliefs although they 
are not laid down in any statute. According to Fiske (1982), an object 
becomes a symbol when it acquires through convention and use a meaning 
that enables it to stand for something else. Convention is necessary in the 
understanding of any sign. It is the social dimension of signs; the agreement 
among the users about the appropriate uses of and responses to a sign . A 
metaphor, however, expresses the unfamiliar (tenor) in terms of the familiar 
(vehicle), thereby exploiting simultaneous similarity and difference. It works by 
a principle of association that involves transposing values or properties from 
one plane of reality or meaning to another. In this sense it works 
paradigmatically "for vehicle and tenor must have enough similarity to place 
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them in the same paradigm, but enough difference for the comparison to have 
(the) necessary element of contrast" . The metaphor is not essentially realistic, 
but imaginative. It is Hart's (1997: 147) contention that "metaphors have 
entailments . That is metaphors mean certain things but imply other things 
too". He posits further that "Entailments are the policy implications of 
metaphor". 
Metonyms, unlike metaphors, work by associating meanings within the same 
plane: making a part stand for the whole. "Selection of the metonym is clearly 
crucial for from it we construct the unknown remainder of reality" (Fiske, 1 982: 
97-98). Fiske explains that metonyms are powerful conveyors of reality 
because they work indexically, "they are part of that for which they stand .. . 
where they differ from natural indexes like smoke for fire is that a highly 
arbitrary selection is involved. The arbitrariness of this selection is often 
disguised or at least ignored, and the metonym is made to appear a natural 
index and thus is given the status of the 'real' , the 'not to be questioned.' An 
index, however, is a sign with a direct existential connection with its object. 
Myths also work metonymically. A myth, Fiske (1982: 93-100) explains, is "a 
story by which a culture explains or understands some aspect of reality or 
nature; a way of conceptualising or understanding something." Myths work 
metonymically because one sign stimulates us to construct the whole of which 
it is part. Both metonym and myth "are powerful modes of communication 
because they are unobtrusive or disguised indexes. They exploit the 'truth 
factor' of a natural index and build on it by disguising its indexical nature." 
One can say then that the myth is the 'cultural' meaning of a sign. My1hs are 
considered as dynamic; they change and some can change rapidly to meet 
the changing needs and values of the culture of which they are a part. 
If denotation refers to the common sense, obvious meaning of a sign, 
connotation describes the interaction that occurs when the sign meets the 
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feeling and emotions of the user and the values of his culture . This is when 
meanings move towards the subjective : it is when the interpretant is 
influenced as much by the interpreter as by the object or the sign (Fiske, 
1982: 91) . In Dyer's (1982: 128) explanation , "connotation is a term used to 
refer to meanings which lie beyond denotation but are dependent on it. 
Connotative readings of signs are introduced by an audience/viewer/reader 
beyond the literal meaning of a sign and are activated by the means and 
conventions or codes" . Connotation is the primary way in which the mass 
media communicate ideological meanings. Seiter (1992: 39) explains that 
"connotative meanings land us squarely in the domain of ideology; the 
worldview (including the model of social relations and their causes) portrayed 
from a particular position and set of interests in society". 
Because connotation works on the subjective level , we are frequently not 
made consciously aware of it. The interesting part is that it is often easy to 
read connotative values as denotative facts . Though connotation works on the 
subjective level , the subjective responses or understandings are not 
individualistic in nature, they are "subjective" responses which are shared to 
some extent by all members of a culture. "This intersubjectivity is culturally 
determined, and is one of the ways in which cultural influences affect the 
individuals in any culture , and through which cultural membership is 
expressed" (Fiske and Hartley, 1987: 46). 
The above discursive techniques of presentation, it is assumed, will be 
employed by the journalist or writer, to reinforce the attitude, values and (or 
slant) the facts in their arguments and thereby present to the reader his 
preferred picture of the reality . It is my contention that, like politicians, 
journalists employ political rhetoric as an exercise concerned more with 
options, attitudes and values rather than with facts per se. I will therefore 
study and analyse the way these rhetorical techniques or devices have been 
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used by the two dailies in their news coverage and opinion columns. As will 
shortly be evident below, political rhetoric is ideological when it is used to 
portray a desired 'true picture' of the real political situation vis-a-vis other 
contending 'pictures' . Therefore, in the analysis of political rhetoric, it is not as 
interesting to analyse or establish the truth-content in factual propositions as 
it is to see how such factual propositions function and are used in the political 
situation (see Heradsveit and Bjorgo, 1987: 11-139). 
5.5.3 Rhetoric and Ideology 
I wish to argue that newspaper readers , and indeed all people, are motivated 
and galvanised not by how the world is, but by what they believe it is . It 
follows therefore that when a journalist or an author engages his readers in a 
textual or prosaic dialogic argumentation, the instrumental thing is what 
discursive reality he is able to create , among others, through rhetoric. The 
important thing then would be to see how rhetoric is used to arrive at certain 
desired pictures of reality. But since rhetoric is not inherently ideological , the 
deployment of the rhetorical devices explained above does not automatically 
make a statement, discourse or text ideological. Therefore, like Carroll (1998: 
362) , "I need a concept of ideology in order to determine whether or not the 
rhetoric of a particular instance of mass art is to count as ideological ." For 
this purpose, the concept of ideology that I have developed in Chapter Two to 
refer mainly to the "political ideas" of a class, or any social group, will not 
suffice . For the purposes of rhetorical analysis, I have found the work of 
Carroll (1998) very helpful. 
The notions or conceptions of ideology can be confusing . Fiske uses the term 
ideology to describe the social production of meaning. His usage is based on 
his understanding that, "Myths and connoted values are what they are 
because of the ideology of which they are the usable manifestations." He 
explains that the relationship between the sign and its myths and 
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connotations, on the one hand , and the user, on the other, is an ideological 
one. In short, "Ideology is the general process of the production of meanings 
and ideas" (Fiske , 1982:144-146). This conception by Fiske makes ideology 
virtually co-extensive with what is ordinarily called culture. 
In my discussion of ideology in Chapter Two, I argued for the usefulness of 
taking ideology to refer to, in Carroll's (1998: 365) construction , the "body of 
ideas expressive or characteristic of a particular social group or class, or 
action oriented sets of political beliefs." This understanding distinguishes 
ideology from culture as a whole by correlating it to the beliefs of certain 
groups or classes, on the one hand, and with politics, on the other. Such a 
conception of ideology is not necessarily pejorative because it does not 
invoke the elements of suspicion and disapproval. But there are other uses of 
ideology both in ordinary language and academic discourse that are 
pejorative. Usually this usage takes ideology to comprise "the ways in which 
meaning (or signification) serves to sustain relations of domination". 
(Thompson 1984 quoted in Carroll, 1998: 366) . This, as already seen in 
Chapter Two, is the meaning that most Marxist/critical perspectives hold. In 
the same chapter other non-pejorative Marxist and non-Marxist perspectives 
were discussed. 
I would like to concur here with Carroll (1994: 367) that for the purposes of 
ideological critiques, one necessarily needs to adopt or endorse a pejorative 
conception of ideology. The main reason for this is because ideological 
criticism is social criticism. And, critics "are in the business of advancing 
negative judgements of that which they identify as ideology". There are two 
conditions that Carroll identifies as being central for this conception of 
ideology. They are the epistemic component and the domination component. 
"The epistemic component requires that the ideas, concepts, beliefs, etc. in 
question be flawed epistemically in some way ; that they be false, mystifying, 
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and so on" while "the second component refers to social oppression". Each is 
a necessary condition of ideology. Carroll concurs with the argument I made 
to the effect that the Marxist concept of ideology: 
is too narrow for the purposes of contemporary ideological criticism. It 
is tied too closely to the notion of class. Thus, it can only be applied 
to societies that have social classes and, indeed, to societies that 
have dominant social classes. Moreover it is explicitly linked to class 
domination. But, arguably, phenomena like sexism and racism are 
ideological, yet they may not be reducible to class relationships . 
Thus, one way in which contemporary critics need to adjust the 
Marxist conception of ideology is to refrain from keying it exclusively 
to class domination (ibid.: 370). 
Another suggestion by Carroll is to do away with the requirement that 
propositions should be false in order to fulfil the epistemic requirement of 
ideology. Such a requirement would be inadequate for being too narrow and 
restrictive; "sometimes true propositions are used to advance ideology ... a 
true proposition may be embedded in an otherwise ideological discourse in 
such a way that its import, overall , is misleading owing to its discursive 
conlexlualisalion." It is restrictive, too, to restrict ideology to propositions. 
Ideology may also be comprised of concepts and categorical frameworks. 
Carroll (1998: 375) explains that "where categories and conceptual 
frameworks fail to fit the phenomena by demarcating it inaccurately, they may 
obscure the phenomena and distort it, for example, by over-simplifying the 
relevant forces in play or categories may draw distortions where they should 
not be drawn". She then gives the following operational definition of ideology: 
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Therefore, let us say that a proposition x is ideological if and only if 1. 
x is false (or otherwise epistemically defective) and 2. x is a tenet of 
or has contextually grounded implications favourable to some practice 
of social domination. 
In this study , therefore , I will investigate the various ways by which rhetoric 
has been used ideologically by the two daily newspapers. I will investigate the 
way in which the propositions, ideas, concepts, beliefs, etc. that are used are 
false or epistemically defective. A significant element of this investigation will 
be to explain how a true proposition can be embedded in an otherwise 
ideological discourse in such a way that its overall import is misleading owing 
to its discursive contextualisation. I will also look at how the news stories and 
editorial opinions have used attributes, categories and conceptual frameworks 
to describe people, events and issues in ways which "fail to fit the 
phenomena". As indicated above, they may do this by demarcating the 
phenomena inaccurately and thereby obscuring and distorting it, or they may 
draw distortions where they should not be drawn. 
5.6 Extra-Media Data 
Throughout the previous chapter, I underscored the import of socio-historical 
factors (context) in the understanding of media content. The need for 
contextual information or data for the analysis and understanding of political 
commentary cannot be over-emphasised; one is dealing here more with 
ideological sympathies, opinions, argumentations, attitudes and the portrayal 
of 'desired pictures' of facts rather than with facts per se. In short, the focus is 
mainly on political and ideological rhetoric. In Chapter One, whilst I was 
discussing the importance of analysing editorial commentaries, I made 
reference to Hay's (1969) observation that a newspaper experiencing an 
epoch produces a series of essays recapitulating daily events, placing them 
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with respect to historical trends, theory , and dogma and expressing opinions 
about them. In order to meaningfully analyse the newspapers' editorial and 
opinion commentaries pertinent to the debate about democratic change to 
multi-party politics , one must of necessity make use of extra-media data. 
The context of this study is mainly historical and party-political, with emphasis 
being put on how the suppression of a healthy party-political culture has had 
consequences for the fundamental human freedoms of association and 
political expression, especially press freedom. The extra-media information on 
the historical development of party politics in Kenya is given in Chapter One 
above while the implications of the resultant culture on press performance is 
given in Chapter Three. The effect of the more recent (1991 to 1992) political 
developments on press performance is the concern of our empirical study. In 
the analysis of the newspaper commentaries , their argumentations and 
ideological positions, therefore, I will make extensive reference to some of this 
contextual information. 
The study and analysis of the changes in the performance of the daily press 
during, and as a result of, the political change will also draw on the 
information given in Chapter One. More especially on the sections that deal 
with the concerted struggle for a multi-party system, and the two ideological 
positions with regard to democratic change. This last section , concerned with 
the two ideological positions is important to the establishment of the individual 
newspaper's party sympathy. I would like to argue that the news items and 
commentaries in one newspaper might be considered as extra-media data in 
respect of, and in analysing data from, the other newspaper. For this reason, 
in the ideological analysis of the editorial and political commentaries of one 
newspaper, I will sometime make reference to data in the other newspaper. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has described in detail the research design that will be followed 
in the empirical investigation. It is believed that the chapter is better 
understood when read together with the previous chapter. I have emphasised 
that the overriding method of analysis will be qualitative. This is mainly 
because the focus of the study presupposes an interpretive approach. The 
quantitative nature of the study will use basic relative frequencies but the 
process of establishing these statistics will be qualitative. This will involve a 
lot of reading and studying of the news stories as texts . The socio-historical 
and political context of the data exist will greatly inform the investigation. The 
statistics arrived at will be important when making performance comparisons 
between the two dailies and across time. The results of the qualitative 
analysis of editorial opinions and commentaries will require more space. 
Direct quotations from the texts will be given to exemplify and support the 
main findings . This will require detailed interpretation and explanation. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
• 
6.1 Introduction 
A major assumption taken as a given in this study is that the political culture 
of a particular society or nation has important implications for the nature and 
extent of the freedom with which the society·s press will perform in the realm 
of politics . From this assumption is derived a concomitant proposition that a 
major change in a society's political conjuncture will be tangibly reflected in a 
major change in the political performance of its daily press. The two major 
ways by which the press may become a political player in a society are in its 
news transmission role, and in its news and political analyses or commentary . 
The former role will be the concern of this chapter while the latter will be dealt 
with in the next chapter (Chapter Seven) . 
In my review of the history of party politics in Kenya , I have showed how prior 
to 1991 , a political culture had evolved in the country which greatly delimited 
freedom of expression and especially, freedom to question the KANU-
government's single-party monopoly on power. Those who were brave 
enough to so question this monopoly were politically ostracised or 
criminalized. Occasions were when even assassinations of vocal critics were 
blamed on the State. It is obvious that this undemocratic political culture 
impacted on the way the daily press performed in its news coverage . In the 
early days of the multi-party crusade, the daily press gave it very little 
coverage , arguably because doing so would antagonise the KANU single-
party political establishment. It has already been demonstrated in Chapter 
One that news publicity for politicians and political groups is a major source of 
political legitimacy. The KANU-government, apart from its legal monopoly on 
party politics, also succeeded in pressurising the media institutions to give 
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multi-party advocates very little publicity, if any at all. In the event that any 
publicity was given, it was invariably negative. 
It is my proposition that with the repeal of the single-party legislation that 
legalised opposition politics, the press could now freely report news on issues 
and personalities that would have been taboo in the former political 
conjuncture . This proposition can be gauged firstly by finding out if there was 
any increase in the proportion of party news, related to the political change in 
the dailies. Secondly, it can be established by finding out if there was any 
change in the political sympathies of the dailies to the two contending political 
groups. One way of doing this is by finding out changes in the nature of 
publicity, negative or positive, given by each daily to each of the two political 
groups. Another way would be to chart any changes in the legitimacy 
accorded to these groups in the news. I intend to do these things in this 
chapter. 
6.2 The Research Findings 
As already stated above, I am interested in finding out whether and how the 
political change to multi-partyism impacted on the proportion and nature of the 
daily newspaper's coverage of party-political news. It will be significant to find 
out if there was any increase, and the extent of this , in party news as a 
proportion of all the political news carried by each of the two dailies, Kenya 
Times and the Nation. The next aim will be to find out if there were any 
changes in the proportion of publicity (coverage) accorded by each of the 
political groups by the two newspapers. From here I will then look at the 
nature of publicity accorded, whether positive or negative. This will help to 
establish the party sympathy for each daily because positive or negative 
publicity for this study would imply giving a particular party public legitimacy 
and vice versa . 
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Apart from the political-change variable, I am interested in the impact of 
ownership status . As already established, Kenya Times is a KANU newspaper 
while the Nation is a private and foreign-owned daily. If it is found out that 
there was significant change in the proportion of party-political news in Kenya 
Times, it will be important to establish , firstly, whether its coverage of the 
Opposition decreased and secondly , whether its coverage of KANU 
increased. And also whether the nature of its coverage of the Opposition was 
more negative than positive. I will also investigate whether the fact that this 
daily is a KANU newspaper meant that it carried largely KANU news and very 
little news on the Opposition and that the news about KANU were mostly 
positive and those about the Opposition mostly negative. In other words, I am 
interested in finding out whether it is true that the party newspaper would 
carry news that gave KANU public legitimacy and none or very little to the 
Opposition. 
The Nation on the other hand considers itself to be 'independent' . I am 
interested in finding out whether it had any party-sympathy and which party 
was accorded that sympathy. It has been showed in previous chapters how 
the KANU government put pressure on the dailies, especially the private and 
foreign-owned Nation, not to give publicity to the budding Opposition. It is this 
study's hypothesis that the new found freedom in the wake of the political 
change means that the 'independent' Nation will now give the Opposition 
more coverage than before and that this will be predominantly positive 
publicity thereby conferring legitimacy on the Opposition. The concomitant 
hypothesis to this is that the Nation will now give less publicity to KANU and 
that the publicity given will be more negative than before . It is also 
hypothesised that in the Nation, there will be an increase in the daily news 
items whereby the Opposition criticised the KANU government. 
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6.3 The Proportion of News Stories Related to the Political Change 
All the news in each daily newspaper that reported on the political change 
was included in the study for all the days of the study period . As mentioned 
earlier. the unit of analysis is the individual news story . In all a total of 1.323 
stories were analysed; 633 from Kenya Times and 690 from the Nation. The 




Party news coverage as a percentage of aU news related to cbang~ by 
Kenya Times and tbe Nation for tbe months ofNovcmber 1991 tbrougb 
February 1992. 
1991 Nov 1991 Doe 1992 Jan 1992 Feb 
Tim es 69 80 76 81 
Nation 80 73 79 94 
The findings in the above Table show that for both daily newspapers there is 
an increase in the proportion of party news related to the political change from 
November 1991 to February 1991 . Save for the month of December, the 
proportion of party news in the Nation is higher than that in Kenya Times. 
Between November 1991 and February 1992 there is a 12 per cent increase 
in Kenya Times while in the Nation the increase is 14 per cent. This change is 
also apparent, though less markedly, when the periods are collapsed into two: 
before the change (Nov-Dec. 1991) and after (Jan-Feb. 1992). When this is 
done, the proportion of party political news items for both newspapers 
becomes the same for the period before the change, thus 75 per cent. From 
this the proportion in Kenya Times increases, just minimally, by three per cent 
to 78 per cent for the period after the change whilst in the Nation it increases 
significantly by eight per cent to 83 per cent. 
One Significant finding to note here is that the impact of the political change 
with respect to the proportion of party news was partly registered by both 
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dailies firstly between November and December and secondly between 
December and February . During the first period, the proportion of party news 
in Kenya Times increased by a significant 11 per cent but in the second 
period, that is from December through February, there was no significant 
change . For the Nation there was first a decrease of seven per cent between 
November and December followed by an increase of 21 per cent between 
December and February . I can conclude that with the political change to multi-
party politics, party news gained in importance between December and 
January, with the Nation registering a greater increase in political party 
coverage than Kenya Times. 




by Times of 
CHART 1 
Coverage by Kenya Times of KANU and of the Opposition as a 
percentage of all news related to change, for the months of 
November 1991 through February 1992. 
1991 Nov 1991 Dec 1992 Jan 1992 Feb 
KANU 40 57 46 34 
Opposrtion 28 23 30 48 
Non-party 32 20 24 18 
N- 99 111 220 203 
I--KANU I 
---Oppos. 
Noy-91 Dec-91 Jan-92 Feb-92 
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It can be concluded then that on the average the effect of the political change 
saw Kenya Times decrease its coverage of KANU while increasing its 
coverage of the Opposition. However, the period between November and 
December seems to be the crucial time. During this period , the changes were 
in the opposite direction; with the coverage of KANU increasing and that of 
the Opposition decreasing . This means that the changes that took place 
between December 1991 and February , as shown above, become much more 
significant that the average change. The fact that in November 1991, the 
KANU-government cracked down on the Opposition and put pressure on the 
dailies may explain the increase in KANU coverage and decrease in 
Opposition coverage. The reasons for the eventual decrease in KANU 
coverage and increase in Opposition coverage will be given below, when the 
nature of the publicity that the two contending political groups were accorded 
is considered . It is significant to note that the decrease in the coverage of 
KANU and increase in the coverage of the Opposition progressed until in 
February , Kenya Times gave the Opposition more coverage than it gave 
KANU. 
Coverage by the Nation of KANU and ofthe Opposition, as a percentage of all 
news related to change, for the months of November 1991 through February 
1992. 
TABLE 3. 
1991 Nov 1991 Dee 1992 Jan 1991 Feb 
% KANU 27 42 36 47 
Coverage Opposition 53 31 42 47 
by Nation of Non-party 10 27 22 06 
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The above table and chart indicate that between the months of November 
1991 and February 1992, the Nation's coverage of KANU increased while its 
coverage of the Opposition decreased. The Nation gave the Opposition more 
coverage than it gave KANU during November and January but gave KANU 
more coverage than the Opposition in December. The important finding is that 
in February 1992, the newspaper carried the same proportion of news items 
for both groups. The Nation's coverage of KANU increased significantly 
between November and December 1991 but changed only slightly between 
then and February 1992. On the other hand, its coverage of the Opposition 
decreased between November to December but increased between then and 
February 1992. The increase in KANU coverage and decrease in Opposition 
coverage between November and December 1991 can be explained by the 
fact that in November, the KANU-government cracked down on the 
Opposition and put pressure on the dailies not to give them publicity . This 
scenario changed when in the course of December, KANU embarked on the 
process of legitimising opposition politics and this explains the eventual 
increase in the Nation's coverage of the Opposition. Another interesting 
observation is that the Nation did not decrease its coverage of KANU as a 
result of the political change. 
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6.5 The Nature of the Publicity given to the Political Groups by Kenya 
Times and the Nation. 
TABLE 4. The Nature of Publicity accorded to the two political groups by Kenya 
Times and by the Nation. as a percentage of all news related to the 
political change, and the Proportion of positive over negative publicity, 









Nov 91 Dec91 Jan 92 Feb92 
About Positive (a) 11 32 18 20 
KANU Neqative b 14 15 OB 04 
Proportion[la-b)/(a+b))" ~.1 0.4 0.4 0.7 
About Positive (a) 16 17 11 04 
Opposition Negative b 35 32 49 55 
Proportion Ha-b/ia+bl1 f1 ~.4 0.3 ~.6 ~.9 
About Positive a} 03 13 14 15 
KANU Neoative Cb) 16 28 15 25 
Proportion [(a-bl a+b)]* ~.7 ~.4 0 ~.3 
About Positive a) 16 25 31 22 
Opposition Negative (b) 43 14 14 24 
Proportion Ha-bl a+blJ* ~.5 0.3 0.4 0 
• The - sign indicates mOTe negative than positive publicity while + indicates 
more positive than negative publicity. Numbers closer to -1 and +1 indicate 








Nov-91 Dec-91 Jan-92 Feb-92 
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~ Positive Kanu 
- Negative Kanu 
Positive Oppos. 
-w-- Negative Oppos 
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6.5.1 The Nature of Party Publicity in Kenya Times 
It can be seen from the above table and chart that in Kenya Times' coverage 
of KANU, there was a substantial change between November and December 
during which positive coverage of KANU increased but only to decrease 
slightly between December and February . Negative coverage of KANU 
decreased substantially. When one considers the proportion of positive to 
negative coverage of KANU , as showed in the chart below, one finds that 
there was a strong preference for positive coverage of KANU by Kenya 
Times. However. the daily's positive coverage of the Opposition decreased 
between December and February whilst its negative coverage increased 
between December and February. As showed below, the proportion of 
positive to negative stories increased in the negative showing a very strong 








The above findings are important because even though Kenya Times' net 
coverage of KANU decreased (see Table 2 above), its positive coverage of 
KANU actually increased while, on the other hand, as its net coverage of the 
Opposition increased, so did its negative coverage . Following my 
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assumptions , I expected that with the political change, Kenya Times, because 
of its ownership affiliation to KANU, would increase its coverage of KANU and 
decrease its coverage of the Opposition. The findings shown above actually 
contradict this proposition . However, the findings presented above confirm the 
proposition but only when modified to refer to positive publicity and inversely 
in respect to negative publicity . 
It can be concluded therefore, on the one hand, that most probably as a result 
of the political change, Kenya Times increased the net positive publicity it 
accorded KANU while decreasing the positive publicity that it accorded the 
Opposition. On the other hand, one can also conclude that Kenya Times 
decreased , most probably as a result of the political change, the negative 
publicity that it gave KANU while it increased the negative publicity it 
accorded the Opposition . So, in effect, the net decrease in Kenya Times' 
coverage of KANU can be attributed to the significant decrease in its negative 
coverage. Also, the net increase in its coverage of the Opposition comprised 
mainly of the substantial increase in negative coverage . As indicated above, 
these observations are supported by the proportions of positive to negative 
coverage for each political group. 







In the Nation, the proportion of KANU's positive coverage increased 
substantially between November and December, only to increase slightly 
between then and February . Negative coverage fluctuated but ended with a 
net increase of nine per cent. When one looks at the proportion of positive to 
negative coverage , one finds out that it leaned on the negative save for the 
month of January when it was roughly neutral. It can be concluded , therefore , 
that on the whole Nation gave KANU slightly more negative than positive 
coverage with the intenSity of the negative coverage decreasing somewhat 
with time. 
About the Opposition , the proportion of positive coverage by the Nation 
fluctuated from month to month with a slight overall net increase. Negative 
coverage had a substantial decrease between November and December, 
remained stable in January and then increased substantially in February 
1992. The proportion of positive to negative coverage changed from negative 
to positive between November and December 1991 and then decreased until 
there was near parity between positive and negative coverage of the 
Opposition by Nation in February 1992. 
I have made reference above (see Table 3 and concluding observations) to 
the crackdown by the government on the Opposition and to the pressure it 
exerted on the dailies in November. These can explain the increase in the 
Nation's net coverage of KANU and the decrease in its coverage of the 
Opposition between November and December. From December 1991 to 
February 1992, the net coverage of KANU did not change significantly while it 
increased significantly for the Opposition. This seems to support our 
proposition that for the Nation, as an independent paper, the political change 
meant that it could now carry more news items about the Opposition. 
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The above conclusion notwithstanding , as already seen above with respect to 
Kenya Times, an increase in publicity (net coverage) does not necessarily 
mean that this is favourable publicity. In this section it has been established 
that the Nation increased the positive coverage of both KANU and the 
Opposition , but it gave comparatively more positive publicity to the Opposition 
than to KANU. It has also been established that the Nation's negative 
coverage of KANU increased, but this was minimal. For the Opposition , 
negative coverage increased until in February there was near parity between 
negative and positive publicity. 
It can therefore be concluded that from a situation whereby it gave both 
political groups more negative than positive publicity (in November) the 
Nation managed with time to give both groups balanced publicity. The political 
change , therefore, seems to have enabled the Nation to perform its role as an 
'independent' daily newspaper. For the Opposition, this means that it received 
'balanced' publicity from at least one of the national dailies. These 
observations are supported by the findings for the proportion of positive to 
negative publicity for each party . 
6.6 The Nature of the Opposition Criticising KANU and of KANU Defending Itself. 
TABLE 5. Coverage by Kenya Times and the Nation of the Opposition criticising 
KANU and KANU reacting to the Opposition, as a percentage of all party news related 







Nov_ 1991 Dec. 1991 Jan. 1992 Feb. 1992 
O pposition criticising KANU (a 06 11 08 07 
KANU reactinQ to Ocoosition Cb 35 38 31 22 
Proportion [(a-bl/(a+b)]* -0.7 -0.6 -0,6 -0.5 
Opposition criticising KANU (a) 14 03 24 22 
KANU reactinQ to Opposition b 31 10 20 20 
Proportion [(a-b)J(a+b)]* -0.4 -0.5 0.1 0 
*The sign - indicates more items whereby KANU is defending itself, while + 
indicates more items whereby the Opposition is criticising KANU. Numbers 
closer to -1 and +1 indicate greater proportion of items whereby KANU is 
defending itself and items whereby the Opposition is criticising KANU, 
respectively. 
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It can be seen from the above table that the proportion between the two 
categories of coverage [(Opposition Criticising KANU - KANU reacting to 
Opposition)/(Opposition Criticising KANU + KANU reacting to Opposition)] 
shows that Kenya Times maintained its preference for stories whereby KANU 
was fending off Opposition criticism. Even though there was a slight decrease 
in both legitimacy categories, this development did not change the preference 
by Kenya Times for carrying more news items whereby KANU fought for its 
legitimacy that was now being challenged by the Opposition. In this respect, 
the political change seem to have had no major observable effect on Kenya 
Times' stance vis-a-vis the two political groups. 
In the Nation, the proportion between the two categories of coverage changed 
from a preference for stories whereby the Opposition criticised KANU to a 
situation whereby there was near parity in coverage. It seems that this is as a 
result of the KANU-government's crackdown on the Opposition , and the 
concomitant pressure on the daily press not to give the Opposition much 
pUblicity. During the two months of 1991, the Nation arguably gave KANU 
much more space to defend and argue for its legitimacy but very little space to 
the Opposition to question this and therefore establish its own legitimacy. In 
the two months of 1992, however, the Nation can be said to have increasingly 
given both political groups similar amount of legitimacy space; with the more 
important development being the increase in the news items whereby the 
Opposition criticised KANU. It can be said, therefore, that the political change 
seems to have enabled the Nation to live up to its claim to fairness in political 
coverage. 
6.7 News objects: Public Figures, Crowds and Events. 
As observed in Chapter One, the definition of issues in the press is a by-
product of their reporting on recent events. In this respect, news coverage can 
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be understood as being skewed in preference of dramatic events that have an 
element of novelty . It can be argued that such dramatic events could be a 
sequence of politically consequential controversies. This is so for the reason 
that the priorities of the press are shaped by perceptions of power, the 
intensity of conflict and their sense of what is important to their audience. I 
also made the argument that disclosure is important in putting events and 
issues on the public agenda. Disclosure accords publicity and publicity may 
crucially enhance the salience of an issue. It is also apparent that political 
issues and events are in most cases intricately related to political personages. 
It is my intention in this section to highlight the major sources of news 
coverage for the newspapers during the period under study. It is clear from 
the above quantitative results that there was an increase and a predominance 
of news items that were pertinent to the political change that was taking place 
in Kenya at this point in time. This can be seen to underscore the importance 
accorded by the newspapers to the whole process of change. When 
analysing the data, I observed that public figures were given most coverage 
especially when their statements were seen to be controversial and to give 
new dimensions to the whole debate about political change. In this category, 
politicians topped the list. In KANU, President Daniel arap Moi and other 
national party officials, especially the party's secretary-general, Joseph 
Kamotho, were widely covered . The same applies to the Opposition especially 
when there was controversy inhered in what was being reported about them. 
Apart from the leading party officials, other political figures were also covered 
especially when they contributed to the debate about the political change or 
when they expressed support or criticism of the two contending political 
groups. The other public groups that featured a lot in the news were the 
clergy, especially those that belong to the National Christian Council of 
Churches of Kenya (NCCK) which is the umbrella Organisation for the 
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Protestant churches in Kenya and representatives of the Roman Catholic 
Church. Prominent lawyers who were officials, or just members, of the Law 
Society of Kenya (LSK) were also very prominent in the news. I discovered 
that in most cases when the clergy and lawyers were given prominent 
coverage, they would be criticising the KANU-government (mostly in the 
Nation) or being attacked by KANU politicians for criticising them (especially 
in Kenya Times). 
The other group of public figures who were given prominent coverage were 
diplomats, especially in November when they took the KANU-government to 
task for cracking down on the Opposition and in December when they 
congratulated the government for legalising Opposition politics. Two 
diplomats stood out. The American ambassador for his outspoken support for 
the change to multi-party politics and the French ambassador for his support 
and defence of the KANU-government against some of the harsh criticism 
levelled against it. Members of the public can also be regarded as major 
players because they featured very prominently during public political rallies 
or in riots when the Opposition was denied licence to hold such rallies, 
especially in November 1991 . During the same month they also showed 
support for the Opposition when its leaders were charged in law courts for 
organising illegal political rallies. The police received wide coverage because 
they were the ones who came to restore order during riots. As a result of 
which , and more importantly, because they were used as an instrument of 
State violence to crack down on the Opposition. 
It is through the reporting of these events in which the political actors took 
part that the newspapers captured the major issues that were debated. The 
politicians used mainly the political rallies and press conferences . The 
President (who is both State and KANU President) used mainly State 
functions, political rallies and National holidays. The others in the KANU-
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government used both political rallies and press conferences , while the rest in 
the KANU group the parliamentary floor or otherwise relied on public rallies. 
The Opposition politicians made most use of press conferences in November 
and December 1991 whilst in January and February 1992 they also used 
political rallies for they could now do that legally after the legalisation of multi-
party politics . The diplomats were covered by reference to their press 
releases or when interviewed by the press. Some of them attended as 
observers, public political rallies or functions organised by the Opposition. An 
unusual exception was the American ambassador who himself addressed a 
couple of public political rallies. The clergy's views were captured during their 
customary Sunday church sermons while the church organisations (NCCK 
and the Catholic Bishops) made press releases. Quite a number of clerics, 
especially of the Protestant Christian faith addressed press conferences 
together with Opposition politicians. The above events then became the major 
ways through which the press highlighted on the pertinent issues. 
6.8 The Nature and Mode of the Discourse between the Opposition and KANU 
In Chapter One, I observed that news could be likened to a political arena 
where political battles are fought. I wish to take this argument further and 
argue that in a situation where there is no legitimate forum for political actors 
to meet face to face, the import of news is heightened because it is only 
through news or press reportage that a discussion can be held. The period 
that I chose for this study is a prime example of such a situation. This is a 
transition period that saw the legitimisation of opposition politics. During this 
period, before the holding of a parliamentary election, which could see the 
Opposition joining Parliament, opposition politicians had the press as the 
main public forum in which to engage the KANU politicians. 
In this section I wish to register my observation that during the period under 
study, the two political groupings never came face to face to discuss issues or 
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attend the same political meetings, rallies or press conferences . They came to 
learn of the other side's views, accusations, arguments, etc., through the 
media and responded to them through the same or in a way that made it 
obvious that the media would carry the response. The KANU government had, 
apart from the press , the State-owned electronic media (both radio and 
television run by the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation , KBC) that it 
monopolised to the disadvantage of the Opposition. The latter depended 
therefore on the private dailies and weeklies. The Opposition out of necessity 
made most use of the press conference and the press release. 
During the month of November 1991, the KANU-government still maintained 
its position not to allow legal opposition in the country . The Opposition's 
activities were conspicuous because of their defiance and daring in vowing to 
go ahead with a planned illegal political rally , They demanded that the 
government repealed the single-party legislation and let the people 
democratically fashion their fate . Their main arguments were, among other 
things, that the KANU-government was oppressive and violated human rights; 
not legitimate because of the 1988 rigged elections; corrupt and had wrecked 
the economy and that the single-party legislation was unconstitutional. The 
government responded with a heavy hand, harassing leading opposition 
politicians, arresting some and eventually charging most of them in law 
courts. As a result the news stories of both dailies were dominated by court 
appearances by the opposition politicians supported by large crowds of 
ordinary Kenyans . 
The KANU~overnment politicians also used the media and public rallies 
mainly to warn the ordinary people against associating with the Opposition or 
attending their illegal rallies. These measures, especially the harassment of 
opposition politicians , prompted strong protest from several diplomatic 
missions in Kenya ; most of them accusing the Moi-government of corruption 
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and human rights violation . The KANU-government politicians in turn lashed 
back accusing Western envoys of supporting dissidents. As the month came 
to a close, mainly as a result of the support for opposition politicians from the 
public and the diplomatic reprimand , the KANU-government backed down and 
dropped all the charges it had preferred against its critics. 
December 1991 saw KANU bow down to pressure and in the end repealing 
the single-party legislation. This decision was projected by the KANU-
government as the President's personal wise decision and initiative, even 
though as late as the previous month he had been categorically opposed to 
multi-partyism. In fact , most KANU politicians were strongly opposed to multi-
party politics. The whole process .of repealing section 2 (a) of the constitution 
received wide press coverage as politicians, the clergy, diplomats and other 
public figures welcomed the change. This change prompted some KANU 
politicians to publicly show support for their party, its President and the way 
the country had been hitherto governed and in the process they warned 
against the dangers of multi-partyism and criticised the Opposition. Whilst this 
reaction from KANU was not unusual, novelly came in two major ways. More 
and more politicians within the KANU-government openly criticised their party 
for some of the same undemocratic practices that the Opposition politicians 
criticised it. Secondly, there began to be reported criticisms of the President 
mainly by opposition politicians but also by other public figures including 
some from the KANU-government's own ranks . Both the Standard and the 
Nation daily newspapers, because they reported these developments, were 




The findings and observations in this Chapter clearly show that the two daily 
newspapers played an important role in the whole process of political change 
from a single party to a multi-party system. The dailies reported the activities 
of both political groups and by doing so, not only informed the public but also. 
provided the only forum in which the contending parties were able to 
communicate and exchange ideas and opinions. As I have already said 
above, there was no other forum that brought the two sides together. It can be 
said therefore that the pages of the daily newspapers provided the arena in 
which the political battle was fought. 
Most of the issues were covered through the events being reported and as it 
turned out, because of their differential stance towards the political change, 
each newspaper underscored what it considered important by the events it 
chose to highlight. The political change affected the press performance in 
some important ways. The impact is appreciated if we first remember that 
prior to November 1991 , the KANU-government put pressure on the daily 
press so that they could give the opposition a news blackout. This was 
necessitated by the propensity of the 'independent' press to give the 
opposition publicity and by Kenya Times' scathing criticisms, under Ochieng, 
of the performance of KANU politicians. 
Kenya Times recorded very little change, if any, in its stance towards the 
central political issues related to the political change. However, it intensified 
its negative coverage of the Opposition and increased its positive coverage of 
KANU . It can be seen to have been biased in favour of giving KANU more 
space in which to fight for its legitimacy whilst giving little space for the 
Opposition's criticism of the ruling party. The Nation can be said to be the 
daily that was significantly affected by the political change from the single-
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party to a multi-party system. Its coverage of party-political news increased 
slightly more than that of Kenya Times. The political change seems to have 
enabled the Nation to give the Opposition more coverage and progressively, 
this coverage became more positive. While on the average the Nation gave 
KANU negative publicity, the intensity of this decreasing with time, the 
publicity given to the Opposition changed from being negative to balanced 
between positive and negative publicity . 
The proportion of news items whereby the Opposition criticised KANU 
increased markedly , and this is an important change, so that in February 
1991, the Nation gave both political groups nearly equal chance to fight for 
their legitimacy. Seen against the situation that obtained just before 
December 1991 , the most significant change, however, is that the 
newspaper's negative coverage of KANU and the proportion of Opposition 
criticising KANU both increased remarkably . The Nation became the daily 
newspaper that to some extent helped the Opposition to establish itself in the 
public sphere while at the same time questioning KANU's legitimacy. This 
may be the change that prompted KANU politicians to claim that the Nation 
was biased in favour of the Opposition. 
When one compares the two dailies on the basis of ownership status, one 
finds out that this study's basic propositions are not borne out by the facts. 
Beginning in November, both the Nation and Kenya Times were critical of 
KANU politician's poor performance, even though the latter opposed multi-
party politics. As a result of the KANU-government's pressure, both increased 
coverage of KANU and decreased that for the Opposition between November 
and December. It is important to repeat here the fact that the political change 
had its significant impact in December and not in January as hypothesised in 
this study. It is this political change that brought out the major differences 
232 
between the performances of the two dailies. It can be concluded, therefore, 
that because of the political change, ownership-status became important. 
Instead of increasing is coverage of KANU and decreasing its coverage of the 
Opposition, as hypothesised above, Kenya Times did the reverse between 
December and February. Its coverage of KANU decreased while its coverage 
of the Opposition increased. However, with regard to the nature of publicity 
accorded the political groups, the hypothesis above was supported . Kenya 
Times gave KANU more positive publicity while it gave the Opposition more 
negative publicity. In fact , the increase in the coverage of the Opposition and 
the decrease in that of KANU comprised mainly of negative pUblicity. 
In the Nation, the coverage of the Opposition increased but that of KANU did 
not increase as hypothesised. With regard to the nature of the publicity 
accorded, the Nation gave KANU slightly more negative than positive 
publicity. But this is clearly not as a result of the political change. The change 
just meant that the intensity of the negative publicity decreased somewhat. 
Between December and February, the Nation's positive coverage of the 
Opposition changed only slightly while its negative coverage increased 
significantly so that in February it was almost the same as positive coverage . 
For this reason , I conclude that the Nation was more accessible and fairer in 
its performance. A further discussion of the findings in this chapter in relation 
to the research problems will be given in Chapter Eight. 
233 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE QUALITATIVE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
7.0 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to analyse the editorial and commentary 
columns of both Kenya Times and the Nation in order to establish each daily's 
attitude towards the two contending political groups and to the political change 
to a multi-party democratic system. The method used here is qualitative and 
emphasis is put on what is said , how it is said and the conclusions arrived at. 
In analysing the data I am interested in how the issues and political players 
are portrayed and characterised, what arguments and premises are advanced 
to reach the conclusions that are arrived at. I am also interested in determining 
whether the arguments used are factual or rhetorical. Another major concern 
in this chapter is to establish the extent to which the political change had an 
effect on the daily newspaper's determination of who or what could and could 
not be commented on or criticised by the daily press. 
As mentioned in the Chapter 2 , it is my assumption that the political culture of 
a particular society is a major determinant of the political performance of that 
society's daily press. I have therefore proposed that a major change in the 
political configuration of a particular society would be reflected in the political 
performance of its daily press. A look at Kenya's political history reveals that a 
political culture had developed whereby fundamental human freedoms were 
abused and freedom of expression, especially to express a different political 
opinion, was greatly circumscribed . State violence and detention without trial , 
both gross abuses of human rights, were used against government critics . 
Other human rights, including press freedom, were curtailed . To institutionalise 
this political culture, legislation was passed that criminalized opposition politics 
and with time there was an apparent fusion between the ruling party KANU 
and the State in the emergent one-party KANU-government. 
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As demonstrated in Chapter Three above, the performance of the daily press 
in Kenya was to a great extent affected by the political whims of, and 
affiliations to , powerful politicians. But above all , the daily press was careful 
not to rub the government on the wrong side , and in the event that this 
happened, the press was always forced to succumb to government pressure . 
The oldest daily press , the Nation and the Standard have always been 
privately owned with controlling shares, during the period under investigation, 
being in the hands of foreigners. As a submission to the fact that complete 
control of the political performance of the daily press in Kenya is not possible , 
the KANU-government launched its own daily press , Kenya Times, which was 
meant to serve its interests which it claimed were being subverted by the 
foreign-owned daily press. 
The call for political change away from the authoritarian and therefore 
undemocratic single-party system became bolder and more frequent in the 
wake of the democratisation wind that swept through the former Soviet Bloc. 
This coupled with Western donor pressure, unilaterally and through the so-
called Paris Club, which pegged the disbursement of further aid assistance to 
Kenya on tangible and demonstrable political change, forced the KANU-
government to legalise multi-party politics in December 1991 . Until this time 
and after, the KANU-government had resisted the introduction of this political 
system because, among other reasons , it argued that plural politics would 
foster ethnic violence. It argued further, that Kenyans were not cohesive 
enough ; that the single party system had an African origin and was popularly 
chosen by the Kenyan people and that democracy was (can be) achievable 
even under the one-party system. It has also been established above that the 
Opposition argued that the KANU-government's performance had 
demonstrated that the single-party system in Kenya had failed to be 
democratic. 
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For the purposes of this study , the above legalisation of opposition politics , by 
the repeal of Section 2(a) - the single-party constitution , means that the 
political views opposed to those of KANU could now be expressed without the 
fear, on the side of the critics, of dire consequences . This change it is 
proposed, will be reflected in the political performance of the daily press. The 
political issues that this study is interested in are those pertinent to the 
question as to whether multi-party democracy is desirable in Kenya . As 
already seen above, the ideological position of the daily press and its political 
sympathy can best be gauged by a qualitative analysis of editorial and opinion 
columns; and also that this section of the press is the most easily politicised 
and potentially sensitive and controversial. 
I intend to investigate, therefore, the extent to which the political change had 
an effect on the way the daily press performed in their political commentaries 
concerning the question as to whether the political change to multi-partyism 
was necessary. The Nation and Kenya Times have been chosen because the 
former is private and foreign owned, has the largest circulation and claims to 
be 'independent' , while the latter is indigenously owned by KANU, and 
therefore not dictated to by foreign interests. I have chosen four months. 
November and December 1991 are the two months falling under the period 
before mUlti-party politics became a constitutional reality while January and 
February 1992 are the two months after this change . 
The period covered in this qualitative part is the same as that covered in the 
last Chapter, which dealt with the quantitative analysis. I will begin with the 
month of November 1991 to establish what the position of each daily was at 
the time and proceed from here by analysing the commentaries on the basis of 
the issues that were being discussed. I have included six appendices as a 
sample of the editorials carried by the dailies. These have been discussed on 
the following pages: Appendix One (page 238), Two (p. 239), Three (p. 244), 
Four (p . 248) , Five (p. 255) , Six (p. 264) , Seven (p . 265), and Eight (p. 274). 
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7.1 November 1991 : Multi-Party Democracy Not Desirable. 
November is the month during which the pressure group FORD (Forum for the 
Restoration of Democracy) threatened to hold a public political rally with or 
without a legal government permit. This was meant to challenge and force the 
KANU-government to see that FORD was serious in its demands for the 
introduction of multi-party politics in Kenya. Until now the KANU-government 
had ruled out the possibility of such introduction and had threatened that any 
such public rally, being illegal , would be forcefully clamped down. Kenya 
Times editorial of November, 15: Why we should all keep away from 
Kamukunjiwarned the people from attending the Opposition's planned political 
rally because it was illegal. It 'advised all peace-loving Kenyans to stay away' 
from the meeting arguing that 'a break in law and order must not be allowed in 
our capital , a city that has known peace for decades ... ' It therefore 
rhetorically provided two reasons why Kenyans should not go to the 
Opposition political rally. Firstly, by suggesting that most Kenyans are peace 
loving and secondly by supporting any measures that will ensure the 
preservation of law and order in the capital city . In fact, the editorial supports 
the government view that the planned Opposition rally is illegal. 
The characterisation in Kenya Times of the Opposition in negative light began 
as early as on November 3, 1991 and probably earlier. What is seen at this 
juncture is the dismissal of democracy-advocacy for the reason that the 
motivation of those who are advocating for democracy is borne out of 
frustration . The editorial titled, Kenyans tired of self-serving nOise, partly 
characterises multi-party advocates as 'political adventurers' , 'masters of high-
profile jinx' and 'political losers' in search of 'free publicity' and whose 'belated 
concern for democracy is but an attempt to vent their frustrations' . The readers 
are invited to disregard the Opposition as frivolous and what they say as a 
nuisance (noise) . 
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The Kenya Times editorial of November 20, Multi-party rule not panacea for 
Africa, argues for an endogenously driven political change (see Appendix 
One) . It argues, in part, that "When the imperialists arrived in Africa in the last 
century, they imposed a new system which largely served their interests'. The 
thrust of the ensuing argument in this editorial is to persuade the reader that 
the multi-party advocacy has a foreign imperialist origin . It 'is largely 
engineered from outside the continent' and should therefore be resisted 
because 'that is the only way we can be sure of maintaining some form of 
independence in this world where the rich nations now wish to dictate 
everything.' This editorial rhetorically invokes the value of independence that 
Kenya dearly fought for and therefore arouses anti-imperialist sentiments by 
arguing that the agitation for change is a ploy by Western countries to 
perpetuate foreign domination of poor African nations like Kenya by dictating 
change to them. The commentary clearly argues against the adoption of multi-
party democracy in Kenya for the reason that it is an imperialist force from the 
West. 
The above editorial concludes that 'what is needed now is the creation of a 
political environment where the rule of law is respected and the people's rights 
protected. If that is possible in a single party, the country that chooses such a 
system should not be censured and denied aic! (my italics) . This editorial 
proposes that the agenda or issues for debate should be the cherished values 
of the respect for the rule of law and the protection of people's rights, and then 
argues that it is possible for these values to be observed in a single-party 
system. It concludes therefore that countries that choose such a system 
should not be censored and denied aid . The possibility, let alone the fact the 
KANU-government's performance negated the single-party's ability to observe 
and protect fundamental human rights is not explored. It is for this defective 
reasoning that this editorial is highly ideological. 
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It is significant that the Nation had only one editorial in November that 
commented on the political change . This editorial of November 19, Another 
tack may be the way to go, censures both political groups for their 
unwarranted blanket criticism of each other (see Appendix Two) . Another 
significant observation to be made here is the Nation's cautious disposition by 
which it avoids antagonising the KANU-government. It censures FORD for 
condemning the KANU government, saying that There is a lot that is wrong 
with the system itself, but the system itself is not illegitimate. The blanket 
condemnation of the system ... is unacceptable precisely because it is blind to 
those aspects and practices of the system that are right.' The editorial 
suggests that the KANU government is capable of reform and that what is 
needed is for it to activate 'the many checks and balances which exist within 
the structure.' It opts not to address the fundamental systemic flaws that led to 
the agitation for multi-partyism. It concludes that: 
We believe that the Government can successfully defuse this 
otherwise explosive situation , not by clamping down on it, but by 
letting it steam itself out. Talk, debate, argue and convince. That 
should be the way to proceed at this time of uncertainty, hostility and 
reforms . 
It seems that the attitude of the Nation is that the Opposition is a temporary 
phenomenon and that the KANU government can afford to let it 'steam itself 
out' . This is a figurative expression predicting that the Opposition will be a 
short-lived phenomenon . In fact , this editorial views the whole agitation and 
advocacy for a democratic multi-party system in a negative light; as an 
explosive situation that the KANU government needs to 'defuse' in order to 
avoid 'uncertainty and hostility' . It seems therefore to be supporting the 
preservation of the political status quo with only minor changes to the polity. 
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One can therefore conclude that in November, when the KANU government 
still held onto its opposition and refusal to legalise opposition politics, the two 
newspapers clearly had no room for the Opposition or indeed multi-party 
democratic politics. It can be argued that Kenya Times, by way of dismissing 
opposition politicians also dismissed multi-partyism. It associated the 
advocacy for multi-party democracy with imperialist and neo-colonial designs 
aimed at depriving Kenyans and Africans in general of their sovereignty and 
therefore exposing them to the shame of vassalage and subjugation. 
Casting the problems of Africa and especially Kenya in economic terms , 
Kenya Times argued that multi-partyism was not desirable for the reason that 
it would not solve all of Kenya's political, social and economic problems. An 
erroneous argumentation is made here which suggests that if multi-party 
democracy cannot usher in a panacea for all the problems facing Kenya , then 
it is not desirable . This can be seen as an attempt at redefining the pertinent 
problem that had to do with good governance, accountability to the electorate 
and lack of legitimacy on the part of KANU. This recasting of the problem 
steers us away from the real debate and can only be seen as ideological. It 
has already been stated above that the Nation's attitude to the Opposition 
pressure group was that it was a passing cloud . It urged the readers to believe 
that the KANU government was capable of real and radical change and what it 
needed, therefore, was to engage in discussion with the budding Opposition 
so that it would in due course 'steam itself out'. 
7.2 The Description of Opposition Politicians in Kenya Times 
I have demonstrated above that in November 1991 , one method by which 
Kenya Times expressed its position about multi-party democracy, was the way 
it portrayed opposition politicians. While in November the commentaries 
merely dismissed multi-partyism as desirable and a distant reality, in 
December they had to reckon with the fact that KANU had already succumbed 
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to pressure and accepted to repeal the single-party legislation . However, 
Kenya Times did not desist from expressing strong opinions against the multi-
party system. In this section I will provide an analysis that will illustrate the 
proposition that Kenya Times, by depicting opposition leaders in a negative 
light, metonymically argued against the change to a multi-party democratic 
political system. 
The editorial on December 3, The about turn of political opportunism, 
articulates its opposition to multi-party politics by taking issue with the 
advocates of change. The thrust of its arguments is that opposition politicians 
are just self appointed 'political experts' who do not know what Kenyans want 
and do not 'speak for the masses.' It argues that: 
In this group of "political experts" are people who were once given a 
chance to serve in public offices . While they were there, and since 
they were dropped, we have heard nothing from them. These people 
would like Kenyans to believe that though they served in key positions 
and did nothing to correct the mistakes they are now ranting about, 
now they have suddenly become wise today and have the right 
prescriptions for Kenya . 
The line of argument in this editorial suggests that some of the mUlti-party 
advocates are unworthy of holding leadership positions because they were 
previously in the KANU government but were dropped from their leadership 
positions because of incompetence. This line of argument persuasively invites 
the reader to conclude that multi-party democracy is undesirable in Kenya 
because accepting it means elevating political failures to positions of national 
leadership. The editorial goes ahead to claim that these are the same people 
who caused the mistakes for which they are now accusing the KANU 
government. The political commentary of December 11 , observes that: 
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The 32-member steering committee of the new political party , the 
Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) has in it over 20 
members from two ethnic groupings, the Kikuyu and the Luo. It 
sounds more of the pre-independence days when such a coalition was 
formed into a political party KANU pitting it against other smaller 
groups who formed the defunct KADU. 
This commentary argues that since its leadership is dominated by people from 
the two main ethnic groups in Kenya, FORD is a tribal party. This is made 
clear by reference to the pre-independence days when ethnic identity was 
seen as a major motivation for political party membership. This is clearly an 
era that most Kenyans would not like to re-live. This historical 
contextualisation is clearly meant to attribute the dark aspects of Kenya's 
multi-party political past to the currently nascent dispensation. The argument is 
that the apparent tribal composition of the Opposition leadership is proof that 
multi-party politics engenders tribal affiliations. Historical context has been 
used here to cast the advocacy for multi-party democracy in a negative light 
and in a way that supports KANU's position . 
The commentary of January 7, Little leadership stuff in emerging opposition, 
argues that Opposition leaders are rejects from KANU who are not interested 
in 'restoring' democracy but are merely interested in power for their selfish 
ends. Another feature of the opposition leadership is now introduced: They are 
regarded as the rejects from KANU whose motivations are not democratic 
ideals but selfish interests. The suggested implication here is that KANU is 
inherently a good party and that those it rejects are not worthy of leadership 
positions. Consequently, the political group that they head, and the ideas 
which they claim to stand for, are not welcome. The negative description of the 
Opposition by Kenya Times reviewed here support the findings in Chapter Six 
that demonstrated that it gave the Opposition mainly negative coverage. It is 
my argument that a daily newspaper which is extremely biased in its opinions 
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about a contending player in the public sphere cannot itself be regarded as a 
democratic player in the same political sphere. 
7.3 Kenya Times in Defence of KANU 
I made the observation in Chapter One that the main argument by the 
advocates of a multi-party political system was that the KANU government had 
become undemocratic. It was argued that KANU has proved to be incapable of 
change and that, therefore, the only way to cultivate democratic ideals in 
Kenya was through the introduction of a multi-party system. To counter some 
of the arguments and criticisms that were used to support the demand for 
multi-party democracy, KANU politicians and supporters were at pains to give 
illustrations and arguments to project their party as being democratic. The 
same illustrations and arguments would also be projected as obviating the 
demand for multi-party politics . This section will show that the position taken 
by Kenya Times about multi-party democracy can be gauged from the 
arguments and illustrations it used to defend KANU, mostly against 
accusations from the Opposition. 
The editorial of December 4, Unity now crucial for peace and stability, says 
partly that: 
The unanimity with which the Kanu Delegates Conference yesterday 
endorsed the reintroduction of multi-party politics in Kenya is further 
proof that the ruling party is not opposed to change but determined to 
maintain peace and unity ... And true to form, it was President Moi who 
yesterday proposed the amendment of Section 2(a) ... The donor 
countries which have pegged aid to the introduction of pluralism in 
Kenya, should see Kanu's move yesterday as further proof of its 
willingness to listen to the views of all Kenyans, including its avowed 
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critics . The openness with which this and other issues have been 
discussed in the recent past is in fact a demonstration of democracy. 
This editorial , which is predicated on the positive value of change, begins by 
giving KANU undeserved credit for 'accepting' to allow the re-introduction of 
multi-party politics (see Appendix Three) . This apparently virtuous decision is 
then used to paint a rosy picture of the KANU government's past and present 
performance. The implication is that because the KANU government has 
deemed it imperative now to allow multi-partyism, it is and has always been 
democratic. It is claimed that this decision is proof that the KANU government 
is not opposed to change but dedicated to peace and unity; that it is always 
willing to listen to criticism and is committed to democracy. A look at Chapters 
One and Three shows that this is not true. These chapters have clearly 
showed how autocratic the KANU government had become. This is ironic 
because when discussing the agitation by the Opposition for multi-party 
democracy above, Kenya Times strongly opposed this system and supported 
KANU 's determination not to allow it introduced in Kenya . As a matter of fact , 
Kenya Times regarded the advocacy for multi-party democracy as mere noise. 
It must be for ideological reasons that it is now supporting the system when it 
is positively, though falsely, portrayed as a KANU initiative. 
The commentary of December 8, comparing the prowess of the two political 
groups, comes to the conclusion that KANU would come out the better party in 
an election contest because "the ruling party has a long tradition dating back 
to pre-independence days. It is the party that ushered Kenya to independence 
and managed to create one nation from the ethnic divides drawn up by the 
colonial government." This article, by transposing the celebrated fame of the 
yester-year KANU that fought for independence, to the beleaguered 
incumbent KANU, portrays the latter as a virtuous party. Historical fame and 
glory is being used to legitimise the present embattled KANU government. It is 
as if KANU has not changed since and has always, therefore, been 
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democratic. Mention is not made of the fact that some of the major players in 
the Opposition were members of that virtuous KANU that fought for 
independence. And also , that it is for its inability to accommodate criticism, 
foster ethnic harmony and embrace change that KANU is being challenged . 
This commentary achieves its rhetorical force because of the facts that it omits 
to say. 
The editorial titled , All that criticises is not transparent, of January 3 argues 
that it is unfair the 'bashing' of the KANU government by the Opposition for the 
'scandals and other corrupt deals that our public sector has been embroiled 
in' . In order to defend KANU , the daily puts the blame for Kenya's poor 
economic situation on the leader of the opposition Democratic Party (DP) ; "Mr. 
Kibaki, for example, was Finance Minister for years . Any shortcomings in the 
economic sector during that time should be blamed on him ... " 
Mass defections to the Opposition by members of the KANU government, 
including several of its Cabinet Ministers, at this time were widely regarded in 
the political circles as a demonstration of their dissatisfaction with the ruling 
party , a welcome to change and a show of support for the Opposition. As 
demonstrated above, Kenya Times regarded the defectors from KANU 
differently; it presented their defection as a process by which KANU was 
ridding itself of "bad eggs". The editorial of January 8, Stop cooking up list of 
defectors, claims that most of the defections are not genuine but fabricated by 
the Opposition to discredit KANU . This editorial, especially the title, is symbolic 
of the extent to which Kenya Times had gone in supporting KANU by 
discrediting the Opposition. 
One of the articles that grossly misrepresented Kenya's past and current 
political reality to the extent of approximating naked ideological rhetoric and 
propaganda was carried by Kenya Times on January 25, under the heading 
Kenya political reforms going well, says Wako. This was an endorsement of a 
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speech by Kenya's Attorney General , Amos Wako, delivered to British law-
makers. It said in part that: 
Kenya, unlike other countries, has always adopted pragmatic policies 
devoid of any ideology ... Furthermore, unlike other countries although 
Kenya was a one-party state, the state and party apparatus were not 
fused . Kenya, unlike other countries, has on the whole upheld the 
virtues of constitutional government.. . (my italics) . 
These assertions are a clear attempt to portray Kenya as the country in Africa 
and the rest of the Third World whose political process best approximates a 
working and acceptable democracy. A look at the history of Kenya and a 
review of the criticism from the Opposition and the Church strongly suggest 
that these claims are a distortion. Such a review makes it clear that the State 
and the ruling party KANU have become as good as fused . This is seen, for 
example, in the extent to which the civil service and the central administration 
took part in election rigging , the constitution was abused and even amended 
to suit the KANU government. These obviously undemocratic practices negate 
the further assertion in this commentary that "Kenyans are not only as 
democratic as others but have been used to democratic practices and want to 
see democratic principles upheld ... " 
It can be said in summary to this section that in order to defend the KANU 
government, Kenya Times gave the credit for the introduction of multi-party 
politics to KANU thereby projecting it as a champion of democratic ideals. In 
fact, this undeserved credit is used to make the argument that KANU has all 
along been democratic and its stewardship is seen as the best illustration of a 
democracy in Africa. The historical fame that is associated with the KANU that 
fought for independence is used as a legitimating factor for the current 
embattled KANU government. In order to defend the KANU government, the 
mal-administration and corruption for which it was being criticised are 
246 
acknowledged but blamed on Mwai Kibaki , the leader of the opposition 
Democratic Party, who was Kenya's Finance Minister for more than a decade. 
These arguments are meant to persuade the reader into believing that the 
accusations against the KANU-government are unwarranted and therefore 
there is no real need for a multi-party political system in Kenya . In order to 
achieve its ideological goals , Kenya Times is not ashamed to twist historical 
facts and make use of false statements . Its performance reviewed here 
reinforces the findings in Chapter Six which show that it gave KANU largely 
positive publicity and a lot of space in which to defend itself. 
7.4 Kenya Times, Foreign interests and Multi-party Democracy. 
One way by which each individual daily newspaper's position on the political 
change to multi-partyism can be gauged is by establishing whether it saw this 
change either as coming from within Kenya, and thus as a Kenyan initiative, or 
as having been initiated from abroad to serve foreign interests. The history of 
party politics that I gave in Chapter One shows that the agitation for a multi-
party democratic system in Kenya originated from within the country and had a 
strong popular support base. In this section, I will analyse the commentaries 
by Kenya Times regarding this question so as to establish its attitude to multi-
party democracy. 
Kenya Times' editorial of December 10, Reform should be a matter for 
Kenyans, suggests its attitude when it agrees with former President of 
Tanzania, Dr Julius Nyerere, when he is reported to have claimed that: 
(T)he West is forcing reforms on African countries as a means of 
installing surrogate leaders under the guise of democracy ... The 
installation of this surrogate leadership is aimed at reinforcing neo-
colonialism. 
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The title itself rhetorically implies that the political change should not be 
supported because it is foreign . The picture conjured up by the concept of 
surrogate leadership and neo-colonialism is that of subjugation and loss of 
sovereignty. A change to multi-party democracy, argues Kenya Times, would 
subject Kenyans to Western neo-colonialism. The editorial goes on to claim, 
as an illustration of this connection, that the Opposition activists have actually 
received huge sums of money from the West and warns them not to use it to 
disrupt Kenya's "peace, stability and prosperity". This editorial achieves its 
ideological force by its implied argument that democratic reform is a pretext 
being used by neo-colonial powers to force their puppet leadership on 
Kenyans. 
The editorial of January 5, Kenyans do not need these foreign meddlers, takes 
to task a British opposition leader, Mr. Peter Hain, who after a visit to Kenya 
had decided to table a motion in the British parliament asking Her Majesty's 
government to freeze all aid to Kenya . This case is used as an illustration of 
foreign meddling in Kenya's internal affairs by Western nations (see appendix 
Four). The editorial then argues that such actions are the cause of the 
problems facing African countries : 
(I)t may be that Mr. Hain is of the neo-colonial types and imperialists 
who seek to influence every political decision taken by the sovereign 
states of Africa . The least Kenyans want is foreign meddlers at a time 
when they are trying to carry out political reforms and when the 
country is facing hard economic realities. Much of the political turmoil 
and economic ruin being experienced in many African countries is a 
direct result of meddling by foreign forces, mainly for their selfish 
interests. 
It is not revealed here the nature of Mr. Hain's findings on the basis of which 
he made his conclusions . A pretext is found to blame such people and groups 
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as him for all the political and economic problems that bedevil African 
countries. There is a strong rhetorical argument here which connects 
democracy to neo-colonialism, political turmoil and economic ruin thereby 
persuading readers to reject it. 
The January 9, commentary, US meddling threat to Kenya's stability, as the 
heading indicates, takes issue with the alleged interference by the US in 
Kenya's political affairs to "impose" democracy. This commentary is interesting 
because, in an attempt to defend the performance of the KANU government, it 
selectively makes a parallel between the political history of the US and some 
of the issues for which the Moi government is being criticised : 
... the world's greatest democracy began as a single party democracy. 
Its first multi-party election was held to choose its second 
administration. President Washington was chosen unanimously by 69 
men representing their various states to be president, President Moi 
was chosen in the same manner. Did that make Washington an 
"une/ected" president? (SiC. my italics) . 
The intended answer to the above rhetorical question is NO, the implication 
being that President Moi was also democratically elected. This commentary 
goes on to say that during the Adams Presidency in America, unconstitutional 
Acts were passed, "those in the opposition were detained" and that "it was not 
until 1824 that a popular vote for President was ever taken and in that election , 
all nominees were from one party". It is apparent that reference is being made 
to undemocratic actions similar to those for which the KANU government is 
being criticised . After the parallel associations between those moments in 
American history and the present Kenyan political reality, another rhetorical 
question is posed: "With these historical realities in mind why do we expect 
others to compress a 125-year struggle into 30 years?" This line of rhetorical 
questioning and argument is meant to persuade the reader to conclude that 
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the US should not censor the KANU government because it has gone through 
similar experiences. In an obvious defence of the KANU government, the 
commentary asserts that "For 25 years the type of democracy practised in 
Kenya has fit the needs of the people here". This is ironic because the 
commentary is penned after the introduction of multi-party politics, something 
that was done in response to the general discontent that many Kenyans had 
with the performance of KANU's one-party rule. 
The commentary of February S, Kenyans should watch against foreign 
inspired change, is interesting because its criticism against "American-inspired 
change" is predicated on , among other reasons , an argument based on the 
predicament of Black Americans in the US. Firstly, it argues that "With regard 
to the rights of the Black man, Kenya is more democratic than the United 
States in multiple ways ... Where is the freedom of the press when the Black 
panthers cannot freely distribute their newspapers?" Secondly, because "AII its 
facts of life including its branch of democracy is in a sorry state of 
putrefaction," the commentary argues, makes a mockery of democracy. It 
concludes that for these reasons "America has no business trying to show 
Kenya" the type of democracy to adopt "for it has nothing to offer." The above 
arguments and conclusion are used to convince the reader and KANU critics 
that the democracy advocated by the Opposition, because it is backed mainly 
by the US, also lacks moral legitimacy and is therefore uncalled for. The 
commentary concludes therefore that: 
We must chart out a uniquely Kenyan form of government given that 
democracy is an obscurantist ideology that has yet to find a perfect 
actualisation anywhere in the world . 
The commentary on December 15, Things changes may not offer, asks the 
rhetorical question, "Can Africa afford to be lured into believing that freedom 
and democracy cannot be sent into exile again?" The main argument here is 
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tha"! the achievement of freedom and democracy is not something to be 
celebrated because it can only be a temporary victory since "history shows 
that all victories are temporary . Nothing is irreversible". The commentary is 
persuading the reader to believe that the change to a multi-party system is not 
something worth supporting because of the inherent nature of freedom and 
democracy to be elusive. It is also implied that this call for change is just a 
snare from the West and not an African initiative. 
It can be concluded from the above analysis that Kenya Times was against the 
change to multi-partyism because it described it as a foreign initiative. It 
portrayed this change as a ploy by Western powers to subject Kenyans to 
Western imperial and neo-colonial influence. Opposition politicians were 
portrayed as mere surrogates waiting on the wings to sacrifice Kenya's 
sovereignty. Democracy as allegedly practised by some of the foreign masters 
(especially the US) is depicted as not being any better than Kenya's. In fact, it 
is argued that because the ills the KANU government is being accused of were 
committed in the history of the US, which took more than a century to reach 
where it is now, these accusations are unwarranted. Democracy is itself 
argued to be obscurantist and elusive and Kenya has therefore the right to be 
left alone to chart its own version . The thrust of these arguments is to 
persuade readers to believe that the foreign initiated change to multi-party 
democracy is undesirable and Kenyans would be better served by their own 
"single-party democracy". 
7.5 Kenya Times, Economic Issues and Multi-Party Democracy. 
In this section , I will look at issues that are mainly related to human rights and 
democracy, on one hand, and their relation to the dependency and 
disadvantaged nature of African economies, on the other. I will demonstrate 
that the line of argument taken by Kenya Times is that democracy and 
economic issues are two sides of same coin. And that human rights and 
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democratic politics at home cannot take root unless, on the international 
scene, the dependency and disadvantaged nature of African economies is 
redressed . An attempt to do otherwise is regarded by Kenya Times as 
imperialistic and neo-colonial. 
Arguing that concern for the economy should take precedence over politicking, 
the commentary of February 1 B, Politics must not harm the economy, lashes 
at the Opposition for allegedly giving Kenyans empty promises about jobs. The 
commentary argues that the Opposition is not being realistic but merely 
playing on the people's emotions because no one can provide jobs to all 
deserving Kenyans . It claims, however, that the KANU government is the only 
one that is realistic because it has already taken the initiative to create more 
jobs. This is yet another commentary in which this daily redefines the agenda 
to focus not on the pertinent democracy issues, but on economic issues. 
It is arguable that the whole discussion about democratic political change and 
whether or not it is desirable or even possible revolves around the issue of 
multi-party politics . About this, Kenya Times of January 1 D, Behind the 
Euphoria Lies the Bitter Reality, has the following to say: 
To state that multi-partyism leads necessarily to democracy is a 
diversionary ploy ... to pre-empt the Third World's demands for 
democratising the global trade system ... a system created to suit the 
powerful economic nations of the West. Unless pax-Americana is 
democratised in global terms, Kenya's efforts will be hamstrung by the 
undemocratic international system in which we operate and which will 
continue militating against our development. 
This editorial commentary is another apt attempt to recast the main issue or 
agenda in an economic light, stressing the 'undemocratic international system' 
and the consequent underdog position of poor Kenya in it. The reader is 
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implored to see the two sides of the coin of democracy. The viability of 
democracy at home is portrayed as intricately dependent on there being 
democracy In the global economic and political arenas. The impression 
created here is that, because the Third World countries have, justifiably, been 
demanding "for democratising the global trade system", the exploitative and 
imperialist West is using demands for multi-party democracy as a ploy to divert 
attention from global economic imbalances. The issue or agenda for debate, 
argues this commentary, should not be KANU, its undemocratic performance 
and the need for political change but the undemocratic global trade system. 
The January 26 commentary goes further in debating the relationship between 
democracy and the North-South trade imbalance. This is what it has to say 
about democracy: "After all if there can be no freedom and democracy in the 
relationship between poor and rich countries with regard to international trade, 
then it doesn't sound possible for either of these sides to chant about 
democracy". This is another of the now familiar arguments that no democracy 
discussion is worth the effort if it does not address the economic disparity 
between the rich and poor countries especially with regard to international 
trade. There is a very strong attempt by Kenya Times to divert the attention of 
the reader away from the internal reasons that inform the agitation for political 
change. 
The commentary of February 21, Scholars in neo-political manoeuvre for 
change, says that "Let us all be aware of the importance of a free and active 
participation on the part of Africans in the evolution of a more meaningful 
World Order." The commentary of February 22, Unmasking African scholars' 
dependency says in part that: 
The number of parties Africa has will not change world commodity 
prices, and therefore, alter her economic fortunes ... If Africa is a victim 
of an international order which is not all that democratic or just, why 
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aren't we able to see multi-partism as iffelevancies which do not 
address the real disequilibrium. (my emphases). 
The above commentary by Kenya Times argues that a multi-party political 
system is an irrelevancy because it does not address the real problem facing 
African nations. It takes it as a given and as a logical conclusion from Africa's 
poor economic fortunes that economic disequilibrium is the issue democracy 
should be all about. The same theme is again addressed in the commentary 
titled Foreign arm-twisting in Africa's poHtical change of February 2B. In this 
commentary, the fight for a liberal multi-party democracy is described as a 
"mythical program". Decrying the undemocratic "international arena", it 
concludes that if there is no change in "global malpractice", "Kenya must not 
posit the problem of its development in terms of accomplishing some mythical 
program in the name of liberal multi-party democracy." 
I wish to state in conclusion to this section that Kenya Times argued against 
multi-party politics because the economic issues facing Kenya are not being 
addressed. In its opinion, preoccupation with multi-party politics may 
eventually harm the economy. In fact, multi-partyism is seen as a ploy being 
used by the West to divert attention from the undemocratic nature of the World 
economic order. Democracy at home is seen as dependent on a democratic 
relationship between the rich North and the poor South. Without such a 
relationship, liberal multi-party democracy in a nation such as Kenya is simply 
a "mythical program". In the commentaries that we have looked at above, 
Kenya Times neither addresses directly the accusations and concerns of 
Opposition politicians nor the performance of KANU that brought about the 
agitation that forced KANU to unwillingly adopt a multi-party system. The 
daily's negative view of democratic values shows that it cannot be expected to 
be a fair and rational participant in the political public sphere. 
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7.6 Kenya Times against Opposition and Multi-party Democracy. 
Right from November 1991 , Kenya Times regarded the introduction of multi-
party politics negatively. In defending KANU , however, it congratulated the 
KANU government for introducing multi-partyism and hailed this as proof that 
the government was committed to change and democratic ideals . But even 
then, the multi-party system itself was still regarded negatively and in most 
occasions when it defended KANU, Kenya Times gave reasons which 
suggested that the system was unsuitable. In this section, it is my intention to 
show that the daily's attitude to the Opposition was negative. I will also show 
that in portraying the Opposition in negative light, Kenya Times also strongly 
argued against the multi-party political system. In this regard, the Opposition 
symbolised the multi-party political system. 
The first January editorial of this daily newspaper sets the accent that will be 
repeated and expounded on throughout the month both in the editorials and 
the commentaries (see appendix Five). The themes of economic priority, 
national unity and sovereignty, tribalism, respect for the Presidency, 
imperialism and neo-colonialism etc. will be used in the ensuing debate. They 
will be used to argue against the multi-party system and to highlight on the 
dangers of the Western concept of democracy in the Kenyan situation. The 
values of economic development, people's rights, non-violence, freedom to 
choose a party are rightly invoked but it is the Opposition that is singled out as 
the villain that violates them. The picture created by all these arguments is 
meant to persuade the reader that in practice a multi-party system would be 
worse than a single-party political system. This is the position that the January 
1 editorial This year, we must all rally for unity seems to introduce: 
Multi-party politics will present Kenya with a very special challenge 
and it is up to all the parties involved to ensure that the people's rights 
are not abused. Already there are numerous cases of individuals 
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being harassed by supporters of some organisations. This is 
shameful, for it goes to show that some of the government's biggest 
critics have no respect for the right of each Kenyan to support the 
party of her or his choice. There have also been criminal acts : 
individuals have been beaten up and KANU offices burnt, not all a 
good sign. 
This editorial invokes the deeply cherished value of the need to protect the 
people's rights, especially the right to choose and support a preferred political 
party, which it says should be the objective of all political parties . Indirectly, 
however, it projects the Opposition as the political group that has violated 
these rights . 
The January 2 editorial , No place for anarchy in a true democracy, 
characterises the Opposition's modus operandi as anarchist. This editorial is 
clearly a rejoinder to the Opposition's threat to use civil disobedience to force 
the KANU government to release opposition political prisoners. It suggests 
that "We should allow the judiciary to deal with these cases (political 
prisoners) and, of course, there is still the presidential prerogative of mercy. 
Hasn't the President on many occasions pardoned people convicted by our 
courts?" If the Opposition is here characterised as the villains, the daily claims, 
however, that the President has always been benevolent and merciful to such 
''wrong-doers''. The rhetorical dimension here is in the impression created that 
while the Opposition is encouraging the violation of the laws of the land, 
President Moi is known to benevolent even to people duly convicted by the 
courts for violating the same laws. 
The editorial of January 10, Let's heed the Catholic bishop's good advice, 
while correctly observing that the multi-party system will not necessarily solve 
Kenya's problems, criticises the Opposition for blaming Kenya's economic 
problems on the KANU-government. It argues that this criticism is the same as 
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that adopted by the Catholic Bishops; one institution that has all along 
censured the KANU-government for its authoritarian rule. The editorial 
thanked: 
The Catholic Bishops for thei r timely pastoral letter issued yesterday in 
which they warned Kenyans that the reintroduction of the multi-party 
system will not necessarily bring to an end the country's social, 
economic and political problems. The country already has serious 
economic problems which the Opposition would like to blame on the 
present Government to lure voters . The Catholic bishops seem to 
have realised this when they pointed out that the problems were not 
peculiar to Kenya . And the best example is in the economic area ... 
The argument that Kenya Times makes above is interesting because it is 
based on a press release that was reported as a news item in both the Nation 
and Kenya Times. From the Nation report, one learns that the Catholic 
Bishops had first and foremost remonstrated the KANU government for the 
way it has ruled the country suggesting its complicity in the assassination of its 
critics throughout Kenya's history and suggesting that because of this, change 
was needed. Kenya Times clearly chose to report and capitalise only on what 
the Bishops said to suggest that they did not share the Opposition's criticism 
of the KANU government. The Bishops had issued the pastoral letter 
prinCipally to ask the government to reconvene the Ouko Commission of 
Inquiry which the government had dissolved at a time when crucial witnesses 
were about to testify before it. Ouko, a Cabinet Minister, was found brutally 
murdered and some members of the Moi government are believed to have 
been involved in his assassination. 
It is clear, however, from what the Nation reported that the Bishops actually 
made similar accusations and demands on KANU to those made by the 
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Opposition. The Nation reported as a banner headline story on January 10, 
1992, that the Bishops' : 
... pastoral letter touched on corruption, the violation of human rights, 
and disrespect for the constitution, among other issues ( ... ) The 
prelates said it was not the first time that the mysterious death of a 
political figure had remained unsolved by the authorities . "The cases 
of the late Tom Mboya, JM Kariuki, (Pio Gama) Pinto and others are 
still fresh in the memory of the Kenyan people. ... (Their) 
recommendations included the release of all political prisoners, 
keeping the administration and the Presidency out of political 
campaigns and giving all political parties enough time to prepare. 
It is obvious from the above reportage by Nation that the Bishops saw the 
murder of Ouko in the same light as those of Mboya, JM Kariuki and Pinto . 
The similarity here is that these were political assassinations and in all of 
them, the KANU government was implicated. The Bishops' demands on KANU 
are identical to those made by the Opposition. So, much as the Bishops 
argued that multi-party politics wouldn't solve Kenya's economic problems, 
their criticism of the KANU government only lends more credence to, and 
legitimises, those of the Opposition. It is clearly for ideological reasons that 
Kenya Times chose to distort the Bishops' press statement. What it was 
exploiting is the strong reputation that the clergy have earned as symbols of 
the fight against mal-administration and corruption in Kenya . 
The editorial by Kenya Times on January 3D, Time to learn the rules of 
democracy, also dwells on the need not to disrupt the government and the 
economy in order to safe-guard peace and continuity and stresses the need to 
preserve the country's sovereignty. The implication is that the multi-party 
system, which is being advocated by Opposition politiCians, would only work 
against these values. The January 10 commentary, Behind the euphoria lies 
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the bitter reality, is an apt and succinct expression of support for the KANU 
government's official position . It argues that: 
Kenya, in which political dissent has existed over the years , does not 
require the emergence of a new democratic tradition. But it needs to 
refine its democracy ... It is however unfortunate that the desire for 
change is being cast in tribal terms here in Kenya ... As Kenyans may 
eventually discover, it is better to advocate no change at all than allow 
the destruction of our polity by ignorant and tribally persuaded political 
bunglers and neo-colonial imperial designs in our political affairs (my 
italics). 
The thrust of the above commentary is that Kenya will be better off without the 
political change to multi-party democracy. Kenya Times argues that the single-
party democracy has served Kenya well and, much as this democracy can be 
improved, the present call for change is motivated by tribal considerations and 
"neo-colonial imperial designs" which, if conceded to, would destroy "our 
polity". Another reason why democratic change is undesirable, argues the 
commentary, is because ''This nation has not attained the political maturity to 
drive towards a non-tribal political consensus hence the bizarre personal and 
tribal conflict that we have been witnessing". In essence, Kenya Times has on 
the one hand chosen to completely disregard the facts of Kenya's recent 
history as necessitating the need for political change. On the other hand, the 
arguments it is giving are to a degree identical to those that KANU has given 
in its opposition to political change. (see 1.10 in Chapter One above). 
The January 17 commentary, A past full of lessons for young Kenyans, is 
important because it brings another dimension to the debate. The commentary 
argues that the democracy that the Opposition wants to restore, is the type 
which obtained during Kenyatta's rule. It goes on to say that, "the young 
people ... are made to believe that Kenyatta was a wonderful man yet he was 
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not." The "Kenyatta democracy" saw the "institutionalisation of tribalism and 
corruption in the first 15 years of independence ... land was grabbed .. . a 
whole street was owned by people from one district." The Kenyatta era is 
therefore to blame for tribalism and corruption because during his reign , his 
ethnic group, the Kikuyu, institutionalised tribalism and corruption to gain a 
dominant advantage over the others. This commentary is countering the 
accusations levelled against the Moi regime by suggesting that the ills for 
which it is being attacked are a legacy of the Kenyatta years. The implied 
conclusion is that the present call for political change is undesirable because it 
is meant to restore that corrupt and undemocratic legacy. The eventual 
change would be retrogressive. The commentary acknowledges that there is 
corruption , tribalism, etc. within the Moi regime but the reader is persuaded to 
blame Kenyatta and not Moi for this. 
The January 24 commentary, Democracy elusive even under multi-party 
system, touches on the issue of sovereignty and the allegation that the West 
wants to impose puppet leaders in Kenya in the name of democracy. Whilst it 
portrays KANU as a reform-happy party by claiming that "it is reforming itself 
extremely fast'" the commentary depicts opposition politiCians as "tribalists", 
"neo-colonial supported political burglars" with "ugly heads". The negative and 
abusive characterisation has become very personal and extreme here and is 
meant to show that Kenyans would be better off with KANU which, asserts the 
commentary, is ridding itself of these "hypocrites". The commentary carried on 
February 1, Of Law and empty talk in changing politics, warns that the 
Opposition should not think that they are popular because of the large crowds 
that have been turning up to attend their political rallies and other events: 
Ford should not be deceived by a multitude of mainly manambas 
(passenger-vehicle touts), idlers, looters, clowns and merchandisers. 
They do not even have time and patience to vote ... These people 
have not been educated on the role of the law in social transformation . 
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Yet understanding law is a useful tool in any effort towards democratic 
reform. 
The rhetoric of the above commentary is found in the use of extremely 
negative adjectives and name-calling to describe popular support. The issue 
being addressed is whether popular support for a political party or organisation 
is a credible source of legitimacy. This commentary argues that in the case of 
the Opposition in Kenya , this cannot be true. Support from a multitude or 
crowd comprising mainly "manambas, idlers, looters, clowns, etc.", who do not 
have the "time and patience to vote" cannot be seen as a source of legitimacy 
for a political group or Organisation, This commentary betrays the low, 
negative and disparaging attitude of Kenya Times writers towards the ordinary 
Kenyan who made up the multitude. 
I wish to conclude by saying that the findings in this section clearly 
demonstrate that Kenya Times' attitude to the Opposition was negative. It is 
the Opposition that it considered as having no respect for the people's right to 
choose their parties. The Opposition is portrayed as anarchist having no 
respect for law and order. They are accused of unfairly blaming Kenya's 
economic woes on the KANU government and portrayed as the cause of the 
same problems. Opposition politicians are seen as neo-colonial hypocrites and 
tribal, and their call for mUlti-partyism as a pretext to restore the undemocratic 
Kenyatta legacy. The show of support for the Opposition from the crowd is 
portrayed negatively to suggest that the Opposition have no legitimate 
grassroots' support. These negative attributes are used to suggest that the 
Opposition and the multi-party system that they stand for are undesirable 
because they are undemocratic. These findings also strongly reinforce those 
in Chapter Six. 
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7.7 Two Exceptions: Scathing Criticism of KANU in Kenya Times. 
Of all the political commentaries carried by Kenya Times, there are only two 
that go against the grain by their strong censure of the KANU government's 
performance. Of these two, the commentary carried on February 3, Agenda for 
multi-party politics in Kenya, while also lamenting the interference by Western 
powers in the internal politics of Kenya, had the following to say: 
One interesting question that many people have so far asked is 
whether Keny":,ns are today cohesive enough for multi-party politics. 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings that we may witness, my opinion is 
that Kenyans are mature for pluralism. (Supporting the introduction of 
multi-partyism against its opponents, it concludes that) Multi-party 
politics therefore , gives people different alternatives from where to 
select and, indeed, makes the people the supreme rulers, since, by 
the same voting process, they can remove a party from power. 
This is the only commentary in both Kenya Times and the Nation that says in 
so many words that Kenyans are cohesive and mature enough for multi-party 
politics. Most commentaries in the Nation have suggested the same but only 
indirectly by criticising KANU for saying the opposite or by supporting the 
Opposition's demands for multi-partyism. This commentary stands out in 
Kenya Times because the rest of the daily's editorial and commentary 
opinions take the opposite view about multi-partyism and national cohesion . It 
goes on to express support for multi-partyism and says that it would make "the 
people the supreme rulers". 
The other commentary that went against the grain in Kenya Times was that of 
February 6, Why leaders require professional guidance. It says partly that, 
"Democracy cannot survive without freedom of speech. The basic tenet of 
democracy is that given the opportunity, common men have a unique and 
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significant voice in the conduct of their country's affairs" . After enumerating the 
advantages of freedom of speech in a democracy, the commentary concludes 
that, "This is one way the KANU failed totally. So many things were going 
wrong but the masses were not given the opportunity to air them freely ... " This 
commentary , unlike most others in Kenya Times, openly accuses KANU of 
muffling freedom of expression and concludes that in this regard KANU had 
failed totally . 
7.8 The Performance of the Nation 
I have already pointed above that the major issue about the advocacy for 
change is whether the KANU government had become so undemocratic that a 
change in Kenya's political system had become imperative. Kenya Times 
through its editorials and commentaries had answered this question in the 
negative . Just as we have done with Kenya Times, the Nation's answer to this 
question can likewise be gauged by the analysis of its editorials and 
commentaries. This is what this section will endeavour to do. I have already 
demonstrated that the Nation in November dismissed the Opposition as a 
passing cloud . The main reason being that it believed there was much good 
that the KANU government had done which the Opposition did not 
acknowledge. Further, it opined that the KANU government was capable of 
debate and argument and that if it activated the necessary checks and 
balances, the Opposition would "steam itself out". 
It will shortly be clear that the position taken by the Nation after the repeal of 
the single-party legislation is quite different from the one it took in November. 
On its part, since it came out strongly to defend the KANU government, Kenya 
Times had very little or no criticism for KANU and the little it had was attributed 
to the KANU "rejects" who had defected to the Opposition. This fact is 
pertinent to the problem with regard to whether the political change enabled 
the daily press to comment more freely and critically on KANU's political 
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performance. It will shortly be clear that the performance of the Nation 
answers this question in the affirmative. Other issues related to the central 
question of the desirability of political change are intricately connected to the 
question of KANU's legitimacy. Consequently, these issues, such as the 
connections between multi-party politics and tribalism, multi-part politics and 
foreign influence etc.' will be covered in this section. 
7.9 The Nation on KANU's Undemocratic Performance. 
The Nation's editorial of December 4, Issues on the way forward for Kenya, is 
a clear step away from the position taken in November (see Appendix Six) . 
The newspaper comes out with a strong censure of the KANU government's 
political performance. Though at this stage maintaining that neither KANU nor 
multi-partyism is the issue, the editorial: 
Congratulate(s) the various pressure groups and organisations whose 
persistent clamour for a free, open and democratic society has, finally, 
forced the KANU leadership to open the way for all Kenyans to 
participate fully in the political, social and economic affairs of their 
country. 
The Opposition, which was in December being chastised for condemning the 
KANU government wholesale, is now showered with praise. The assertion 
made here that the KANU leadership was forced to open the way to 
democratic practice does suggest that, in the daily's opinion the KANU 
government has all along nurtured an authoritarian political system. It is clear 
that the Nation is engaging both KANU and its supporters including Kenya 
Times in a public debate. I have demonstrated above how Kenya Times 
argued that it is KANU that brought multi-partyism without any external or 
internal pressure. This Nation editorial repudiates that argument and gives 
credit instead to opposition pressure groups and organisations. The editorial 
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goes on to describe the single party political system that has been followed in 
Kenya under KANU as inhibited and its institutions as unpopular. It warns that 
"Kenyans do not expect and must never again allow, the establishment of 
systems which could be manipulated by irresponsible leaders to harass the 
people, to loot the national treasury or to amass personal wealth". Unlike 
Kenya Times which blamed the undemocratic world trade system, this editorial 
clearly shows that the Nation believes that it is the corrupt KANU leadership 
that is responsible for Kenya's economic woes. 
In the same editorial of December 4 , the Nation strongly accuses KANU of 
encouraging and perpetuating belligerent tribal emotions, and through political 
demagoguery, of whipping up these emotions to promote political ends. It 
goes on to advise that the KANU government must cease its hostile and 
alienating aversion to criticism and also that "no Kenyan should opt to flee this 
country because his political views are not compatible with the mainstream 
political thinking". In the opinion of this article , this is the "opportunity for 
leaders to give Kenyans the Kenya they want" . This is a strong censure of the 
KANU government because it rhetorically suggests that what the KANU 
leadership had given Kenyans is the Kenya "they do not want". This editorial 
goes on to show support for the Opposition by supporting their demand for the 
adoption in Kenya of a limited preSidential tenure. 
If the above editorial censured KANU, the one of December 12, titled Republic 
Day with a different note is partly ambiguous in the beginning. Anticipating the 
presidential address to mark the Republic Day celebrations on that day, the 
editorial argues that the President will most probably use the occasion to 
campaign for KANU by referring to and cataloguing what he considers to be 
his party's achievements. The daily concurs that what the president will say, 
mostly that the KANU government has performed a wonderful job, is true 
because KANU, argues the daily: 
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Held the country together, it has encouraged free enterprise, its 
government has overseen a fabulous growth of the education sector. 
Its foreign policy has seen Kenya develop cordial relations with most 
of the countries in the world , etc. It has been a commendable 
performance all round . 
The lofty attributes listed above are difficult to reconcile with the censure in the 
previous editorial that blamed tribalism, corruption , etc., on the regime. More 
poignant is the fact that, whilst the above citation grades the KANU 
government's performance as satisfactory and good "all round", the rest of the 
editorial portrays it as very poor and in need of an overhaul. It continuous with 
the following observation: 
But wananchi (the citizens) will be acutely aware that it is the same 
Kanu which, through intolerance of dissenting opinion , undemocratic 
electoral practices , mismanagement of public finances by some of 
those in government, promotion of unpopular initiatives, corruption , 
etc., sowed and nurtured the seeds of opposition whose struggle 
culminated in the Tuesday amendment. 
The two different opinions about KANU's performance are a demonstration of 
the ambiguous nature of Nation's editorials at this point in time. However, the 
latter part of the editorial is demonstrative of the accent that the daily will 
assume from now on. This argues that it is KANU's poor political performance 
that justified and made legitimate the Opposition's call for change . This latter 
critical spirit is the one that the daily assumes in its December 31 editorial (see 
Appendix Seven) . This editorial , Year to separate the wheat from the chaff, 
welcomes the political change, which it observes, other African countries have 
already effected. It characterises single-party rule as autocratic and says 
that "having been force-fed on a single-party diet for so long, it is not 
surprising that Kenyans are eager for change". This statement clearly points 
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out that the system was not popular or legitimate but authoritarian . The figure 
of feeding "on a single-party diet for so long" invokes the idea that Kenyans 
had been politically "malnourished" while that of being "force-fed" portrays 
KANU as an authoritarian party that was forced on unwilling Kenyans. 
If in December the editorials were restrained in their criticism of the KANU 
government's performance, the political commentaries were more blunt. The 
tone was set by the commentary on December 1: What KANU must do now to 
save itself. The writer sets the ground by asserting that multi-partyism does 
not guarantee democracy: "Countries are not democratic or undemocratic 
depending on how many political parties they have". But he goes on however, 
to enumerate some of the practices that have made the single-party system's 
performance undemocratic. Concurring with the multi-party advocates, the 
writer argues that the performance of the single-party parliament, and the 
"fact" that it came to parliament as a result of the 1988 rigged election , more 
than anything else makes the adoption of multi-partyism imperative. The writer 
argues that, "I have no doubt that if another party existed, KANU MPs would 
act a lot more responsibly than they do at the moment.. . It is difficult to hide 
the fact that the present parliament has performed to everyone's 
disappointment". 
In the December 1, political commentary, we find yet another strong illustration 
that for most commentators in the Nation, the KANU government had lost its 
legitimacy because it is seen as having performed below par. And to drive 
home his point, the opinion writer says that, "there can be no democracy 
where the rules are chosen for the people ... " The commentary concludes by 
saying that KANU in its present constitution is poorly suited for the 
management of change. It goes on to argue that external influence, the threat 
of tribalism, lack of national cohesion, and the threat to national unity, "the 
arguments so far advanced by KANU against the adoption of pluralist politics 
cannot stand scrutiny". In other words, the reasons advanced by KANU 
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against the adoption of mUlti-party democracy are mere propaganda designed 
to score political points . 
The December a'" commentary, The time for peace is now as Kenyans brace 
for democracy, is a bold statement to the fact that there has not been 
democracy in Kenya before. It argues that KANU wouldn't on its own volition 
have conceded to the adoption of mUlti-party politics by the rhetorical relief it 
expresses at the fact that KANU actually succumbed to pressure; "But would 
you believe? The party has actually given in and the infamous Section 2(a) of 
the constitution will go!" This commentary in the Nation, unlike the view taken 
by both Kenya Times and KANU politicians, argues that it is the KANU 
government's undemocratic performance, and not foreign influence, that gave 
birth to multi-party advocacy. This happened "when, to keep the political 
monopoly, it condemned, vilified , suspended, expelled and, lately de-
registered members who were critical to some of its policies". And when 
KANU finally decided to allow opposition politics, the decision "was not taken 
because KANU is a kind and merciful party. It is not because Kenyans did 
become cohesive overnight": 
The decision was a result of unprecedented pressure, both local and 
international, and the final straw that broke the camel's back was the 
Paris Club. That gathering of international donors gave Kenya six 
months within which to carry out social and economic reforms before it 
could give the country any aid money. Now I know who foreign 
masters are and who gets foreign money! (my italics) . 
The above commentary attributes the credit for change both to internal 
advocacy for multi-partyism and to international pressure. A major difference 
between this stance and the position taken by KANU and Kenya Times is that, 
Western countries are regarded not as politico-economic powers, but as donor 
countries . The pressure coming from them is seen as necessitated, not by 
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imperialist and neo-colonial considerations , but by the fact that Kenya's 
political and economic performance was seen as seriously wanting reforms . In 
a twist of sarcastic rhetoric, this editorial opinion suggests that the donor 
countries who make up the so-called Paris Club are the foreign masters and 
that the surrogate leaders are not multi-party advocates but the leadership of 
the KANU-government. It is this leadership who have been made by the 
donor countries, to adopt multi-party politics against their wish . 
Reviewing the events that saw the adoption in 1982 of Section 2{a), that 
legislative amendment that proscribed the formation of rival parties to KANU, 
this commentary observes that it was an illegal and opportunistic move. It was 
meant to forestall the registration of Odinga and Anyona's proposed opposition 
party, the Kenya African Socialist Alliance (KASA). About the consequent 
detention of Anyona and his lawyer, Dr. Khaminwa, the editorial argues that: 
Their detention was, of course, illegal, partly because the process of 
forming a political party did not constitute an emergency or threaten 
State security in such a manner that the Government had to invoke 
the Preservation of Public Security Act in order to detain them. 
With this commentary, one sees an attempt by the Nation writers not just to 
criticise generally the KANU government, but to allude to historical facts to 
illustrate or make legitimate their criticism and arguments against it. Here, the 
daily suggests that the detention of the main multi-party advocates of that time 
was an unwarranted draconian measure. One can see in this kind of criticism 
a strong negative attitude to the KANU government's performance record . It 
must be mentioned here that this kind of criticism would have been suicidal for 
the opinion writer, had it been penned in 1982 when the Preservation of Public 
Security Act was put to use against Odinga, Anyona and Khaminwa. It is 
therefore symbolic of the fundamental change that multi-party politics has 
brought to freedom of expression. 
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The commentary on December 9, With Kanu subdued, the agenda is on calm 
change, achieves its rhetorical objective by comparing and contrasting the 
performance of KANU during the early post-independence Kenyatta era and 
during the current Moi era ; the KANU of "then" and the KANU of "now" . The 
former is depicted as having been good and democratic and the current as 
being bad and autocratic. The commentary argues that, "That Kanu was a true 
nationalist party . Kanu today is a party of chameleons whose colours change 
according to the dictates of the stomach". This implies that President Moi's 
KANU cannot be trusted because its leaders, like chameleons, are not 
trustworthy and they are motivated by selfish interests (dictates of the 
stomach). For these reasons, the reader is persuaded to welcome the political 
change as an obvious necessity . Moi's KANU-government is further 
characterised as, and accused of, assuming infallibility and claiming the 
"ordained role to lead God's people". Its performance: 
... is a far cry from the Kanu that told its opposition at the dawn of 
independence: "Brothers, let's sit at the same table and talk over 
matters for this country belongs to all of us." It was an accommodating 
Kanu, willing to give and take ... 
The commentary of December 10, Reasons why a national convention is vital 
now, makes the now familiar criticisms and comments against the KANU-
government. These include detention without trial, international pressure on 
KANU to adopt plural politics, the 1988 election-rigging, and the necessity for 
a limited Presidential tenure. It argues at the end that "the worst crime that 
Kanu perhaps committed was the one of politicising the entire Government 
apparatus". The commentary of December 16, This time round, voters will be 
demanding results, raises the issue of the people's lack of confidence in 
KANU's single-party parliament and civil service, saying that "it will take a 
serious House to restore that confidence . (But) there is hope for that since 
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there will be opposition to wake up those who think Parliament is either a 
bedroom or a place to make a joke of matters of life and death" (my italics) . 
The image of parliament being a bedroom invokes the idea that KANU 
parliamentarians had reneged on their duty to debate issues in the House and 
turned it into a sleeping and playground . It also shows the negative and low 
regard that the daily had for the performance of the KANU Parliament. 
The criticism against the KANU in the Nation continued unabated . The 
commentary of December 21 , Let's not kid ourselves about multi-party politics, 
argues that whilst "the solution to Kenya's economic, social and political 
problems is not one of multi-parties", Kenyans must protect themselves from a 
repetition of the non-democratic fashion in which the KANU government has 
hitherto performed. The article argues that, "among KANU's many ills, 
probably the worst was its inability (or unwillingness) to let people debate on 
decisions which had profound effects on their lives". The commentary indicts 
the KANU-government of gross violation of the freedom of expression and the 
people's right of participation in the political process. This is a bold support for 
a multi-party democratic system that will allow for debate and dialogue. 
The next commentary takes up the question of tribal clashes that had become 
a big problem in Kenya at this time. In brief, this problem was located mainly in 
areas where the Kalenjin ethnic group (of President Moi) borders on other 
ethnic groups, mainly the Kikuyu, Luo and Luhyia. During this time, the 
Kalenjin engaged the other ethnic groups in bloody and violent clashes 
claiming that the lalter groups had grabbed Kalenjin land. The whole question 
is pertinent to this study because it is connected to the KANU-government's 
argument that multi-party politics would breed tribal hatred and violence. The 
writer of the December 28 commentary, A story that makes no sense, 
suggests that this is a KANU government ploy to lend proof to the above 
ideological position : 
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It is hard to believe that the clashes over land - or tribal clashes as 
they are turning out to be - are not the work of a devious mind and a 
desperate soul which wants to make some political mileage out of the 
chaos and fears that the clashes have engendered. 
The writer does not mention the KANU government by name but the reference 
is obvious from the following citation , remembering that it is KANU that has 
propagated the argument being criticised here: 
I am more than inclined to think that the bogey of tribalism is being 
used to justify a stereo-type - that tribalism exist in abundance in this 
country, and that it will be worse with the arrival of multi-party politics. 
In other words it is a matter of having given a dog a bad name, you 
proceed to crucify it. 
This is a very serious accusation for it implicates the KANU government in the 
fuelling and politicising of ethnic animosities, arguing as it does that the 
violence is a creature of KANU meant to lend credence to its aversion to multi-
party politics. This is what is implied by the image of giving a dog a bad name 
and then going ahead to crucify it. One can see that the Nation is committed to 
addressing and countering most of the arguments that KANU and Kenya 
Times have given to oppose multi-party democracy. It goes on to show that it 
most cases, it is the KANU government that is to blame for the problems. 
The editorial on January 12, Wako's wise word to State counsel, commenting 
on the performance of State counsel , suggests that they should remain neutral 
in the new era of multi-party politics: 
... Our concern here is that in the transition to multi-party politics, 
Kenyans, all the parties and the Government, must take cognisance of 
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the rules of fair play which were non-existent in the days of Kanu's 
monopoly of power. Kanu, the party , must de-link itself from the civil 
service and the State's apparatus to ensure fair play (my italics) . 
The above editorial strongly supports the change to multi-party democracy in 
Kenya because it means that Kenyans can now create a system in which 
there is fair play in the political process. The "fusion" of KANU and the civil 
service is again given as one of the features that contributed to the violation of 
fair play in the political process , especially in the form of election malpractice, 
during KANU's monopoly of power. The nature of this article is important 
because it shows that the Nation has moved one step ahead from discussing 
the desirability of change to pointing out what should be done to underwrite 
that change. The change is seen as a good that having been achieved legally 
must now be institutionalised in praxis . 
In the editorial of January 19, Setting the pace for peaceful change, the daily 
supports the opposition's demand for fair play; that they should participate in 
the appointment of an Electoral Commission ; that the President be elected by 
a popular vote; and that presidential tenure be limited. The era of KANU's 
monopoly of power and political suppression , apart from violating 
"fundamental human rights and freedoms", encouraging nepotism, condoning 
corruption and "running down the economy", was said to have brought Kenya 
close to the Romanian situation, by the commentary of January 19. However, 
suggesting that the political change has brought political relief and freedom to 
Kenyans, the commentary asserts that: 
Kenyans are talking without looking over their shoulders to see if the 
political police are listening. Kenyans are not talking in whispers and 
hushed voices or with fingers covering their mouths. 
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This graphic rendition of the freedom of expression being enjoyed in the wake 
of multi-party politics in Kenya is another example in the Nation which 
illustrates the positive attitude with which the daily embraced the change to 
multi-partyism. The above comment suggests that what obtained before the 
change was a culture of silence and fear, whereby Kenyans were intimidated 
into being suspicious of the next person lest they be the establishment's 
"political police". That KANU 's performance was autocratic is suggested by the 
implied similarity with Romania . 
As the title declares, the editorial of January 20 (see Appendix Eight) asks the 
KANU government to Restore faith in the power of the vote because: 
Over the years , the misuse of power and office by some top Kanu 
officials has greatly undermined the confidence of wananchi and 
dampened their enthusiasm to participate in crucial processes like 
voting at elections. ... Somewhere along the way, politics was 
divorced from the concrete socio-economic issues it should address. 
Apart from touching on the issue of election malpractice that we have now met 
several times above, this citation suggests that because of the misuse of 
power by the KANU government, politics did not address economic issues. In 
the Nation's opinion, one reason why KANU had become ineffective and 
undesirable is because it did not address the real socio-economic issues 
facing the populace: This argument is a clear rebuttal of Kenya Times ' 
argument that Kenya's economic woes could be attributed largely to the 
undemocratic World economic system. 
The commentary of January 22, Can these parties offer the changes people 
desire?, accuses KANU of "casting upon Kenyans" the "cancerous curse ... of 
personality cults" and of introducing "a stage-managed parliamentary 
democracy, where the party hierarchy becomes all powerful, even over 
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parliament" and this "is the root cause of our current woes". The image of a 
"stage-managed" parliament suggests that the KANU parliament operated 
according to the wishes and directions of the "leader". This underscores the 
observation I made in Chapter One that this parliament was used merely to 
rubber-stamp the whims of the KANU government. The commentary goes on 
to argue that for a democracy to function there must be efficiency, and of "all 
the checks and balances that guarantee the much-sought efficiency, the 
Opposition is the most important institution. An Opposition will , without doubt, 
generate an atmosphere of competitiveness that will result in efficient 
government". This support for the Opposition is a clear and long step away 
from the position taken by the Nation in November. At that time, KANU was 
portrayed as capable of implementing the checks and balances in the system 
(which, as we have demonstrated in Chapter One, it had actually eroded) 
thereby obviating the need for a multi-party democratic system. 
It is my conclusion that the Nation now considered the KANU government's 
performance to have been undemocratic and regarded as legitimate and 
justified, the call for and eventual change to a multi-party system. KANU's 
single-party system is depicted as having been inhibited, unpopular and 
actually "force-fed" on Kenyans through intimidation and election malpractice. 
Tribalism was whipped up by the political demagoguery of KANU politicians for 
political ends. For the Nation , the performance of KANU's single-party 
parliament was a farce. KANU is accused of having politicised the civil service 
to the extent of merging the party and the State. Unlike the position taken by 
the Nation in November, the KANU-government is now considered as 
incapable of change and ill equipped for its management. 
The performance of the Nation after the introduction of multi-party democracy 
shows that the political change had greatly impacted on its performance. The 
daily is now bolder and more daring in its political analysis and especially in its 
appraisal of KANU's previous and current performance. This is a long step 
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from the time when , as I described in Chapter One and Three , criticism of the 
KANU-government and its leadership could only be read between the lines. 
Most of what is being said now is open criticism. The findings also show that 
whilst in its news coverage the Nation strove to be no-partisan in according 
space to the contending political groups, as a participant in the public sphere it 
strongly supported multi-party democracy and criticised KANU and the one-
party system. 
7.10 The Nation aboutthe Opposition 
In this section I will investigate in more depth the question whether the Nation 
supported the Opposition or still considered it as a passing cloud. The analysis 
in the above section establishes that the Nation had similar criticisms against 
the KANU government to those advanced by opposition politicians and other 
government critics. This creates the impression that it supported the 
Opposition. In this section I intend to establish whether this is the case and if 
so, to what extent. 
The December 14 commentary, Victory belongs to those "commoners" in the 
street, is important because it not only congratulates the multi-party advocates 
and hails them as patriots, but also declares the change to multi-party politics 
a victory worn mainly by the common man. The latter, sometime seen and 
conceptualised as crowds, is here portrayed as being in tune "with what was 
happening" and as supporting the FORD: 
Evidence that the common man was in tune with what was happening 
was demonstrated when the Government made the unwise decision to 
send members of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy to the 
districts to stand trial following the abortive November 16 FORD rally 
at Kamukunji. The FORD people were received as heroes, a clear 
indication of the sympathy that their movement enjoyed in the districts. 
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A couple of observations can be made from the above commentary. Firstly, it 
portrays the crowds as a positive phenomenon in the process of political 
change , a picture different from the one depicted in Kenya Times. Secondly , 
its assertion that the crowds received the FORD people as heroes shows that 
the commentary regarded this show of support from the crowd as a popular 
and grassroots source of legitimacy for the Opposition. Thirdly, it 
demonstrates that the Nation was engaging Kenya Times in a debate by 
differing with the latter's analysis of the same events. 
The editorial of February 3, Undemocratic show of support, criticises members 
of the FORD for heckling and disrupting a KANU recruitment rally. It cautions 
that "Supporters of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy will have to 
exhibit a great sense of maturity if they expect to earn the respect and 
confidence of the people they are trying to woo ." However, in the same breath , 
it also criticises harshly the KANU-government supporters for similar 
behaviour: 
We condemn this juvenile behaviour in the same manner in which we 
censured the violence portrayed by Kanu supporters against Kenyans 
who had voiced their sympathy and support for the opposition . At one 
time it was routine that intimidation or outright violence was used to 
induce in people unfelt support for Kanu . It did not work then, it will not 
work now. 
This is yet another assertion that the KANU-government had used state 
violence to intimidate Kenyans to support the ruling party . What is interesting 
here is that even though what prompted the commentary is the fact that the 
FORD supporters had disrupted a KANU political affair, the commentary ends 
up criticising KANU itself as harshly. Similarly, the commentary of February 9, 
ft is elections not selections, gentlemen of the opposition, strongly criticises 
the FORD supporters who had, without any elections being held, endorsed 
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Oginga Odinga, the party's chairman , as the man to lead the party. This is 
seen as imposition of leadership, a practice for which KANU is detested. In 
fact, the commentary goes ahead to lash at the KANU government for "the 
infamous and singularly shameful 1988 parliamentary and KANU elections", 
citing this as an illustration of KANU's imposition of leaders on the Kenyan 
people . These commentaries prove that the Nation was committed to criticise 
both political groups whenever there was need. This fact supports my finding 
in Chapter Six that the daily was not merely concerned with supporting the 
Opposition but with debating the issues of the day. 
The Nation's commentary of February 23, What a savage approach to 
freedom of association, is a bold and blunt critique of the KANU government's 
contention that tribal violence would come in the wake of multi-party politics. 
The commentary is directed at a recent violent encounter between alleged 
Maasai supporters of KANU and officials and supporters of the FORD; the 
latter had gone to open their party's branch office at Ngong, which though in 
the outskirts of Nairobi is located in the Rift Valley province. In the ensuing 
violent encounter, several FORD leaders were injured, some seriously . The 
KANU government's official position was that the attackers were Maasai 
supporters of KANU who had been provoked by FORD supporters. 
A look at the press coverage at that time shows that most observers, however, 
saw it differently, wondering why the police did not act appropriately having 
been informed before-hand of the planned FORD branch-opening. Indeed, 
some people believed that KANU had stage-managed the violence to lend 
credence to its aversion to multi-party politics and to keep the FORD away 
from its (KANU's) "stronghold" . This latter view is the one taken by this 
commentary which claims that, "somebody wants to keep the opposition out of 
Rift Valley". It observes that most of the tribal clashes have taken place in the 
Rift Valley province and that in all these cases, as is the case with the Ngong 
one, the police have responded in an "amateurish" fashion . The commentary 
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then bluntly blames the KANU-government for the Ngong violence by putting 
the violence in a historical context: 
If one is to understand the Ngong-town violence, one has to go back 
into the history of opposition politics in Kenya and everything falls into 
place. My view is that the Kanu Government is going to pull all the stops 
out to make it very , nay, extremely difficult for the opposition to operate, 
just as was the case between 1966 and 1969 when the now-defunct 
Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) threatened the supremacy of Kanu . 
It is clear that the above editorial commentary that the Moi government is 
regarded as trying to use all means, including fuelling tribal animosity, to kill 
the Opposition. This is reminiscent of short-lived multi-party era "when the 
1968 Local government elections were due, "Kenyatta made it plain - not just 
to the voters but also to the electoral officials that he wanted the KPU 
obliterated". The implied argument is that KANU has not changed and is not 
ready to change. Commenting on the problems that the Opposition were now 
facing, the commentary alludes to the historical fact that "The KPU was denied 
access to the radio; licensing its rallies was a major problem" and now: 
A generation later, the opposition will find it extremely difficult to 
operate and the hitches over licenses for the Democratic Party of 
Kenya and the FORD in Kiambu and Nakuru are but some of the 
frustrations the opposition will encounter, especially in Rift Valley 
Province. The Ngong violence is the work of the "open mouths" and 
closed minds of insidious and crafty animals. Those were Kanu not 
(Maasai) morans. 
The commentary ends with a very negative characterisation of KANU 
politicians as "open mouths", closed insidious and crafty animals. It lays the 
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blame for the Ngong violence on KANU saying that those were KANU morans 
and not Maasai morans as officially claimed by the KANU government. 
It can be concluded from the above observations that the Nation openly 
sympathised with the Opposition and what they stood for. The December 14, 
commentary clearly shows that it saw multi-party advocates as heroes and 
what they had achieved as victory; a successful agitation for political change . 
Whilst Kenya Times considered them as villains and self-interested puppets of 
foreign masters, the Nation hailed them as patriots. It came out and criticised 
the Opposition , especially the FORD, when the party leadership, or some of its 
supporters , were involved in undemocratic behaviour. However, in all instances 
when it thus criticised the opposition, the Nation balanced the criticism, in the 
same editorial or commentary, with a stronger criticism of the KANU 
government for the perpetuation of similar acts. On occasions, when the daily 
considered the Opposition unfairly accused, especially in the above Ngong 
episode, it defended them and laid the blame on the KANU government. It can 
therefore be concluded that unlike the case in November, the Opposition 
received favourable treatment in the Nation after the political change . 
7.11 Description of KANU leaders in the Nation 
The analysis in this section will show that from the month of December 
onwards, there is a heightened criticism of KANU politicians by the Nation, 
mainly for their political utterances. More pertinent to this study, however, is 
the general tendency by the editorial commentaries, from now on, to take the 
opportunity to criticise the KANU government's performance when the object 
of their criticism is the individual KANU politician. In some cases, it is apparent 
that KANU politicians and functionaries are considered to be symbolic of the 
party as an institution, which is then criticised by way of criticising them. More 
important in this section is the development that saw open and blunt criticism 
being levelled at the President himself. 
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In a clear reference to President Moi , the December 1 commentary, What 
Kanu must do to save itself, laments that "some governments have gone as 
far as proscribing debates on whether or not political pluralism is the right way 
forward" thereby restricting the freedom of speech and discussion. The 
commentary goes on to give examples to show that the President himself has 
performed very poorly. It claims, for example, that "many appointments which 
the President is only empowered to make on consultation or advice of other 
people or institutions are being made without such consultations or contrary to 
such advise." Demanding that this practice must change, the commentary now 
goes on to suggest that: 
The president on his part, should make the widest consultations 
before making important public service appointments , and should 
resist tribal considerations . As long as the Civil Service and the 
Corporations remain predominantly staffed with people from one 
ethnic group, the people's right to exercise democratic choice is 
grossly curtailed . 
The above editorial commentary is one of several that the daily newspaper 
carried that strongly censures President Moi's performance. It openly accuses 
him of tribal considerations in his public appointments and of not making wise 
consultations prior to making such appointments. Arguing that this practice on 
the part of the President has denied Kenyans "the right to exercise democratic 
choice', the commentary calls for change . 
The December 15, Sorry, the era of intimidation is over, Bwana PC, takes to 
task a high ranking administration officer, the Provincial Commissioner (PC) 
who had been reported as having attempted to force his official guests to show 
support for KANU by flashing the party's one-finger salute. From accusing this 
PC, the editorial goes on to accuse the provincial administration of having 
taken part in defeating the democratic process. This they did when "On the 
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instructions of powerful (Kanu) politicians , god-fathers and power-brokers , 
District Commissioners flagrantly and massively rigged the 1988 parliamentary 
and Kanu elections ( ... ) and, therefore, imposed on the electorate unpopular 
fellows to lead them. The administrators denied Kenyans the right to choose 
their leaders." That the civil service, being the central administrative arm of the 
government, had worked in concert with the powerful KANU leaders in election 
rigging is clearly indicated and abhorred. We see here that the Provincial 
Commissioner metonymically represents the civil service and, by extension, 
the KANU government. 
The December 16 commentary , This time round, voters will be demanding 
results, takes the cue from the one above by saying that the people's 
confidence in Parliament must be restored and that the civil service must be 
de-linked from party politics. The main aim of the commentary is to censure 
KANU's secretary-general , Joseph Kamotho , also a Cabinet Minister, for 
accusing the Nation of pro-FORD bias . The commentary defends the position 
taken by the Nation partly by telling Kamotho and, by extension, his party 
KANU that a section of the population wants political change, wants KANU 
'out' and that it is the daily's duty to report these feelings. 
On January 4, the Nation was on Kamotho again with the commentary, Pity so 
much effort can be wasted on misleading, this time for denying that Kenya's 
military leaders had attended a special meeting of the ruling party. This event, 
widely covered by the local press, especially the Nation and the Standard, had 
raised fears of a possible suspicious alliance between KANU and the military . 
This opportunity is also used to chastise the KANU-government. The 
commentary argues that "Mr. Kamotho's sloppy handling of the whole matter 
is symptomatic of the insensitive style that the Government has all along used 
to handle awkward situations, a style which has been responsible for its loss of 
popularity and subsequent poor publicity" (my italics). Kamotho's behaviour is 
282 
portrayed not just as that of the ru ling party's secretary-general but as the 
embodiment of the government's style of governance. 
The January sth commentary , Watch out, the poachers have become game 
wardens, criticised another KANU Cabinet Minister, Wilberforce Kisiero , 
because: 
He told Kenyans the other day that the so-called clashes in the Rift 
Valley and Western and Nyanza provinces are a result of the advent of 
pluralism. He is dead wrong . He is trying to obscure the real issues 
behind the attacks on the Luhyia , Luo, Kikuyu and others by the Kalenjin 
and the Sabaot (ethnic groups) . He is telling the lie that Kenyans are not 
cohesive and, therefore, not ready for multi-party politics. ( ... ) How did 
these people know that pluralism was coming when the entire country 
had been told time and time again that there was no way mUlti-party 
politics would be introduced in Kenya? (my italics) . 
This commentary takes on head-long the KANU-government's argument that 
the introduction of multi-party politics would breed tribal violence in Kenya . 
This is one of the numerous examples whereby a KANU-government leader . 
had cited the triballland clashes , now taking place in Rift Valley province and 
other adjoining areas, as proof of the negative consequences of multi-party 
politics. The commentary is critical of these claims partly for the reason that 
the ethnic 'clashes' referred to actually started at a time when President Moi 
had ruled out the introduction of multi-party politics 'in the near future' because 
Kenyans 'are not cohesive' . Consequently, there is no way that tribal violence 
could have been caused by multi-partyism at that time, because it simply did 
not exist. The Nation argues that tribalism is being used 'to obscure the real 
issues' behind the violence. The moral argument of this commentary is that 
KANU leaders are the real perpetrators (poachers) of ethnic violence who are 
now disguising themselves as protectors (wardens) of peace. 
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The alleged monopoly of power by 'one leader' ostensibly by divine right is 
attacked by another commentary of January 5, Political cacophony? Take 
heart, it's democracy at work. This article also argues that the discussion or 
'profusion of voices' and 'apparent cacophony of conflicting opinions', brought 
by mUlti-partyism is 'not necessarily a bad thing ' but 'very good signs of a 
thriving democracy, bewildering as they may be to the electorate'. The 
commentary demonstrates that the Nation unlike Kenya Times encourages 
debate and the expression of diverse opinions: 
This interesting process will ... eventually demystify leadership so that 
those elected to office do not start claiming a divine right to their position . 
When a society fails to recognise and correct its mistakes in the name of 
preserving stability, that society decays and eventually collapses . 
Unlike the opinions of the KANU leadership and of Kenya Times, this 
commentary argues that the value and need for stability is wrongfully being 
used to justify the KANU-government's failure to recognise and correct its 
mistakes and warns that this is recipe for Kenya's collapse. President Moi is 
personally criticised for claiming that the opposition is tribal , by another 
commentary on January 5"': 
Already President Moi has said that the emerging parties are tribal and 
are therefore going to disrupt the unity of Kenya . There is no way one 
can look at the FORD as a tribal party, cutting as it does across ethnic 
lines and having representatives from most ethnic groups in Kenya . 
Whilst earlier references to 'strong leader' and the 'leader' clearly indicated 
that the President was being discussed, the above commentary is the first and 
only one that mentions President Moi by name and does so in a very negative 
light. Like the other KANU-government politicians criticised above, President 
Moi is accused of spreading the lie that the emerging multi-party system is 
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tribal in its constitution and therefore a potential threat to national unity . Apart 
from being a strong defence of the opposition FORD against accusations from 
the most powerful politician in the land, 'the strong leader', this commentary 
stands out as a symbol of the change in the political performance of the press 
ushered in by multi-party politics . 
The commentary of January 12, Presidency: shrouded in myths, rife with 
perils, attempts to explain why the Kenyan Presidency developed to be averse 
to criticism. The thrust of this commentary is that the performance of President 
Moi has been undemocratic and the change to multi-party politics would help 
redress the situation. The image of a disciplinarian know-it-all , always-right 
'father' , which the commentary uses to describe the President, brings to mind 
the picture of an authoritarian , pontificating, patriarchal and rigid leader. The 
commentary explains that the President has become authoritarian because 
the KANU-government has propagated the belief that Kenyans are simply 'the 
President's children' and therefore have no right to freely question him 
because of the myth that the father 'knows best' . By the same myth, the 
'father of the nation' has the right and duty to 'discipline' those who hold 
dissenting political views . The commentary is here alluding to the political 
harassment, including detention without trial that has been visited on 
dissidents during Moi's (and Kenyatta's) one-party monopoly on power. The 
broadcast media, it is argued, helped in the mystification and creation of the 
cult presidency. The media attributed to the President real and imagined 
characteristics, endowed him with 'extraordinary abilities and rarely, if ever, is 
anything said about his shortcomings'. 
In the editorial of January 27, the Nation chides KANU's secretary-general for 
allegedly preaching violence. This behaviour is seen as 'a telling expose of 
why KANU's popularity has reached the current abysmal depths' . Here again, 
in the same breath that a KANU leader is criticised, KANU as a party is 
criticised too. This accusation is interesting because violence has been 
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attributed to the Opposition and the multi-party system by KANU supporters 
and Kenya Times in an attempt to discredit the desirability of democratic-
political change. 
The Nation's commentary on February 1, Mwangale, let voters decide, 
censures the Cabinet Minister Elijah Mwangale, accusing him of fanning tribal 
sentiments . Mwangale is reported to have claimed that members of his ethnic 
group, the Luhyia , have no intention of voting for Oginga Odinga, the leader of 
FORD who belongs to the Luo ethnic group, as the President and that the 
Luhyia (ethnic group) will remain loyal to KANU. The commentary argues that, 
'It is such deplorable arrogance which precipitated the legitimacy crisis that 
KANU is currently going through and its perpetration is a big ballot repellent.' 
This is another example given by a Nation editor to show that KANU-
government politicians are 'guilty' of the very tribal motivation for which they 
are accusing the OpPosition. Similar views to the ones expressed above are 
repeated on the following day February 2, 1992, in an editorial that criticises, 
once again, KANU's secretary-general. 
An editorial commentary appearing on February 16, has the following criticism 
of two KANU leaders: 
Kanu stalwarts Sam Ongeri and Joseph Kamotho now want to behave 
as if they are angels and are asking the opposition not to insult Kanu . 
( ... ) Kanu stalwarts must be told in no uncertain terms that they are 
the ones who turned Kenya's political arena into a parlour of 
mudslinging and mud-raking. ( ... ) When it comes to insult, especially 
in public, Kanu has always excelled. 
From the above citation, it is apparent that the Nation is suggesting that KANU 
politicians have not the moral high ground to criticise the Opposition. This is 
mainly because they are themselves guilty of having actually started , nurtured, 
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and propagated the culture of "dirty politics" for which they now accuse the 
Opposition. The reader is persuaded to regard KANU , and not the Opposition , 
as guilty of "mudslinging and mud-raking ". 
It can therefore be concluded, from the observations presented in this section , 
that the Nation held the outspokenness of KANU leaders in very low esteem. 
Their actions and statements are taken as the outshoot and proof of the 
authoritarian style by which the KANU-government has ruled Kenya. The 
reader is time and again persuaded and reminded of the fact that the public 
service was politicised by KANU to serve the undemocratic interests of the 
party and to force the party on the people . It is KANU leaders who are 
portrayed as the people who preach violence and spread lies. They are 
repeatedly accused of instigating tribal violence to lend credence to their 
argument that multi-party democratic politics is a threat to national unity . The 
need for national unity is depicted as a ploy used by KANU politicians to gloss 
over the KANU-government's failure to recognise and correct its mistakes. 
KANU leaders are accused of turning 'Kenya's political arena into a parlour of 
mudslinging and mud-raking'. It is the Nation's argument and conclusion that, 
because of the poor image and performance on the part of the KANU 
leadership, the change to a multi-party system is necessary so that democratic 
values can be re-established . 
One of the observations made in Chapter One on Kenya's political history is 
that the President was beyond public censure during KANU's single-party 
monopoly on power. It has been this study's aim to find out whether the 
general freedom of expression that came in the wake of multi-partyism meant 
that the President could now be criticised by the daily press. The findings of 
this section demonstrate that this is true in the case of the Nation. 
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7,12 Conclusion 
This chapter has clearly demonstrated that the political change that ushered in 
mUlti-party politics in Kenya had a great effect on the performance of the two 
daily newspapers, It impacted on who and what they could comment on, and 
on the way they commented on the political issues pertinent to the desirability 
of multi-party politics, Kenya Times waged an ideological war against the 
Opposition , Poor economic performance, vassalage to imperialist and neo-
colonial powers, failure to perform satisfactorily when in public office, 
disrespect for the law, anarchy, tribalism etc., were all blamed on Opposition 
politicians. All these things which are depicted as threatening the people's 
deeply cherished national values are meant to undermine the necessity and 
legitimacy of the Opposition, and by extension, of a multi-party political 
system. 
It is evident from the findings that the above picture by Kenya Times about the 
Opposition was a misrepresentation of the issues that were being debated, 
something that was designed to redefine the political agenda in order to argue 
against the necessity for democratic change . For example, in an effort to 
present the KANU-government as good , Kenyatta's rule is portrayed as the 
one that was tribal and authoritarian and the Opposition is then accused of 
working towards restoring that legacy. The openness with which the Kenyatta 
era is criticised is a manifestation of the change in press performance because 
this kind of criticism was taboo before the change to multi-party politics. In the 
meantime, very little, if any criticism of KANU under President Moi is made. 
The effect brought about by the political change was more remarkable in the 
Nation. In November 1991 , this daily played it safe, criticising both political 
groups for trading blanket accusations against each other. However, the daily 
took the position that KANU was capable of the kind of the debate that could 
withstand opposition criticism and advised the party to do just that, arguing 
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that as a result , the Opposition would die a natural death. With the change to 
multi-party politics, the newspaper, now arguing that the issue is not KANU or 
multi-partryism, came out to criticise the performance of the KANU 
government. With time, especially in January and February 1992, the Nation 
clearly showed that KANU and multi-partyism were the issues. 
After the constitutional change that ushered in opposition politics, the KANU 
government was portrayed in the Nation as being rigid , authoritarian , 
undemocratic, corrupt, and incapable of change on its own. The KANU 
parliament was depicted as a place where leaders who were 'force-fed' on the 
people went to sleep and make fun of matters of life and death. The Nation 
argued that a multi-party system was made necessary, not because of foreign 
interference, but because of KANU's illegitimacy and it violation of 
fundamental human rights. It accused KANU of fanning tribal violence in order 
to lend credence to its arguments against mUlti-party politics. For the Nation, 
all this called for change and made it imperative. The newspaper argued that 
in principle democratic values could be upheld even under a single-party 
system but that the performance of the KANU government had proved that this 
is much more difficult than it would be under a multi-party system. 
Unlike Kenya Times, who blamed the opposition for the same, the Nation 
argued that it is the KANU government that was the cause of Kenya's political 
and economic problems. This new found freedom to take the ruling party to 
task got its strongest expression when the daily criticised President Moi for 
claiming that the composition of the emerging Opposition was tribal. It can be 
argued that the political change enabled the Nation to be more supportive of 
this change and that its attitude towards the KANU government's performance 
became increasingly negative. However, there is not enough evidence to 
conclude that the Nation was pro-Opposition. What is most manifest is the 
increased tendency by this daily newspaper to accuse the KANU government 
of the same things as those levelled against it by the Opposition. It can also be 
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argued that in an attempt to give a more balanced picture of the situation , 
when criticising the Opposition for a particular offence, the daily would give 
examples to show that the KANU government too committed similar if not 
more serious offences. 
Another issue about which the two dailies differed was whether or not the 
turning up of large crowds during Opposition-organised public rallies was a 
sign of popular support for multi-party politics or for the Opposition for that 
matter. It is arguable that because it was against the political change, Kenya 
Times saw this phenomenon as inconsequential; the crowd comprised of 
idlers who were not schooled in the laws of the land to appreciate and 
participate in a democratic political process. The Nation, however, portrayed 
the crowd as an expression of the popular demand and support for democratic 
change . Whilst the attitude of Kenya Times towards the ordinary Kenyan was 
negative and spiteful, the Nation hailed him as the hero of the struggle for 
multi-party democracy in Kenya . 
The above differences in the way the two newspapers saw the pertinent issues 
can be said to be ideological. The dailies were selective in the way they chose 
and used the fact and arguments. On some occasions, in order to come to 
desired conclusions, they advanced falsehood. This is evident, for example, 
when the Nation claimed that Kenyatta's regime was democratic and that in a 
brotherly spirit had accommodated dissenting politicians; and when Kenya 
Times claimed that the change to multi-partyism was KANU's initiative and 
proof that the party has always been democratic. Arguments, figures used to 
characterise issues and personalities, historical material, news items, etc., were 
used selectively to argue for the attitude and ideological position of the 
particular newspaper. For Kenya Times, the adoption of a multi-party system 





The major aim of this study has been to assess the performance of the daily 
press in an African country during a period that can be seen as the beginning 
of a fundamental change in its political culture and to discuss the implications 
of this for the performance of the daily press as a public sphere. The 
investigation has taken the form of exploration and analysis of changes in the 
way two daily newspapers differentially performed in their coverage of 
(reporting) and commentary on the political transition in Kenya from a single 
party to a multi-party system. 
The study's major hypothesis was that in Kenya , the country's political culture 
and praxis , more than any other single variable, has contributed most to the 
pressures and influences that have constrained or enabled the performance of 
its press in the realm of politics. For this reason , I have argued that one needs 
to appreciate the dynamics of the influences between political culture and 
press performance, as they were before the political change in order to 
investigate and understand how this change impacted on the political 
performance of the daily press. Following Gallagher (1982: 171), I have 
argued that the daily press, like all mass communication, is indeed bound with , 
and bounded by, the interests of the dominant institutions of society , but that 
these interests are continually redefined through a process to which the media 
themselves contribute. 
8.1 KANU's Undemocratic One-Party State 
One of this study's propositions was that in practice, a one-party political 
system does not, in some important respects , foster or guarantee an open and 
genuinely representative body politic. This means that in the political process 
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of such a system, some basic and fundamental tenets of democratic practice 
are not upheld . A situation of this nature may result both from an established 
but unwritten political culture and from legal instruments. This proposition has 
been supported by the brief but concise review-analysis of the historical 
development of party politics in Kenya that I have given in Chapter One. I have 
established how the realities of a one-party State had undermined some 
fundamental and human freedoms. I have showed how opposition to the ruling 
KANU government during both the Kenyatta and Moi eras were strongly 
resisted . Both leaders disapproved of multi-partyism, were averse to and 
harshly dealt with government critics , made use of legal instruments to 
achieve their authoritarian ends, and amended the constitution to their political 
convenience whenever the need arose. All these contributed , with time, to a 
marked erosion of various fundamental and human freedoms, especially the 
freedoms of association and expression. 
The Moi era , however, has given this study its temporal positioning or 
time-frame. I have showed that it is during Moi's regime that the KANU 
government's legal monopoly of Kenyan politics was brought to an end in 
December 1991 . However, it is also during this era that Kenya was made a de 
jure one party state with an all-powerful Presidency. During this period , 
Parliament lost most of its functions and became an arm of KANU and the 
executive's rubber-stamp ; amending the constitution at the executive's whim to 
entrench the KANU governments hold on power. The limited political space 
that existed during Kenyatta's era was now effectively circumscribed and 
political views crimina lised. I have also showed how the early years of the 90's 
saw a world-wide hue and cry for democratic governance and for the end of 
one-party and military states. This coincided with an unprecedented show of 
daring by a number of prominent Kenyan political activists, and others in 
positions of leadership, in their criticism of Moi's regime. The demands by 
donor countries for political transparency and accountability and their eventual 
292 
linking of development aid to the satisfaction of these conditionalities finally 
forced the KANU government to introduce multi-party politics in Kenya . 
8.2 Two Ideological Positions on the Need for Multi-Party Democracy 
In this study, I have taken ideology to refer to the social and political 
consciousness, or system of ideas, connected to and expressive of the 
interests of a particular social group or class, which has a capacity to inspire 
concrete attitudes and provide orientations for action. I have demonstrated 
how the political beliefs of the first socio-political group, KANU-government 
politicians and their supporters , led to the establishment of an authoritarian 
and undemocratic one-party state in Kenya . As illustrated below, the political 
ideology of the second group, the Opposition politicians and their supporters, 
challenged KANU's hegemony. Their concerted actions led to the repeal of the 
one-party legislation and the establishment of a multi-party pOlitical system in 
Kenya . 
By analysing the developments that led to the end of KANU's monopoly of 
power in Kenya , I have argued that the debate about multi-partyism was 
waged from two different ideological positions. The major issue was whether 
or not multi-partyism as opposed to a single-party system was the desirable 
political system for Kenya. The first ideological pOSition argued that the status 
quo was democratic enough and should be maintained. Those who supported 
this position are the KANU government and its supporters who argued that a 
multi-party system was unsuitable and therefore undesirable in Kenya . 
Politicians in this group insisted that multi-partyism by its very nature, was a 
recipe for ethnic tensions and chaos mainly because Kenyans were not yet 
cohesive enough for such a system. They saw a multi-party system as a 
lUxury that had to wait until Kenya was more 'cohesive' . They made reference 
to the early multi-party period that involved KANU and the KADU, highlighting 
the fact that both parties relied on tribal alliances, which polarised the country . 
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KANU also argued that the concept of multi-partyism was not indigenous to 
Africa and that Kenyans would face problems if they absorbed wholesale 
fashionable political prescriptions without adapting them to local realities . It 
was said that the traditional African approach to government was through 
consensus and participation , as opposed to the competition of a multi-party 
system. It was also argued that the one-party tradition in Africa arose out of 
the experiences of colonialism and as such , ruling parties were not merely 
factions but nationalist movements representing the interests and aspirations 
of entire nations. KANU accused the advocates of multi-partyism of being 
'puppets of colonialists' who were being used by Western countries to 
dismember African countries, including Kenya , along ethnic lines. 
The second ideological position argued that the status quo was undemocratic 
and begged for change . The main aim of those who agitated for political 
change was the introduction of a more accommodating and democratic 
political system. It was their opinion that the KANU government's performance 
had shown that a single-party system worked against democratic ideals . They 
argued that there was lack of openness and accountability in the one-party 
system. They protested that KANU was using tribalism as an excuse to 
entrench itself undemocratically . For them tribalism is neither created by a 
multi-party system nor cured simply by maintaining a single-party system. 
They pointed out, as a matter of fact, that tribalism existed even under the 
one-party KANU government and it is not therefore bred by the kind of political 
system that a country adopts . 
Among the decisions for which the advocates of multi-party politics slated 
KANU included the adoption, even In the wake of strong criticism, of the 
election system of queue-voting. The single-party system had led to the 
rigging of elections, especially of the 1988 General Elections; frequent 
expulsions from the party; the constitutional amendments making Kenya a de 
jure one-party state; and, removal of the security of tenure of the 
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Attorney-General , Comptroller and Auditor General and of High Court judges. 
The conclusion taken by this ideological group was based on their conviction 
that the one-party arrangement had stifled political debate in the country and 
undermined the democratic process. The advocates of change argued, 
therefore, that a multi-party system would allow freedom of expression, which , 
they insisted, KANU had denied Kenyans by victimising those who held views 
different from their own. 
8.3 Factors that Affected Press Performance before the Political Change 
Government Control and Political Pressures 
The historical analyses of party politics and of the daily press that I have given 
in this study support the need for a multi-party democratic system in Kenya 
and therefore support the second ideological position given above. These 
historical analyses were made in order to investigate another proposition . That 
in the politico-cultural environment that obtained during KANU's hegemony, 
the freedom of the media to report and comment on the political process in a 
way that was construed as openly challenging the legitimacy of the powers 
that be, would be curtailed both directly and indirectly . A situation would then 
obtain where there was overt censorship and/or self-censorship . 
Before investigating how KANU's hegemony affected the performance of the 
daily press before the political change, I have briefly reviewed the performance 
of Kenya 's broadcast media. I have established that the Kenyan broadcast 
media was so completely controlled that, for all intents and purposes, it was a 
publicity extension of the ruling KANU government. Access to radio and 
television for a diversity of political opinions and views was hamstrung by a 
monolithic and authoritarian grip of the ruling KANU-government. This in effect 
meant that it is the daily press that could be accessible to alternative or 
Opposition news and comments . 
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The proposition given above, about the impact of KANU's hegemony on press 
performance, was supported with reference to the daily press. From the 
historical analysis that I presented in Chapter Three , it can be argued that 
political interference was a major, if not the most important, influence on the 
performance of the press in Kenya. This influence manifested itself in various 
ways , most of it indirectly. Oversensitive to the way they are perceived by the 
public eye; most Kenyan politicians would go to a great length to avoid 
negative portrayal in the press. One source of political interference emanated 
from political patronage of editors by politicians, and the other, arguably the 
most potent, was in the form of government interference. Government 
departments are major sources of revenue in the form of advertisement placed 
in the daily press. The threat or decision by the KANU government to withdraw 
this source of revenue most clearly made media organisations 'behave', 
meaning succumb to government pressure, as exemplified by the case of 
Ng'weno and Stellascope Ltd . I have given examples in Chapter Three that 
demonstrate how this type of pressure saw the sacking of prominent and able 
editors of the daily press . Even though this was usually an ex post facto 
interference, it served as a reminder to editors and other journalists of the 
treacherous nature of their profession. It was common also that editors were 
rounded up by the police, roughed up and/or threatened on the instigation of 
politicians and over-enthusiastic functionaries in the KANU establishment. 
Ownership Considerations 
Though not having the overriding determination, there is no doubt that 
ownership has had important implications for the control and performance of 
the Kenyan daily press. The findings of this study support the conclusion by 
Gallagher's (1982) that power and control are differentially located in society 
and that communication organisations and professionals operate within a 
complex of constraints. Ownership is one such powerful constraint. The daily 
press was frequently criticised by KANU politicians. In most of the 
press-bashing by politicians and government functionaries that I have given 
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above, foreign ownership was blamed for the perceived 'dysfunctional ' 
performance of the daily press. 
The 'absentee ownership', it was argued, works against the interests of Kenya 
because it dictates the propagation of foreign ideologies and interferes with 
the freedom of local editors in their employment. KANU politicians saw this as 
'the greatest obstacle to freedom of the press in Kenya' . Editors , most of them 
Kenyans, always hit back at these allegations while at the same time asserting 
that they do not take orders from their employers in their editorial work; 
thereby dismissing the existence of owner-interference. Ironically , I have given 
above a number of cases where editors were relieved of their duties following 
disagreement with owners or employers. At such times, the editors regrettably 
acknowledged the existence of, and strongly attacked owner-interference. 
Another strong argument against foreign ownership by the KANU government 
has been that the main interest of the press organisation so owned is to make 
profit. This profit-motive was, and still is, seen as taking precedence over the 
national interest. 
The nagging concern about the relationship between ownership and the 
press's political performance was at the heart of the suggestions by KANU 
politicians that the ruling party found its own press. They strongly believed that 
because the two major daily newspapers at the time, The Standard and The 
Nation, were foreign-owned , foreign influence would perpetually support the 
press in their criticism and belittlement of the ruling-party politicians. A press 
founded by the party, because it is indigenous and because it would be 
answerable to the party, would be the answer to the politicians' press-publicity 
problems. However, it is for similar reasons that there was concern by 
government critics that a party press would end up being a mere propaganda 
machine. It was feared that it would hurt 'freedom of the press' should the 
ruling-party press monopolise advertisement and news from the government. 
It is this realisation that made Ng'weno, an indigenous newspaper publisher, 
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opine that a foreign-owned press , though not the best answer to the country's 
interests, would be preferred by readers to the ruling-party press. 
The above reservations led me to the following proposition . Assuming that a 
private and foreign-owned press does not serve Kenya's national interest, and 
that a party press runs the risk of being overly biased in the interest of the 
ruling-party, then a private indigenous press would be the desirable alternative 
that would provide objective, non-partisan Kenya-friendly news and views. I 
have demonstrated that Ng'weno's experience proves that this is not 
necessarily or practically true. He was subjected to the constraints and 
vicissitudes of both the market and the political climate in ways similar to those 
experienced by the private foreign-owned press. His experiences show that 
even a private indigenous press is susceptible both, to strong political 
interference exerted on owners and publishers and to owner influence exerted 
on journalists. It is these experiences that made Ng'weno loathe the KANU 
government's interference in the freedom of the press. 
The ruling party's own daily, Kenya Times, has been beset with problems not 
unlike those that faced the private commercial daily newspapers. The party 
found it imperative to solicit the financial and organisational assistance of none 
other than Robert Maxwell to save the paper from imminent collapse. In doing 
this foreign interest became a factor even in the ruling party's press. The 
relationship between the ruling party and the government was to prove 
consequential for the paper's professional and financial position . Public 
servants found their way into the paper's employment bringing with them a 
bureaucratic ethos in management. The experience of Kenya Times has 
proved that it is extremely difficult for the local media to be sustainable without 
foreign investment even when they have preferential treatment from an 
incumbent ruling party. It also shows that the dynamics of ruling party 
ownership easily and directly compromises the freedom of the press so 
owned . 
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8.4 Media Performance and Normative Media Analysis 
Another reason behind the historical analysis was that it would be a variable or 
backdrop against which to analyse the performance of the daily press during 
the period when the dominance of the undemocratic political culture had been 
legally brought to an end . For this part of the study, my proposition was that a 
change , or the process of changing, to a more open political process that 
entails the lifting of some central constraints inherent in a less democratic 
political process, should in turn be reflected in the performance of the press. 
This I hypothesised to mean that the press would now execute its functions 
more freely, reporting and carrying commentaries that would have been 
considered taboo before . It is in this light that this part of the study is a "media 
performance assessment" study . I have provided in this study an assessment 
of media provision , conceptualised as news reports and editorials, which 
covered the change to a multi-party political system in Kenya . 
I have argued that a media performance analysis or assessment should be 
grounded in normative and historical perspectives. This would facilitate a 
systematic evaluation of what the media are doing according to some 
normative criteria of achievement. It is my belief that critical normative analysis 
can be used to uncover power structures, relations of subjugation and systems 
of oppression. The first aim, for me therefore, was to develop as 
comprehensive a framework of normative principle as possible, consistent 
both with the historical record of social concerns with public communication in 
Africa generally and Kenya in particular. I have developed this framework in 
Chapter Two on theoretical perspectives . I began the chapter by looking at the 
Four Theories of the Press by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm. I have argued 
that in spite of its weaknesses, Siebert et al.'s typology is important for, 
modified to accommodate the criticisms levelled against it, it provides a good 
starting point for the development of arguments for normative media analysis 
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as a prescriptive and analytical tool. On its own, however, it is inadequate for 
the purposes of this study. 
I have showed that McQuail (1987) took the Four Theories further by 
suggesting six normative theories , including development media theory . In this 
study, I have dwelt on the latter mainly because of the great extent to which it 
has been embraced in African perspectives both in practice and in theory. The 
major reason for this theory is given by McQuail (1 987) as the general 
inapplicability of the Four Theories and the great attention on matters to do 
with Third World communication. He argues that the special conditions, values 
and aspirations of developing countries call for a particular normative 
orientation for the press prescribing roles that will serve their development 
goals. A major weakness and concern in this theory, however, is that the 
development support role is given overriding importance to the extent that its 
achievement is seen to justify -the abridgement of other human and institutional 
rights and freedoms, especially press freedom. 
8.5 Reasons for a Democratic and Participant Press in African Countries 
The critical examination that I have given of the literature on the performance 
of the media in post-independent Africa supports the above concerns to do 
with the abridgement of human rights and freedoms . I have showed how it was 
widely argued that in the face of the enormous problems facing many African 
and other developing countries, it was necessary to abridge civil and political 
rights in order to accelerate development. What was implied by this position 
was that human and other democratic rights had to come secondary to the 
imperatives of economic development because the two could not be pursued 
simultaneously. Therefore, it was collective development and not individual 
rights and freedoms that needed to be emphasised. Some of the features of 
collective development were seen to be national identity and national unity. It 
was argued that during this initial period of growth, stability and unity had to be 
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sought, criticism minimised and the public faith in government institutions and 
policies had to be encouraged. I have argued that the result of this can only be 
seen to have been enforced or imposed consensus in the name of national 
development. This was clearly at variance with the more enlightened view of 
development that sees free and active participation as an essential ingredient. 
It can be said further that in the propagation of this undemocratic political 
culture , an active political press has been eschewed for the perceived risk that 
opposing views and dissent may be irresponsible and calculated to undermine 
stability. It has been felt for a long time that opposition elements and a critical 
press may take advantage of the illiteracy of the masses and exploit their 
ignorance to destabilise the State. An argument is made to the effect that 
since political institutions in developing countries are fragile and any criticism 
of the government may be interpreted as a challenge to its legitimacy, the 
media should refrain from scrutinising the affairs of the government too 
closely . It is clear that, African political leaders have found the control and 
subservience of the press , as well as other media, to be necessary to their 
exercise of political power. The media in most African countries have been 
tightly controlled for the fear that they would propagate views and promote 
interests that were at variance with those defined by the national leadership. 
The above arguments and their normative implications have been used to 
justify the adopting of an authoritarian system of political governance, and the 
concomitant abuse of various human rights and freedoms in general and the 
freedom of expression in particular. As Ansah (1988:9) put it: 'the virtual 
monopolisation of the mass media has been explained in terms of the need to 
ensure that people are not distracted by 'false propaganda', and that 'all media 
resources will be harnessed and directed towards national development.' I 
have demonstrated that it is for the above reasons that there has been a call 
from African media scholars, Opposition politicians and the civil society, for a 
democratic and participant press in African countries. What is being 
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emphasised now is the import of freedom of expression and discussion as a 
means of reaching the best strategies , alternatives and results for and in 
development. 
Popular and grassroots participation for socio-economic development has now 
been suggested with an increasing emphasis on freedom of political 
expression to stimulate constructive debate and to enable the press to act as a 
check and watch-dog on abuse of power and violation of human rights . There 
is perceived now the need to develop and nurture democratic ideals as human 
development objectives . The role of the media in a developing country should 
now be seen in the context of participation , meaning the critical examination , 
evaluation and report of the relevance , enactment and impact of development. 
In this regard , social and political criticism and public debate are not, and 
should not be seen as, necessarily disruptive. An argument has been made in 
this theoretical orientation for the consideration of socio-economic 
development and democratisation as two sides of the same coin of human 
development. In prescribing such a role for the African media as suggested 
here, or engaging in a critique to see whether such a role has been played , I 
have turned to the theory of the public sphere. 
8.6 The Theory of the Public Sphere 
I have showed that the theory of the public sphere was developed by 
Habermas (1989) , in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. This 
was later widely criticised as I have detailed in Chapter Two. However, I agree 
with Garnham (1992: 360) that criticism of Habermas's model of the public 
sphere are all cogent and serve as a necessary basis for the development and 
refinement of Habermas's original approach. However, they do not detract 
from the continuing virtues of the central thrust of that approach. It is now 
pertinent to argue that the concept of the public sphere and the principles it 
embodies represent an Ideal Type against which we can judge existing social 
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arrangements , and which we can attempt to embody in concrete institutions in 
the light of the reigning historical circumstances . 
It is important to understand that the public sphere can only be realised today 
on an altered basis as a rational reorganisation of social and political power 
under the mutual control of rival organisations committed to the public sphere 
in their internal structure as well as in their relations with the state and each 
other. We should therefore be concerned with Habermas's model of the public 
sphere not so much as a paradigm for analysing historical change , but more 
as 'a normative category for political critique' . According to Curran (1991b: 83) , 
Habermas's work, ' ... offers nevertheless a powerful and arresting vision of the 
role of the media in a democratic society, and in this sense its historical status 
is irrelevant.' 
I would like to concur with Dahlgren (1991 : 2). that in its more ambitious guise, 
the public sphere shou ld be understood as an analytical category, a 
conceptual device which, while pointing to a specific social phenomenon can 
also aid us in analysing and researching the phenomenon . As an analytical 
category, the political public sphere consists of a dynamic nexus, which links a 
variety of actors, factors and contexts together in a cohesive theoretical 
framework. It is this configurational quality, with its emphasis on institutional 
and discursive contingencies which gives the concept its analytical power. I 
also concur with Curran (1991 b: 83) that within this public sphere, people 
collectively determine through the process of rational argument the way in 
which they want to see society develop, and this shapes in turn the conduct of 
government policy. The media facilitates this process by providing an arena of 
public debate, and by reconstructing private citizens as a public body in the 
form of public opinion . 
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8.7 The African and Kenyan Press as a Political Public Sphere 
From all the above theoretical discussions, I would like to propose that the 
media of any African country, including Kenya, should play two significant 
roles in order to actively facilitate and participate in the democratic process. 
Firstly, the African and Kenyan media should be a political public sphere 
accessible 10 all contending political players, groups and interests whose 
objective is the deliberation of common public issues or affairs and the framing 
and influencing of public policy especially as they affect the country's 
developmental objectives. The African and Kenyan media should also seek to 
redress the imbalance of power in society by broadening access to the public 
domain in these societies where the elite have privileged access to it. 
Secondly , it should be an active , involved player or participant in such 
deliberations. This should be in a way prescribed by Curran (1991a) in the 
tradition of a radical democratic theory, very much akin to the Fourth Estate 
role . The African and Kenyan media should facilitate the functioning of 
representative organisations, but also expose their internal operations to 
public scrutiny and the play of public opinion . They should therefore expose 
wrongdoing , correct, or help the correction of injustice, subject to critical 
scrutiny the exercise of power in all its manifestations. 
For it to fulfil these functions, the African and Kenya media as a public sphere 
should be free , to a significant degree, from political and economic constraints 
and pressures from the State and from organised and vested economic and 
other interests. Some of these pressures can easily be effected when the 
media are owned by the State, political party or by private capital. In the case 
of public ownership by the state, the media should be organised and run in a 
way that greatly minimises political interference. In the case of other modes of 
ownership, the media system should be organised so that most interested 
parties have access to at least some medium of public communication , and 
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particularly in the publicly recognised main medium. In Kenya , and most of 
Africa, it is the radio that can justifiably claim to be the effective and publicly 
recognised main medium. 
8.8 Political Change and the Performance of the Kenyan Daily Press 
Having established above the extent to which the undemocratic political 
culture constrained the political performance of the media in Kenya , the 
change to multi-party politics provided the reason for the empirical stage of 
this study. As indicated above, in this stage I put to the test the hypothesis that 
the political change would result in the performance of the daily press as a 
political public sphere. Firstly, that there would be more news stories related to 
the political change, and secondly , that the dailies would accord the 
contending political groups fairly equitable access to their pages. This would 
be in relation to the debate about whether multi-party politics was necessary in 
Kenya . I have argued for the use in this study of the concept of ideology to 
refer to the ideas and positions of the two political groups that were contending 
for the introduction of multi-party democracy and for the consideration of these 
two groups as social groups. In this regard , I have argued that it is necessary 
to take political/ideological considerations as a relatively autonomous source 
of determination of media content. I have also established a case for 
considering political struggle as meaning ideological struggle in the realms of 
politics and governance. 
This stage of the study has been comparative in at least two ways . In the first , 
I have investigated how the ruling party newspaper, Kenya Times, compared 
with a private one, the Nation , in covering the same political issues and the 
two contending social groups. I have considered the comparison between the 
two types of newspaper ownership to be significant because of the historical 
discussion in Kenya about press ownership . The discussion has centred on 
the question: What is the most desirable form of ownership , foreign or 
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indigenous, that will serve the country's national interests. In the second, I 
have investigated how the press coverage of the political transition before the 
constitutional change compared with the coverage after. The temporal 
comparison was concerned with the influence of the change in the political 
culture on the performance of the daily press. 
Another dimension to the question of ownership is the problem of private 
ownership versus political party-ownership of the press . It was argued in some 
circles that a ruling party newspaper would of necessity give access only to 
party propaganda and monopolise news from the State thereby defeating 
press freedom. This argument implies that private ownership of the press is to 
be preferred to party ownership . If one considers also the above-mentioned 
preference for indigenous as opposed to foreign-owned press, the preferred 
press, it would seem, would be indigenous and privately owned . This study 
has aimed at finding out whether these propositions are valid . These issues to 
do with ownership status have already been dealt with in the analysis above of 
the history of the daily press. I have again dealt with them here mainly to see if 
the political change impacted on their relevance. The ownership question is so 
important for the reason that African , including Kenyan, politicians have 
always argued that private and foreign media ownership influences the press 
to work against national interests. 
In the empirical stage of this study , the question of publicity has also been very 
important. I have argued that politicians are perennially preoccupied with 
publicity, being mainly concerned with whether the media publicity that they 
are accorded is negative or positive. The struggle for publicity on the part of 
political actors can be likened to a battle . I have demonstrated that in Kenya, 
the struggle for party-political change was in its seminal stage heavily 
dependent on , and waged through the media. Opposition politicians depended 
on the media to legitimise their agitation for change whilst the KANU 
government, through the media, resisted this by trying to ensure that the 
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Opposition was not accorded any media publicity or/and that they were on the 
average accorded mostly negative media pUblicity. 
The implication of the above arguments is that the preference and search for 
positive publicity by contending politicians gives birth to a litany of struggles. 
The struggles for access to the news media, for legitimacy in the news, for 
control of access to and performance of the news media, among other things . I 
have argued that Opposition politicians in Kenya were in the main seeking 
after political power and recognition . They could achieve this only by being 
legitimate players in the political arena. Before the 1992 constitutional change, 
this legitimacy was denied them because opposition party-politics was 
proscribed. It can be argued, therefore, that the seminal stage of their fight for 
legitimacy was carried out through press publicity. This is important because in 
the realms of politics, publicity may crucially enhance the salience of issues. 
Publicity can determine and transform the priority accorded an issue in a 
positive or negative direction. What is important to note is that frequent and 
intense coverage of some issue or group and the intermittent coverage or 
neglect of others helps to shape public agendas. 
8.9 The Kenyan Daily Press as a Political Public Sphere 
The findings and discussion of the content analysis that I have given in 
Chapter Six clearly show that the two daily newspapers played an important 
role in the whole process of the political change . The dailies reported the 
activities of both political groups and by doing so, not only informed the public 
but also, provided the only forum in which the contending parties were able to 
communicate and exchange ideas and opinions. This is very important since, 
apart from the daily press , there was no other public forum accessible to both 
political groups. It can be said therefore that the pages of the daily 
newspapers provided the arena in which the political battle was fought. 
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In the news reports, political issues were not covered directly. I have 
demonstrated that the issues that were pertinent to the democratic-political 
change were covered through the events that were being reported . Each daily 
newspaper underscored what it considered important by the events it chose to 
highlight. My analysis has demonstrated that the political change affected the 
press performance in some important ways . The magnitude of the impact is 
appreciated more if we first remember that prior to November 1991 , the 
KANU-government successfully put pressure on the daily press so that they 
gave the Opposition a news blackout. This was necessitated by the propensity 
of the 'independent' press to give the Opposition publicity and by Kenya 
Times' scathing criticisms , under Ochieng, of the performance of KANU 
politicians. 
Kenya Times was very critical of the performance of KANU politicians before 
the legislation of the multi-party system. This has led me to conclude that, 
before the change , party ownership did not seem to make Kenya Times a 
subservient daily. But then again , much of this criticism was attributed to the 
person and style of Phi lip Ochieng, its editor at the time. One implication that 
can be drawn from this is that for the press in Kenya to operate like a public 
sphere, there is need for journalists who are both able and courageous . Its 
criticism of KANU politicians notwithstanding, Kenya Times recorded very little 
change, if any, in its stance towards the central political issues related to the 
political change. In short, it was throughout opposed to the introduction of 
multi-party politics . This performance by Kenya Times clearly implies that the 
pages of a ruling-party newspaper cannot be expected to be accessible to 
contending parties and other critical groups on an equitable basis. The Nation, 
however, can be said to be the daily that was significantly affected by the 
political change . Whilst the performance of both dailies support my hypothesis 
that the political change would enable them to carry more party-political news, 
the Nation 's coverage increased slightly more than that of Kenya Times. 
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Publicity and Ownership Considerations 
When one compares the two dailies on the basis of ownership status , one 
finds out that this study's basic propositions are not supported by the facts. 
Beginning in November, both the Nation and Kenya Times were critical of 
KANU politicians' poor performance, even though the lalter opposed multi-
party politics. As a result of the KANU-government's pressure, both increased 
coverage of KANU and decreased that of the Opposition between November 
and December. It is this political change that brought out the major differences 
between the performances of the two dailies. The fears that ownership 
affected the performance of the daily press were not confirmed during the 
period before the political change . This confirms my argument that so long as 
KANU 's hegemony was not challenged , the press was allowed some room to 
criticise its performance. One can conclude, therefore, that because of the 
political change that ended KANU's hegemony, ownership-status became 
important. 
Instead of increasing its coverage of KANU and decreasing its coverage of the 
Opposition , as hypothesised in Chapter Five above, Kenya Times did the 
reverse between December and February. Its coverage of KANU decreased 
while its coverage of the Opposition increased. However, with regard to the 
nature of publicity accorded the political groups, the hypothesis above was 
supported. Kenya Times gave KANU more positive publicity while it gave the 
Opposition more negative publicity. In fact , the increase in the coverage of the 
Opposition and the decrease in that of KANU comprised mainly of negative 
publicity. This confirms my argument that an increase in press coverage does 
not imply an increase in positive or favourable publicity . The important finding 
here is that Kenya Times stopped carrying negative stories about KANU and 
positive stories about the Opposition. It actually increased dramatically the 
percentage of negative stories about the Opposition. This leads me to 
conclude that because in the nascent elite political culture, the ruling party's 
legitimacy and hold on power is being threatened ; the daily press that it owns 
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will be completely biased in its favour. The implication of this is that in a 
competitive party political climate such as the one that Kenya had just 
adopted, a party-owned newspaper cannot play the role of the public sphere . 
In the Nation, although the coverage of the Opposition increased as 
hypothesised, that of KANU did not. With regard to the nature of the publicity 
accorded, the Nation gave KANU more negative than positive publicity 
throughout, with the proportion of this decreasing with time . This clearly 
supports my hypothesis in this regard . Between December 1991 and February 
1992, the Nation's positive coverage of the Opposition changed only slightly . 
However, its negative coverage of the Opposition increased substantially so 
that in February it gave the Opposition a fairly balanced proportion of positive 
and negative coverage. This finding contradicts my hypothesis that a more 
democratic political culture would result in the Nation giving the Opposition 
more positive coverage . It actually demonstrates that the Nation was not just 
out to support the Opposition by according it positive publicity but was 
probably supportive of the political change in general. It is my conclusion , 
therefore, that the Nation was more accessible and more balanced in its 
performance. This shows that without some of the political pressures and legal 
constraints such as existed before the political change, the Nation had 
significantly more freedom now to play the role of a political public sphere . 
The Daily Press and Party Legitimacy 
The findings show that Kenya Times was heavily biased in favour of giving 
KANU more space in which to fight for its legitimacy whilst giving little space 
for the Opposition's criticism of the ruling party. The more interesting statistical 
finding is that for the period before the change, this newspaper carried four 
stories whereby KANU was reacting to the Opposition for each story whereby 
the Opposition was criticising KANU; thus, there was a ratio of four to one in 
favour of KANU defending itself. For the period after change, there were three 
news items of KANU reacting to the Opposition for each item of the Opposition 
310 
criticising KANU ; thus, there was a ration of three to one in favour of KANU . 
This shows that Kenya Times maintained its preference for stories whereby 
KANU was lending off Opposition criticism and thus defending the legitimacy 
that was now being challenged by the Opposition. In this respect, the political 
change had no major observable effects on Kenya Times ' stance vis-a-vis the 
legitimacy it accorded the two political groups. It openly supported the 
undemocratic one-party system and strongly opposed the more democratic 
multi-party system. The party newspaper proved itself incapable of any 
semblance of fairness in its performance. 
The proportion of the news items in the Nation whereby the Opposition 
criticised KANU increased by a whole 19 per cent while that of KANU 
defending itself increased by 10 per cent. These increases are an important 
change because they progressed until in February 1991, the Nation gave both 
political groups nearly equal chance to fight for their legitimacy. This finding 
does not support my hypothesis that a more democratic culture would result in 
the private foreign-owned Nation carrying more stories in which the Opposition 
criticises KANU and less of KANU defending itself. The Nation , therefore , 
became the daily newspaper that to a great extent enabled the Opposition to 
establish itself in the public sphere while at the same time questioning KANU's 
legitimacy. This may be the change that prompted KANU politicians to claim 
that the Nation was biased in favour of the Opposition. The performance by 
the Nation implies that it is the private-owned daily newspaper, free from party 
allegiance and direct political pressure and control, which can be expected to 
play the public sphere role. 
The findings of the content analysis have some implications for the constitution 
of the press as a public sphere . It is evident that in a competitive party political 
system, the ruling party press will be biased in favour of the party . This means 
that in order to promote equity of access and freedom of the press, party 
ownership should be strongly discouraged. Foreign and private ownership of 
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the daily press , though not the ideal arrangement, seems to better serve the 
interests of democratic communication . The implication of this is that the 
private daily press , both local and foreign , needs to be vigilant and committed 
in supporting and safeguarding the hard-earned multi-party democracy. This it 
should do partly by allowing a diversity of news and views in its news pages. 
8.10 The Kenyan Daily Press as a Participant in the Public Sphere 
The Case of Kenya Times 
Chapter Seven has also clearly demonstrated that the political change that 
ushered in multi-party politics in Kenya seems to have had a great effect on 
the performance of the two daily newspapers. It impacted on who and what 
they could comment on, and on the way they commented on the political 
issues pertinent to the desirability of multi-party politics . Kenya Times waged 
an ideological war against the Opposition. Poor economic performance, 
vassalage to imperialist and neo-colonial powers, failure to perform 
satisfactorily when in public office , disrespect for the law, anarchy , tribalism 
etc., were all rhetorically blamed on Opposition politicians. All these things, 
which are depicted as threatening the people's deeply cherished national 
values, were used rhetorically to undermine the necessity and legitimacy of 
the Opposition, and by extension, of the multi-party political system. 
One rhetorical method by which Kenya Times expressed its opposition to 
mUlti-party democracy was in the way it portrayed the Opposition politicians; 
depicting them in a negative light. It portrayed them as tribalists that were 
motivated by ethnic considerations. It argued that this was proof that multi-
party politics engenders tribal affiliations. The position of Kenya Times about 
multi-party democracy has been gauged also from the rhetorical arguments 
and illustrations it used to defend KANU, mostly against accusations from the 
Opposition. It gave KANU undeserved credit for accepting to allow the re-
introduction of multi-party politics, thereby projecting it as a champion of 
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democratic ideals. For this reason Kenya Times argued that there was no 
need for a multi-party system in Kenya . 
Kenya Times further expressed its aversion to the democratic change by 
arguing that it was a foreign initiative with an imperial and neo-colonial 
influence. It argued that, because democracy is itself elusive, Kenya should be 
allowed to chart her own version . The thrust of this line of argument is that the 
foreign initiated change to multi-party democracy was undesirable and 
Kenyans would be better served by their own "single-party democracy". Kenya 
Times also argued against multi-party democracy giving economic reasons . It 
portrayed the agitation for change as a ploy by the West to divert attention 
from the undemocratic nature of the World economic order. It argued further 
that democracy at home should be seen as dependent on a democratic 
economic relationship between the rich North and the poor South. For Kenya 
Times, democracy in Kenya is meaningless and a waste of time if it does not 
address the local economic problems by democratising the World economic 
order. 
It is evident from the analysis that the picture given by Kenya Times about the 
Opposition was a misrepresentation of the issues that were being debated. 
This misrepresentation was used rhetorically to redefine the political agenda in 
order to argue against the necessity for democratic change . The implication of 
Kenya Times ' performance is that it cannot be expected to be a rational player 
in the public sphere. Firstly, because it has not supported the need for and the 
legitimacy of the much sought-for and hard-earned democratic dispensation in 
Kenya. Secondly, because instead of debating issues, it has rather decided to 
focus on abusing personalities and name-calling, to the extent of propagating 
falsehoods as if they were facts. Thirdly, because it has showed a poor regard 
for the public generally and public opinion in particular. These are two 
indispensable ingredients of a democratic dispensation. The implication of all 
this is that a party press cannot serve the democratic interests of Kenya. It can 
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only be regarded as a publicity and propaganda organ of the ruling party . In a 
country where the public broadcast media is controlled by the government, 
party ownership of a daily press does not augur well for the role of the press 
as a public sphere. 
The Case of the Nation 
I have demonstrated that the effect brought about by the political change was 
more remarkable in the Nation. In November 1991 , this daily played it safe, not 
giving significant criticism of KANU's performance but merely criticising both 
political groups for trading blanket accusations against each other. It is 
arguable that the Nation gave its support to KANU . As a matter of fact, it 
argued that the party was capable of the kind of the debate that could 
withstand Opposition criticism and advised the party to do just that, arguing 
that as a result, the Opposition would die a natural death. With the change to 
multi-party politics, the newspaper, at first arguing that the issue is not KANU 
or multi-partryism, came out to criticise the performance of the KANU 
government. With time , especially in January and February 1992, the Nation 
clearly showed that KANU and multi-partyism were now the issues. 
After the political change that ushered in multi-party politics, the KANU 
government was now portrayed in the Nation as being rigid , authoritarian, 
undemocratic, corrupt, and incapable of change on its own. The KANU 
parliament was depicted as a hciuse where leaders who were 'force-fed' on the 
people went to sleep and make fun of matters of life and death. The Nation 
argued that a multi-party system was made necessary, not because of foreign 
interference, but because of KANU's illegitimacy and its violation of 
fundamental human rights. It accused KANU of fanning tribal violence in order 
to lend credence to its arguments against multi-party politics. For the Nation, 
all this not only called for change, it made it imperative. The newspaper 
argued that in principle democratic values could be upheld even under a 
single-party system but that the performance of the KANU government had 
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proved that this is much more difficult than it would be under a multi-party 
system. 
Unlike Kenya Times, who blamed the Opposition for the same, the Nation 
argued that it is the KANU government that was the cause of Kenya's political 
and economic problems. This new found freedom to take the ruling party to 
task got its strongest expression when the daily criticised President Moi for 
claiming that the composition of the emerging Opposition was tribal. It can be 
argued that the political change enabled the Nation to be more supportive of 
this change and that its attitude towards the KANU government's performance 
became increasingly negative. However, there is not enough evidence to 
conclude that the Nation was pro-Opposition. What is most manifest is the 
increased tendency by this daily newspaper to accuse the KANU government 
of the same things as those levelled against it by the Opposition. It can also be 
argued that in an attempt to give a more balanced picture of the situation , 
when criticising the Opposition for a particular offence, the daily would give 
examples to show that the KANU government too committed similar if not 
more serious offences. 
Another issue about which the two dailies differed was whether or not the 
turning up of large crowds during Opposition-organised political rallies was a 
sign of popular grass roots support for multi-party politics or for the Opposition 
for that matter. Showing very clearly that it was against the political change, 
Kenya Times portrayed this phenomenon as inconsequential; the crowd 
comprised of idlers who were not schooled in the laws of the land to 
appreciate and participate in a democratic political process. The Nation, 
however, endorsed multi-party politics by portraying the crowd as an 
expression of the popular demand and support for democratic change. Whilst 
the attitude of Kenya Times towards the ordinary Kenyan was negative and 
spiteful, the Nation hailed him/her as the hero of the struggle for multi-party 
democracy in Kenya . 
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In the case of the Nation , therefore, the hypothesis I gave was not supported 
for the period before the political change. At this time , instead of supporting 
the ideological position that multi-party ism was desirable, this daily supported 
the status quo, only recommending that KANU should transform itself. I have 
showed, however, that after the change the hypothesis was strongly supported 
with the Nation supporting both the political change and the demands and 
views of the Opposition . The implication of this performance is that private 
ownership, or freedom from government ownership, does not foster press 
freedom if the political culture is autocratic. However, in a more democratic 
dispensation, freedom from government and party-ownership enables the daily 
press to be an active watch-dog. This implies that with the advent of multi-
party politics in Kenya , the private owned newspapers could now begin to 
participate in , and play the role of, the political public sphere. What is required 
now is for the public broadcast media to be freed from ruling-party influences 
and control. The running of the electronic media should be restructured so that 
Kenyans, the majority of whom can only be reached by these media, can listen 
to contending political and other views . 
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The VOIce a/ Ihe People 
\tiulti-party rule not 
~_anacea for Africa 
~F;m~.!thing'ibciunhe'curTent.cru..Sade 
~g-erm,.,Africa·r;'";·countries·is·that it is largely 
Dgineered#:r'Om~-Ou·tSide·" ttie · conlinem. This is no 
oubt what prompted OAU Secretary·General 
:alim Ahmed 'Salim to send out the appeal that 
~frican countne; be given a chan ce to evolve 
em~ratic systems based on their history and 
xpeneDce. 
Or Sa lim, who is on a Kenyan visit, said on 
unday that donor nations should nOt use econ0 mic" 
id to blackmail Mrican countries into adopting 
nrealistic political strUClUres sOffi..:thing he said did 
o! z'.Jgllr wcll for the independence of these nations. 
A number of donor nations are now demanding 
lat African countries must immcdialely adopt 
lUlli·pany pcilitics, bd:.ause. according to these 
eoplc in the West, dem(Y;rac) SLans and ends with 
luralism, prererably tho: US, Swedish or .British 
·ay. 
Bul ',,'hilo: we agree wilh lhese spor.scrs of the mulli. 
afty crusade on Ihe ntX'J for ::!13l)ge in cenain areas., 
'e fc.::1 Ihal Dr Salim is illdeed speaking for many 
Jricans whcn he says that the multi·pany system is 
Jt a panacea for Africa's problems. . 
The 'Solutions thar are prescrib.!d from thou.>.1.,:Js v~ 
iomel.'":::S away do nOI adCG;..;aciy address the local 
'ohb:n~ I! i:-. obvious that all the COt,mtnes on t bis 
)1Itill~nt are. not homogeneous. Each should, therefore, 
: allo ..... ed to~fU1d its o ..... n syn thesis that will be suited 
."itS needs. . . ... .\..: ':. -, 
Our fne ~ds and foo in the ' West should realise thal 
frica his never Ix:en static. When tbe . iinperi lll ists 
rived in Africa in the last century, they"-inipOsed a 
:w system wltich largely served its inlerests. This was 
gbtly modified when African countries achieved 
dependence about three dCClldes ago. Some of the 
'un'ries nined wirh communism ..... hile Olherscmbraccd 
piulism. So when some of}he proponents of the multi. 
ny system now argue that Africa is now ripe for 
mocracy, they give the fal<.e im pression rhat everything 
nained static until the Wesl staned·calling for multi. 
ny rule on the conlinent. ; 
We agree with Or Salim's conl~O!ion that Africa h 1 
"'ays been ripe for change and thal what is now' nee..:! . 
Ihe Cfe3lion of a polil ical environment \.\ here Ihe rul{. 
law is respected and Ihc JX'opk'~ righl5 protecled . 
Ihat is possible under a single pany. rhe country that 
:xlSCS such a system should nOI be ("r;:n~ured ilnd denied 
I. 
0 1.11 iLS w( have s.aid time and ll:'!~'". "'c would nOl 
~ 10 ~c Africans slaughter on(' anolher In Ihr nam(' 
iingle Of multi·pany systems. Thi~ i~ why ""f' in Kenya 
c:t 'Iirh Pr..-:sident Moi lhal ... hauI'cr c hanges We' 
i:llc. such change:; sh .. 'ul::l b.: pursued through OIn 
Ic::rl y and [X'acc(ul manner . _ . 
I is against Ihis background Iha1 \1"<' laud the ru ling 
ty. Kanu'S Parliamcm:lf.\' Group ror cndorsing the 
lplion of nlulri·p,iTI)" politic in 1\cf)ya in fUlure . And 
agree with our Memht-f'!' or Parllament's suggeslioll 
I thr initia(ile should be rrum ... ·llhln and nOI as 
!sul: or ('Xlernal pressure. Tha i IS (he ont\" wav we 
oc su re of mainl;lining some rorm of !ndcrc-ndcn~'e 




Another tack may 
be the way to go 
Th~ ....... n" ..,.y that 1 .. , S.turoay', fONm fo. the 
Ruw.ation of Ocwo«uy (FORD) meelin, would haH 
laken pia ... PIU Upt"CIICC - IpKirlCuly I,n ye.,', '(Iba 
50/>(& t •• ,edy and •• imilnly aborti .... rally ocheduled (or 
la1t IXtobe. S - ,hould hHe convinced mll Ind lundry thul . 
It would hl ... e ... ' ed N.;,<lbi r •• idenu the umomtortabl. 
npef'enee of 1i"'''1 ";th Ipp.!I '''' fur; it would ha ... e pn_ 
."'plod the ChBO' wi(ne" .• d in the city limited U'''\I,h that 
w~, . ~d it would hive Ipa •• d 11.0 .. 'njured the pain of .uch 
.nJun ... 
"'. it "'AI, !.he fORD rncmbe .. nud, \.0 th.ir I'U'" up to 
the I~ll rnln"lr and . • quIII)'. the Coy.rment rum .. ".d ,t, 
d.termi"ation 10 "oc III th e mun. &l iu. d •• po,.1 to Ilap 
the ", •• tinl f,om !.ak,nl pllce. '1'hi, llein, Ihe c&>;e. 
S~lu,d.y·, ,,,,h"PI')' ev.nU in Nlirobi "'trt ineviUble . 
Re,'01l8bly. thi, ;. ncl UI in.lance wh~n il ~In be .. id 
Ih~1 all i. woll thlt ended ",·tll. Or thlt ju~t iflcltion enn be 
,·.Ic"la,.<l On the .qultioll of th. end lo,it'mi.;nll: the 
n'~.n •. The fORO members hlvlt,lWorn to cury (o",, " rd 
the noume",um u{ whit the)' n ..... . ri,h'.,'ulll"'U1 •. the 
GuvNn",e"t h ;. • . ror II.S pilI. clo.ed Out II,y pouibility or 
.,,(,·ru.inin~ <l,e dernlnd. or Ih. FORD. ;" oth., word •• 
"och ha. ch".~" to ~"ck tu th.i, positio,,, " _tnrdle .. or the 
1I',,,,bl. C,," .Cl/U""Ct! 
"? WelJeli,·vc Ih", hOlh pu,it""," . r. unfortun"tP. 11 0 1 only 
L'.l ul(' th)' clepin .n in!raslSin.e" •• IhM ;~n only lie 
CO\HII.'.p"''',,'-: · .... but bocllu •• bolh PO.ition •• re blind t" 
th. r~cI LhM :luilJiloly i. an ~In'o" deli .. ;", princil'le of 
!lvhti •• _ O"8",d .. nl m",~ly .n"e"ch •• div .... "piniOll' 
Ind .h,,1t ou l Ih. p" .. ibility of comp,un,i.u .nd 
ACcornnlotlMi"lI . . 
'.- 11 illlut entirely cur .. et r<>. the FORD I"d other critic. to 
di.",in 110. CU'''"m.,,1 ,,·hgluo l .... n ille,it jmltc ell,ily 
Ihal loco . Ih. p"bho mand .. te and h.nce th. mor.1 
""Ihu,il}' to ,iv. in ... uelion. th.t "a"anehi . hovld 
"ulunlu,iI), "'polld ", The .. i •• 101 thlt i. w .... ,,' 'Nithi" 
the .}"~t.m, lJut the .. ·.t.m illoU i. nOl HI'.l'Itlmou. . 
Th. bl.nkel contl.rn"" I'o" of th. lylUm - ",h"ther oul 
or (,ul u.ti"n tI,1t no·o". ;n the Iyltem '''em. to loo 
h_.t.,,:,, ~. '0' b~ca"s. Ih. FOHD melDben acl"~Ul' b~!i~v" 
'hM ,h •• ", i •• oi, .nd c.l>"o<Il. io ,vu.n - i. "nlCCOp""". 
I',,,,,j.df ""ell .. . e i. i. blind.o .ho .... pto~" and pr.Clie". "r 
(I,. sru.m thal ore ,i.ht . 
NOlI "'·U)'''". ;n .h •. r"diciary. the E.cculi •• and lhe 
Cobi"., IS 0,,,,,,1''- No' •• uy M .mber or J>adi.m.,,1 wtu 
,i~c.d;" If ;"di,·itl".I, in th ... " inoti.tuI;on> Ire. c~rru"t. 
I;",id ur "".,1>10 'u . ,';cuI3t. whl' " """'C. " ,. nol 
n.c .. ~tll)· 0 rUllctin" or Ihe Iy".,n. Th.y MC there ." 
d'~II ~' it.· Tu !I'M ul.nt . the •• Iu.o . we du "01 ~I'.~ with 
FOrti)". I"".idcd "".Ipi. "r Ih.I""hl.",. ",,,,rtf,,,ti,,, thi, 
'.""""). 
Ou' 1>)" 11," .,",," ,,,k.,,. th.,,· i. ,,,,tl,i,,~ pnrt,""lnrly 
loo.·"cr,cinl ,11 tl,e WO ." Ih" nuthn.it}· hnl •••• led In the FOrO) 
.i,,,,,,i,,,,. C<""I.m"'~. aLu':"1 "lid lucoillg th"n Ul' '''''y h • 
• n .rr.ui,-. ol"ion ill <l,e ,hurl '''nI, but ito I"n¥"."n 
i'''l'hcot;''''$ Of< ..... b.h",' •• m" •• rel ..... nt. 8y p,,"~cu tin, 
th.,,, fo, ,,')'''1 hu ~"n tout.d It ch.mpionin, I wonhy 
.cau ••.• h~ CV"un"'e,,' end. up elnoni.inl and ",.king 
huo .. ,""t or Intlividual> ,,·ho •• ""ly cI"m to fa ..... - .t 
leut ..,m. nr th.m - IS Ihlt .h.y un ........ , lJack to 
oulho,i ly. 
Thi. i. II"t'n d"ml" the movement ill tolO. hecQ"' •. l;oe 
Mr John I'.~n. ley"'. 'U im~Jin. th.t ,he,. i. nu oppo.i.i"n 
lIr . n)· •• ,,' In thi. country i. to Iry 10 wi.h .""y • b.d 
... Iily . Thot '" as i,np,.cticlbl ••• i, io .... orthl" ... A 
p",bl'lIl like the One p .... nt.d by .he FOUD hn to h. "'., 
i.,.,I·on. 
Ir it i. I rna".' or .dd .... ,,,. "'orryin, i .. u,," like ,h • 
• nd.,nIC eO""I'I;O". 1 •• hll~'Y in the ci ... il •• ",ice ."d •• ".,el 
III.ffici.ny in the ,)·s ltm. ell the Co.",,,m.,,, needs to du i. 
.cti".l. the IU"y check. and bllancu wh ich exil' within 
,h. """ell" • . This il pur",ly a" admini.I,."", molte' 
.. hieh, "nruttun".I),. hi. be.n d.fl"cd I., politic.'1 \.Crml, 
j;- PolitiCally, ""ha< ,h. CO'ern",."t . bou ld. be .do"" '~UI 
Ih. FORD i. to .dd,tu •• ch ""d .... cry PO"'t II hi. rllnd 
. "d 10';.alI1 counl« il . Lel the FORD teU wnanchi whit 
o"ol.(,iu it ha. \(I addre .. ,b. c ,ilicoJ prohl"n'" of 
"".mploy",e"t, economic decline Ind provi.ion or ,GOd. 
.nd .. ""icn 1.0 the p«'l'le at .rford.ble price •• Th.t, 
ultirnlt.l y •• hould be the tell or .ny .u~hority Or 
Co'.""no"t whi.h wan ... the rull mlndale of the I"'ople , 
Me~nwhil •. the Covernment must 'U.lr be ~.n 1.0 he 
"·o.kill~ ,ow.rd .... h", any fOpo thlt ui., in i ... ediroe •. 
\\'. ueh.vc 'he Co'·.rnme,,' Ca" ""c<:.~.ruIl1 def~ .. ,hi , 
",h.""". "'I'!v,;," .. ~uuitrn. nut by cllmpi", <!trWn ~n it 
~"d throttl.n~ 11. bUI bv 1Nl in, it lIum i\.lelr oul. lelk. 
~olral.c. ~'l\1e .".:j C''''''''<:o. Thn .hould I>c t!'l ...... ). 10 
1'''J':~'i:d ~, ,10" IOu .. 0: u"'tnnin:y. hO~lility .<ld .. ru"," 
Unity now crucial for 
peace and stability 
~
HE tmanimil), with which tbe Kanu Delegatcs 
. Co{1ference yesterday endo~ed the reiotroduction : 
of multi-pany politics in Kenya is funher proo~ 
that the ruling pany is 001 opposed ,to cbange but ' 
:dClem1ined la maintain peace and unit}. The Kanu 
Jparliamentary Group, lhe Governing Council a~d 
the ddega\<!S have continued to meet regularly In 
the pas! few years tQ chan out the course our c.oun!,)' 
should follow. 
- And true 10 his forC'!. It W~ Pre::;idenl MOl v.ho 
yesterday proposed the amendment of Section 2(A ) 
of the ConsliUllion which prohibited 1h.:: registration 
of olher parties in the country .made the Kenya 
African 1>I(I\iooa1 Union (K3nu ) the sole politiCAl 
pany. 
Tne President and Ihe Kanu delegates have, by 
allowing the reintroduclJon of multi.partyism in 
Kenya, sh(;wn that the ruling party is only interested 
in the destiny of our counlr) and would lib.e to 
see pe<ict and tranquillity prevail , , 
, And to further demonstrate that national unity 
is what is paramount, Pres.idenl Moi has advi...~d 
Ihose who have been clamouring for multi·party 
rule to form only national parties as tribal ones 
will o.ot ~ registered, :1 But Kenyans had belter walCb out for the 
tendency of the multi·party ' system to breed 
:wroupings tha t only champion tnbal or other nan-ow 
'IilIlterests at the expense of national uni ty. Examples 
, ,abouod in Africa of how the multi·pany system 
:has been abused and Kenyans should learn from 
these. 
In the meantime, as we wait for Auomey·General 
Am~ Wake to draft a Bil l for the arucndrncut 
of Section 2(A) for deba te by Parliament as 
inslT'\lcted by Kanu, rve hope that Government 
critics al home and abroad will now appreciale 
Kanu's commitment 10 pt.acdul change and drop 
their confrontational stance. 
E 
Those don'or countries ..... hic.h had pegged aid !(\ the 
'ntroduction of pluralism in Kenya, should see Kanu'S 
ove ycst<!rday as funher proof of i15 willinf'n Cl>S 10 
i isten 1£ the views of all Kenyans, including il$ a,·ow~ 
fo:il ics.(Thc openness ..... ·ilh which this and ytJ:Ier I!;SUes 
'!.ha~·e Been dIscussed In the recent past IS In faCI a 
demonstration of democrac\'. 
As we go into the nlUlli.pall) ph3se in the: 
development of our roJiticaJ sySttm . .... 'e would like to 
apJ"'C.1II to Kenyans to p:micip3le more activch in lh~ 
political PI(ICCSS in the COUnlr). . 
In the p3St, a JarEe nllmb.:r of people, who deliberately 
refu5C'd toexcrcist their right to VOle, ha,'C been kn\I \1n 
10 go around complaining laler aboul how tbis or that 
Mer,nbcr 0; Parliarnent \I'U only elected by a small 
secl10n of the VOlers in a cDnstituenc\·. One \(lle can 
make a dir.<!r<!n~ in an election and· thal is wh\' \I~ 
fed {'\'er~ eligible Kenyan should 'ote, . 
.1 All we can do now i~ hope thl:' noi~c thal 
""e h:lllc heard so much in the recent paSI frllw 
Goycrn~lcm ~ritics will die do ..... n as the muhi.pany 
sysl{'m IS put 1010 place . And as tho!>t' who h .. ~e b.·l'O 
3,!!ilating for many panil's regi~ter t1-.eirs. '''''c in,isl th.1 
th.:}' r~ahS(' Ih3! n<llia .. al ~1at>illl.' ;,nd prosperi!~ art 
par"moum 
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Kenyans do not need 
these foreign meddlers 
EITHEH British, Labour MP Peter Hnin is n~ive or 
the Bri1ish Parliament i~ gullible. 
The Kenyon·born opposition leoder 50yS he intellds 
10 1..1b1e ~ motion in Parliament on JarlualY 13 askin!; 
H~r MaJc.>ly'~ government 10 freeze all aid to Kcnya. 
After visiting Kenya and talking 10 a number of people 
in the Kanu Government and in the opposition, he 
condr.:ded th~t l'raident Moi wJntcd to c~teh the 
opposilinn unawara Hrs solution. thercior~. ,~ that :<11 
~rd 10 Kenya should be rruz~n u<ltil scvcral mc~su'es 
ar~ unplCnlenlcd 10 gLlar,!-nlce tllat (he impcndmt; multi· 
party elections are free and fair. 
It is difficult 10 know who the Labour MP was 1~1~;ng 
to when he visiled Kenya and whether he got the trulh 
about the politic:11 events unrolding her,· as Kenya 
prepares for plural polilics. He may have de(tded to 
accept bait, hook and sinkcr the onc view being touted 
about that the Kanu Governmenl would nOt play n 
f~ir game come election time, But Ihat no!with"landmg, 
Mr H~ir. must be naive to believe thal his c;)lI e ~!;ucs 
in Parliament, including Ihose in govemmenl arc gullible 
enough to buy his story and Ihal they do :JOt know 
Ihe dCCl,ions Ihat have been set in motion to ensure 
participation of 311 eligible Kenyans in free and r~ir rnultl· 
party elections. 
They know that Kenya h.1.5 instiluted mCa!>lJres, amn"g 
them the repeal of Ihe contentious Seclion 2(a) 01 the 
ConSlitution and is in the process of registedng properly 
conslituted parties which presen! lhemselvcs for election . 
They al~ know that Mr H3in'~ mOlion It~, II'~ basis 
and thal it is vexatious and countel·prOOu(tive rn the 
long run, 
While Mr Hain has the righl tu speak on bsucs h~ 
feels strongly about, we suspect he has a Indden nscnd:l 
and parti~an interest in Kenya. 
As the Secretary-General of Kauu s"id, there is no 
record in Kenya that Mr Hain, who carried the mantle 
of anti·apartheid leader, opposed the type of :I~rthcid 
that Kenya ns were suITe ring beforc independence. He 
was spirited out of Kenya in the wake of the Mau M:lu 
liberatioo struggle only 10 assUolC Ihe anti·apartheid 
manlle iD his adulthood. 
..... Or it may be that Mr Ha'n is one of the' neo·eolonial 
lyptS and imperialists who seek to innuence every 
political decis ion taken by the sovereign stales of Africa. 
3be least Ktnyall5 want is foreign meddlers at a time: 
when they arc Irying 10 carry out political reform~ andi' 
when the country is facing hard economic realities. 
oor::fMuch of the politicallurmoil arid economic ruin being 
experienced in many Africarl countries is a direct result 
of :J\eddJint by foreign forces, mn iuly for their own 
selfl.lh interests. 
~.MOSI African COIJollies ale kun to evol~e democrat'c 
s~tcms IDd institute slruelural adJlUtmcnl.S, not only to mec( ' 
conditions given b)' tile International Monetary Fund (JMF) 
but is put of tllClt own efToll 10 erute healthy and viable 
economic:.stlUctules for the welfare of their people. On her 
p:!rt, Kenya is in the process or· liberalising the economy by 
priv.tisiDg pariSuul Olgan~lions by selling them to pnV3(e 
m~C5tors as a measure 10 cui down on Governmern 
cApendiltlfC and revamping the olgan's;otion5. The Govern· 
ment is atsoromrnitled la reining import and olher Ic::nrielir.)n$ 
in aIde. to attract [oreign ;nveslments and erc.ale more job\ 
for Kenyans. 
_ h is Ih= measures which Qn brc.ath ne'" tife in the Kenyan 
economy which WOUld. in lurn, ;UPPOIl any government Ilrat 
may emerge afler the tiCC\ions and it i:; rhClC mca.sures and 
nO! potilies PC' it Ih:1.I should be 5upporlcd and not rtnOled 
;I,S Mr lhin r..:Cm$ 10 have dune converucnt\)·. 
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This year, we must 
all rally for unity 
TODAY Ihe world wdoomCo$ 1992. wilt> mu!;h hop..: ~n(j 
e~peClalion. ror Ihe new year [ollows on Ihe heels of a lerrible 
onc. For 1991 was Ihe year or IlIe Gulr War" Ihe year when 
Somalis slaughlcrl'tl t.lch otllcr because of clan diffcrcn.ecs, 
Ihe fear whcn many inr'l~nt Liberi~ns ",:,cr~ slaughlered 
because of a power $lruggle and many olher Ine,denLS, 
Fe,r us lIe,e in Kenya. 1991 was a dimeult ycar bolh I 
pVlilic."lIy KrKt economic;lIly. Wc must 1I0pe I h~1 Ihis will 
be a \xll.:r Y!!:lr, lha! our economy will improve so Ihat Ihe ' 
m~ny llo\lu:;and~ of unemployed young peoplt can get jobs. 
Afltl all we are a developml coun([y and Ihe economy muSI 
alwa)'l' be our lOP p riority i we wanllO improve the qu~lily 
of life everywhcre rn Ihis country. 
~ Indeed. Ihis is going 10 be a 1llrn;1 challcn~ing year 
everywhere in Arrica, for there is less economic aId coming 
from Ihe richer n"io"," even as Africa's problems conlinue 
to multiply. The developed oounlrics of Ihe Nortll arc buying 
less and less goods from Ihe poor South. 
Thus, as' we st~!," oul on Ihe load 10 mulli·parly po!ilics 
In Kenya it is impQrtanl that each onc knows Ihal the fUlure, 
is :nor-al all likel): 10 be rOsy, that the pOwerful WCSI is 
never ;going 10 lift!us' out of our economic problems merely 
because we now hive more than onr.,political party. 
. ' TIle [ulure depends on us KenyanP.\Ve must 'remain united 
or perish u nder Ihe evi l of trib;r.l.ism. Wc mUSI rise bo:yumJ 
our individual cravinl for political powcr and Dct only in 
!he grealer interest 0 Ihe nation wc h.ve worked w hard 
10 keep togelher. . 
. Obviously, polillcking has il$ pla~ in a democralic society 
s~.eh_ a¥)h~ onc wE ,.a!~. tryin, 10 bu! ld, an~ many Slalem~nLS 
·WtIH,. made by politrClans a tmed at,dcfcanllg the opposit,on. 
-SOme Potitiei.ans, .,!,c can be Quile ·sure. are 'ooncerncd; aboul 
1I00hin& m'ore t han .seeing their relaliv.es ,rid individuals' from 
'!heir: 'Iribes rise , to lOp posilions in IlIe Governmell l Dnd 
~raslatals.. . . ' • 
~ nis.,' in fact; explains why some polilieians ate cons13ntly 
speaking "on behalf or' lhei, Iribc:s. These are Ihe kind of 
leaden ~eny3 must forgel aboul. Any man ur woman who 
trumpets ",hal he believes is Ihe tribal inlert~1 i~ nOI worthy 
of a seal in Parlia ment and mUSI not be allowed 10 get there. 
. Whal Kc'nya needs in t he future are men and women wllo 
never : forget· fo. a min ute that Ihcrc are millions o~ othcr 
people in Ihis CQU nlry who spe:ok a different I~ngunge . 
Mulli·pIO<IY polilic::s will I'rcse~1 Kcny~ wilh • V<!ry sp.:ci~l 
chlllcn,e .nd il il lip 10 all the putic:s in'iQlved tl> ""su'e th~l 
lhe ~c's nshts;re nOl abu.\CtJ . Already Ihere .re nunw.ous e.sts 
0( ,ndividuals bein~ h .. used by ,IIJ1PO.lell of son'e fIOlilial 
of,'nis:>lions. Thil ., shameful. fo. it IOCS 10 ,how 111.:>1 SOme of 
Ibe 'Governmenl', !.>iucsl enlic::s have nv rc:rp<:C'l ror thc righl of 
c:lch Kcny.n to SUPPD" lhe pIOny of hi. on her choice, 
t. The.e h.ve .lso been.criminal :0<:1.1: individual. hove br.-cn tle,lcn 
up Ind K.nu orrl(d burnl. nOI i t Ill . good ,isn. 
tu wc cnler the' new y.;:>r, wc hope ,h.t .11 rhus.: in.ulved in 
polilics .- .nd let US not (O',CI Ihl' so;lle people h."" no intc.c:r, 
,n ,ballots and b.llot boxes _ win realise lhal Ihcy Clrry .• gn:.~l 
'csponsibilily. The,. num realise: Ih., Ih.c:y con pul lhi. country on 
Ihe :puh to dQltuaion by encourllling violc,nce ~nd l,ib:rl h5uai 
01'''''' r;o<IrK of peace by ,emlininl d ... n i" .1Ilhoy do. 
Twuparency.niI oa;:Quntlibilil), will be dem.rided of all l •• dcl'1. 
nOI :jUS! the indiviclllolls in Ihe GovefllmCni. MOSi of Ihe leaders 
.o(ycslcryc:or whu n(Ow find Ihcrnsch~ .... i'hQul .ny of Ihe much 
·'coVtted.JI!:>O!s . f. Ir)'i~f to .sne.k wc~ into lhe l;mel;lIl>l. hopins 
Ihal Ihcir ' mis<ka:ls .... ,1 be- fO' lotten In lhe chIlled atmosphere 
of mulli_",,"y polilG. 
,.., Men who 0<0 known to h.:r"" s.tolcn (.nm lhe public ond .. rhclS 
who; have. stinkiDi .eco.d as tribohll$ arc try;n, 10 P;w u ,j,. 
people who will lad Keny."" inJO the futu.e. tJnf"'tun.,cly (0 • • 
Ihest people. lhere Ire 'eco,ds of Ih.-ir wronM..:1Qin,1 .nd Ihey .. ill 
not St. Ihci. dirl)' drum. com. Ifllc. nOl if rhey •• ealled In 'ccoun, . 
Lel US f.ce Ihc f~lu •• will. hope and Unil)' .nd w',houl tliOulllus 
0( IriDloI .mli.lion, f", unles. wc do Ih" ,w ... h.ll pay (or ;1 d .... ly 
~.orlt .:t, (X,rnOo;racy istupPDOCd 'oin>('fuv('"our lot. t(),n>PfOve 
I~ quality of ),f. ,n Ihi~ nllion. 1I mull n,'1 he: .n u(:us<; (or ,h,cvcs 
• nd poIitlci.ns "·'th Mlhinl bul mcu.~~I" of I'~I.«I HI (ind lhc", 
"'~y!xlct into public off...,. 
Ken).", """,,,"e be"e' Ihan th.1 .,Id ,n lhrs l"'~. ut ,eh~lIcn!. ... 
for Ilt.=..uliOfl Cl~h onc must work hard '0 hcip the C(>u<>lIy ,0 
fnr,." ""',n r .. ,"" .. r"v f'~"h .. "oe, "I.,," " .. , 
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Issues on the way 
forward for Kenya 
Wc ab th;. .... ly opportunity to "",,"_tuat.o u.. v.no... 
pr .. lu •• "oup' .nd o ........ tio ..... ho .. p.'.'.tont 
cllUIlO\lr fo ... rr.,., opeo and democr.tic o.oci.ty hN, finally, 
forted the Kanu ludenhip to open the woy (Ot all Kenyana 
'I<> participate NUy i.n the potitic&l .• oei.l and economic 
.rr.in o( lb.ir country. 
H;'l.ory will record thot thi. h .. nOl bMn &<:b ievcd 
without Iou of life ond oth .. ro r"", of oufrerine by Kenyan. 
who. by d.mandin, t hot the inhibitiv. political oy.te ... be 
I •• ned UP. incurr.d the "'foth of t he Kanu Gov.m",.nt. 
w. ,",ant I<> re&in.r th. t.et that thi. n.w.poper hoe 
alw.y. chompioned and .upported the wi.h of Ihe m.ajority 
of Kenyon. to enjoy .ruter fr .. do ..... Juot b.for. 
independence. the Nalion .... the only ne ... p.pe. 1.0 
declare ila .upport for Kanu . W. did .0 beca .... Kanu 
reoenl.ed the .. pirotion. of 'the majority of Kenyan •. 
11 w .. COUrIIW'" .t thot ti me fo • • nyone. even the 
,",oIWn··l.o publicly decl.re .uppor1- for an Atm.., pol it ic.! 
puty u: the f.c. of th,'b",t.oJ .ep.e .. ion by the crumbl~1 
colonial lo .... nm .. nl. • 
f.- 'In the mid'19700. the NolI"'n .... lh , only n ..... p.per 
" '1lin which py!.>lid,. op_d an .Ilempt by the Chlnle· 
·lhc.ConniIUllon Group I<> p"vetlt Ihelhen Vice·p ... idcnl, 
and n ...... I' ... id .. nl. Moi. t,om lucc.edinl M~ .. Keny.tLo to 
po .... r, That. too. "'0' I bold Iction by the NOIW ... 
TodoY. we IIY the time h .. come fo. oil Kenyan. to .il 
down 10lether round I conferenc .. Lobi, 1.0 ch.rt. the future 
, ,,,,It'iul cour .. for KenYo. 
Th,1 the Klnu .... . upparted in 19-60 i. not the IIm. 
K,nu wo h.v. !>e'n utllin, I<> ehon,e "YI volum • • • !x>ul 
';hot raulI be l"'n! by lho.e .ither in tli. ruline p.rty o. in 
Ihe oPI'",i,;on lA Ih, n.:ion p"pare. to d .. ,.. up 0 new 
Conotit"tion and In inuilu l ional t,.me ... o rk to build. ne .. 
KenYI. 
t-'It i. 0'" conlidered opinion t h.t neither Kanu nor n",lti, 
port;lm is the i .. ue now. AI w. move (o ..... ..d. the poJiti.cal 
I .. d ..... hip mun cri t icolly look into our nO'" unpopul •• 
in",i""~'~n •. g."yon. <l" not u.-.:t. and "'UI~ n ..... .,Iin 
. 11010. the eltobl i. h ment of "y"ten .. w}l ieh cO'lld b, 
m.nipullled by irrelponsible I .. de ,. to ha .... the people. 
1.0 loot th, notional lr .... ury o. 1.0 ....... peroanol wulth. 
Wananchi raYlt ncv'" •• oin be forced 1.0 run ..... y (.om 
their houau boc.uoe lOOm' political de",. IOCU' h ..... hip~ 
up tribal .. mction. to p.omote hi. o ... n pOlitico! .ndo. N~ 
Keny.n .hould opt to ne, hil country beclU .. hi. poliLicol 
vi.w .... not compotible with the m. in.t ....... political 
Jhinkinl· 
To .. f,,,,.od the country •• oin.t tho.. ond wo ..... 
eventu.lities. w. url' our lude .... - in Go .. emment ond in 
the,'tiJl .;';OrphCU I oPpol itio'; - 1.0 con~id., the (ollowin, 
I,end" 
, R,droft the Conltitution 1.0 en. ur. th.t the country'. 
inllitutio". ore fully p.otected.ond the concer of trib,li,m. 
which i. ve", rOIl. i. eff.ctively dult with. 
• L. , i.I"te , th&! in the future. before Iloe .,reed 
Conotitution i. amended. tlie ' .. ue i. put to , na\ionel 
rer ... ndum ond thttthe dec"'on i. corried by not I, .. \.hln 
, 7~ p.r c.nt vole. 
ic'" To .]iminole polt,election compl.inla o( ril&in, Ind 
olher electiQn p.ocedyIC Ibuoe •• ·. n independent electoral 
cnmm; •• ion . hoyld !>e c.uled by otfttute to handle III 
eieclu<,,1 i .. "u. 
• SimU .. ly. lO ,U,.Antee the hi,hut ,t.ndud, of 
r.irn .... juotioe. efficiciency and effectiv~ne .. in the 
£ .. cuti.e ond Judicitl .rm. of the Gove.nment, .n 
i" d.p· .. nd.nt Public Service Commiu' on. Judiclol 
Cur"m, .. iun ond oth~r public ~mployment .,tnc ....... u.t be 
,nleS .. 1 P .. t~ of lhe nc'" conatitu l ion .] (<I~m~ .. ork. 
Independent tende r !><>a.d ... it! be requl,ed to p",vent 
l'Orruption. 
• The IIplo."c m.lter of land ownc .... hip mu.t be 
.ddrellcd c9mpreh.n,;vel)' and h. re wa t UClut t he 
lrimmin, ot Ihe ,weepinl powe,. of the Commi .. ioner o( 
l....ond. or Any other o(lice. No o~ . hou ld ho ... a frH hand 
,in lht . Iloc:. tion or public lAnd. y 0.". or th • . _t v .... tiouo o....u ;., th, ' ",n up I<> yoote.do .... 
...tenMd ""';'10" h&l !oHn "'" I"'rpctuil)' or the "'ny .. or t'h. 
Pr .. id.nl, W. 'If .. ",Ith tb.o ""Itooon th.t the P ... id. nl·. \.enn of 
offlC. l loould bo ,m,ted to t .. o r; ••. y ... ""._ • • nd that 11 oloould 
be ... bjKt 10 compoliti •• ,l4t:tio", .. cl> 11 ..... Slmllad),. the poot'of ~ 
v;';'.P ... ido"t . hoWd bt .0t.4 '01 dirtdJy ,with "f~rbolnc 
. bk I<> P ......... . ... rodid.ota. It.hoWd bo poN.Ibloo to '.Ilhot'tr" 
or both baIdo .. of <heM·ol'l'lc.. " 
Ci •• " the ,...t .. po.;....,. with _~ion and the "'.,. '-do .. 
h .... uood It I<> .......... dth. it \0 doolr. bI. to """"""" tho.t Ioado .. 
doeloor. their "Mlth .. b.D ........ "':J and loa""" ""bile ofllct • n.- .... ~I ' , .... of th, Ml;'nt 1'0"'\& which ","'I'bo <kaIt with 
in th, poh'l<aI • ..., ... """u.." p""' ...... ADd .. w. U7 to ......... 
tM. p._.lt Lt vital to ...... "'b'" tbalthlo ... ,. ~ty. ro' l 
.;IftlItl'l U' 'UIi~III"'K~ """'M~ t!r.,.......:.~-.... • 









As we lay 1991 to Test today and prepa re to welcome the 
New Year tomorrow, Kenyans would be wise to keep in 
Inind that the two years are ine:<tricably linked by an 
HllpOrLant idea - 1992 will bopefuUy !:lee the fruition of 
selds sow n in 1991. 
The momentous decision to allow the el<isten('.e of more 
Lhall one political party in Kenya was a welcome one, but 
also one that came not a moment too soon. After all, several 
o ther African !;ountries had already successfully ended 
autucratic single. party rule. Most of these were in the 
?tl·tlcll ·speaking nil linO!; of West Africa. but an eJlcellent 
'!x:.mple much closer to home was that of Zambia, where 
ilft~r months of su~tained political pressure, President 
Frederick Chiluba's Movement for MulU-Party Democracy 
:M MD) swep\ fOfl.ler President Kenneth Kaunda's. UniLed 
:--'a~iunal Independence Party (UNIP) out of office ;n an 
e ;('ctoral landslide_ 
Whi..:h way now (or Kenys. as ..... e peer into the uncertain 
fUII..:re? Will Kenyans - overwhelmed by the sudden 
jJuli~kal freedom - scramble to fOTm more PQlilicaJ pllrties 
~h .... \ are practical or will they sensibly choose one vehicli! 
thllt seems most likely to fulfil those aspirations they feel 
ho, e been neglected by Kallu? 
It is ubvious where the first road leads. In a worst -rase 
so.:enado. ~ujitio.:lI1 pani.!s would proliferate at such a rlite 
that within no lime . even the most ridiculous interest group 
would have some sort of "voice" seeking "represenUltion" 
[UI it III Parliament. This could only result ill a perception 
within the entrend,ed power structure, and most possibly 
111 the military. that malLers wc re running out of control 
31:d that a measure o[ o rder was ca!1ed for. The military is 
ai ready sd!!ing things up in Togo and Cougo, . 
The second road is much more hopeful. By supp ressing 
their personal ambitions - an alien notion to most Kenyan 
poli,,icians - opposition members could make room for a 
· .... ic •. ":n~e of ,~pinions wi'.hiu OLa: t'vli~i.;",j part;,' ~hat would 
articulate them dearly and in a manner lo show that it was 
much mOre responsive to wananchi's needs than anyone 
else. 
There will be. no doubt, effons to create splinter groups 
"'nd (ilher attempts by status QUO power brokers_to throw 
Lhe C'pposition into confusion. This can be achieved by 
slres~illg the differen ces between the opposition's various 
strands instead of emphasising what binds them together. 
This and other time· honoured divisive Ulclies 3re sure to be 
w..islely used as 1992 matures, 
/"Fortunately, Kenyans are nobody's foo ls. Having no use 
at the best of times for the power game that is politics. they 
are politically aware and knov .. "'hieh side their b read is 
bl!ttered. Having come t lus far and achieved this much. 
they .. te hardly li ke ly lo b q sidetracked by the kind o f short, 
sighted chicanery and ou tright cheating so favoured by the 
c lHrenched power brokers. 
Nineteen ninety-two is the year when Kenyans will h'lYe 
to look extremely dos!:l)' al the choices in fro n t' of them 
I"eforc deciding for themselves which party is bes \ placed to 
pruvide t he greatest good for the greatest number. 
Hn"illg be~n force-fed s s ing!e ·parly diet for so long, it is 
l1ut ~u rprisinl: that Kenyans arc esger for change. But they 
du not want change just fo r its own sllke. They want to see 
LU what e~tent their political leaders - entrenched or 
ul>p,,~illvl1 - are capable "f working for the populnr guod as 
ul'P"sed lU work ill!! ror thtir OWJl welfare. 
III thiS rCbnr'~ ",,'n, l~.)!n is the year of reckoning, the (JUt 
th.J\ "Ill »Cl: Hie mCIl scpar;-;.te<i from the boys, the wheat 




____ ~N=&irob=·:.::=i_!londay, J~ zo;· l~?2 : 
Restore faith in 
power of the vote 
Building and We~g in.ttitptiora whicb will weguard 
the tradition of democratic government la Cl baaic objective 
o f multi-party political 'Y1Ite~, But equa,lly important. 
particularly i.D the cont.en 'of Kenya, ,uci:eaa of plural 
pclitica will be ju~ed againat the eIlthuawm it genera~ in 
the People to participate in politica at the gruaroota leveL 
Over the Ye&r8, the 'misuse of power and office by ~lr.e 
top Kanu oCficiala haa gre.atly undermined the confidence of 
wananchi a.cd dampened their enthuawlll to participate in 
crucw democratic proceuaea like votiDg c.t elections. 
The fe e lioc generally has been one of resigned 
frustration. W.hy &bowd I vote if wbate\,er. 1 do will oot 
ru.Ut., a difference? This WBJI a direct reauit of the rampant 
r'.ggi:lg of electiollJo at all leve1.-. Other wa.canchi did not feel 
the lIeceuity to vote because politica W, over the yean, 
beeIl reduced ' to glorifir.ation oC individuala, a gateway to 
richee a.cd 83 a whip to puniab' and intimidate "enemies". 
Somt' .... qer,; ~o,n8 the way, politic. Wail divoreecl from the 
concrete .ocio-:eeonomie iMut8 . ~t . ahouJd e;ddre8I. 
. Tbere d, th~fore, an t%\.re~ely ~ent n~uity to 
restore the confidJ:lnce of people i.ri politiet! This has to be 
underta'-en 83 .. deliberate educatioq.al ue~.intended to 
remove from the people', minds the blinkered images about 
politic8 put ·thcre by politiciaJa who should have known 
better, hut dj'd not care. . 
The National Council for Churchefl of KeIl'ya (NCCK) 
ha& taken a.o important initiati";e in this r.egard. Lut .... eek. 
it launched a 'handbbok, Why You ShouLd. Vote, meant to 
rekindle 'the inLereat or people to Yote. I :, provi-lea, iD 'imple 
\a..iiguage. the different concept. or a r.,u1ti ·party political 
,yatem, a.cd m01lt importantly, the eJect.ion· p;ocedure, and 
why it is eritical that peOple vote, 
But >&ven a.I we note the iI:l.menae imporLaJlce of the 
NeCK handbook, we realilIe t.h.st it might not reach all u l S 
majori ty of the people it d IUppo&ed to get to, Thi& u. .... htrp 
political parties, ·pre&8l1re group. Md iodividuru. c .. me in. 
Throuj:"h politicaJ rallies, ICrninarI and other foruIWI. the 
point must be made to the people that the ballot they hold 
m.U:t8 a difference to baYing in Parliament 0. dunderhead 
who will not even know the Standing·Ord.u. after yean in 
the HoWW!, 0 1 n peraon .. ~ho undel'&~d& a.nd can articulate 
the problCID8 facing his people, to them and other bodies 
whieb may be nble to help. 
The atraLegy i.'! 1:0 ma.l.:e a atraitbt pitch Ilt people -
exhort them to vote. ol'land outline th~ i,suel tbat confront 
then:> in jLU.lltapo6itlon to thEo progu..moea of partiea. The 
necell.llity for thi.a cannot be oyer~llIph.eaiaed: 
. Lo the excitement. of.polincal campaig:l& - d ie factor of 
many parties beigbLens the experience - it ie all too ealy to 
work the crowds by harping at the ain& Of wca.kneBlles o f the 
party. While th.i.tI b.a.a been known to work generally, it i~ 
imperotive t.h.sl the partiee oven::ome the thmptation to 
eheapell the uerfiae of mwti-partyi$m by concentrating 
more on the mattera whieh will =a.kt or brea.k the nen 
govemsneDt. 
I While FORD and olhera will, n&eeeaarily, campaign to 
-discredit Moj', government, they must addrua isluea 1ile 
tae unemployment time-bomb, food .elf+.uf(iciency, 
boo.ting the economy iD race oC .;lvere structurol 
adjU&tment programmea, the co-operative movement. 
regional eo-opuatioa., the education ,ystem, etc. etc. 
While Ka.ou ha& every ~t to ,,:tempt to ahow the . 
-opposition '- rightly or wrongly - all t\ mot.ley of ill-luiLed, 
taiDt.ed, revenge-driven KaJJu rejectl. it Ir.UlIt addresa tbe&e 
urne ilIauee from the point of view of wbether it hu any 
nc .... concrete propoa.8la to =a.ke to improve the situation. 
The urne approach must be adopted by the Democratic 
Party. DEMO, and other group, which have c hosen to 
educate the people on the power of the vote. 
Ignorance and apathy ba.a for, long time haee used to 
J.:ecp the people out of the mamatretU:ll politics. The 
rehabilitation exercise must st&.rt 00"', ,nd h is 6 thllllenge 
to t.bc parties to do the needful. 
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